The Christmas Truce: Myth, Memory, and the First World War by Crocker, Theresa B.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--History History 
2016 
The Christmas Truce: Myth, Memory, and the First World War 
Theresa B. Crocker 
University of Kentucky, tbcroc2@uky.edu 
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.495 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Crocker, Theresa B., "The Christmas Truce: Myth, Memory, and the First World War" (2016). Theses and 
Dissertations--History. 42. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/history_etds/42 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the History at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--History by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more 
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Theresa B. Crocker, Student 
Dr. Philip Harling, Major Professor 
Dr. Scott Taylor, Director of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE: 
MYTH, MEMORY, AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
College of Arts and Sciences 
at the University of Kentucky 
 
 
 
By 
Terri Blom Crocker 
Lexington, Kentucky 
Director: Dr. Philip Harling, Professor of History 
Lexington, Kentucky 
2016 
Copyright © Terri Blom Crocker 2016 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE: 
MYTH, MEMORY, AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
 
 
The 1914 Christmas truce, when enemy soldiers met, fraternized and even played 
football in No-Man’s-Land, is frequently used to support the popular view of the First World 
War as a “stupid, tragic and futile” conflict, the ultimate “bad” war. The truce, which one 
historian describes as “a candle lit in the darkness of Flanders,” is commonly perceived as a 
manifestation of the anger that soldiers felt towards the meaningless war which they had 
been tricked into fighting. However, contemporaneous sources show that the impromptu 
cease-fire was not an act of defiance, but rather arose from the professionalism of the soldiers 
involved, the conditions of static trench warfare, the adaptation of the soldiers to their new 
environment, the foul weather on the Western Front, the absence of major battles, and 
memories of traditional celebrations of Christmas. The truce, in short, was caused by rain, 
mud, curiosity, lack of personal animosity towards the enemy, and homesickness, rather than 
by frustration and rebellion. Although the conventional narrative of the truce maintains that 
soldiers defied their 0fficers to participate in it, this was rarely the case: in fact, Lieutenant-
Colonel Fisher-Rowe, commander of the 1st Grenadier Guards, wrote his wife that the 
Germans “say they want the truce to go on till after New Year and I am sure I have no 
objection. A rest from bullets will be distinctly a change.” No soldiers were punished for their 
participation in the 1914 truce, and no troops refused to fire upon their enemies afterwards. 
Newspapers published accounts of the armistice openly and many regimental histories later 
featured the event prominently. 
An evaluation of sources from 1914 through 2013 that reference the truce 
demonstrates that the conventional narrative of the truce, like that of the war itself, took 
many decades to develop. This work examines the myths that have defined the truce over the 
past century, and contrasts them with the letters and diaries of British soldiers who 
participated in it, the reports of it in the official war diaries of the battalions involved, and the 
accounts of it published in the newspapers. By examining the support the soldiers felt for the 
war, as well as their willingness to return to fighting after the impromptu armistice ended, 
the book argues that the Christmas truce, which would seem to confirm the dominant view 
of the First World War, instead challenges the war’s popular narrative. A soldier involved 
described the temporary cease-fire as being “just like the interval between the rounds in a 
friendly boxing match.” The boxing match that was the First World War was in fact a deadly 
and tragic conflict, yet this soldier’s view of the truce broadly summed up the attitudes of 
 
 
participants toward the event, who remained determined to win the war, while enjoying a 
break from the battle.   
 
 
KEYWORDS: First World War, Christmas Truce, Trench Warfare,  
Western Front, Memory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
Terri Blom Crocker 
      December 16. 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE: 
MYTH, MEMORY, AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
 
By 
Terri Blom Crocker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
       Philip Harling________________ 
       Director of Dissertation 
 
       Scott Taylor___________________ 
       Director of Graduate Studies 
 
       December 16, 2016_____________ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Mark 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
It is wishful thinking to suppose that an historical memory can be transmitted without being 
simplified. The memory is already simplified before people decide that it needs to be 
transmitted. 
-Clive James, The Crystal Bucket 
 
Wars that shout in screams of anguish . . . 
-Yes, “The Gates of Delirium” 
 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my academic advisers at the 
University of Kentucky, Drs. Phil Harling and Karen Petrone, who contributed so much to 
this work. They both offered vital support and feedback on the project, from its beginnings as 
a master’s thesis through the final manuscript submission, and I am very grateful for the time 
they gave to this work. Additionally, I want to thank them both for their forbearance with the 
world’s most willfully stubborn graduate student, as their patience has been stretched far too 
often to remain unacknowledged. I would also like to thank Dr. Pearl James for her interest 
and encouragement, and Drs. Amy Taylor and Jonathan Allison for serving on my committee. 
 My colleagues in the Office of Legal Counsel at UK deserve much appreciation for their 
understanding when class times or research trips kept me out of the office, as well as their 
willingness to listen to me talk about the First World War. I am particularly grateful to UK’s 
general counsel, Bill Thro, for his support for my academic endeavors and enthusiasm for this 
book. All my coworkers have been helpful, but I would especially like to thank Cliff Iler, 
Marcy Deaton, Shannan Carroll, and Thalethia Routt. 
 Others at UK have been very generous in their support for my work, and Bill Swinford 
deserves special gratitude for encouragement as well as for practical assistance. Cathy 
Masoud, Eduardo Santillan-Jimenez, and Skip van Hook all took an interest in this project at 
times when support was sorely needed and much appreciated, and I hope they know how 
much that meant to me. 
 I am most grateful to Steve Wrinn and Allison Webster at the University Press of 
Kentucky for their many kind comments and helpful suggestions throughout the publishing 
process. 
 
 
ii 
 
 Peter Grant reached out to me about my work at a very opportune time, and since then 
has provided much assistance in the way of suggestions, corrections, and advice, for all of 
which I am most grateful. Anne Samson provided me with some research help and lots of 
encouragement, and I am very appreciative of both. 
 The staff at the Imperial War Museum (IWM), particularly the late Roderick Suddaby, 
were of great help with my research, and ditto for the indefatigable Inter-Library Loan folks 
at UK, who always found the books, however obscure, I needed to complete this work. 
Thanks also to Dick Gilbreath for the wonderful maps. 
 I am very grateful to all the IWM collections’ copyright holders who took the time to 
correspond with me regarding their relations’ letters, diaries, and memoirs and to provide me 
with many details of interest regarding the war service and memories of their relatives. I hope 
they all feel that I have represented the views of those soldiers and veterans accurately. 
 Thanks to Ruth Booher for her friendship and support and to Jamie Wilson for the same, 
as well as her kind comments on some of this work in earlier drafts. In spite of the fact that 
we have never met, Shelley Nass obligingly offered to read the entire dissertation and 
suggested useful corrections. Pat O’Connor and I have met, many times, but that didn’t stop 
him from not only reading some chapters but also providing comments on them that made 
me want to write a whole other work on the Christmas truce. I’m grateful to you all for your 
help and advice. 
 Lori Cresci, in her various roles as cheerleader, unofficial editor, sounding board, 
grammarian, intelligent ideal reader, and BFF, has been a rock throughout the three years it 
took to complete this work, and I can’t imagine how I could have got through it without her. 
I also can’t imagine how I would have got through the past forty years without her, but that’s 
another story. 
 Thanks to Saskia for being the best daughter ever. 
 Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Mark, for everything he has done to help with 
this work. From sharing my passion for the subject to providing much-needed advice on the 
various drafts of the project, his support, insight, and understanding have proved invaluable. 
In addition, he is the only person who has read this work in its three forms—master’s thesis, 
dissertation, and manuscript—although I doubt that is what he had in mind when he 
volunteered for better or worse thirty-three years ago. In gratitude for his patience and 
assistance, I therefore dedicate this dissertation to him, with lots of love. 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements         vi 
List of Illustrations         x 
Chapter One            1 
“A candle lit in the darkness”: The Christmas Truce and the First World War 
Chapter Two            22 
“Absolute Hell”: The Western Front in 1914 
Chapter Three            43 
“A great day with our enemies”: The Christmas Truce 
Chapter Four            65 
“No war today”: The Christmas Truce as Reported in Official War Diaries and         
Regimental Histories 
Chapter Five            92 
“One day of peace at the front”: The Christmas Truce and the British Press 
Chapter Six            113 
“That unique and weird Christmas”: The Christmas Truce during the War 
Chapter Seven            135 
“The curious Christmas truce”: The First World War and the Christmas Truce from            
1920 - 1959 
Chapter Eight            157 
“The famous Christmas truce”: The First World War and the Christmas Truce from            
1960 -1969 
Chapter Nine  1          178 
“The legendary Christmas truce”: The First World War, the Christmas Truce and             
Social History, 1970-1989 
Chapter Ten            200 
“Memories of Christmas 1914 persist”: Orthodoxy, Revisionism and the Christmas            
Truce, 1990 - 2013 
 
 
iv 
 
Chapter Eleven            219 
“It was peace that won”: The Christmas Truce and the Narrative of the First World             
War 
Bibliography          230 
Permissions          246 
Vita           250 
  
 
 
v 
 
List of Illustrations 
Figure 1            28 
Drawing by E.R.P. Berryman, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles, showing a soldier leaving for                 
and returning from the trenches.  Used by permission of Tamsin Baccus. 
Figure 2           67 
Structure of B.E.F. on 25 December 1914, showing which battalions, brigades,                
divisions and corps participated in the Christmas truce. (Table by Dick Gilbreath) 
Figure 3            71 
25 December 1914 entry from Official War Diary of the 1/16th Queens Westminster           
Rifles.  Used by permission of the National Archives, London. 
Figure 4           74 
Map of front and general area of fighting on the Western Front in December 1914.            
(Map by Dick Gilbreath) 
Figure 5           76 
Map showing area of German/British truce at end December 1914.  Locations of               
British Corps are marked on front line. (Map by Dick Gilbreath) 
Figure 6           82 
Map drawn by 7th Division soldier showing location and identity of German                      
troops along British front lines at Christmas 1914. Used by permission of the                 
National Archives, London. 
Figure 7           83 
Drawing by E.R.P. Berryman, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles, showing British and German           
soldiers fighting on Christmas Eve 1914 and fraternizing on Christmas Day 1914.                 
Used by permission of Tamsin Baccus. 
Figure 8           127 
Bruce Bainsfather cartoon showing Germans and British soldiers fraternizing on         
Christmas Day 1914.  (Image in public domain) 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter One 
“A candle lit in the darkness”: 
The Christmas Truce and the First World War 
 
 
To fraternize was in itself an implicit condemnation of the war. 
-Remy Cazals,  
Meetings in No Man’s Land: 
Christmas 1914 and Fraternization in the Great War (2007) 
 
The three Battalions in the line, like the rest of the British Army, met the enemy in No-man’s-
land; exchanged the ‘souveneer’ so precious to the hearts of the Private Rifleman; smoked 
German cigars and gave ‘gaspers’ in return; speculated with philosophically minded Teutons 
upon the futility of the whole thing, and upon the ‘rumness’ of talking together today and 
killing each other tomorrow; passed Boxing Day in the traditional spirit of sentimentality; and 
resumed the war hammer and tongs on the 27th. 
-Reginald Berkeley, M.C. 
The History of the Rifle Brigade in the War of 1914-1918 (1927) 
 
 
 
“To die tomorrow,” proclaims a German soldier in Joyeux Noel after the Christmas truce, “is 
even more absurd than dying yesterday.”1 The 2004 film takes the futility of the First World 
War as its theme, and uses the 1914 holiday armistice, the day when “(e)nemies leave their 
weapons behind for one night as they band together in brotherhood and forget about the 
brutalities of war,” to advance its theory that the soldiers who participated in the truce were 
rebelling against the senseless conflict in which they were engaged.2 Joyeux Noel begins with 
British, French, and German schoolchildren parroting their national attitudes towards their 
enemies; the British schoolchild recites, “To rid the map of every trace/Of Germany and the 
Hun/We must exterminate that race.” This early scene establishes the film’s attitude towards 
the war: that all combatants were equally culpable for the conflict, and yet equally innocent, as 
they had clearly been indoctrinated by their governments to hate their enemies. The film then 
shows French and Scottish soldiers on the Western front attacking a German trench in 
December 1914, an assault that results in many casualties with no gain of territory. Soon 
afterwards, on Christmas Eve, the Germans place lit Christmas trees on their parapets, a 
soldier sings “Silent Night” and the men from all three countries walk hesitantly into the 
                                                          
 1Christian Carion, Director, Joyeux Noel (Sony Picture Classics, 2005). 
2 Joyeux Noel, DVD liner notes.   
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bomb-cratered area between the trenches. The German, French and Scottish officers share a 
bottle of champagne and arrange for an evening’s cease-fire. The lower ranks exchange drinks, 
cigarettes and chocolate, and at midnight a Scottish priest leads them all in a mass.  
On Christmas morning, the officers return to No-Man’s-Land and coordinate the 
burial of the dead. After the bodies are interred and a service read over the graves, 
fraternization resumes, with a hastily arranged football match and card-playing and even a 
juggler entertaining the troops. The next morning Horstmayer, the German officer, walks over 
to the French line. The French officer, Audebert, protests that the truce is over, but the 
German has come not to extend the armistice. Horstmayer instead warns the French that they 
will shortly be shelled by German artillery, and he invites the French and Scottish soldiers to 
shelter in the safety of the German trenches during the bombardment. Once the German 
shelling has ceased, the soldiers from all three armies then congregate in the French trenches 
to avoid retaliatory shelling from the French artillery on the German lines. Afterwards, the 
German soldiers return to their trenches on the other side of No-Man’s-Land, while the three 
officers shake hands wistfully and a Scottish bagpiper plays “Auld Lang Syne”. 
After the truce ends, the narration shifts to military censors reading the letters that the 
soldiers have written home about the event, which also announce their intentions of 
continuing the armistice:  
“The Scots photographer promised us pictures at New Year’s.  Be a chance to 
get back together.”  
 
“We and the British decided to accept the Kraut’s invitation.  We’ll go spend 
New Year with them.”  
 
“And above all, drink to the health of all those bastards who, sitting pretty, sent 
us here to slug it out.” 
 
Joyeux Noel then shows the official consequences of participation in the impromptu cease-fire. 
Audebert is chastised by a superior officer, who tells him that it was disgraceful for his unit to 
have been involved. “If public opinion hears of this -” the officer warns, at which point 
Audebert interrupts: “Have no fear, no one here will tell...because no one would believe or 
understand.” Audebert also admits that he “felt closer to the Germans than to those who cry 
‘Kill the Krauts!’ before their stuffed turkey!” His unit is then sent back into battle in a 
different part of the front lines. The Scottish battalion that participated in the truce is 
disbanded “by order of the King” and its soldiers scattered among other regiments. The 
Germans are reprimanded for their participation in the truce by their crown prince, who 
lectures the soldiers briefly on their insubordination before informing them that they are 
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being sent to “East Prussia to take part in an offensive against the Russian Army.” As 
punishment, therefore, for their fraternization with the enemy, the Scottish battalion is 
disbanded, the French soldiers are returned to a brutal sector of the front, and the Germans 
dispatched to the Eastern front. 
 Joyuex Noel’s depiction of the Christmas truce will be familiar to many. As 
demonstrated by the reviews it received, the film was accepted as an accurate representation 
of the famous day in 1914 when enemy troops fraternized on the Western front. The Times 
observed that it was “(i)nspired by the spontaneous ceasefire that occurred in the corpse-
strewn no man’s land between the trenches in northern France on Christmas Day, 1914.”3 The 
New York Times noted that it “tells the true story of an improvised Christmas truce during the 
first year of World War I.”4  While it may sound unbelievable, the BBC asserted, Joyeux Noel 
“is actually based on fact.”5 Roger Ebert, the famous film critic, declared that the film’s 
“sentimentality is muted by the thought that this moment of peace actually did take place, 
among men who were punished for it, and who mostly died soon enough afterward.”6 
Christian Carion, the film’s director, stated that, while the characters presented in Joyeux Noel 
were fictional, “the detail is historically accurate.”7 
As recounted in Joyeux Noel and echoed in many other sources, the story of the 
Christmas truce is indeed a heart-warming tale - but one that bears little relation to the truth. 
There may have been British soldiers who rushed out to meet the Germans with peace and 
brotherhood in their hearts and mutiny on their minds, but for the vast majority of the troops 
involved, the reality was much different.8 The truce, which at the time it occurred was largely 
perceived as an interesting but unimportant event, was not an act of defiance, but one which 
arose from the convergence of a number of factors: the professionalism of the soldiers 
involved, the unprecedented conditions of static trench warfare, the adaptation of the soldiers 
                                                          
3 “Merry Christmas (Joyeux Noel)” The Times, 17 December 2005.  
4 Stephen Holden, “A Christmas Truce Forged by Germans, French, and Scots,” The New York Times, 3 
March 2006.  
5 Matthew Leyland, “Merry Christmas (Joyeux Noel), BBC, 13 December 2005.  
6 Roger Ebert, “Joyeux Noel,” Chicago Sun Times, 9 March 2006. 
7 Sheila Johnston, “The astonishing war story that a nation chose to forget/Lessons in humanity: Joyeux 
Noel,”, Telegraph, 2 December 2005. 
8 For the conventional narrative of the 1914 truce, see, among others, Stanley Weintraub, Silent Night: 
The Story of the World War I Christmas Truce (New York: Penguin, 2002); Malcolm Brown and Shirley 
Seaton, Christmas Truce (London: Pan Books, 1984); John Keegan, An Illustrated History of the First 
World War (New York: Random House, 2001); Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Alan Clark, The Donkeys (London: Pimlico, 1961); Lyn Macdonald, 
1915: The Death of Innocence (1993.; repr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); and Marc 
Ferro, Malcolm Brown, Remy Cazals, and Olaf Mueller (with translations by Helen McPhail), Meetings 
in No Man’s Land: Christmas 1914 and Fraternization in the Great War (London: Constable & Robinson 
Ltd, 2007). 
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to their new environment, the foul weather on the Western Front in the first winter of the 
war, the absence of major initiatives along that front during the last two weeks of December, 
and memories of traditional celebrations of Christmas. The holiday truce, in short, was caused 
by rain, mud, curiosity, lack of personal animosity towards the enemy, and homesickness 
rather than by frustration and rebellion.  
The actual armistice, however, does not have the narrative appeal of the Christmas 
truce as it is commonly portrayed in historical and fictional accounts. In the popular 
imagination, the holiday cease-fire, which appeared out of nowhere and ended just as quickly, 
has left behind the legend of a “candle lit in the darkness of Flanders,” and a lingering 
collective memory of football matches, shared cigars and camaraderie.9 In Britain, the 
conventional story of the truce is well-known: on 25 December 1914, the soldiers in the 
trenches, trapped in a pointless war and angry with both the politicians who had deceived 
them into enlisting and the incompetent generals who commanded them, were eager to show 
their opposition by defying their officers and consorting with the Germans. The military 
leadership, outraged by the willingness of their men to fraternize with the enemy, issued harsh 
orders commanding that the truce end, and the soldiers, now reluctant to fire upon opposing 
troops, had to be coerced into resuming the war and were subsequently punished for their 
participation in the cease-fire. Some regiments that took part in the truce even had to be 
transferred to different parts of the line, or to other fronts altogether, as they refused to fight 
the men they now considered comrades. Soldiers, whose letters were censored, were 
forbidden to write home about the armistice, and press censorship, imposed by the 
government to keep civilians ignorant about the truth of the war, prevented the news of the 
truce from reaching the British public. In any case, the conspiracy that the press barons had 
willingly entered into with the authorities to promote the war made it impossible, even 
without government-imposed restrictions, for the newspapers to acknowledge the existence of 
the truce or the soldiers’ attitudes that prompted it.  
According to the widely accepted narrative of the truce, since the episode was covered 
up at the time it occurred, only the soldiers who had been involved in it knew about the 
holiday cease-fire. The general public supposedly did not find out about it until decades later, 
when the truce was mentioned in the famous 1964 BBC documentary series, The Great War, 
and memorialized in the anti-war play and film, Oh What a Lovely War. As soon as the British 
became aware of the 1914 Christmas fraternization, the story of the truce and the desire for 
                                                          
9 Weintraub, Silent Night, pg. xvi. As the various cease-fires and fraternizations were unconnected, they 
should more accurately be described as “the Christmas truces” rather than “the Christmas truce,” the 
singular term will be used throughout this work 
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peace on the part of the soldiers involved that it symbolized became a vital part of the 
narrative of the war, as can be demonstrated by the number of books, newspaper articles and 
websites devoted to it. It has been the subject of television documentaries, plays, children’s 
books, and an opera, Silent Night. The truce was mentioned in the last episode of the popular 
television series Blackadder Goes Forth, a cross has been put up in Ploegsteert Wood to 
memorialize the spot where enemies met and fraternized in No-Man’s-Land, and the 
centenary of the First World War will be celebrated by recreating the truce’s most famous 
feature, “the football match played against German troops which remains one of the most 
poignant moments of the conflict.”10  As a recent Manchester Guardian article claims, the story 
of the Christmas truce is one “that seems to gain in resonance and potency as the years go 
by.”11  
It is certainly true that the tale of the truce is one that has expanded throughout the 
years to encompass the changing narrative of the First World War, but as the holiday 
armistice has gained a cherished position in public memory, myths about it have overtaken its 
reality. Although the conventional narrative of the truce maintains that soldiers defied their 
0fficers to participate in it, this was rarely the case: in fact, Lieutenant-Colonel Fisher-Rowe, 
commander of the 1st Grenadier Guards, wrote his wife that the Germans “say they want the 
truce to go on till after New Year and I am sure I have no objection.  A rest from bullets will be 
distinctly a change.”12 No soldiers were punished for their participation in the 1914 holiday 
armistice, and no troops refused to fire upon their enemies afterwards. The military diaries of 
the regiments involved often reported the truce openly, and numerous accounts of it were 
published in the British national press.  The truce remained a part of the public narrative of 
the First World War from the time the conflict ended through the early 1960s, when it was re-
packaged and re-purposed by historians and others who were anxious to advance a certain 
view of the war. 
In spite of the readily available information regarding the episode that demonstrates 
otherwise, the romanticized version of the Christmas truce, with its defiant soldiers, 
disapproving leadership and ignorant home front, is one that has increasingly been pressed 
into the service of the conventional discourse of the First World War. That assessment of the 
1914-1918 conflict, which came into prominence during the 1960s and is exemplified by the 
works of authors such as Alan Clark, A.J.P. Taylor, Paul Fussell and John Keegan, is that it was 
                                                          
10 “Kickabout that captured futility of First World War to be replayed for Centenary,” Manchester 
Guardian, 8 February 2013, http://www.ww1battlefields.co.uk/flanders/plugstreet.html. 
11 Malcolm Brown, “When Peace Broke Out,” Manchester Guardian, 23 December, 2001. 
12 L. Fisher-Rowe, 1st Grenadier Guards, Private Papers of L. Fisher-Rowe, Imperial War Museum 
Collection No. 16978, 27 December 1914 letter. 
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a “stupid, tragic and futile” war.13 It is famous, firstly, for the enormous numbers of people that 
died in it. Gerald De Groot, for example, opens his history of the war with the stark 
observation that “nine million combatants and twelve million civilians died during the Great 
War.”14 The sheer scale of the war’s destruction and its unprecedented impact on the civilian 
populations involved greatly surpassed any previous conflicts, as Martin Gilbert noted when 
adding the “mass murder of Armenians in 1915, and the influenza epidemic that began while 
the war was still being fought” to the butcher’s bill.15 
 Of course, horrific as these totals are, the number of people killed by the war is not 
necessarily sufficient grounds upon which to condemn it. The judgment of history, however, is 
that in spite of the millions who died fighting in it, the 1914-1918 war achieved nothing. “The 
First World War,” John Keegan states unequivocally, “was a tragic and unnecessary conflict.”16 
The twin themes of tragedy and futility are present in most works about the war, ceaselessly 
underlining this view of the conflict and propagating the belief that the nations of Europe, 
through lack of foresight and with insufficient justification, had blundered into a war that they 
foolishly expected would be localized, short and relatively easy to win. As Adam Gopnik sums 
up the attitudes of the countries involved, they went to war in 1914 because 
(t)he Germans thought that, more or less, it would be like 1870; the French 
thought that, with the help of the English, it wouldn’t be like 1870; the English 
thought that it would be like a modernized 1814, a continental war with 
decisive interference by Britain’s professional military; and the Russians 
thought that it couldn’t be worse than just sitting there.17  
 
The catalyzing event that prompted the British to get involved in the war, the violation 
of Belgian neutrality, is now perceived as an excuse rather than a reason, and the subsequent 
emphasis on the atrocities committed against that country by the Germans is also viewed 
cynically. In addition, many theorize that the British press deliberately published a number of 
outright lies about the behavior of the German army in Belgium and France in order to sway 
British public opinion in favor of the conflict and therefore assist with recruiting. Niall 
Ferguson argues that in Britain “the most commonly aired justification for the war was that it 
                                                          
13 Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), pg. 3. 
14 Gerald de Groot, The First World War (London: Palgrave/St. Martin’s Press, 2001), pg. 1. 
15 Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (London: Orion Books Limited, 1994), pg. xv. 
16 John Keegan, The First World War (London: Hutchinson, 1998), pg. 3. 
17 Adam Gopnik, “The Big One: Historians rethink the war to end all wars,” The New Yorker, August 23, 
2004, pg. 81. Of course, as the agreements France had entered into with Britain did not guarantee 
British involvement if Germany attacked them or if they attacked Germany, they could not know before 
entering the war that British help would be available. Gopnik was, however, pretty much spot-on about 
the German, British and Russian motives. 
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was necessary to defeat Prussian militarism and ‘frightfulness’, exemplified by the atrocities 
perpetuated by the German army against Belgian civilians.”18 John Simpson, the noted BBC 
reporter, agrees that the situation in Belgium was exploited by the British government, 
observing that based upon the “memory of 1870…there was an expectation that when the 
Germans invaded Belgium and France they would behave savagely. It was this expectation 
which the British wartime propaganda services took advantage of.”19  
According to the conventional narrative, the series of miscalculations and pretexts that 
entangled Europe in the First World War paled in comparison to its sheer incompetence in 
fighting it. Military leaders on both sides, trained for and expecting a war of movement, 
proved unable to cope with the conditions of defense-oriented industrialized warfare. As a 
result, soldiers were slaughtered in the millions on the battlefields of the war simply because 
of the shortsightedness and callousness of the generals leading them, and the same generals 
were willing to endure enormous casualties rather than admit to incompetence. On the 
Western front, Fussell asserts angrily that “even in the quietest times, some 7000 British men 
and officers were killed and wounded daily, just as a matter of course. ‘Wastage,’ the Staff 
called it.”20  
 The battles of the First World War – of which the Somme and Passchendaele are by far 
the most infamous in British remembrance – are thought of today chiefly in terms of the 
ineffectual generals who caused the gratuitous death and destruction of the men involved.  
The combat on the Western front, with its characteristically static nature, came to embody the 
typical soldier’s experience in the war: endless spells of duty in horrific conditions, interrupted 
only by orders to ‘go over the top’ and take part in yet another fruitless, and generally fatal, 
assault. The modern attitude toward the Western front can be inferred from the titles of the 
books written about it, including Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I and The 
Killing Grounds: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 
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1900-1918.21 The time spent in the hell of the killing grounds took its toll on those involved, 
even if they survived; Keegan notes that the war not only “ended the lives of ten million 
beings,” but also “tortured the emotional lives of millions more.”22   
One factor that contributed to the acceptance by the British of the continued slaughter 
and mental torture of their soldiers on the Western front was the ignorance of civilians about 
the conflict. “What actually happened,” Cate Haste claims, “was that so little information was 
released that the home front was left in a state of bewilderment about the nature of the war.”23 
The public, however, had been made to believe in the war and therefore supported its 
continuance; as A.J.P. Taylor argued, “(i)t was necessary to rouse public opinion in order to 
fight the war; and this opinion then made it essential to keep the war going.”24 Because 
noncombatants, for the most part, did not come under attack, De Groot maintains that “a 
chasm of experience developed between the home front and the fighting front. Soldiers felt 
deep antagonism towards civilians who, they felt, could never understand the horrors of the 
trenches.”25 The hostility that active troops felt towards not only civilians, but also towards the 
military leaders who took great care never to expose themselves to hostile fire and the 
politicians who had chosen to sacrifice an entire generation in a unnecessary war only 
increased the soldiers’ alienation from non-combatants, and their subsequent disillusionment 
with the entire conflict. 
As a result, British society was divided, in Arthur Marwick’s view, between the civilian 
who was “aware of and almost inured to colossal slaughter, but oblivious to the real tortures, 
physical and mental, of trench warfare, and on the other the soldier who was enduring 
them.”26 According to Simpson, however, this division was both necessary and deliberate, as 
“(t)he horrors of front-line warfare were so great that if the newspapers had been free to 
describe them honestly, it would certainly have been harder to persuade men to come forward 
and join up in sufficient numbers.” It was, therefore, “(b)etter, the politicians and the generals 
believed, to hide the truth from the British public, so that they would continue to support the 
war and encourage their sons to join the forces.”27 In fact, as Brian Bond maintains, it was not 
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necessary for politicians and generals to direct the press to hide the reality of war, as the 
newspapers were glad to take on that task themselves. “Censorship of the press was 
inconsistent and astonishingly lax,” he notes, “but this hardly mattered given the press barons’ 
conviction that newspapers had a duty to maintain civilian morale and support the army.”28 
  Keith Robbins further contends that, because the truth about the war was hidden from 
the general public, many soldiers were later unable to talk about their memories of combat 
with their families and friends and were therefore prevented from coming to terms with what 
they had been through. He declares that the experiences of the war so traumatized the men 
who fought it that “(n)o man who took part in the First World War ever completely shook off 
the experience…For some, the only solution was silence. There was no way in which it was 
possible to communicate with those who had not been through it themselves.”29 According to 
the modern narrative, there would be no survivors left to stifle the memories of their 
experiences in any case, as service in the First World War is now assumed to mean death in 
the First World War. As Simon Schama notes in his critique of Downton Abbey, if the series 
had been a realistic portrayal of British life during the war, Matthew Crawley, who was 
wounded during the Battle of the Somme, “would be one of the 750,000 dead.”30 Although the 
majority of British soldiers who fought in it survived the war, Schama admits no other 
possibility for this fictional character: not ‘might be’ dead, but “would be.” 
 Beyond the boundaries of the war itself, and the damage it caused to the lives and 
psyches of those who were involved in it, lay the aftermath of the conflict. Barbara Tuchman 
believed that “the war had many diverse results and one dominant one transcending all 
others: disillusion.”31  Gilbert asserts that it “changed the map and destiny of Europe as much 
as it seared its skin and scarred its soul.”32 A major truism of the history of modern Europe is 
that the First World War, and more particularly the treaty imposed upon Germany after that 
war, was the proximate cause of the Second World War. “One of the tragedies of the Great 
War,” Jay Winter and Blaine Baggett observe, “is that, despite all the suffering it had entailed, 
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war simply begat another war.”33 Gilbert holds the Treaty of Versailles, and particularly the 
clause in that treaty blaming Germany for the war, responsible for the renewed world conflict 
only twenty years later, maintaining that “(t)he link between the two world wars…was this 
‘war guilt’ clause as perceived by Germany, aggravated by her extremist politicians, and set up 
as a target to be shot down in flames and fury by Hitler.”34 The final entry in the ledger against 
the First World War, therefore, is the way it led inevitably, and inexorably, to the Second 
World War. 
The generally accepted narrative of the Christmas truce as a soldiers’ rebellion against 
the tragic waste of the war and the stupidity of the warring countries’ politicians and generals 
aligns perfectly with this interpretation of the conflict. In fact, by emphasizing the 
disillusionment of soldiers with the war and the comradeship they felt during fraternization 
with the enemy troops, their fellow sufferers in the trenches, the holiday cease-fire underlines 
the moral of the war’s orthodox narrative. As Peter Bradshaw inaccurately notes in the 
Guardian review of Joyeux Noel, the truce was “supposed to have begun not merely with carols 
but cries of ‘No more war!’”35 This typical misconception about the impromptu armistice helps 
explain its overwhelming appeal to many who consider the First World War a futile and 
senseless conflict and who use the truce to illustrate that discourse by emphasizing the anger 
that the generals felt towards their rebellious soldiers who had fraternized with the enemy, 
and the subsequent official cover-up of the story of the truce.  
Fussell, for example, believes that the British military leadership was furious about the 
insubordination of the men participating in the truce, claiming that when “British and 
German soldiers observed an informal, ad hoc Christmas Day truce, meeting in No Man’s Land 
to exchange cigarets and to take snapshots,” the army command was “outraged” and “forbad 
this ever to happen again.”36 Taylor took the same view, adding an element of irony by 
including the reaction of the ignorant home front to the event when he observed that  
(o)n Christmas Day in France firing stopped in the front line. British and 
German soldiers met in No Man’s Land, gossiped, exchanged cigarettes. In 
some places they played football. They met again the next day. Then, after 
strong rebuke from headquarters, firing gradually started again. In the 
churches at home, prayers were offered for victory and for the slaughter of the 
men who were exchanging cigarettes.37  
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Winter and Baggett share the opinion that the truce was viewed as threatening by the army 
command, claiming that “British generals were appalled at the news of the Christmas truce.  
Explicit orders threatened serious punishment should any similar incident ever happen 
again.”38   
Others endow the episode with even greater significance. Malcolm Brown and Shirley 
Seaton, in Christmas Truce, a popular rather than academic history, maintain that the truce is 
an event of continuing importance, and “can be now seen as a small but significant gesture 
against the tide of international and nationalist rivalry and hatred which was flowing strongly 
in 1914 and flows strongly – and no less dangerously – as the century moves towards its 
close.”39 In Silent Night, another work devoted to the holiday armistice, Stanley Weintraub 
argues that the value of the truce as a symbolic event goes far beyond its temporal boundaries, 
asserting that “Christmas 1914 evokes the stubborn humanity within us, and suggests an 
unrealized potential to burst its seams and rewrite a century.”40  
 The Christmas truce, therefore, is now considered to be a moment of sanity in the 
midst of the brutal and senseless lunacy that the First World War comprised. The orthodox 
narrative of the First World War, which this view of the 1914 holiday armistice underlines, 
argues that the war killed enormous numbers of people but achieved nothing, that it was 
caused by an irrelevant assassination in the Balkans, that the violation of Belgian neutrality 
merely provided British politicians with a convenient excuse to get involved in the war, that 
the stories about German atrocities in Belgium were invented to incite hatred against the 
enemy, that the war was incompetently fought, that the civilians of the combatant nations 
blindly supported the war, with no idea of its realities, that the few soldiers who survived the 
conflict were forever haunted by the horrors of the war that festered in their repressed 
memories, and that the First War World was the proximate cause of the Second World War. 
To those who subscribe to the conventional narrative of the conflict, the Christmas truce 
represents a golden opportunity lost: a moment when the two sides met up in No-Man’s-Land 
in the spirit of peace and fellowship, and the war’s madness might have been stopped.    
More recently, however, the generally accepted discourse of the First World War, into 
which this version of the truce fits so cozily, has been challenged. Adrian Gregory, Niall 
Ferguson, Daniel Todman, John Terraine and Gary Sheffield, among other modern historians, 
have examined many of the orthodoxies of the First World War narrative and argued for a 
more nuanced view of the conflict. Gregory believes, for example, the more clear-cut goals of 
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the Second World War contributed to the perception that the 1914-1918 war was futile. “Both 
morality and long-term self-interest,” he observes, “appear to argue that Britain was right to go 
to war against Nazism in 1939,” but he notes that it is important to remember that the British 
public “believed precisely the same thing about the Kaiser’s Germany.”41 While current 
conventional wisdom may maintain that this was a delusion, Gregory argues that the war “was 
not fought in retrospect and to understand it we must stop re-fighting it that way.”42 Sheffield 
agrees, stating categorically that, while the war was tragic, “it was neither futile nor 
meaningless. Just as the struggles against Napoleon and, later, Hitler, it was a war that Britain 
had to fight and win.”43  
John Horne, the editor of A Companion to World War I, claims that the expectations 
raised by the conflict’s magnitude inspired its reputation for futility, observing that “(t)he 
scale of the effort and the size of the sacrifice inclined many who fought in the war to believe 
while it lasted that such an experience must have a decisive result, a closure that would be 
worthy of the conflict.”44 However, owing “to the gulf between cause and effect, and to the 
ways in which it set in motion more than it resolved…(p)opular perceptions and official 
memory have likewise reflected the divisive legacies of the conflict.”45 Terraine advances a 
more sanguine view of the war, believing that, for Britain, preventing German domination of 
the continent meant that “victory lay in what had been averted, not in what had been 
achieved.”46  
Equally, many scoff at the notion that the war was sparked by the assassination of the 
Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, seeing their deaths at the hands of a Serbian nationalist as 
merely the excuse Austro-Hungary and Germany seized upon to begin the desired conflict. 
Blackadder Goes Forth highlights the irrelevance of the actual event in the following exchange 
between two soldiers: 
Private Baldrick: I heard it started when some fella called Archie Duke shot an 
ostrich 'cos he was hungry.  
 
Captain Blackadder: I think you mean that it started when the Arch-Duke of 
Austro-Hungary got shot.  
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Private Baldrick: No, there was definitely an ostrich involved.47 
Gopnik observes that the only person who seemed genuinely concerned about the deaths of 
the Austrian royals, whom he describes as “notably unmourned,” was the Kaiser, “who had a 
class interest in protecting Germanic royalty from Slavic terrorists.”48 On the subject of why 
the British in particular chose to get involved in the First World War, Marwick looks past the 
German invasion of Belgium to “the growing awareness in Britain that her world economic 
power was steadily being challenged by Germany [and] the conviction that any German 
aggrandizement on the European continent would fatally upset the balance of power.”49 
Todman agrees, observing that “British ministers in 1914 went to war to maintain the balance 
of power in Europe,” and arguing that it “was in Britain’s best interests then, as it had been for 
centuries, to prevent a single hegemonic power dominating the whole mainland of Europe.”50  
Additionally, many historians now maintain that the outrage over purported German 
brutality towards the Belgian population was in fact prompted by the existence of real 
atrocities in that country. Although some of the more inflammatory stories about German 
soldiers chopping off the hands of children, raping nuns, and tying priests to bell clappers 
were discredited almost as soon as the war was over, it has been noted lately that a number of 
the press reports written about German behavior in Belgium were accurate in their 
descriptions of German soldiers killing non-combatants, including women and children, on 
flimsy military pretexts, and behaving savagely towards the civilian population generally. 
Gregory observes that the German soldiers in Belgium engaged in both “cold-blooded 
executions of large numbers of hostages and more spontaneous massacres carried out by units 
that went on the rampage.”51 Todman contends that German actions against Belgian civilians 
“were not just the actions of soldiers out of control of their officers: German atrocities were a 
matter of policy, not just panic.”52  
 The idea that the war was incompetently fought is one that has also come under attack 
in recent historiography. Terraine, for example, protests that too many people think about 
Douglas Haig in terms of the “grim casualty list” of the battles of the Somme, Ypres, and 
Passchendaele. Instead, he argues, “(w)hat is exceptional about Haig is the hundred days of 
uninterrupted victory by which he did so much to bring the War to an end.”53 Gopnik agrees, 
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observing that recent accounts of the war “conclude that the generals did the best they could” 
and maintaining that if “a steering committee of Grant, Montgomery, Napoleon and 
Agamemnon had been convened to lead the allies, the result would have been about the 
same.”54 Horne notes that, although the current understanding of the war has “moved 
decisively” in the direction of a narrative of horror and disproportionate suffering, military 
historians have emphasized “the ‘learning curve’ of the British army which, they suggest, 
achieved one of the finest performances ever on the western front in the last three months of 
the war.”55  
 The view that service on the Western front consisted of nothing but suffering and 
death is also one that is, to a certain extent, a creation of modern attitudes. While no one 
would deny the horrific number of fatalities that occurred on that front, as well as the misery 
caused by the conditions of trench warfare, it is also important to remember that this was not 
the overall or even dominant experience of every man involved. One First World War veteran 
estimated that, while serving with an infantry battalion in France, a soldier would spend 
approximately 100 days out of a year in the front line, and although sniping and shelling 
remained almost a daily fact of life while in the trenches, actual attacks would only occur a few 
times a year. The rest of a soldier’s time was spent in reserve trenches, in billets, in training 
out of the line, and on leave. This does not mean that time serving in the lines was in any way 
easy, but the troops passed the majority of their time away from the front, making the 
conventional image of soldiers living exclusively for four years in the unrelieved mud and 
misery of the trenches inaccurate.56   
However, the famous poetry of the First World War, with its stress on the horrors of 
the front unmitigated by spells out of the line, has influenced the collective British memory of 
the conflict and shaped its perception of the lives of soldiers who served in it. Samuel Hynes, 
in A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture, examines literature written 
during and after the war and traces the myths that dominate the literary narrative of the 
conflict: the idiotic generals and uncaring politicians sacrificing the brave and idealistic young 
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soldiers who went off so gallantly to the trenches, to be slaughtered there by the millions.57 
Many other historians maintain that the emphasis in British school curricula on the poetry of 
writer/soldiers, such as Wilfred Owen, Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves, encourages 
students to believe that this body of literature represents the “truth” of the conflict rather than 
the specific reactions of a group of non-professional junior soldiers to their experiences of 
battle. As Emma Hanna notes, “(i)n Britain, the idea that the First World War can be 
understood through its literature has proved particularly enduring…British historians, 
although they have produced an enormous body of very good work, have had a negligible 
effect on the way the majority of the nation thinks about the war.”58 Hew Strachan advances a 
similar argument, observing that the “legacy of literature, and its effects on the shaping of 
memory, have proved far more influential than economic or political realities.”59 
Other modern portrayals of the war have also influenced the way it is perceived. Lynn 
Macdonald’s popular and compelling books about the First World War use extensive personal 
narratives to focus on the miseries of the trenches, the high death toll and the surviving 
soldiers’ subsequent disillusionment with the conflict, and therefore, according to Ferguson, 
tend “to endorse the idea that the war was sheer hell and the soldiers its victims.”60 In fact, 
Gregory believes that “it is reasonable to suggest that many working-class men in the armed 
forces found their experiences less unusual and shocking than might be expected.”61 It can be 
argued that the very qualities, such as patience and a sense of responsibility towards the men 
with whom they fought, which enabled soldiers to survive four years of regular spells of trench 
warfare conditioned their post-war attitudes as well, prompting them to retain a belief in the 
war for which so many had paid a high price. Gary Sheffield agrees, countering the suggestion 
that soldiers were disillusioned by their experiences with the observation that “many who 
fought in the war did not hold the view that it was futile, and maintained their pride in their 
achievements to the end of their days.”62 
The ignorance of civilians about the horrors of the war, which springs from the belief 
that press reports during the war consisted of nothing but propaganda and lies, is another 
First World War truism that has been lately revisited. Horne, for example, notes that neither 
censorship nor propaganda “was as powerful as was made out by…[an] interwar myth, 
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according to which governments and the press deliberately manipulated opinion with 
mendacious tales.”63 To demonstrate that the public received more information about the war 
and its associated terrors than is currently credited, Ferguson includes in his work a 
photograph of a German corpse on barbed wire, which he notes was taken by an accredited 
press photographer and “reproduced for use in stereoscopic viewers. The horror of war,” 
Ferguson infers, “was concealed less from the public than is sometimes thought.”64 While 
Gregory does believe that soldiers had trouble expressing the truth about their experiences at 
the front, he nevertheless concludes that “they tried to recount conditions far more than is 
sometimes realized, and were listened to by their friends and relatives, much more so than is 
usually acknowledged.”65  
 Finally, the contention that the First World War was the proximate cause of the 
Second World War has also received considerable attention from revisionist historians.  
Ferguson, for example, argues that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles did not cripple the 
German economy, thereby leaving its population open to the appeal of fascism: “(t)he reality,” 
he maintains, “was that the economic consequences of the Versailles Treaty were far less 
severe for Germany than the Germans and Keynes claimed.”66 In fact, Ferguson claims, the 
German economy was wrecked by bad economic policies, not reparations. Todman concedes 
that there were issues with post-war settlements and the Treaty of Versailles but believes that 
these issues should not retroactively deny the war its meaning. The fact that the treaty was 
flawed, he observes, does not mean “that the war that preceded it was futile. The First World 
War stopped the German threat that had erupted in 1914. Perhaps that was enough. The 
Britons who had gone to war in 1914-18 had achieved their objective.”67  
 The existence of websites with titles such as “Fighting the Myths of the First World 
War” demonstrate that resistance to the generally accepted narrative has become a battle of 
its own, pitting the forces of orthodoxy against the armies of revisionism.68 However, as 
Todman points out in The Great War: Myth and Memory, these onslaughts on the 
conventional discourse have not “made the slightest difference to what most people actually 
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believe.”69 The surprisingly persistent myths that dominate the popular conception of the war 
have been the focus of many scholars who have tried to elucidate the reasons for the 
“(s)tupidity plus tragedy equals futility” view of the conflict.70  
Some historians believe this interpretation can be traced to attitudes towards the war 
prevalent in the 1920s; Nicoletta Gullace, for examples, argues that scholarship between the 
two world wars “subordinated itself to the overriding imperative of turning World War I into a 
morality tale” with the aim of avoiding future wars by labelling the late conflict the creation of 
government, press and commercial lies, and therefore futile and unnecessary.71 “The moral 
and ethical imperatives of this interpretation,” she observes, “have made it unusually difficult 
to dislodge.” Michael Nieberg, like Gullace, places the narrative shift in the inter-war period, 
but provides an alternative explanation. Neiberg, in fact, contends that the belief that the war, 
which had been a disaster for all of Europe, should never have happened “built up steam in the 
comparatively co-operative and pacific atmosphere of the mid-1920s because it moved blame 
away from Germany in the hopes of creating future peace.”72  
Other scholars situate the attitudinal shift against the First World War in the 1960s.  
Emma Hanna notes that during that decade, the Second World War became perceived “as a 
‘good’ war, with a relatively low number of casualties, while the memory of 1914-18 was 
reduced to images of mud, blood and cemeteries.”73 Adrian Gregory similarly credits the 
changing attitudes towards the First World War to the memory of the second conflict, 
claiming that in its aftermath the earlier conflict became “an apocalyptic fall from grace, at 
best, the definitive bad war.”74 Todman, in addition, believes that, during the 1960s and after, 
the passing of the generations most hurt by the First World War’s deaths, the parents, siblings 
and wives of soldiers killed and wounded in battle, freed critics of the war from the need to 
respect the feelings of the bereaved, and therefore allowed a more unfavourable view of the 
conflict and its aftermath to surface. 
Janet Watson sees the narrative shift as more thematic, arguing that the emphasis on 
trench warfare as the essential experience of the First World has strongly conditioned its 
discourse: as a result, the “received history of the war starts with idealistic volunteers and ends 
                                                          
69 Todman, The Great War, pg. xii. 
70 Gregory, Last Great War, pg. 3. 
71 Nicoletta F. Gullace, “Allied Propaganda and World War I: Interwar Legacies, Media Studies, and the 
Politics of War Guilt,” History Compass, Volume 9, no. 9 (2011): pg. 686. 
72 Michael S. Nieberg, “Revisiting the Myths: New Approaches to the Great War,” Contemporary 
European History, no. 04 (November 2004): pg. 506. 
73 Hanna, The Great War on the Small Screen, pg. 7. 
74 Gregory, The Last Great War, pg. 18. 
18 
 
with shattered veterans and names carved in stone on memorials.”75 While all these factors 
certainly contributed to the First World War’s reputation for futility and tragedy, this book 
will argue that an even more important factor in the construction of the conventional 
narrative of the war is the fact that a second world war began before the embers of the first 
had barely died out. The necessity for another global conflict twenty years later is the most 
telling argument that, for whatever reasons the First World War was fought, the conflict 
solved nothing, and the soldiers who died fighting it gave their lives in vain. The national 
commitment to this interpretation is demonstrated by John Simpson in his work on 
twentieth-century British journalism, in which he confidently asserts that every appalling 
episode of both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries can be credited not only to the First 
World War, but, more precisely, to the purported cause of the conflict. The murders of the 
Archduke and his consort, he argues, led   
not just to the start of the First World War five weeks later, but directly or 
indirectly to many of the most important events of the twentieth century: the 
Russian revolution, the rise of Stalin’s Communism and Hitler’s Nazism, the 
Second World War, the Holocaust, the atomic bomb, the decline of Europe and 
its colonial empires, the Cold War, the seemingly endless conflict in the Middle 
East, the growth of militant Islam. If the Archduke’s car had not taken a wrong 
turn and stalled, would any of these things have happened? Perhaps, but they 
would have happened differently. The balance of Europe could well have been 
maintained indefinitely, had it not been for one particular chain of events.76   
 
As this passage demonstrates, while the orthodox narrative of the war has been continuously 
challenged by revisionist contentions about the inaccuracy of its various elements, and 
numerous myths about the conflict have been thoroughly dissected, British cultural memory 
remains fiercely loyal to the dominant First World War discourse of waste and futility.   
Within these various challenges to the conventional discourse of the First World War, 
however, the Christmas truce has not yet found its place in the revisionist narrative. If the 
truce can no longer be used to underline the moral of the war, does it continue to have any 
meaning? Without a privileged place in the orthodox view of the war, the event appears to 
become merely a day off for the soldiers involved and a temporary curiosity for the British 
public, and many historians challenging the war’s orthodox narrative view it in precisely those 
terms. This dismissive attitude, however, obscures the meaning that the 1914 truce had for 
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those who had participated in it. As demonstrated by the letters, diaries and memoirs of the 
soldiers involved, the impromptu cease-fire was a significant moment for all those who were 
involved, and remained a cherished memory for veterans long after the war was over. In 
addition, even within a more revisionist view of the war, the Christmas truce can still maintain 
an important role: as an episode that illuminates the attitudes of the soldiers who participated 
in it, including their belief that the conflict had meaning and purpose, their willingness to 
share information about their experiences with those at home, their adaptation to the 
conditions under which they fought, and the professionalism they brought to their service on 
the Western front. Furthermore, the way the news of the Christmas truce was received by the 
home front illustrates that the British public was not, as is often argued today, protected from 
the truth about the war, but was instead aware of the realities of life at the front and what its 
soldiers had to endure in the trenches.  
A new assessment of the 1914 Christmas truce demonstrates that the holiday cease-fire 
was neither “the only meaningful episode in the apocalypse,” as Weintraub would have it, nor 
“relatively minor and inconsequential,” as Nieburg argues.77 The armistice was an event of 
significance for those involved, even if its contemporaneous meaning was not the defiant 
moral that was imposed upon it long afterwards. The truce meant time off for weary soldiers, 
providing them with an opportunity to move about in the lines without fear of snipers, rebuild 
their trenches and enjoy Christmas as best they could under the circumstances, as well as a 
chance to satisfy their curiosity about the enemy and write home about something besides the 
endless mud and shelling. The holiday cease-fire became a valued memory for the 
participants, as demonstrated by the way it was discussed in letters written by the soldiers, 
fondly recalled years later in interviews and memoirs describing their service, and featured in 
many regimental histories. “It will be a thing to remember all one’s life,” was how R.J. Armes, 
one truce participant, put it, and most of the men writing home about the impromptu 
armistice expressed similar sentiments, noting that they would never forget the Christmas Day 
they had spent fraternizing with the enemy in No-Man’s-Land.78 An examination of the 
accounts sent home by the soldiers who took part in the holiday cease-fire, as well as the 
reports of it that appeared in the war diaries of the participating regiments and subsequently 
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in the same regiments’ official histories, will refute the legends and fictions that have come to 
obscure the reality of the truce.79  
In addition to its personal importance for those involved, the episode is significant for 
another reason, which is that attitudes towards the Christmas truce have tracked the evolving 
popular narrative of the war. Examining works written about the war and the way they deal 
with the truce illustrates how the discourse of the conflict has evolved since the firing stopped 
on November 11, 1918. In the century that has passed since it took place, the 1914 Christmas 
truce has been invoked by many as confirmation that their assessment of the war is accurate. 
The episode has been utilized by a number of historians and writers who believe that their 
view of the conflict can be proven, or at the minimum underlined, through reference to the 
impromptu armistice. In the 1960s, the truce became, and has remained since then, a 
historiographical touchstone for the conventional narrative of the First World War and an 
enticing shorthand for the view that the conflict was futile and senseless.  As Emma Hanna 
has noted, the holiday armistice has proved to be “a historical soft spot,” engaging emotions 
“which render the audience uncritical” and therefore much less likely to question the point 
which the truce is being used to prove.80  
The myth of the truce, like that of the conventional interpretation of the war, has its 
roots in the “lions led by donkeys” interpretation of the First World War promoted so strongly 
in the 1960s, and the parallel discourses of the war and the truce demonstrate the power of an 
appealing and simplistic narrative to drive out the voices of dissent, even if in this case the 
“dissenting” voices are those of the original participants in the event. With the centenary of 
the 1914 Christmas truce approaching, it is past time for the opinions of soldiers who were 
involved in the cease-fire to be heard. 
While Joyeux Noel and other similar works use a romanticized Christmas truce to 
advance their view of the First World War as a futile conflict, this book will instead engage 
with the reality of the 1914 holiday armistice as a means of challenging the popular perception 
of the war. Rather than reacting to the Christmas truce in the monolithic manner now 
embraced by historians who subscribe to the conventional view of the war, the soldiers who 
participated in it brought a range of feelings, from elation to suspicion, to the event. There 
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were officers who joined in the truce, and commanders who were willing to allow its 
temporary continuance. No one was punished for participation, and very few of those who 
took part allowed the event to alter their view of the war. The truce did include shared drinks 
and spontaneous games of football, but also featured solemn burial parties and moments of 
treachery. Furthermore, the manner in which the details of the truce were accepted by the 
British public demonstrates that the home front was ignorant neither of the conditions on the 
Western front nor the attitudes of the soldiers who served there. Consequently, the holiday 
armistice, in itself a fascinating and complex episode, also serves as a means of achieving 
further insight into the experiences and attitudes of soldiers on the Western front, the views of 
the British public towards the war, and the evolving discourse of the war over the past 
century. As a result, the 1914 Christmas truce, an event which at first glance appears to confirm 
the popular discourse of the First World War, can instead contribute to a more complete 
understanding of both the conflict and the development of the war’s orthodox narrative. 
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Chapter Two 
“Absolute Hell”: 
The Western Front in 1914 
 
 
It was almost impossible for a man to convey the reality of life at the front to family or friends, 
even if social convention had permitted such frank discussions. 
-Gary Sheffield 
War on the Western Front (2007) 
 
The firing died down and out of the darkness a great moan came.  People with their arms and 
legs off trying to crawl away; others who could not move gasping out their last moments with 
the cold night wind biting into their broken bodies and the lurid red glare of a farm house 
showing up clumps of grey devils killed by the men on my left further down.  A weird awful 
scene; some of them would raise themselves on one arm or crawl a little distance, silhouetted 
as black as ink against the red glow of the fire.   
-Captain H.M. Dillon 
2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry 
24 October 1914 letter to his sister 
 
 
 
 
To understand what motivated British soldiers to become involved in the Christmas 
truce, it is necessary first to examine their attitudes during the first year of the conflict, and 
more particularly, one of the most persistent tropes of the First World War, which is the belief 
that soldiers fighting in it did not share the truth of their experiences with the home front. 
This theory, coupled with the perception that the civilians in Great Britain had absolutely no 
idea about the conditions in which their soldiers fought, including the mud, miseries and 
dangers of the trenches, colors the approach of many historians and other writers towards the 
war, and helps explain the conventional narrative of the holiday armistice. “What people at 
home had heard of the fighting man’s war was only a confused murmur,” the historian Arthur 
Marwick wrote about British non-combatants during 1914-1918 conflict. “They knew the 
statistics of death…but not the foul horror of it; they saw the glory, but not the sordid filth of 
trench life. Fighting men, appalled at the nature of the war in which they found themselves, 
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were unable to convey the unbelievable substance.”81 This narrative was heavily featured in 
First World War historiography during the 1960s but was by no means limited to that period.  
John Terraine similarly theorizes that “the inexhaustible patience and cheerfulness of the 
troops…cut them off from communication with their relatives,” and Modris Ecksteins also 
notes that “soldiers were inclined to hide the gruesome reality of the war from their loved ones 
at home.”82 Even Dan Todman, otherwise adept at skewering First World War myths, 
maintains that, in addition to the restrictions imposed on the soldiers by army censorship, 
“more powerful was a self-censorship which was designed to protect those at home from the 
worries they might have experienced if they had known the dangers that their correspondents 
were facing.”83  
This theme runs through many works on the war. In Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare 
in the First World War, John Ellis contends that “the men were always at pains to conceal the 
reality of what was happening from their loved ones” when writing letters home.84 A. Fletcher, 
in “Between the Lines,” an article on communications between front-line soldiers and their 
friends and relations, concedes that, while “messages sent by British soldiers of the First 
World War to their loved ones back home have long been valued for what they tell us about 
daily life in the trenches,” while noting at the same time that “their authors were often at pains 
not to reveal too much of the horror and pain they endured.”85 Robert Graves, whose memoir 
Goodbye to All That greatly influenced the orthodox narrative of post-war veterans’ 
disillusionment, sharply underlined the division between soldiers and their families when he 
described the emotions he felt upon returning home on leave. “England looked strange to us 
returned soldiers,” he wrote in 1929. “We could not understand the war madness that ran 
about everywhere, looking for a pseudo-military outlet. The civilians talked a foreign 
language, and it was newspaper language. I found serious conversation with my parents all but 
impossible.”86  
Recent studies that have used soldiers’ writings as the focus of their analysis have 
chipped away at this dominant narrative; however, the emphases of their work have prevented 
the myth of soldierly reticence from being completely exposed. Michael Roper’s monograph 
on soldiers’ strategies for emotional survival, which takes a psychoanalytic approach to their 
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writings, seeks to “discern states of mind from the often oblique clues given in letters, diaries 
and memoirs,” and maintains that the information in their letters is “opaque,” forcing scholars 
“to read between the lines.”87  Jessica Meyer, on the other hand, acknowledges in Men of War: 
Masculinity and the First World War in Britain that soldiers were more forthright in their 
letters home than is commonly believed, but her focus on manifestations of masculinity leads 
her to emphasize the writings of soldiers who “manfully” attempt to reassure their families 
about their safety over those who wrote openly about the experiences of battle.88  
The British soldier suffering in the mud and danger of the trenches, therefore, is now 
assumed to be writing home cheerfully mendacious letters assuring his relatives that he was 
relatively safe, warm, and dry, that he remained a patriotic supporter of the war in which he 
fought, and that he confidently expected he and his fellow soldiers would thrash the cowardly 
Hun with the next big push. According to this narrative, the British civilian, safeguarded from 
the ghastly truth by his protective soldiers, as well as the government and press conspiracy to 
keep him ignorant of the war so he would continue to support it, was able to give the conflict 
his whole-hearted backing, and by doing so prolonged both the war and the agonies of the 
front-line soldiers. By creating the perception that the troops on the Western front did not 
share their experiences with their friends and relations, which reticence in turn increased the 
soldiers’ alienation from civilians and their disgust with non-combatants’ strong support for 
the war, these views about the fraught relationship between the home and fighting fronts have 
strongly influenced the war’s discourse and, indirectly, have provided a convincing rationale 
for the generally-accepted narrative of the Christmas truce.  If in fact, as John Morrow argues, 
“(f)ront soldiers’ writings reflected a stark division between the fighting and home fronts and 
their anger and hostility toward the latter,” it is only natural that the British troops, when 
presented with an opportunity to do so by the convenient excuse of holiday celebrations, 
would turn to their brothers-in-arms in the opposite trenches, who were the only ones who 
understood the miseries with which they had to deal daily.89 
An examination of letters written home by British soldiers during the first year of the 
war, including both those kept privately by the families who received them and those 
forwarded to nationally circulated newspapers for publication, however, shows that, at least in 
the first year of the war, this great divide between soldiers and civilians did not exist. The 
horrors of front-line warfare were exposed from the moment the guns started firing, and 
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soldiers freely shared information about the war with their families and friends, writing letters 
about the dangers of battle, the ghastly trenches, and their attitudes towards their enemies. In 
addition, soldiers’ letters openly discussing the conditions at the front were published in 
nationally circulated British newspapers.  Men serving on the Western front were surprisingly 
forthright about the war and the conditions under which they fought, and, as censorship of 
letters home appears to have been minimal, those attitudes were communicated freely. In a 
1985 interview, George Ashurst, who served with the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, dismissed the 
idea that there was extensive suppression of news written home by soldiers. “(W)e give ‘em to 
the officer,” he said, “but I don’t think he bothered any further. You had to give it to the 
officer, you know, your letter…he didn’t bother to look at them, no.”90 Of course, officers’ 
letters were subject only to self-censorship, and were quite frank as a result.91 Because of the 
flow of information from the battlefields of France to the home front, civilians were much 
better informed about the conditions of the war than the current narrative allows.  
In addition to these private sources of information, the British public as a whole was 
also able to attain a certain level of understanding about the Western front through its 
newspapers, which were not always as deceptive about the reality of war as is now believed.  
From the first days of the war, the surprising amount of information available to the home 
front through soldiers’ letters published by the mainstream press, including stories not only 
about the horrors of the war but also about the occasionally friendly relations between the 
opposing sides, helped give the British the sense that they understood what life in the front 
lines was like. The reports that were shared with the home front through these letters 
included information about the changing nature of war, the dangers of battle, the horrors of 
the trenches, the proximity of the Germans, and soldiers’ attitudes towards their enemies. By 
providing those back at home in Britain with vivid first-hand accounts of the lives of their 
soldiers in the trenches, the press conditioned the public to accept the stories of those who 
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served in the Western front as the ‘truth’ of the war, paving the way for general acceptance of 
the seemingly incredible story of the truce. 
By the time the truce occurred, the war was nearly five months old. One of the many 
tropes of the conventional narrative of the First World War is that everyone expected it to be 
over quickly.92 While this assertion is not altogether correct, what no one involved predicted 
was that it would be a war of stalemate rather than mobility; the stationary trenches of the 
Western Front, although not a new development in modern warfare, were one that the 
military leadership on both sides struggled to overcome.93 For four years, every new offensive, 
whether undertaken by the Entente or the Central Powers, was supposed to produce the 
breakthrough that would decide the conflict, but for four years, those offensives failed, at the 
cost of millions of lives over the course of the war.  Generals were trained in, and trained their 
troops for, wars of movement, and the conditions of static warfare were a reality to which both 
military leaders and common soldiers had to adapt. “It’s a war with no glamour or glory such 
as one expects in a huge world-wide show like this,” John Liddell, who served on the Western 
Front with the 2nd Argyll and Sunderland Highlanders, wrote home to his father. “Modern 
weapons are too deadly, and the whole art of war, and all tactics as laid down in our books, 
and in the German dittoes, has been quite altered. No advancing across the open by short 
rushes.”94 Liddell, like many other soldiers, found his expectations of war confounded by the 
enforced shift from standard offensive campaigns to tactics that favored the defence. While no 
one knew in 1914 that the stalemate on the Western Front would continue for four long years, 
soldiers nevertheless quickly became aware that war, as everyone previously understood it, 
had changed dramatically. 
In addition to the restrictions imposed by a static war, men also had to adjust to the 
conditions they found at the front. Unfortunately, as the historian Charles Cruttwell pointed 
out, those conditions were dreadful: the trenches “had not been deliberately sited; they were 
more often an elaboration of the holes into which the combatants had dug themselves when 
                                                          
92 The first recruiting appeal offered terms of service for a period of three years or “until the war is 
concluded,” from which Marwick deduces that “Kitchener at least did not share the widely held belief 
that the war would be over within six months.” Marwick, The Deluge, pg. 35. 
93 Although trenches had been used as defensive measures during warfare in the American Civil War, 
the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese war, they had never been as extensively employed as they were on 
the Western front between 1914 and 1918. Compounding this issue was the fact that conventional 
military training in the early twentieth century emphasized grand tactics and mobile campaigns rather 
than defensive warfare, leaving commanders on both sides ill-prepared to fight the stationary battles of 
the First World War. Of course, lack of imagination on the part of the same military leaders certainly 
did not help ease the bottleneck. 
94 J.A. Liddell, 2nd Argyll and Sunderland Highlanders, Private Papers of J. A. Liddle, Imperial War 
Museum Collection No. 11126, 26 November 1914 letter. 
27 
 
unable to advance.”95 As a result of their haphazard placement, the trenches were generally 
hastily constructed, situated in muddy and flat areas, prone to flooding, and always 
uncomfortable. In fact, the soldiers serving on the Western front often found the Flanders 
mud to be as persistent an enemy as the Germans, and that mud and its attendant discomforts 
featured largely in soldiers’ letters home.   
“I have been up to my knees and over them at times in this horrible cold mud – the 
awful part is having to stand there until the frost comes and binds all together into one 
congealed mass,” Tom Lucey, of the 1st Loyal North Lancashires, wrote to his mother.96 Arthur 
Pelham-Burn, with the 6th Gordon Highlanders, echoed that assessment, remarking in a letter 
to England that “I used to think I knew what mud was before I came out here but I was quite 
mistaken. The mud here varies from 6 in. to 3 and 4 ft. even 5 ft. and it is so sticky that until 
we were all issued with boots, half my men used to arrive in the trenches with bare feet.”97 
Lieutenant Berryman, who served with a Garhwali regiment, described the physical effect of 
living in such conditions, observing how “after standing in water and mud” for days “you can’t 
imagine the state your feet get into, soft and swollen and no good for walking on, just good 
enough to stand upon and no more.”98 (*See figure I for Berryman’s drawing of a soldier going 
into and then returning from the trenches) Similar vivid portrayals of the physical discomforts 
of the front featured prominently in the letters written home by many soldiers, and left their 
friends and relations in no doubt about the conditions in which they were living.  
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Figure 1: A soldier leaving for and returning from the trenches. Drawing by E.R.P. Berryman, 
2/39th Garhwal Rifles. (Used by permission of Tamsin Baccus.) 
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Far from protecting those at home from the horrors of the trenches, soldiers instead 
kept their correspondents very well informed about their daily experiences, including the 
dangers to which they were exposed.99 Frank Black, an officer with the 1st Royal 
Warwickshires, wrote to a friend in early December 1914 that his unit was “having an easier 
time now, spending four days in the trenches and four days out.” This “easier” time, however, 
consisted of trying to hold “a very warm corner” where “shots are flying up the trenches, down 
the trenches and across them all day, and most of the night; and all of us except the sentries 
sit tight in our dug-outs all day, and only venture out when it is absolutely necessary.”100 
Captain H.M. Dillon, who served in Flanders with the 2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire 
Light Infantry, sent his sister grim details of an attack on the Germans: while first taken by 
surprise, the enemy, he reported,   
must have seen us as from then on it was absolute hell let loose, one could not 
move a finger and the opposite bank was plastered with shell and shrapnel. 
One high explosive burst right above where I was and the 2 poor devils on my 
right got a piece of it between them. It tore the flesh clean away from the bone 
of one of their legs, and there was a piece of bone 6 inches long with the flesh 
hanging over the heel.101 
 
E. Daniell, a major with the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, told his mother at the end of September 1914 
that his battalion had “not had a day’s repose since we started the campaign; previous to this it 
has been march, fight, hell-fire from shells continuously.”102 Pelham-Burn also noted in a letter 
written home that the “hardships to be suffered in the trenches are really quite beyond 
anything I could have imagined while still in England. The cold, the wet, the mud, are awful, 
also the frequent lack of water means continual risking of life.”103  
Percy Jones, with the 1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles, described the trenches in a 
letter to his brother as “a wet hell.”104 Wilfred Spencer of the 2nd Wiltshires agreed, writing to 
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his mother that he wondered “how many people realize what Hell the trenches can be. No 
shelter from rain or cold and in some places mud right over one’s knees nearly always over 
one’s ankles.”105  Lieutenant John Aiden Liddell reported in a letter to his mother that the 
soldiers heard gruesome stories about “trenches where both sides have sapped forward until 
they are about 20 yards from each other.” Because, he explained, “the ground is full of dead 
bodies…when the walls of a dug-out or part of the trench falls in, there is generally a body 
exposed.” Liddell ended his macabre tale with the information that a soldier “wanted to cut 
some ends of roots that were sticking out of his dug-out wall, and discovered they were a 
corpse’s fingers!”106 Even the most shocking details about the horrors of active service in the 
line, it appears, were considered appropriate subjects for inclusion in letters home. 
At the same time that these gruesome depictions of the war were keeping the soldiers’ 
correspondents well-informed about conditions at the front, the men also wrote home about 
the enemy whose trenches were so close to their own. The fiancée of Maurice Mascall, who 
served with the Royal Garrison Artillery, must have been concerned to receive a letter from 
him stating matter-of-factly that he was “in trenches at the edge of a large wood, with the 
German trenches only about 70 yards distant.”107 Captain Dillon reported to his sister that in 
his battalion’s current position, “the German trenches were 25 yds in front of us, i.e. about the 
length of a tennis court,” although he did add the reassuring fact that in between the two lines 
was “a fairly thick wood.”108 Captain Lucey wrote to his brother that his battalion’s place at the 
front was “slap up against the Germans,” noting that “in some cases only 30 yards separates 
the two lines and we chuck bombs at one another.”109 As alarming as these descriptions of the 
nearness of the enemy must have been to those at home, it should also be noted that the 
proximity of the trenches of the British and Germans had an unexpected result for both 
armies: that of a better acquaintance with the soldiers in the opposing trenches.   
Soldiers, even in the early parts of the war, became used to their places in the line; as 
both armies on the Western Front dug in for the long haul, they could not avoid growing 
familiar with the soldiers opposite them. Under these conditions, whatever the men in the 
front lines felt about the enemy as a political entity, they recognized that the soldiers whose 
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trenches they were facing, and whose daily activities not only mirrored theirs but could also be 
observed, were enduring the same discomforts and fears as they were. As a result, the two 
sides developed, in addition to a certain amount of familiarity with each other, a surprising 
level of acceptance, considering the natural antipathy that must have been felt as a result of 
the terrible death toll of the first months of the war. 
Contributing to this atmosphere of mutual tolerance was the fact that almost all the 
soldiers in the trenches in winter 1914, on both sides of the line, were either professionals, 
previously conscripted soldiers, or from reserve units, all of whom had enlisted in or been 
drafted into the army before the war. As a result, their service was generally motivated by 
reasons other than hatred of the opposing side, as opposed to the attitudes of at least some of 
the men who enlisted once the war had started. With its small, all-volunteer army, Britain was 
able to initially send only a small number of men to France, in the form of the British 
Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.). While both the Germans and French were subject to 
conscription, their troops who were sent to the front during the early winter of 1914 were 
mainly comprised of men who were in service before the war began, as it took time to train 
and equip those who joined at the beginning of the conflict. The British forces did receive 
supplements in the form of newly-enlisted men throughout the late autumn and early winter, 
but those recruits were absorbed into already formed units, meaning that the men who joined 
up early in the war served with career officers and soldiers, and the presence of newly 
recruited soldiers in a particular unit, therefore, would have been diluted.110 
The fact that so many of the men, and particularly the officers, in the front lines during 
the winter of 1914-1915 were pre-war professionals contributed to the relative lack of personal 
enmity between the opposing lines of trenches at that time. The historian B.H. Liddell Hart, in 
particular, credited at least part of the tolerance that developed towards the enemy during the 
first winter of the war to the fact that the British army, because of its professional character, 
was “relatively immune” to what he described as “the natural ferocity of war accentuated by a 
form of mob spirit which is developed by a ‘nation in arms.’”111 As Robert Graves observed 
colloquially in a story about the Christmas truce, “‘(r)egulars, you see, know the rules of war 
and don’t worry their heads about politics or propaganda.’”112 This resistance to partisan hatred 
by the troops who fought on the Western front in 1914 created more opportunities for the 
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opposing sides to develop a respect for the professionalism of their enemies. An example of 
this was provided by E.W. Cox, an intelligence officer at GHQ, who wrote to his wife in 
September 1914 that “(t)he Germans are making a splendid stand. They are wonderful 
soldiers.”113 Such mutual esteem, even among the fierce battles and debilitating conditions of 
the trenches, informed the attitudes of the soldiers on both sides, and British troops, as a 
result, spoke in their letters home about the Germans in a way that made it clear to their 
families and friends that the enemy was not the stereotypical “fiendish Hun” of the more 
sensationalist British press. 
The professional soldier’s resistance to “politics and propaganda” created more 
chances for the opposing sides to develop a respect for their enemies’ positive qualities, 
leading Major Daniell to write to his mother about the consideration shown by the enemy to 
the British who were injured in battle, which he contrasted to anti-German propaganda. “All 
these stories of cruelty to our wounded are I think a pack of lies,” he observed, “our 
information is very reverse, because we have direct evidence repeatedly of the extreme 
kindness extended to our wounded.” After one battle, he noted, the British had “to leave our 
wounded … and when our Dr. went out to bring them in he found they had been bandaged by 
the Germans, given them water and removed them to a comfortable place. Many of the 
Germans said you English treat our wounded well and we do the same for you.”114 Cuthbert 
Lawson, who served in an artillery unit, praised the abilities of the enemy, telling his mother 
in October 1914 that the war “is going to last a jolly long time unless something unforeseen 
happens – the German army is a highly efficient fighting machine, and the German staff is very 
nearly perfect, and certainly the best in the world – they won’t make any silly mistakes, and 
can only be decisively beaten by really superior numbers.”115 Such observations reflected the 
way these professional soldiers viewed their enemies, and many of the British troops showed 
no hesitation about reporting these opinions to the civilians at home.  
Because of the proximity of the two lines of trenches, soldiers on both sides shared not 
only respect and common miseries, but were able to appreciate mutual jokes and 
entertainment. Alfred Chater of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, for example, reported in a letter 
how the British troops used a German’s tin chimney as a target for rifle practice: “After each 
shot the German waved a stick or rang a bell according to whether we hit the chimney or not! 
There are lots of amusing incidents up there,” he continued, “and altogether we have quite a 
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cheery time our worst trouble is the wet and mud which is knee-deep in some places.”116 
Liddell also talked about friendly relations with the enemy, writing to his mother that he had 
heard about some British officers who “were reported to have made a practice of going over to 
the Germans’ lines by day for a chat with the men, the latter warning them when one of their 
officers was approaching, and helping them over the parapet so that they could get back.”117  
Foreshadowing the carols on Christmas Eve that ushered in some truces, singing in the 
trenches often occurred on quiet evenings in the line, and both British and German troops 
enjoyed the impromptu performances. M. Holroyd, a subaltern in the 1st Hampshires, wrote 
about a battalion “who had a fine singer among them, whom both sides delighted to honour: 
so the Germans just shouted ‘Half time, Wessex,’ when desiring music, and everyone stopped 
firing. The songster climbed on the parapet of the trench, and both sides joined in the 
chorus.”118 F.E. Packe, a company commander with the 2nd Welch, also reporting singing across 
No-Man’s-Land, writing to his mother in October 1914 that some cheering from the German 
trenches “was followed by singing, the tune being the Austrian National Anthem – do they 
sing ‘Deutschland Deutschland Uber Alles’ to that tune I wonder? Our men responded with 
‘counter cheers’ and sang ‘Who Killed Cock Robin’ and ‘Down by the Old Bull and Bush’ – so 
very characteristic of Atkins.”119 As can be seen by these excerpts, the two armies certainly had 
the miseries of trench life in common, but jokes and music were also shared with the enemy – 
and, through the soldiers’ letters, with the British home front. 
Besides noting the details of daily life on the Western Front, soldiers also wrote home 
occasionally about the larger topic of the war, or more explicitly, their perceptions of the 
conflict’s rationale. Their thoughts on the war itself did not constitute a large portion of their 
letters: as Ashurst explained years later, soldiers did not tend to write about the war itself, 
because “they really weren’t interested in that, your parents, you know what I mean, they 
just wanted to know how you was.”120 While the British troops were able to admire the 
Germans soldiers’ professional abilities, they still felt anger over their behaviour towards the 
Belgians. An examination of British soldiers’ writings demonstrates that, contrary to modern 
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cynicism about atrocity stories, many of them found the sufferings of Belgium sufficiently 
compelling, even without any propagandistic embellishments, to serve as a reason for fighting. 
As temporary residents of Belgium, the British troops were in a position not only to see 
the effects of the war upon it, but also to tell their relatives and friends about what they had 
observed. Cox told his wife that although he tried to be tolerant towards the enemy, “since 
reading a German officer’s diary yesterday, I feel I only want to get into Germany and raze 
everything to the ground and let their people feel the effects of the war to the very utmost 
limit. They are incredibly brutal and should be treated as they have treated the Belgians.”121 
Dillon, who was fatalistic about the fact that he would eventually be wounded or killed during 
the war, felt that his sacrifice would be worthwhile: “I don’t care one farthing as far as I am 
concerned,” he wrote to his sister in September 1914, “but the whole thing is an outrage on 
civilization.  The whole of this beautiful country devastated. Broken houses, broken bodies, 
blood, filth and ruin everywhere. Can any unending everlasting Hell fire for the Kaiser, his son 
and the party who cause this war repair the broken bodies and worse broken hearts which are 
being made.”122  Lieutenant Chandler shared Dillon’s sentiments, writing that, while he didn’t 
know “which is the worst – high explosive shells, shrapnel or rifle bullets,” what “upsets me 
most of all is the plight of the civilians and hearing the kiddies crying with fear. It is a strange 
and awful state of things.”123 These statements, while firmly contradicting the idea that 
German atrocities in Belgium were concocted to provide fodder for the sensationalist press in 
Britain, demonstrate that British soldiers felt strongly that the war was worth fighting, and 
also that they believed that there were clear differences between the behaviour of the two 
sides, however much they might admire the professionalism of the troops opposite. 
As revealed by the letters that they wrote home from the Western front, British 
soldiers found the conditions of the trenches and the defensive warfare they faced both 
horrific and challenging, but were forthright about sharing with their correspondents details 
of their lives in the front-line. As a result, those on the home front were able to receive 
information about the war from unimpeachable informants: the soldiers themselves. At the 
same time, if individual letters from the trenches were its only source of such information, the 
British public as a whole, particularly those households that did not have a near relation at the 
                                                          
121 Cox, 5 October 1914 letter. 
122 Dillon, 24 October 1914 letter. In fact, Dillon died of pneumonia in London in January 1918, a 
condition no doubt brought on by his four periods of service on the Western front.  According to the 
Imperial War Museum website, he was a company commander in the 2nd Oxfordshire and 
Buckinghamshire Light Infantry from August to November 1914, and participated in the retreat from 
Mons and the Battle of the Aisne.   
123 F.G. Chandler, 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Private Papers of F.G. Chandler, Imperial War 
Museum Collection No. 15460, 17 December 1914 letter. 
35 
 
front, would have found itself largely ignorant about the war. An examination of British 
newspapers published during the first five months of the conflict, however, shows that they in 
fact revealed much more about the conditions on the Western front and attitudes of the 
soldiers fighting there than the orthodox narrative customarily allows.  
When discussing the way the First World War was reported in the British press, it 
must be remembered that access to the Western front was strictly controlled by the military 
and that before the middle of 1915, there were no journalists at the front at all.124 As a result, 
the accounts of the war that the newspapers published during 1914 were based entirely on 
official briefings, and therefore tended to run along the now familiar lines of how splendidly 
the Allies were fighting, and how easily the treacherous and brutal Germans were being 
beaten. A report in the Daily Telegraph on 12 December 1914, for example, flatly insisted that 
no other outcome was imaginable, except on a temporary basis. “A few days ago,” the article 
began, “there was suddenly a rumor that a repulse had been met with, and this was rather a 
shock, considering that a repulse anywhere along the Franco-British front is, according to a 
foregone conclusion, impossible, and it was received, therefore, with incredulity.” The report 
went on to state that this incredulity was “entirely justified, for the so-called repulse consisted 
simply of the loss of one advanced trench, which had been insufficiently guarded, and which 
the French immediately recaptured the following day, and to the success of which they added 
by capturing several other trenches in the same district from the enemy.” Lest the Telegraph’s 
readers worry that there was more to this enemy assault than the French merely being caught 
temporarily off-guard, the paper went on to reassure them that this was just another example 
proving “that the Franco-British ascendancy is asserting itself more and more over the enemy, 
who may sometimes capture a trench, but is never able to hold it long, whereas the Allies 
thoroughly maintain themselves in every position conquered.”125 
If all the newspapers had to rely upon were official sources, it is unlikely that their war 
reporting would have gone beyond these clichéd and misleading accounts. However, in an 
effort that was probably aimed at providing ‘human interest’ for readers while simultaneously 
filling column inches about the main subject of the day, all the major daily newspapers 
regularly solicited and printed letters received from soldiers’ families.126 Columns featuring 
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this type of correspondence were not printed as prominently in the newspapers as the war 
news itself, but neither were they tucked away in small print on the back pages. Although not 
all these letters were completely forthright about the war – there were examples printed from 
soldiers who were anxious to get to the front before the conflict reached an untimely end, and 
missives that echoed such contemporaneous phrases as “but are we downhearted? No!” - the 
majority of soldiers’ writings included in the “Letters from the Front” columns presented sober 
and detailed descriptions of the realities of war. Through these letters, the British public was 
able to catch glimpses of the war beyond the military’s heavily censored, and often fantastical, 
accounts. A sampling from the “Letters from the Front” columns featured in all the major 
British newspapers demonstrates that these letters displayed a remarkable freedom of 
information, given the papers’ commitment to self-censorship and the desire on the part of 
the British press to keep accounts of the war positive.127 It was in these columns of letters that 
the truth about the war, at least as far as the soldiers’ experiences of it, was told, and these 
same columns later provided the medium through which the details of the Christmas truce 
would be transmitted to the general British public. 
The “horrors of front-line warfare” which were supposed to be so carefully kept from 
the home front were in fact freely shared with the readers of the Daily Mail, who learned 
through a letter from an officer that “(w)e do endure ghastly tortures in this war. The cold is 
perfectly appalling, however many clothes one wears, and I haven’t slept for nearly a fortnight, 
so I am awfully tired and done up.”128 The Mail, which was the British newspaper with the 
widest circulation at that time, also published a letter in December 1914 under the headline 
“What Modern Shell Fire is Like,” from an officer with the Army Service Corps who described 
the troops coming out of the line.  “The experiences in the trenches are sometimes so terrible 
that those who come out sound in body look absolutely indifferent to all their surroundings; 
they are always covered with mud from head to foot, clothes torn, tired out through lack of 
sleep and having in many cases seen half their pals killed or wounded alongside of them and 
in all cases having existed for days under a continuous shell fire,” the officer reported. “This is 
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the kind of thing all our fellows in the firing line are going through to keep the Germans back, 
and in many instances it is enough to send them out of their minds.” The letter concluded 
with the bitter observation that “(p)eople say the Army is paid to do this job. No pay can ever 
compensate a man for a few days under modern shell fire.”129   
Another letter reprinted in the Daily Mail from a soldier in a West Yorkshire regiment 
described an attack on a British trench. “We were subjected to a murderous fire from machine 
guns and shrapnel, and our men fell like sheep in this terrible rush, and the few who arrived in 
the firing line found very few of the original line alive,” Sergeant Woodcock’s letter reported. 
“We had to get in the trench somehow, and in places dead, wounded, and living piled on top 
of each other.”130 In case the Mail’s readers failed to understand how badly the British troops 
suffered in this attack, the letter was printed under the headline “Letters from the Front/204 
Left out of 1,250,” a reference to the number of soldiers able to answer the battalion’s roll call 
the next day. The Mail also printed a number of soldiers’ letters that tried to sum up the entire 
experience of the conflict. Echoing Liddell’s observations to his father, one staff officer wrote 
his wife that “(t)he war is absolutely different from what I expected it to be. There is no what I 
call glamour about it or any kind of chivalry.”131 A letter written by a Lieutenant in a 
Northamptonshire regiment to his mother summed up the experience of life on the Western 
front even more succinctly: “It’s awful,” he wrote. “Nothing can describe it but the two words, 
‘absolute hell.’”132  His assessment was echoed by an officer from a Cheshire regiment: “If there 
is such a thing as hell on earth this must surely be it.”133 
 Other newspapers provided equally honest views about the trenches in the letters they 
chose to reprint. In December 1914, the Manchester Guardian’s “Letters from the Front” 
column featured a letter from a sergeant in the Stalybridge Territorials which provided a frank 
assessment of the conditions at the front. “The trenches are awful,” the sergeant wrote.  “In 
some parts they are up to the waist in water and slush, and we were practically doubled up for 
60 hours.  The men were absolutely done when they were relieved.”134 A captain in an East 
Kent regiment presented a sombre description of life at the front. “It is the poor devils in the 
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trenches who get shelled day and night, who sit in mud, and seldom get a hot meal, and who 
then, disheartened and cold, are asked to run over a sea of mud under a hail of lead to capture 
another mud ditch,” he wrote. “Depend upon it, in the present show the country’s thanks and 
compassion should be to the sufferers in the trenches. Poor devils!”135   
The Times’ “Letters from the Front” column also contained frank accounts about the 
horrors of the war. A letter from a “general officer,” published in November 1914, talked about 
life in the trenches under fire, noting that his troops were “shot at all day and night by bullets 
and shells. The latter do far the most damage, but the bullets are particularly deadly, being all 
fired by picked marksmen, who lie in wait to pick off heads moving in the trenches.”136  On the 
same day, the Times also printed a letter from an infantry officer who described a battle in 
which he had led some troops. The German heavy guns were trained on their trenches, and 
“more than once” the shells “buried whole sections of men in the earth of the parapet. Some of 
these took no harm, and we dug them out and used them again. Others died, being torn to 
fragments. Shrapnel killed others, and then as the infantry crept nearer rifle bullets made their 
mark.”137 The letter goes on to describe the confusion of battle, when at one point the British 
soldiers stopped firing at advancing Germans, with catastrophic results, because they believed 
the soldiers were British; how multiple messengers were sent to fetch reinforcements and 
killed in the attempt; and a final retreat after no support for the British troops was made 
available, due to the prevalence of enemy fire and overall muddle. It seems incredible, in the 
face of such readily available public information, that historians can continue to argue that 
only “sanitized” reports of the war were presented by the British press to the public, when it is 
clear that civilians were frequently exposed to graphic accounts from soldiers serving on the 
Western front. 
The Times also freely reprinted letters which praised the abilities of German soldiers 
and directly contradicted the information routinely found in the major British newspapers, 
including in its own columns. One letter published in November 1914 came from a major in a 
Highland regiment. Bemoaning the slowness of recruiting, he blamed “the home papers 
tremendously for publishing articles saying the Germans cannot shoot straight, that they run 
away, that their armies are now composed of old men and boys, &c.,” noting that “such things 
are not true, or, if they are, their old men and boys fight wonderfully well.” He finished with 
the sobering prediction that the British were “up against a thundering good army, and it will 
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take us all our time to break ‘em.”138 In the same edition of the Times, the officer who found 
life in the trenches so deadly remarked that he was “disgusted by the accounts I see in the 
papers of the inferiority of Germans as soldiers; don’t believe one word of it. They are quite 
splendid in every way. Their courage, efficiency, organization, equipment and leading are all 
of the very best, and never were surpassed by any troops ever raised.”139 A private from a 
Cheshire regiment, in a letter published in the Manchester Guardian, agreed with this 
assessment. “It is no use saying the Germans are a ‘rotten lot’ as fighters, because I think their 
artillery is very fine,” he wrote. “German aeroplanes were on top of us, and found us out every 
time. They worked well, helping their troops and giving the guns the range.”140 
The British press also, rather astonishingly, printed some letters discussing friendly 
relations between the British and Germans in the trenches. The short distances between the 
opposing armies not only increased the danger of exposure to rifle fire, but also the 
opportunities to eavesdrop on the enemy. The Daily Mail, for example, published a letter from 
a private in the Seaforth Highlanders, who wrote that his unit was in trenches so close to the 
Germans “that we can hear them talking and sometimes singing.” He also reported that they 
had a gramophone, which “must have broken down, for one of them shouted across to us in 
quite good English, ‘Hey, you chaps, can any of you mend a gramophone?  This one has got 
broken.’” One of the British soldiers even volunteered to fix it. “So you see,” Private Rogan 
concluded, “we are on quite friendly terms with them.”141 The Daily Mail also reprinted a letter 
from a major serving on the Western Front, who recounted a story he had heard about two 
opposing regiments whose “trenches are only fifty yards apart.” They “have established very 
friendly relations with one another,” he claimed, and “hardly ever snipe at one another now, 
although they attack each other vigorously when they are required to do so.”142 
The Manchester Guardian also published letters describing friendly behavior between 
the two sides. A private in the King’s Own Royal Lancashires wrote in a letter to his wife, 
published in December 1914, that a “German patrol shouted out to a party of our transport 
bringing rations to us, ‘Halt, you fools; you are going right into the German trenches.’”143 The 
contrast between the German soldiers presented, through these letters, as capable of sharing a 
joke and establishing friendly relations with the British, or warning off a group that was 
headed into the wrong trenches, and the Germany that the same papers referred to as “a jack-
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booted Colossus seeking to stamp out the liberties of Europe” shows that the coverage of the 
war in the British press was not nearly as monolithic as is often believed; in fact, those 
newspapers did not hesitate to present the soldiers’ point of view, with all its divergence from 
the official line, in the same editions as their censored and stereotypical accounts of the war. 
It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that the Manchester Guardian felt able to 
publish an editorial on 24 December 1914 which reflected on the approach of Christmas and 
the fact that the holiday, which “celebrates the coming into the world of the religion of peace,” 
still “finds half the world at war.” The editorial argued that any settlement of that war must 
include the defeated nations, and therefore blind hostility, “however natural and even justified 
the strongest hostility may be,” will not give “the results we seek, and is not in place any more 
during the continuance of the struggle than it will be at the close. Nor is it necessary even as a 
condition of the hardest fighting.  For in this we may take example by the conduct of our own 
troops.” These troops, the Guardian contended, fight with “no fury” but rather 
professionalism, endurance, military pride and patriotism, and “coupled with this a great deal 
of good humour and respect for and even a kind of queer sense of comradeship with the 
soldier on the other side of the trenches who is enduring the same hardships and daring the 
same dangers with feelings and from motives largely similar to his own.”144   
The Manchester Guardian, it appears, had no qualms about admitting that British 
soldiers did not hate the dreaded Hun of newspaper clichés, but rather felt respect for, and 
even a certain kinship with, the enemy. In addition, the paper felt justified in setting before its 
readers an image of a peace that included the defeated powers. Of course, the Guardian was 
assuming that the Allies would win the war, but to be arguing in late 1914 against the 
atmosphere of hatred and propaganda that characterized much of the British reporting on the 
conflict shows that there were newspapers, and therefore members of the public, who were 
able to view the war in a more balanced way. By echoing the attitudes towards the enemy 
expressed in letters written home by men serving in the trenches, the editorial demonstrated 
that the soldiers’ views about the war were reaching British civilians. 
Although the conventional narrative of the First World War emphasizes that soldiers 
were deceived into fighting it through deliberate propaganda and programmed blind hatred of 
the enemy, an examination of their letters show they had a much more complex and nuanced 
view of the war and their German opponents. In addition, contrary to the orthodox view that 
the British public was kept entirely in the dark about the course of the war and the conditions 
under which their soldiers were fighting, even a cursory examination of the newspapers in 1914 
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demonstrates that information which provided a more accurate picture of the fighting 
conditions was readily available. In fact, papers such as the Daily Mail, the Times, and the 
Manchester Guardian had no compunctions about publishing letters and articles that 
discussed the falsity of reports of atrocities, the respect the British troops felt for their German 
counterparts, and their occasional acts of friendliness towards the enemy.  
The fact that realistic information about the Western front was readily available to 
civilians has, however, had no discernible effect on the conventional narrative of the war, 
which continues almost uniformly to insist upon a discourse composed of soldierly reserve 
and public obliviousness. The reasons for the claim by many scholars of the Great War that 
soldiers kept their experiences from their correspondents, and that those on the home front 
were unaware of their sufferings, can be credited to a view of the war which has caused the 
contemporaneous testimony of the soldiers who fought in it to be overlooked in favour of an 
insistence by the war’s poets, memoirists and historians on a more monolithic interpretation 
of the conflict. “And when they ask us, how dangerous it was/Oh, we’ll never tell them, no, 
we’ll never tell them,” sang the soldiers in the 1969 film Oh! What a Lovely War, helping to 
reinforce the myth that the home front was protected from the facts of the conflict and the 
miseries their soldiers had to endure, a discourse that may, at least unconsciously, have been 
adopted by post-war civilians as a way to deflect criticism for their support of the war.145 
Such views, however, are firmly contradicted by the available evidence. Even if the 
later inhabitants of the trenches on the Western front, the volunteers of Kitchener’s Army, 
were more circumspect about their experiences, and newspaper censorship became more 
prevalent later in the war, this was a bell that could not be unrung. Anyone with access to a 
British national newspaper during the first six months of the war – at a time when it could be 
argued that interest in the conflict was at its height – could not, with any amount of 
conviction, claim ignorance of the conditions on the Western front. As a result of the 
forthright manner in which British soldiers wrote home about their experiences, and the 
extent to which the press were willing to circulate accounts from the front that ran counter to 
its stereotypical war reporting, the British public was in a better position to understand the 
truth of the war than someone who read only typical newspaper reports. By presenting the 
first-hand accounts of life on the Western front as a way of helping the home front understand 
the circumstances under which their men lived, fought, and even died, the British press 
certified the authenticity of the soldiers’ statements and prepared the public to accept a reality 
from the front lines that deviated from the official reports.  
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The Christmas truce, which can only be understood through an examination of the 
circumstances prevailing on the Western front during the first five months of the war and the 
attitudes of the soldiers who served in the trenches during that time, grew out of those 
conditions. While it is true that the impromptu cease-fire was, as is currently believed, a 
response by those soldiers to the war and the way it was fought, the nature of that reaction 
diverges sharply from the conventional view, firmly lodged in the public imagination since the 
1960s, that the men involved perceived the war as futile and senseless. Instead, the truce was a 
consequence of the professional attitudes of the troops involved and the adaptation of the 
troops to a relatively new type of warfare that, at least initially, promoted an altered 
relationship with the enemy, based upon proximity and shared experiences. As the letters they 
sent home demonstrate, soldiers who were faced with a static military situation learned how 
to cope with the uncomfortable and dangerous conditions they found on the Western front, 
and while doing so grew to appreciate the skills of their opponents who shared in the miseries 
of life in the front lines. Although their motivations for fighting did not change as a result of 
their increased familiarity with the enemy, the lack of personal animosity most British soldiers 
felt towards the German troops enabled them, while under the influence of the Christmas 
spirit, to approach the enemy with a surprising level of tolerance and understanding. The 
sense of shared experiences and mutual professionalism which contributed to the unofficial 
cease-fire was displayed by soldiers on the Western front long before the truce occurred, and 
placing their participation in the truce within the context of those early war experiences helps 
to explain its occurrence. 
Because the home front was exposed to a more realistic portrayal of what their soldiers 
endured in the trenches, and the way the troops viewed their enemies, the British public was 
better prepared for the news of the Christmas truce than would have been possible had they 
been less well-informed about the war. As a result, the understanding that civilians attained in 
1914 through letters and newspaper accounts about the conditions in which their soldiers were 
fighting and living, and the way that the same newspapers promoted the first-hand accounts 
of soldiers as the authentic voices of the war, contributed to the way the story of the truce 
would be presented by the soldiers involved and received by the British public. 
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Chapter Three 
“A great day with our enemies”: 
The Christmas Truce 
 
The impromptu truce seemed dangerously akin to the populist politics of the streets, the 
spontaneous movements that toppled tyrants and autocrats.  
-Stanley Weintraub 
Silent Night 
 
 
Spent a very quiet Xmas day. Troops fraternized with enemy on 6th Div. front and held a 
concert and football match. Pork for dinner.  
 - J. S. Fenton 
2nd Field Company Royal Engineers 
 26 December 1914 diary entry  
 
 
“But who would have guessed that, on December 25,” the jacket copy of Truce: The Day 
the Soldiers Stopped Fighting asks rhetorically, “the troops would openly defy their 
commanding officers by stopping the fighting – and spontaneously celebrating Christmas with 
their ‘enemies’.”146 Jim Murphy’s children’s book focuses on the motivations of the soldiers 
involved in the Christmas truce, and takes a far different stance on the cause of the First 
World War from Joyeux Noel’s: while that film blamed deliberately incubated nationalist 
hatreds for the conflict, Truce, as a way of emphasizing the war’s futility, instead stresses how 
easily it could have been prevented.147 The book describes the First World War as “this 
calamitous conflict that could have been avoided,” and the first chapter of the work, entitled 
“Those Stupid Kings and Emperors” after a quote from Winston Churchill, lists the putative 
reasons that the world went to war in 1914, apportioning blame between all the countries 
involved but focusing on the flimsiness of their motives: Germany fearful and jealous of other 
nations’ dominance, Austria concerned about Serbia’s growing power, France “tensed and 
anxious” while still nursing a grudge over the Franco-Prussian War, England nervous about 
Germany’s naval fleet, and Russia worried about the prospect of a German invasion of 
                                                          
146 Jim Murphy, Truce: The Day the Soldiers Stopped Fighting (New York: Scholastic Press, 2009), quote 
from jacket copy. 
147 Although Murphy asserts that “(y)ears of such government propaganda on each side conditioned 
European people to distrust and hate their enemies, many of whom longed for war,” the main thrust of 
his argument is that “the rush to war had been driven by the egos and ambitions of their national 
leaders, fueled by misguided popular support.” Murphy, Truce, pp. 6, 11. 
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Poland.148 In the shadow of each country’s culpability, the war that did not have to happen 
begins, and almost immediately got bogged down in the trenches of the Western front. 
Murphy contends that the barriers between the enemy troops began to break down in 
the early months of the war because of the physical proximity of the two armies fighting in 
France and Belgium. Germans and British soldiers “had been induced to fight in part because 
they’d been led to believe the enemy was inferior to them or a mindless monster,” Truce 
argues, but under the conditions of prolonged trench warfare, the “more friendly contact they 
had with the enemy, the less anger they felt toward them.”149 As a result, according to Murphy, 
on Christmas Eve, although commanders on both sides told the men to keep “on alert, hoping 
to discourage fraternization,” such warnings were in vain.150 The desire on the part of the 
soldiers involved to defy their officers and implicitly condemn the war by celebrating 
Christmas with their enemies resulted in the Christmas truce which took place “all along the 
Western front” on 25 December 1914.151 According to Murphy, the soldiers involved defied the 
orders of their commanders to participate in the truce, the episode that “demonstrated that 
the combatants were more alike than not.”152 While it was only “a very small step toward peace 
on earth, a tiny bit of light in a vast and threatening darkness,” the armistice, Murphy believes, 
still “offered reassurance and hope that a kinder, humane spirit could prevail amid the 
horrible brutality of war.”153  
The cease-fire presented in this book conforms to one the main myths of the 1914 
truce: that the troops who participated in the holiday armistice did so as a form of rebellion 
against a war they had come to see as a farce, and deliberately disobeyed their leadership’s 
commands so they could fraternize with the soldiers that, within just a few months of the war 
starting, had been transformed by the conflict’s futility from opponents into “‘enemies’.” 
Truce’s reception bears out the acceptance of this narrative: Kirkus Review, for example, 
observes that the book describes “that magical, spontaneous Christmas truce of 1914, when 
peace broke out all along the Western Front.”154 In an interview after the publication of Truce, 
Jim Murphy emphasized the research he had undertaken while writing the book, noting that 
he would trace participant’s names back to the original sources, “usually museums or military 
                                                          
148 Murphy, Truce, pg. 10. 
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154 Vicky Smith, review of Truce: The Day the Soldiers Stopped Fighting, by Jim Murphy, Kirkus Reviews: 1 
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organizations in England, France, or Germany,” thus suggesting that his view of the Christmas 
truce has a factual basis.155 
The reality of the war and the holiday armistice, as attested to by the soldiers involved 
in it, however, varies widely from Murphy’s simplistic and clichéd account. As already noted, 
the letters and diaries of British soldiers fighting in Flanders in 1914 demonstrated that they 
felt no blind hatred towards the enemy, and that while they found trench warfare dangerous 
and the conditions under which they fought horrific, they did not feel that they had been 
tricked into fighting the war or find it futile. While the holiday armistice can indeed be 
attributed to a number of causes, including, as Murphy notes, a familiarity with the troops 
opposite and the short distances between the opposing trenches, he erroneously contends that 
the increased knowledge of the other side led to the unmasking of the myth that the enemy 
was an “inferior” being or a “mindless monster.” In fact, in the first months of the war, any 
British or German soldiers that might have volunteered out of hatred towards the enemy were 
still back at home drilling and preparing for later battles. The soldiers in the trenches at 
Christmas 1914, both regular and territorial troops, were fighting because fighting, if their 
country was involved in a war, was the job for which they had signed up, and their letters 
reflected this professional attitude long before the truce began. 
At the same time, the Christmas truce was not, as Murphy does admit, an 
unprecedented event. Although it did occur on a much larger scale than any previous 
armistices in prior wars, military history shows that soldiers often established temporary 
cease-fires, particularly after battles, for the purposes of burying the dead or giving both sides 
a brief rest. The web-site “Wartime Truces in History” discusses fraternization between the 
French and British soldiers during the Peninsular War of 1807-18, truces arranged between 
French and Russians during the Crimean War, and a football match between Boers and the 
British troops during the Second Boer War.156 Brown and Seaton, in their work on the truce, 
point out that localized cease-fires in wartime were common enough occurrences, and cite 
examples from the Peninsular War, the American Civil War, the Boer War and the Russo-
Japanese War to prove their case.157 “So the Christmas truce of 1914,” they concede, “does not 
stand alone,” while at the same time contending that “it is undoubtedly the greatest example 
of its kind.”158  
                                                          
155 Roger Sutton, “Five Questions for Murphy,” Notes from the Horn Book: News about Good Books for 
Children and Teens 2, No. 11 (November 2009). 
156 Wartime Truces in History, https://suite.io/lito-apostolakou/190t2tw.  
157 Brown and Seaton, Christmas Truce, pp. xxii-xxiii. 
158 Brown and Seaton, Christmas Truce, pg. xxiii. 
46 
 
To speak of the Christmas truce so monolithically, however, is fundamentally to 
misunderstand the holiday armistice. The separate truces that occurred on 25 December 1914 
and for a few days afterwards were not pre-arranged, centrally coordinated, or consistent, but 
rather were composed of individually arranged armistices, entered into at different times 
ranging from early Christmas Eve through Christmas afternoon, and widely divergent in 
nature. As a result, they were really no different in intent or effect than the isolated friendly 
instances that had occurred both in previous wars and earlier in the First World War. Only the 
fact that so many battalions participated in the 25 December 1914 truce caused it to be so 
much more well-known than any amicable episodes between opposing troops that had already 
taken place during the conflict. There had already been, for example, some instances of 
friendly British interactions with the Germans before the holiday season began. The 2nd Essex 
reported in their official battalion diary that on 11 December 1914, “(o)fficers & men of A & B 
Co. meet Germans ½ way between the trenches.” The diary further noted that the “Germans 
said they were fed up” and that their trenches were in the “same state” as the British ones, 
indicating that there was conversation between the two sides, and that some British soldiers 
got close enough to the German lines to note the conditions there.159 Closer to Christmas, the 
2nd Queen’s Royal West Surreys’ diary recorded a “little armistice” on 19 December, the day 
after a bloody and unsuccessful British attack on the German trenches.  “At daybreak Germans 
were seen beckoning to our men to come out and collect wounded and bury dead,” the diary 
reported. “Several of our officers including the M.O. and 30 men went out. About 50 Germans 
and 10 German officers also came out.”160 The Germans helped bury the British dead and 
collect the wounded, and the cease-fire only ended when a British gun started shelling the 
enemy trenches. 
While in terms of the numbers of soldiers on both sides who were involved in the 
holiday cease-fire, the description of the truce as “greatest” certainly applies, even those 
British soldiers who participated enthusiastically in the event had no idea that many others 
were doing the same on other parts of the front, which indicates that there was no overall 
                                                          
159 Entry for 11 December 1914, 2nd Essex, WO 95/1505, National Archives. This episode was also featured 
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Although two officers and two stretcher bearers from the battalion were taken prisoner during the 
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coordination of the separate truces. J. Selby Grigg, for instance, described the armistice in 
which he was involved as “quite ‘unofficial’ and local,” apparently believing as late as 27 
December that it had been confined to his unit’s area of the line only.161 As the historian Keith 
Robbins observes, “(t)here was no single war shared by all who took part in it”; similarly, there 
was no single truce, and any attempt to impose a uniform interpretation, as Jim Murphy does, 
upon the motivations of the troops who took part in the various armistices on Christmas 1914 
on the Western front is doomed to frustration by the actual experiences and reports of the 
soldiers involved.162  
Interestingly, the idea of a truce for Christmas did not necessarily originate 
spontaneously in different areas on the Western front, but was first suggested by Pope 
Benedict XV earlier in December 1914.  His proposal that all combatant countries should cease 
warfare for the Christmas season as a precursor to searching for a peaceful solution to the 
conflict was not, as The Times delicately put it, “crowned with success,” but the suggestion 
must surely have inspired at least some soldiers to create their own version on the ground.163 
When M. Holroyd, an officer with the 1st Hants, wrote to his parents describing his “very 
remarkable” Christmas, he noted that it included a “peace on earth that really happened, in 
spite of the Pope’s failures,” demonstrating that the Pontiff’s proposal was known by at least 
some soldiers serving on the Western front.164 
The Christmas truce, being driven by the specific situation existing on the front lines 
at the end of December, 1914, including perhaps the seed planted by the Pope’s suggestion, 
owed both its existence and its grand scale to those circumstances. The attitudes towards the 
truce by the soldiers who participated in it reveal a great deal about their opinions on the war 
and the enemy, and the way they wrote about the temporary cease-fire, both in their diaries 
and in letters home, shows that their views of it were much more complex than the 
conventional narrative, as depicted in such works as Truce and Joyeux Noel, allows. Although 
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it is true that some of those involved expressed regret that the truce would eventually come to 
an end and the war continue, these sentiments appear to have been motivated by distaste for 
being shot at rather than an expectation that the temporary cease-fire would result in any 
lasting peace. Even in the middle of the truce, none involved expected the episode to end the 
conflict – and few even expressed a hope that it would.  
Even though many of the soldiers involved made the holiday armistice the main 
feature of their letters home on or immediately after Christmas, or wrote at length about 
fraternization in the diaries they kept, they were clearly focusing more on the event’s novelty 
value than they were on its significance. In a month when there was little besides mud and 
rain to discuss, the truce must have come as welcome fodder for the otherwise monotonous 
subjects covered in letters written by weary and homesick soldiers. Most importantly, 
although the British soldiers all described the truce as “weird” or “unbelievable” when writing 
home about it, they apparently felt no need to apologize for or explain away their participation 
in the event. The lack of excuses or justifications offered for fraternization with the enemy 
makes it clear that they expected their friends and relations to situate the episode within the 
contemporaneous narrative of the war already jointly assumed and endorsed by those on both 
the Western and home fronts.  
In scale alone, the 1914 truce was indeed great, covering (albeit sporadically) more than 
fifteen miles of the twenty mile front fought over by the BEF and the German forces. Brown 
and Seaton estimate that two-thirds of the British troops along this front, which at the time 
stretched from Ypres south to the town of La Bassee, participated in some type of Christmas-
time cease-fire.165 In total, fifty-four British battalions who were in the line either on or 
immediately following Christmas joined in a truce with their German opponents opposite. 
However, in spite of the widespread nature of the various cease-fires, the form the truce took 
varied widely in different parts of the British/German line. In some cases, the Christmas truce 
was foreshadowed by carol singing on both sides on Christmas Eve and the placing of lit 
Christmas trees on the German parapets, but in others, the night before Christmas was merely 
a bit quieter than usual. On the day itself, in certain areas, firing still took place in some places 
along the line; for a few battalions, the truce consisted of nothing more than a general cease 
fire, with no interaction between opposing sides; some units arranged for a collection and 
burial of the dead in No-Man’s-Land before returning to their respective trenches; and a 
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number of troops engaged in what is now thought of as a conventional “Christmas truce,” with 
full-scale fraternization between the lines.166 
When fraternization occurred, the soldiers on both sides would gather in No-Man’s-
Land and exchange pleasantries, cigars, cigarettes, food and drink. Often, as soldiers reported 
in their letters home, the two sides discussed the war, although in the most simplistic terms; 
these communications were aided by the presence, among the German troops, of soldiers who 
in civilian life had worked in Great Britain as waiters, cabdrivers, barbers and hotel attendants, 
and spoke English well. There were even some football matches between the opposing sides, 
although not nearly so many as would be later believed.167 Photographs, which often became 
valued keepsakes, were taken, and souvenirs, such as regimental tunic buttons, were swapped. 
In some cases, the truce lasted for little more than an hour or two; in quieter parts of the line, 
a general cease-fire and noticeably friendly feeling between the opposing troops persisted 
until New Year’s Day and even afterwards. Although there were a few soldiers who wondered 
whether the temporary armistice would have any impact on the war, the majority of the 
participants viewed the truce as merely a welcome holiday after a difficult and exhausting five 
months of fighting, and obviously expected the recipients of their surprising news to 
appreciate the event in the same spirit. 
In their letters home, soldiers often introduced the story of the Christmas truce by 
indicating that they were about to share something unexpected. “We have just had the most 
extraordinary experience of our lives,” Jack Chappell wrote to his mother and father two days 
after Christmas.168 Alfred Chater tried to place the cease-fire in context, noting that it was 
“really very extraordinary that this sort of thing should happen in a war in which there is so 
much bitterness and ill feeling.”169 Sergeant Hancock, with the 1st Royal Fusiliers, wrote to a 
school-age pen-friend that he had spent an “interesting if not a happy Xmas” in “a truce with 
the enemy opposite us.”170 The letters home rarely provided more than one line of preamble 
before launching into the news of the truce: while soldiers were free with their use of the word 
“extraordinary” to describe the cease-fire, they apparently believed their friends and relations 
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could easily withstand, without a great deal of preparation, the surprising news they were 
about to impart. 
 Having briefly primed the way for “a Christmas Day which I shall never forget in all my 
life,” the soldiers then recounted the details of their respective truces.171 The cease-fires were 
often arranged by meetings in No-Man’s-Land between representatives of both sides, although 
British participants generally agree that the Germans initiated the negotiations. Wilbert 
Spencer, for example, wrote home that on “Xmas Day we heard the words ‘Happy Christmas!’ 
being called out, wherefore we wrote up on a board “Gluckliches Werhnnachten!’ and stuck it 
up. There was no firing, so by degrees each side began gradually showing more of themselves, 
and then two of their men came halfway over and called for an officer.”172 J. Selby Grigg 
reported a similar experience, writing that early on Christmas Day, “small parties on both 
sides ventured out in front of their trenches all unarmed and we heard that a German officer 
came over and promised that they would not fire if we didn’t.”173 Lieutenant Chater wrote to 
his mother that on Christmas morning “I was peeping over the parapet when I saw a German, 
waving his arms, and presently two of them got out of their trenches and came towards ours – 
we were just going to fire on them when we saw they had no rifles so one of our men went out 
to meet them.”174 The variety of truce beginnings demonstrates the lack of coordination that 
went into the event overall, as soldiers from different battalions all reported differences in the 
approaches taken. 
 In a number of cases, the Christmas truce was preceded by German soldiers placing 
traditionally lit Christmas trees on the parapets of their trenches the evening before. Both 
German and British soldiers indulged in carol singing, sometimes in harmony with each other. 
Private Squire reported to his parents that “(o)n Christmas Eve they were singing away as hard 
as they could go and they had lights all along their trench in front of us,” and Ted Lack told his 
niece that, on the evening before Christmas Day, the British soldiers “listened to the nasty 
Germans singing carols on Xmas Eve night and we sung some to them.”175 The songs drifting 
across No-Man’s-Land often invited responses from the opposing trenches: as John 
Wedderburn–Maxwell, a 2nd Lieutenant in the artillery, wrote in a letter to his father, upon 
                                                          
171 Richard Lintott, 1/5th London Regiment (London Rifle Brigade), Private Papers of R. Lintott, Imperial 
War Museum Collection No. 3394, 25 December 1914 diary entry. 
172 W.B.P. Spencer, 25 December 1914 letter.   
173 J. Selby Grigg, 26 December 1914 letter. 
174 A.D. Chater, December 25 1914 letter.  
175 E.W. Squire, 1/13th London Kensingtons, Private Papers of E.W. Squire, Imperial War Museum 
Collection No. 369, 4 January 1915 letter; Ted Lack, Regiment Unknown, Collection of Documents 
relating to Croydon Branch of the Old Contemptibles, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 9646, 
undated letter. 
51 
 
seeing the trees and hearing the Germans singing on Christmas Eve “(o)f course we stopped 
firing and both sides sang carols.”176 Captain Armes heard reports that “the Germans had 
lighted their trenches up all along our front,” so he went out on top of the parapet to view a 
scene that “somehow” became peaceful. As men from both sides sat on top of their trenches 
throughout the evening of 24 December, enjoying the Christmas lights and the quiet 
countryside, Armes “talked German and asked them to sing a German Volkslied, which they 
did, then our men sang quite well and each side clapped and cheered the other.”177 
 Many of the British soldiers hoped that the presence of Christmas trees and carol 
singing on the previous night would portend a peaceful holiday, and “(s)ure enough,” as 
Holroyd wrote in a letter to his parents, “the carols of Christmas Eve were followed by friendly 
exchange of greetings on Christmas morning. During the day both sides came out and 
fraternized in between the lines, buried stale corpses and reconoitred the ground.”178 
Holroyd’s experience, while not universal, was certainly not unusual; on Christmas day itself, 
many truce participants left their trenches and went out into No-Man’s-Land to meet with the 
enemy. Sam Lane recorded one such encounter in his diary, noting that on Christmas Day, 
after an agreement with the troops opposite to cease firing for 12 hours, “some of our fellows 
went over and met the Germans who came out of their lines, and shook hands with each other 
this seems hardly believable but it is true.”179 Percy Jones similarly observed that for the entire 
day “the ground between the two lines was simply swarming with little knots of Saxons and 
English.”180 Grigg, coming up on Christmas afternoon from the reserve line to the front, found 
“a crowd of some 100 tommies of each nationality holding a regular mothers’ meeting between 
the trenches.”181 While not all cease-fire agreements involved meetings with the enemy, many 
participants in those truces that featured fraternization report a general lack of hesitation in 
venturing forth from the relative safety of the British trenches and joining the enemy in No-
Man’s-Land. 
 Those who took part in the fraternizations generally did not go out to meet the enemy 
empty-handed: soldiers from both sides brought food, tobacco and other items to share with 
the enemy soldiers. Private Squire wrote home that, after the British left the trenches, the 
“Germans came out of theirs and we met halfway and talked and exchanged souvenirs our 
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own bullets for theirs and they also gave some of our fellows cigars of which they said they had 
plenty and we gave them tins of bully beef as they said they had very little food.”182 A soldier 
from the 1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles reported in his diary that, when visiting the front 
lines on Christmas Day, he “found about 200 English drawn up across it & 20 yds further down 
about 300 Germans looking at each other in the end they all mixed up & started exchanging 
fags & buttons. I got some fags a cap badge a button & some cigars.”183 Frank Black had a 
similar experience: while negotiating terms of the truce with some German officers, he told a 
friend, “crowds of Germans came out and more of my men, till we formed a group of about 
100, all shaking hands, and trying to make each other understood and exchanging 
souvenirs."184 
 In addition to the exchange of food and souvenirs, another standard element of many 
individual truces was a proposal to engage in a football match. Considering that both the 
British and Germans were enthusiastic footballers, and that international fixtures had been 
recently regulated after the creation of the Federation Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) in 1904, it is hardly surprising that the thoughts of the opposing troops would turn to 
the possibility of a match.185 Although in most cases a game was impractical for many reasons, 
including lack of a ball or a suitable patch of ground, it was apparently frequently suggested. 
Wedderburn-Maxwell, for example, wrote that the two sides “wanted to have a football match 
yesterday afternoon but couldn’t get a ball.”186 Colonel Diggle, a staff officer with the 8th 
Division Headquarters, reported that he heard “that there was a football match between the 
trenches on one part of the line against the Germans. The Germans got beaten again 1-0.”187  
J.A. Liddell wrote his mother that the Germans “were awfully keen to get up a football match 
against us; whether it will come off or not I don’t know.”188 Sergeant Bryan with the 1st Scots 
Guards did report an actual match, which he claimed his men had won “easily by 4-1.”189 
Although most of the stories of football games were rumors rather than reality, the fact that so 
many soldiers either mentioned matches being proposed, or reported hearing that they took 
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place, has given the mostly mythical games the air of reality, and embedded them firmly into 
the collective memory of the truce. 
Thus far, the event these soldiers experienced conforms closely to the Christmas truce 
of the conventional war narrative, including negotiated cease-fires, cheerful fraternizing, 
proposed football matches, and sharing of food, drink, cigars and souvenirs. Where these 
accounts diverge from the standard truce discourse is in the lack of rebellious motives on the 
part of disaffected soldiers. In fact, these reports are mostly notable for the cheerfully matter-
of-fact way the British troops approached these individual cease-fires, viewing them as 
opportunities to have a good time without any significance beyond the celebration of a 
holiday with other soldiers – who, in this case, happened to be from the opposing army.  
At the same time, further examination of accounts of the truce reveals other, more 
nuanced interactions, many with mournful or ominous undertones that do not often find their 
way into the standard discourse. A number of battalions involved used the cease-fire as an 
opportunity to retrieve bodies from previous battles that had been lying in No-Man’s-Land; in 
some cases, the dead were soldiers who had been killed long before Christmas. Sergeant 
Richard Lintott, for example, recorded in his diary walking up to the front line of trenches to 
find the two sides “burying some dead which had been lying about since Oct. 21st.” After the 
burial, “(w)e all (Germans and English) stood bareheaded round the grave while a German 
officer read the service.”190 Grigg participated in a similar ceremony, which occurred after the 
British retrieved the body of a dead German. At the burial, a German officer provided a brief 
prayer service over the grave. After the ceremony, the Germans thanked “‘our English friends 
for bringing in our dead,’ and then said something in broken English about a merry Xmas and 
happy New Year. They stuck a bit of wood over the grave – no name on it only ‘Fur Vaterland 
and Freheit’ (for Fatherland and Freedom).”191 Captain Armes wrote home that he gave the 
German officer in command of the troops opposite his “permission to bury some German dead 
who are lying in between us, and we agreed to have no shooting until 12 midnight 
tomorrow…We saluted each other, he thanked me for permission to bury his dead, and we 
fixed up how many men were to do it, and that otherwise both sides must remain in their 
trenches.”192 Negotiations between officers regarding the parameters of individual truces, 
including how many men could participate and the time an armistice would cease, were 
common, which illustrates the transient nature of the episodes. 
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For some soldiers, the burial of the dead seems to have been the primary reason for, 
and the main feature of, the Christmas Day cease-fire. D. Lloyd-Burch, who served in France 
with an ambulance corps, wrote in his diary that upon hearing of a truce he “went to the East-
Lanc trenches and found the Germans and English troops burying the dead between the 
trenches cigarettes and cigars were exchanged.”193 Cecil Lothian Nicholson of the 2nd East 
Lancashires also reported the same incident in his diary, noting that, upon moving towards 
the opposing trenches, he discovered that the Germans “wanted leave to bury the dead of 
which there were a good many lying in No-Man’s land.”194 Nicholson offered the Germans “an 
hour and a half,” for both sides to “bury all the dead lying close to our line and they could do 
the same with theirs.” This offer was “subsequently extended for another hour in the course of 
which we buried all the dead and Sanders went out from the Adv. Post in the 3rd Sector and 
recovered the body of Dilworth Sher. For. who had been killed about a month before.” 
Pelham-Burn, with the 6th Gordon Highlanders, wrote that he found the joint burial service for 
the British and German dead, some of whom “had been there 6 weeks or more,” a very moving 
experience.195 “Our Padre who was up in the trenches for a few hours arranged the prayers and 
Psalms etc. and then our interpreter wrote them out in German,” he reported. The service was 
“then read first in English by our own Padre and then in German by a boy who was studying 
for the ministry. It was an extraordinary most wonderful sight. The Germans formed up on 
one side the English on the other the officers standing in front, every head bared.”  
 While some British soldiers found the improvised ceremonies, consisting of men from 
both armies united in memorializing their fallen comrades, a meaningful and at times heart-
warming experience, others were more distressed, particularly by the sight of the dead. Percy 
Jones described in his diary how, in No-Man’s-Land, there was a “long ditch about four feet 
wide and four feet deep. It was simply packed with dead Germans. Their faces, brown and 
leather-like, with deep sunken cheeks, and eyebrows frozen stiff, stared up horribly through 
the clear water.”196 Some of the soldiers had been killed in a battle that took place on 18-19 
December, and the sight of their recently slain comrades strongly affected the troops who had 
to bury them. A diary from an unidentified soldier in the 2nd Battalion Border Regiment 
recorded on 25 December that an officer told his unit “that we were to Bury our Comrades that 
fell in the Charge on the 18th of Dec. so we all started diging and Burying them side by side 
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and made them a Cross out of the wood of a Biscuit Box and layed them to rest on Xmas day.” 
When the soldiers had been buried, “we all kneled and offered up a Prayer to God above for 
our Comrades who fell in Honour.”197  
Second Lieutenant Spencer’s unhappy truce consisted of a four-hour armistice during 
which the Germans carried “dead men back halfway for us to bury. A few days previous we had 
an attack with many losses.” Spencer noted bitterly in a letter home that he did not want to 
describe “the sights I saw, and which I shall never forget.” After burying the dead “as they 
were,” Spencer wrote, he went “back to the trenches with the feeling of hatred growing ever 
stronger after what we had just seen.”198 While the truce provided some soldiers with the 
welcome relief of being able to collect and bury the bodies of their comrades as well as honor 
their memories, the grisly remains reminded others of the horrors of the war and the reasons 
they had to hate the enemy.199  Even Pelham-Burn, who found the joint burial party in which 
he joined “a wonderful sight”, described the collection of the dead for burial as “too awful to 
describe so I won’t attempt it.”200 
 In addition to the burial parties, however peaceably conducted, which reminded the 
soldiers of the presence of the war, there were also signs of continued fighting throughout the 
holiday week. Grigg, for instance, noted ironically that, while Christmas Eve had been quiet in 
their trenches, “there has been a little sniping on our right where the Germans are evidently 
not quite such good friends with their enemies.”201 Captain Wellesley, who served with the 2nd 
Lincolnshires, the battalion that relieved the 1st Royal Irish Rifles on 26 December, similarly 
remarked that “on our right and left they have been going on fighting as usual,” and William J. 
Chennell, with the 2nd Queen’s Royal West Surreys, observed that during the truce “the most 
peculiar thing was that on our right and left the Germans and English were still fighting.”202 In 
spite of the temporary armistice, many soldiers involved were unable to forget the war entirely 
and remained aware that, while they were fraternizing with the Germans, other British troops 
nearby in the front lines were still fighting them and perhaps being wounded or killed. 
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 Even without the reminders of dead bodies or adjacent fighting, however, there were 
soldiers who were still not able to overlook their distrust of the Germans during the cease-
fires. Although the modern narrative of the truce has everyone participating happily in the 
event, many could not, even for Christmas, forget the war and their resentment of the enemy.  
Spencer’s sight of the dead British soldiers, as already noted, upset him badly, and he was not 
the only soldier who found the truce aroused negative emotions. Colonel Diggle, who reported 
in a letter home that the Germans in his area had asked for a truce on Christmas Day, 
remarked on the treachery of the enemy, who shot “one of our officers dead who was doing his 
half of the truce.” Diggle concluded angrily that the Germans “are dirty dogs and you can’t 
trust them.”203 Frank Black was very nervous during 1st Royal Warwick’s truce: when 
fraternization took placed between “crowds of Germans” and his men, during which they 
shook hands, tried to converse and exchanged souvenirs, he observed that “(t)he Germans 
outnumbered us by 4 or 5 to 1.” With understandable caution, Black “told the Captain I 
thought we had better get back to our trenches, which we did after a great deal of bowing."204  
Bernard Brookes, who served in France with the 1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles, 
recorded a similar watchfulness among his battalion, observing that, when an officer went out 
to meet a German emissary, we “stood at our posts with rifles loaded in case of treachery.”205 
Captain Armes reported that although he believed that the Germans offer on Christmas Eve 
for a mutual cease-fire was sincere, and that “they mean to play the game,” he intended to be 
awake all night so as to be on the safe side.” The next day, he and the German officers fixed up 
between them “that the men should not go near their opponents’ trenches, but remain about 
midway between the lines.”206 This was a standard truce precaution, designed to prevent the 
enemy from learning too much about the opposing sides’ defences, and demonstrates how, 
even in the free atmosphere of fraternization, reasonable care was taken to prevent the 
collection of information that could assist their opponents in the next attack.207 Although, 
under the conventi0nal narrative of the holiday cease-fire, the soldiers were supposed to feel 
confident about the motives of their “comrades” on the opposing side, similar caution was 
displayed by many truce participants, as their distrust of the enemy was never completely 
subsumed in the general holiday atmosphere. 
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 Along with a very understandable suspicion of the Germans, many British were also 
startled to discover how badly misinformed they were. Instead of making common cause by 
bonding over their shared dislike of their leadership and the futile war, the two groups 
discussed the conflict during fraternization - or rather, as often reported by the British, they 
listened politely to the Germans’ asserted belief in their country’s eventual victory. Lieutenant 
Liddell, for example, wrote his parents that the Germans he met “were quite convinced that 
the Russians were absolutely beaten, and also the Servians. Also that they would win, and the 
war would be over in about 6 months at most.”208 Ernest Morley, who served with the 1/16th 
Queen’s Westminster Rifles, said that one German asked him about the sentries “posted 
around Buckingham Palace” as he was under the impression that German troops had reached 
England.209 Another soldier recorded in his diary that, during fraternization, the first thing the 
enemy asked “was when are you going to give in you are beat.”210 The Germans further claimed 
that their newspapers reported “they had troops reviewing in Hyde Park and also troops in 
Calais.” The soldier responded that “well I must admit that you have got troops in London But 
they are Prisioners of War,” however, the Germans “would not take that so my Chum gave 
them the News of the World.”211 Leslie Walkinton, also with the 1/16th Queen’s Westminster 
Rifles, was apparently tactful with his particular group of Germans: although he met some who 
came from London and hoped to return after the war, “of course we did not talk about who 
was going to win or anything touchy like that.”212 
In spite of the confidence with which the Germans presented their tales of conquest 
and impending victory, none of the British soldiers recorded any doubt about the progress of 
the war and the possibility of Allied defeat. Perhaps the generally outlandish nature of claims 
about German soldiers standing guard at Buckingham Palace were too ridiculous to 
contemplate seriously, but at the same time, for the conventional narrative of the First World 
War and the Christmas truce to retain any credibility, the soldiers at this point in the war 
should have begun to question the lack of progress and the futile nature of the conflict. After 
all, the war had not ended as quickly as anticipated: at the time of the truce the Allies had 
been fighting for five months and yet the Germans still occupied Belgium and all of northern 
France, while the British troops were stuck firmly in the mud of the trenches and apparently 
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going nowhere fast. Instead of harboring doubts about the meaning and progress of the 
conflict, however, British soldiers appear to have cheerfully listened to the Germans brag 
about their war news, including one soldier who, as Ralph Blewitt reported, refused to 
contradict a German who had great faith in his country’s victories “as he didn’t like to hurt his 
feelings!!”213 It seems incredible that, after the retreat of the Allied forces before the German 
onslaught in the autumn, and their experiences with the miseries of trench warfare, British 
soldiers continued to feel confidence and optimism about the course of the war and its 
eventual outcome, but contact with similar confidence and optimism displayed by the 
Germans does not seem to have shaken their belief that the Allies would ultimately prevail. 
Many British also reported that the Germans with whom they fraternized confessed 
that, while they were confident about their country’s progress in the war, they also felt tired of 
the conflict. Ralph Blewitt, for example, wrote to his fiancée that the Germans “were all fed up 
with the war and wanted to know when we were going to give in!”214 In some cases, the 
weariness with war (without a corresponding loss of faith in its prospects) was shared by both 
sides: Frank Black noted that the Germans “are just as tired of the war as we are, and said they 
should not fire again until we did.”215 Chater agreed, writing home that “(f)rom what I 
gathered  most of them would be as glad to get home again as we should.”216 Grigg claimed 
that none of the Germans with whom he had fraternized “seemed to have any personal 
animosity against England and all said they would be jolly glad when the war was over.”217 
Although these statements appear to track the conventional truce narrative, emphasizing the 
bond formed between the opposing sides over their dislike for the war and reluctance to 
continue fighting it, closer examination of the letters and diaries of the men involved show 
that these were standard soldiers’ complaints about army service, exacerbated by the holiday 
season, which would naturally be the occasion for additional homesickness.218  
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It is worth noting that many of the cease-fires ended with firing that had been pre-
arranged, indicating that both sides understood that the truce was a temporary measure and 
that the war would resume at a set point. J. Fenton, who served in the Royal Engineers, 
provided a case in point, recording in his diary that the Germans “threw a message over to say 
they are going to start firing at midnight and that they take it as an honour to inform us of the 
fact.”219 J. Ray, with the 1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, which was out of the line on 
Christmas but relieved the 1st Devonshires on 28 December, said the Germans had signaled the 
British “that they were going to shell us.”220 Harold Atkins of the 1/5th London Rifles wrote that 
“it is understood that when hostilities must recommence they will be preluded by a volley in 
the air.”221 These courtesies enabled the truces to end in many areas with fewer hard feelings 
than they might have had the firing started without any warning, and further demonstrate 
how many soldiers in the line understood that the truces into which they had entered were 
finite arrangements, and were to last only as long as the holiday period itself. 
Another interesting aspect of the truce was observation by the British of the origins of 
the soldiers opposite them. While the phrase ‘the enemy’ in modern British discussions of the 
war now refers to all Germans, the men on the front line at that time clearly drew a distinction 
between Saxon and Bavarian soldiers and Prussians. As Brown and Seaton note, the onus of 
dislike towards the enemy mostly fell on one sub-group, and “the Saxons were assumed to 
have had no hand in excesses blamed either on the Prussian soldiery or on the German 
leadership.”222 The writings of the men involved in the truce bear out this observation. Lloyd-
Burch recorded in his diary the belief that the cease-fire was due entirely to the identity of the 
troops opposite: “(t)he Saxon’s were in front of my brigade at this time had the Prussians been 
there no truce would have been held.”223 Holroyd agreed, noting that he would be “greatly 
surprised if they or we fire a shot tomorrow; whatever Prussian war-lords may do, Bavarian 
troops are pretty sure not to desecrate Christmas Day.” When he discovered that the troops 
opposite were in fact Saxons rather than Bavarians, he emphasized their communal heritage 
across the lines, referring to the British and German troops collectively as “(w)e and the other 
Saxons.”224 Edgar Cox also reported in a letter home that all soldiers “except the Prussians” 
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were fraternizing.  He even noted that the non-Prussian troops provided a friendly warning to 
the British, telling them “not to go south of a certain line as there were Prussians there.” In 
fact, Cox claimed, “(t)wo of our fellows who disregarded the warning were shot dead.”225 As 
these examples demonstrate, it is apparent that the British soldiers believed that the impetus 
for war originated with the Prussian militaristic influence on the German leadership, and that 
the Bavarian and Saxon regiments were less responsible for the situation in which the British 
now found themselves, making it easier for them to respond to the overtures of friendship 
offered by these regiments during the Christmas truce. 
 The British soldiers closed their accounts of the truce with relatively brief summings-
up of the event. “It was indeed an ideal Christmas,” Brookes noted in his diary, observing that 
“the spirit of Peace and Goodwill was very striking in comparison with the hatred and death-
dealing of the past few months.”226 Ernest Morley light-heartedly characterized his Christmas 
turn in the trenches as “not so bad as regards weather, it being chiefly frosty and as regards 
the war was a perfect scream.”227 Pelham-Burn predicted that the enthusiastic fraternization 
between the soldiers of the opposing sides “was a sight one will never see again,” and John 
Wedderburn-Maxwell called it “the most wonderful thing of the war.”228  Percy Jones summed 
up the event by noting in his diary that “(a)ltogether we had a great day with our enemies, and 
parted with much hand-shaking and mutual good wishes.”229 Lance-Corporal Gaunt of the 
1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles did observe that “(i)t seems most weird, talking and 
laughing with them one minute and killing each other the next,” but this was a minority 
opinion.230  J. Selby Grigg unconsciously adopted the majority view towards the truce when he 
wrote that “(o)n the whole, apart from the wet, cold and lack of sleep which one has to get 
used to, I have quite enjoyed our three days up and wouldn’t have missed it for anything.”231 It 
is clear from the words of the soldiers who participated in the event that the Christmas truce 
was a memorable episode, but at the same time was considered a temporary and likely 
unrepeatable one. 
In many ways, the letters and diaries of those who participated in the Christmas truce 
are remarkable more for what was not recorded than what was. While soldiers wrote 
cheerfully about the opportunities to fraternize with the Germans and move about freely in 
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the trenches without fear of snipers, and less happily about being able to bury the dead lying 
in No-Man’s-Land, they did not voice any belief that the existence of the truce meant the end 
of the war (although some, heartily fed up with life in the trenches, hoped it would stop soon), 
or that contact with the Germans removed their rationale for continued fighting. Therefore, at 
the same time that the men were marveling at what they described as “a very weird Xmas Day” 
or “an extraordinary state of affairs,” they still clearly expected that the war would resume 
after the brief respite.232 Claims by British soldiers that the Germans would have prolonged the 
truce if the British had agreed did occur but were infrequent; similarly, observations by 
soldiers who believed that the truce had any significance beyond that of a brief holiday were 
also rare.233  
As the accounts written by the soldiers involved demonstrate, the Christmas truce was 
not the monolithic event that the current orthodox First World War narrative claims. In spite 
of Lloyd-Birch observing in his diary that “(i)t seems terrible to think that they were 
exchanging souvenirs one day and killing one another the next,” and Ralph Blewitt writing 
that he believed that “if it wasn’t stopped jolly quick I suppose it would spread all down the 
line and the armies would cease to fight at all,” most participants wrote about “this funny 
unofficial truce” with “our friends the enemy” as if it were a purely temporary episode.234 
Although many men reported fraternizing with the Germans with unreserved enjoyment, 
there were other soldiers, such as Wilbert Spencer, who were unable to completely subsume 
their resentment of the enemy during the holiday cease-fire. In addition, except for the 
occasional comment about how the truce demonstrated “what a remarkable show this war is,” 
most of those involved in the truce accepted that they would go back to killing the opposing 
side as soon as the extraordinary event ended.235 “(I)t really is a funny war isn’t it,” Captain 
Wellesley wrote home rhetorically, without any indication that the truce had caused him to 
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Christmas Truce, pg. 157). However, it is much more likely that, with the shortage of ammunition that 
plagued the Allied armies through mid-1915, and other parts of the line experiencing more volatility 
during this time, these were just not particularly busy areas. No soldier’s letters or diaries examined 
reported any truce extending past the end of the year, (even though in some cases, as demonstrated by 
battalion war diaries, the truces did last until the first weeks in January) and most were over by 27 or 28 
December 1914. 
234 Lloyd-Burch, undated diary entry; Ralph Blewitt, 1 January 1915 letter; A. Pelham-Burn, undated 
letter; Bernard Brookes, 26 December 1914 diary entry. 
235 J.A. Liddell, 25 December letter. 
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rethink his attitude towards the conflict.236 Even after the truce finished and bitter fighting 
resumed, soldier’s attitudes remained unchanged: three months after fraternizing with the 
Germans, W.J. Chennell wrote his wife that “I should like the war to finish and yet I should 
like to see them wiped out, as they thoroughly deserve it,” demonstrating that a friendly 
afternoon spent with the enemy had not changed his mind about the need to defeat them.237 
In spite of claiming that the truce could have spread and caused the armies to cease fighting, 
Ralph Blewitt noted without surprise that the armistice only lasted on Boxing Day “till some 
officer came down and said they’d had enough now” at which point “both sides retired to their 
trenches and started off sniping with increased vigour.”238  
Contrary to the orthodox narrative of the war, the British soldiers involved appeared to 
have no constraints in writing home to their friends and relations about singing songs in 
harmony with the Germans, meeting them in No-Man’s-Land, exchanging food and souvenirs 
with the enemy, and joining with the soldiers from the opposing sides in joint burial parties.  
These accounts of the truce, including descriptions of open fraternization and the burial of the 
frozen and rotting corpses in No-Man’s-Land, arrived home uncensored, demonstrating that 
the news of the cease-fire, even in its friendliest or grisliest aspects, was not suppressed or 
kept from the home front. Additionally, the ease with which these soldiers related stories 
about their experiences in the truce contradicts the conventional war narrative which insists 
civilians had no idea of what life on the Western front was like. Having generally kept their 
correspondents informed since they had arrived at the Western front about their attitudes 
towards the war, the conditions of life in the front lines, their feelings of comradeship with 
their enemies, their respect for the professionalism of the German soldiers, and the horrors of 
the war, the British truce participants obviously expected that their friends and relations 
would view the holiday cease-fire as they did: a temporary break from fighting, but not a 
reason to cease doing so. The absence of attempts to reassure their correspondents about their 
unchanged attitudes towards the war or their continued desire to fight demonstrates that the 
soldiers believed their letters’ recipients would enjoy the story of a peaceful Christmas and 
fraternization between the two armies as much as they did, and would view it in the same 
spirit: as a welcome, but transitory, holiday from the battle.  
                                                          
236 C.V.G. Wellesley, 25 December 1914 letter. 
237 W.J. Chennell, 20 March 1915 letter. 
238 Ralph Blewitt, 1 January 1915 letter. Blewitt’s remark, incidentally, represents one of the few 
observations that the fighting began again by orders of an officer; most truces ended in a rather more 
desultory fashion, with shooting by both sides picking up slowly as battalions rotated in and out of the 
trenches in the week after Christmas. 
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It is impossible to detect in these letters and diary entries the disaffected, embittered, 
and disillusioned soldiers that participated in Murphy’s Truce. The men fighting in Flanders in 
1914 did not need the proximity of the trenches to convince them the German soldiers were 
not inferior beings or mindless monsters. They already knew that the troops opposite were 
much as themselves: homesick and tired of rain, cold, and mud.  This did not obviate the need 
to win the war and prevail against German militarism and global ambitions, but it did mean 
that, for many soldiers along the British front, there was no impediment to celebrating the 
holiday with the enemy troops that could not be overcome by the Christmas spirit.  Although 
others found that they could not enter into the holiday mood and therefore spurned the 
advances of the enemy, this did not necessarily indicate a different attitude towards the war. 
Frederick A. Brown, who served on the Western front with the 2nd Monmouthshires, wrote 
years later about a company sergeant who responded to overtures from the German trenches 
on Christmas morning, only to be shot by a sniper.239  Although in the afternoon many of his 
fellow soldiers went out to fraternize with the Germans, Brown recalled that he did not, as he 
was too upset about the death of a fellow Monmouth. Brown was no more or less enthusiastic 
a soldier than the rest of his company – in fact, his memoir records a strong level of irritation 
with petty army rules – but his reaction to the truce was very personal: he could not overlook 
the treacherous death of his sergeant and therefore declined his opportunity to fraternize with 
the enemy. 
The Christmas truce, for those who did decide to participate in it, was clearly a 
response by professional soldiers to the holiday season and the unusual proximity with the 
enemy owing to the trench system on the Western front.  Even Brown and Seaton, who 
desperately want the temporary cease-fire to mean more than just a day off for the war-weary 
troops, acknowledge that it was prompted “by the dramatic revolution in the style of warfare 
which took place in 1914 within weeks of the onset of hostilities.”240 Considering that the 
soldiers on both sides were experiencing an unfamiliar and largely unexpected type of war, 
with its attendant discomforts and dangers as well as unavoidable close contact with the 
enemy, the collective truces were probably in retrospect not nearly as surprising as they would 
be later characterized.  
The impromptu cease-fires were entered into by many without hesitation and 
experienced by most of those who took part in it as a holiday from fighting and a ‘breather’ 
before renewed combat. The absence of any major battles or ongoing engagements during the 
                                                          
239 Frederick A. Brown, 2nd Monmouthshires, Private Papers of F.A. Brown, Imperial War Museum 
Collection No. 4401, memoir. 
240 Brown and Seaton, Christmas Truce, pg. 11. 
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Christmas season helped provide an opportunity for the soldiers on both sides to take some 
time out to reinforce their trenches, appreciate the arrival of parcels and letters from home, 
and, in many but not all cases, celebrate the first Christmas of the war by negotiating a brief 
cease-fire with their enemies.241 As the parameters of those individually-arranged armistices 
varied widely, the result was a largely unconnected series of truces, some of which resemble 
the now-conventional narrative, and some of which diverge sharply from that image. In the 
current discourse, they have all merged into one “Christmas Truce,” in which all soldiers 
happily fraternized with their new comrades, with whom they joined in defying their hated 
high-ranking officers, who feared any breach of discipline and wanted to stamp out all signs of 
friendliness between the two sides. An examination of the British military leadership’s 
reaction to the truce will determine whether they indeed wanted to bring the truce to an 
immediate end, and if they were successful in doing so. 
 
 
  
                                                          
241 Most soldiers at the front reported being inundated with mail and presents from home for the first 
holiday season of the war. Percy Jones probably summed up at least a minority view in a letter dated 24 
December 1914 when he wrote that “I am keeping well in spite of the large number of Christmas parcels 
received.” (Percy Jones, 24 December 1914 letter). 
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Chapter Four 
“No war today”: 
The Christmas Truce as Reported in Official War Diaries and Regimental Histories 
 
 
Although soldiers and officers thought, for a moment, that they could forget the war, the war 
itself had not forgotten them – and for that reason it punished them.  
-Malcolm Brown 
Meetings in No-Man’s-Land: Christmas 1914 and Fraternization in the Great War (2007) 
 
 
After a night entirely free from sniping, a kind of informal truce took place all day. The 
Germans, who were not allowed near our wire, met our men between the lines on most 
friendly terms, cigars, cigarettes and news being exchanged freely.   
-11th Brigade, III Corps 
Official War Diary entry for 25 December 1914 
 
 
 
The Christmas Truce, a 2004 documentary in the BBC Days that Shook the World:  
series, features the moment in the First World War “when enemies stopped fighting, and a 
brief window opened into a world of peace.”242 The dramatization, which claims that the 
conflict “consumed more than 20,000,000 men, fourteen and a half thousand a day,” contrasts 
the misery of the soldiers in the trenches during December 1914 with the situation of General 
Smith-Dorrien, leader of the British army’s II Corps, who dines in comfort in his quarters 
while confidently announcing that he plans to take Ypres after the holiday.243 “But this 
Christmas proves to be an even bigger obstacle than he can imagine,” the narration declares, 
before the camera cuts to a British soldier in No-Man’s-Land on Christmas Eve hearing carols 
from the German trenches. 
The documentary observes that the truce starts “between lower ranks,” and then 
spreads down the lines. By mid-day, “nearly half the British front-line army is involved in the 
truce. They are, in effect, committing mass treason, an offense that can mean the firing 
                                                          
242 Days that Shook the World: The Christmas Truce (BBC documentary: 2004). 
243 Each day’s 14,5000 casualties totals 23,490,000 for the entire war. The casualty figures generaly 
accepted for the war are 9-10 million military deaths and 6-7 million civilian deaths – still horrific, but 
not the more than 20 million asserted in this documentary. Of course, the civilian deaths would include 
women and children as well, whereas the documentary implies that the casualty numbers cited are 
military deaths only. 
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squad.” After showing some soldiers defying their junior officers’ orders to cease contact with 
the German troops, the dramatization moves to the headquarters of Field Marshall John 
French, the leader of the British forces in France.244 It shows the opulent Christmas lunch to 
which he has invited both Smith-Dorrien and General Douglas Haig, the leader of I Corps, 
with whom French intends to discuss restructuring the B. E. F.  French, however, is distracted 
by rumors of a truce in the lines. “British High Command is worried” about these reports, the 
documentary maintains, “but not nearly worried enough. So far, they have just seen the tip of 
a very large iceberg.”245   
The BBC program observes that Smith–Dorrien, who had issued orders on 5 December 
1914 forbidding instances of friendly contact with the Germans, “has the power to court-
martial all those involved.” The Christmas Truce does concede that no actual punishments 
were handed down to those who participated in the truce, but a threat of impending doom 
pervades the entire documentary: ominous background music plays every time military 
officials learn more about the truce. The documentary makes much of the fact that Smith-
Dorrien, who is treated throughout as the commander of half of the British forces in the field, 
issued an order on 26 December 1914 asking for the names of officers and units that took part 
in the truce, but admits this was a “hollow gesture,” as there were too many troops involved in 
the armistice to prosecute, and “the very men he would have to condemn are his best troops.”   
The focus in the documentary on French’s Christmas lunch with Smith-Dorrien and Haig 
glides over a number of inconvenient facts about the structure of the B.E.F. on 25 December 
1914, and the battalions that participated in the truce. Although it is true that Haig 
commanded I Corps and Smith-Dorrien II Corps, the documentary fails to mention that there 
were three other B.E.F. corps in the front lines in Flanders – III Corps, IV Corps and the Indian 
Corps (See figure 2). It further ignores the fact that no battalions in I Corps participated in any 
cease-fires with the Germans, and that, of the twenty-three battalions in II Corps, only seven 
fraternized with enemy troops. The battalions comprising the III, IV, and Indian Corps, on the 
other hand, were much more enthusiastic truce participants: in III Corps, under Lieutenant-
General Pulteney, twenty-three out of twenty-eight battalions joined in the holiday armistice, 
while the numbers for IV Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Rawlinson, were twenty-
one out of twenty-eight, and three of the four battalions in the Indian Corps, headed by 
Lieutenant General Willcocks, fraternized with the enemy.  The battalions under Smith-
                                                          
244 In this documentary, the assertion that soldiers in the line defied orders from junior officers to cease 
fraternization is based upon the memoirs of Francis Philip Woodruff (alias Frank Richards), written 
many years after the event. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of Woodruff’s work.  
245 Of course, no mention is made of the leaders of III and IV Corps, whose battalions were much more 
heavily involved in the truces on 25 December 1914. 
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Dorrien’s command comprised only a small portion of the British fraternizers, and therefore 
emphasizing, as the 2004 documentary does, his role in issuing orders to end the Christmas 
 
Figure 2. Structure of British Expeditionary Forces on 25 December 1914, showing which 
battalions, brigades, divisions, and corps participated in the Christmas Truce. (Tables by Dick 
Gilbreath) 
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Figure 2, continued. 
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truce ignores the much more relaxed attitude towards the event taken by the leadership of III 
and IV Corps, which commanded over 80% of the British troops that took part in the 
impromptu cease-fire.246 
  Before further analysis of the reactions of the B. E. F.’s leadership to the truce, 
however, it is worth examining the Christmas Truce documentary’s contention that junior 
officers tried to keep their men from joining in the armistices. In fact, the majority of the 
officers in the front line on 25 December 1914 neither forbade the truces in which their 
battalions joined nor refused to participate in the episodes. Arthur Pelham-Burn, Frank Black, 
Ralph Blewitt, H.J. Chappell, J.A. Liddell, L. Nicholson, M. Holroyd, R.J. Armes and John 
Wedderburn-Maxwell, all quoted in the previous chapter, were front-line officers who had no 
objection to the negotiated cease-fires, and, in addition, wrote extensive letters home about 
the truces in which they participated.247 Captain Arthur Bates of the 1/5th London Rifles of III 
Corps even wrote to his sister on 24 December 1914 that “my orders to the Co[mpan]y are not 
to start firing unless the Germans do,” indicating that he not only tolerated but even 
encouraged a Christmas cease-fire in the front lines.248   
This attitude was shared by other battalion officers. Lt. Colonel Fisher-Rowe, 
commander of the 1st Grenadier Guards of IV Corps, wrote approvingly to his wife on 25 
December that he believed the Germans “want a bit of Peace like us and the Scots Guards I 
hear have arranged not to have any shooting last night or tonight.”249 In fact, Fisher-Rowe 
wrote home about the truce daily for a week and not only took no steps to stop the 1st 
Grenadier Guards from participating in the cease-fire, but was obviously happy for it to 
continue, at least for the holidays. Additionally, Fisher-Rowe’s writings on the subject make it 
clear he did not believe the truce was either dangerous or bad for discipline, and he certainly 
did not punish any of his men for their involvement. While there were a few instances of 
front-line officers putting an end to individual armistices, they were not preventing the truces 
themselves, but rather bringing specific episodes of fraternization to a close, often at a pre-
arranged time. Chater’s letter home about the truce, for example, records that conversation 
                                                          
246 While it is true that, after the British forces in France were re-organized at the end of December 1914, 
Smith-Dorrien was put in charge of the new Second Army, which comprised the former II and III Corps, 
at the time of the truce he commanded only one out of five British corps in France, and therefore the 
order he issued on December 26 was addressed to the II Corps only – not the entire army, as the 
documentary implies. 
247 While Black, as already noted, did confess to being slightly apprehensive about being surrounded by 
the Germans on a 4 to 1 ratio with British troops, he still had no compunctions about shaking hands and 
exchanging souvenirs with the enemy. (F.H. Black, 31 December 1915 letter) 
248 Arthur Bates, 1/5th London Regiment (London Rifle Brigade), MS Letter, Imperial War Museum 
Collection No. 10083, 24 December 1914 letter. 
249 L. Fisher-Rowe, 25 December 1914 letter. 
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with the opposing troops “continued for about half an hour,” after which “most of the men 
were ordered back to the trenches.”250 Liddell similarly reported that the German officers put 
an end to the cease-fire, whistling the men “back after about an hour.” However, this action 
does not appear to have been prompted by any animosity, as Liddell wrote that, while the 
Germans were leaving, “there was a lot of handshaking and ‘Auf wiedersehen’” which would 
hardly have been the case if the officers involved had disapproved of the fraternization.251   
This information about the attitudes of front-line officers towards the Christmas truce 
appears, it should be noted, in their letters and personal diaries rather than any authorized 
record. After all, as Tony Ashworth argues in his work on the ‘live and let live’ system that 
allowed for a certain level of mutual accommodation in the front lines between the two sides, 
there would be little point in examining military records for details regarding any sort of 
defiance of orders or friendly contacts with the enemy, as this is hardly the sort of information 
that officers in the field would admit to in official documents.252 War diaries, for example, 
which were kept by officers in the field and chronicled the daily actions of troops in the line 
were intended, according to the 1914 Field Service Pocket Book issued by the War Office’s 
General Staff, “to furnish an accurate record of the operations from which the history of the 
war can subsequently be prepared.”253 These accounts, which were sent to divisional 
headquarters monthly, became the permanent records of the actions of a battalion, brigade or 
division. Because they served as the official record of all military activities, and were collected 
and reviewed by the army leadership, it is reasonable to expect that no news of the truce 
would be documented in them by participating battalions. 
An examination of the diary entries for many battalions that joined in the holiday 
cease-fire, however, disproves this theory. “A local truce British and Germans intermingled 
between the trenches,” proclaimed the 1st Royal Warwickshires’ official record for 25 December 
1914. “No shot fired all day.”254 In fact, a review of the war diaries kept by the fifty-four 
battalions that participated in the truce shows that thirty-five of those battalions – almost 
two-thirds of those involved – featured the truce in these records.255 Some of those battalions 
went far beyond a mere mention of the armistice, recording a surprising level of detail about 
                                                          
250 A.D. Chater, 24 December 1914 letter. 
251 J.A. Liddell, 25 December 1914 letter. 
252 Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System (London: Pan Books, 1980), 
pg. 10. 
253 General Staff, War Office, Field Service Pocket Book: 1914 (Reprinted, with amendments, 1916) 
(London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1917), pp. 210-211. 
254 1st Royal Warwickshires, WO 95/1664, National Archives 
255 Of the fifty-four battalions involved, the war diaries for eighteen of them do not mention the truce at 
all – although most of these note that the front line was very quiet around Christmas – and one diary is 
missing from the National Archives, that of the 1st East Surreys.   
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the cease-fire. The 25 December diary entry for the 1/16th Queen’s Westminsters, for example, 
was particularly forthright: “No war today,” it announced boldly. “Much conversation with 
enemy between trenches.”256 (See Figure 3)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3, 1/16th Queen’s Westminsters’ diary for 25 December 1914.  (Used by permission of the 
National Archives, London.) 
 
Confounding the theory that those involved in the Christmas truce feared reprisals 
from their leadership should their participation become known, the diaries of battalions 
comprising the 25th Brigade of IV Corps recorded the fact that their superior officers were told 
about the armistices as well as the details of their respective cease-fires. The 1/13th London (the 
Kensingtons), for example, noted that not only did they refrain from firing on Christmas Day, 
but also that the voluntary cease-fire was “reported personally by Adjutant to O.C. [officer in 
charge] 25th Brigade at 9 am.,” and that the “same conditons” persisted the next day.257 The 2nd 
Royal Berkshires recorded that their truce began on Christmas Eve and continued for two 
days, until they rotated out of the trenches. During that time, “soldiers got up on parapet and 
advanced half way towards German trenches and in some cases conversed with them.”258 The 
2nd Rifles, who relieved the 2nd Royal Berkshires on the evening of 26 December, observed that 
at that time “an informal truce reigned,” and that the “opportunity was taken to do a lot of 
work in the open and mending wire.”259 When the cease-fire continued through 27 December, 
“this curious state of affairs” was reported to the brigade headquarters. No adverse reaction 
from the 25th Brigade leadership was recorded. 
                                                          
256 1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles, WO 95/1616, National Archives. 
257 1/13th London Kensingtons. O/C is an abbreviation for “officer in charge.” 
258 2nd Royal Berkshires, WO 95/1729, National Archives. 
259 2nd Rifle Brigade, WO 95/1731, National Archives. 
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The diaries of many brigades, the immediate commanding units for battalions, took 
much the same relaxed attitude towards the impromptu armistices that sprang up in their 
ranks. Perhaps because all five of its battalions were involved in the truce, the diary of the 20th 
Brigade of IV Corps included a vivid description of the event. Drawing heavily on a report 
about the truce from the 2nd Scots Guards, one of its battalions , the entry mentioned the 
approach by the Germans on Christmas Eve, the agreement not to shoot, the dead soldiers 
who were located during the cease-fire, the burial party, the information gathered, and the 
continued fraternization on 26 December. On 27 December, the 20th Brigade reported that the 
“Germans tried to come over and enjoy another day’s so-called ‘armistice’ but were informed 
that they must keep in their trenches,” which refusal left them “quite indignant.”260 During the 
rest of the week, the foul weather conditions prevented both sides from focusing on anything 
except trying to keep dry; the brigade noted the “constant heavy rain,” which flooded the 
trenches and left the Germans, who could “be seen at pumping operations daily,” similarly 
handicapped. 
The diary of the 10th Brigade of III Corps also includes detailed information about the 
truce, noting on 24 December that the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers reported a quiet day, when 
the “Germans were singing and seemed cheerful,” and that on the next day the “Germans 
appear to think that an armistice exists for Christmas day.”261 It appears that the soldiers of the 
10th Brigade, all of whose battalions joined in the truce, thought the same, as an “informal 
interchange of courtesies took place between troops in the fire trenches of both belligerents.” 
The diary declares that “valuable information was gleaned during the intercourse,” but this 
was limited to a sketch of the enemy’s barbed wire placements and the observation that the 
Germans looked “cheerful and well fed.” Burial of German and British dead also took place, 
and the diary reported little sniping or shelling over the rest of the week, although actual 
fraternization was clearly limited only to Christmas Day.   
On the battalion and brigade level, as demonstrated by these examples, the official war 
diaries of the units involved were often very forthcoming about the truces in which they 
participated. It was, however, the military leadership at the divisional and corps level that 
would have been more concerned about the effects of a continuing cease-fire in the lines. I 
Corps, which was led by General Douglas Haig - whose command of the British Army has 
become a byword for incompetence and butchery - had two divisions comprising five brigades 
                                                          
260 20th Brigade, WO 95/1650, National Archives. 
261 10th Brigade, WO 95/1477, National Archives. This must have been an oral report, as the 2nd Royal 
Dublin Fusiliers’ diary noted only that Christmas Day was “very quiet,” with “no shelling or sniping 
heard.” (2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, WO 95/1481/4, National Archives.) 
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with a total of twenty-four battalions near or at the front around Christmas-time. Although 
neither Haig nor his subordinates appeared to forbid fraternization in advance of Christmas, 
as Smith-Dorrien did, none of the battalions in I Corps participated in the armistice, which 
directly contradicts the conventional truce narrative of soldiers rebelling against their 
despised leadership. Additionally, Major-General J.A.L. Haldane, the commander of II Corps’ 
3rd Division, reported in his autobiography that he had also issued orders just in advance of 
Christmas prohibiting fraternization with the enemy.262 Haldane’s directions appeared to have 
had the desired effect, as the fourteen battalions that made up the three brigades under his 
command refrained from friendly contact with the enemy, although soldiers in the line just 
south of them, such as the 6th Cheshires and 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, were fraternizing freely 
with the Germans. In fact Haldane, who noted in his memoirs that during September 1914 he 
“insisted on an aggressive policy – that is to say, no opportunity should be lost for inflicting 
casualties on our opponent,” would, in particular, have made a useful target for the 
dissatisfaction of soldiers from the 3rd division had they been inclined to rebel against army 
leadership. They did not do so.263 
While it is valid to note that the 3rd Division of II Corps was north of the part of the 
line where the truces occurred, and the battalions comprising I Corps were just south of it, the 
areas involved were close enough to each other that fraternization could easily have spread 
throughout these corps.264 (See figure 4 and 5). In fact, the complete lack of participation in 
the truce by I Corps and the 3rd Division of II Corps demonstrates that a wish to defy their 
superiors did not form a motivation for soldiers to join in the truce, and in fact, when 
forbidden outright to do so, soldiers generally obeyed those orders. The restriction on friendly 
behavior issued to the battalions comprising II Corps is the only example of a corps-wide 
prohibition found in the official diaries of the British Expeditionary Forces in the time leading 
up to the truce, and Haldane’s self-reported order the only example of a division-specific 
one.265 
                                                          
262 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, A Soldier’s Saga: The Autobiography of General Sir Aylmer Haldane 
(Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1948), pp. 304-305. 
263 Haldane, A Soldier’s Saga, pg. 287. 
264 Richebourg, where the 1/39th and 2/39th Garhwal Rifles and the 2/3rd Gurkhas became so friendly with 
the Germans that, as one participant described it in a letter home, you “would never believe that we had 
been fighting for weeks,” was only two miles north of Festubert, where the 4th Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1st 
Gloucesters and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders had no such contact with the enemy. Similarly, the 1st 
Bedfords, in trenches along the Wulverghem-Messines Road, fraternized with the Germans while the 3rd 
Worcesters, less than two miles north in Kemmel, did not. 
265 The Brigadier General of the 12th Brigade (III Corps), to whom the 2nd Essex, which had reported an 
earlier meeting with the Germans, belonged, had also issued an Operation Order dated 13 December 
which forbade “further parlaying with the enemy in any form,” adding that the “Germans will be 
informed of this as soon as possible but no further communication of any sort will be made to them.”  
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Figure 4. The front and the general area of fighting on the Western front in December 1914. 
The area of detail is shown in figure 5. (Map by Dick Gilbreath.) 
 
In the 5th Division, the other half of II Corps, the situation was more complicated. 
Reports of occasional amicable relations between the British and Germans in the trenches had 
reached General Smith-Dorrien around the beginning of December 1914. As a result, his Chief 
of Staff, George Forestier-Walker, issued a memorandum on 4 December which included a 
prohibition on “(f)riendly intercourse with the enemy, unofficial armistices (e.g. ‘we won’t fire 
if you don’t’ etc), and the exchange of tobacco and other comforts, however tempting and 
occasionally amusing they may be.”266 Although this ban on any form of fraternization was 
only a part of Smith-Dorrien’s general injunction to the 3rd and 5th Divisions of II Corps that 
“Brigade, Battalion and Company Commanders must be enjoined to take every opportunity of 
carrying out minor enterprises to annoy and intimidate the enemy, and to place him in a state 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
This was no doubt in response to the 11 December meeting reported earlier in the Pompadours’ diaries. 
No other brigade-level orders prohibiting fraternization were found in the war diaries. 12th Brigade, WO 
95/1501, National Archives. The 2nd Essex did, in fact, participate in the Christmas truce, but no 
indication that they did so can be found in their battalion diary or regimental history. No copy of 
Haldane’s order was located among the 3rd Division diaries. 
266 14th Brigade, WO 95/1560, National Archives. 
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of continual anxiety,” it does demonstrate that some localized pre-Christmas cease-fires had 
attracted the attention of the British military leadership.267  
This directive forbidding fraternization clearly had some effect, as only seven 
battalions from the entire 5th Division took part in the truce. In addition, probably as a result 
of those order, the diaries of the seven 5th Division battalions that did engage in some form of 
armistice were fairly taciturn on the subject.268 The aftermath of the Christmas truce for II 
Corps was to prove more problematic. The diary of the 15th Brigade of the 5th Division recorded 
a visit by Smith-Dorrien on 26 December 1914, undertaken for the purposes of assessing the 
state of the front lines. Later that day, the General issued a confidential memorandum to the 
“General Officers Commanding Divisions and Brigades, and Officers Commanding Battalions, 
of the 2nd Corps.”269 In it, Smith-Dorrien expressed his displeasure with the large number of 
shelters in the fire trenches, gaps in the line, lack of support trenches, the inadequacy of firing 
loopholes, and the general lethargy of the troops at the front.  
After this laundry list of complaints, the general further added that he had just 
received a report that “on Christmas Day, a friendly gathering had taken place of Germans and 
British on the neutral ground between the two lines, recounting that many officers had taken 
part in it.” Smith-Dorrien regretted that his previous orders forbidding fraternization had been 
“useless” in preventing this behavior and instructed commanders to “keep up the fighting 
spirit and do all we can to discourage friendly intercourse,” while requesting the “names of 
officers and units who took part in this Christmas gathering, with a view to disciplinary 
action.”270 This communication was forwarded on 28 December to the 14th and 15th Brigades, 
reminding the commanders of those brigades about the earlier order prohibiting 
fraternization, and asking for “a fuller investigation of the circumstances…and that the names 
of the officers present, who should have been responsible for preventing the meeting reported, 
shall be forwarded together with your report as early as possible.”271  
 
                                                          
267 Smith-Dorrien’s primary aim at this point in the war was to seize the initiative in the conflict, which 
“has hitherto generally been with the enemy”; these orders were part of that effort. 
268 Although the 14th Brigade papers did include a report from a sergeant in the 1st Devons who, on 
Christmas, “was able to go forward” and as a result “had some talk with an English speaking officer,” a 
conversation that clearly could not have occurred had the battalion not been fraternizing with the 
enemy. 14th Brigade. 
269 14th Brigade. 
270 14th Brigade. 
271 5th Division, WO 95/1510, National Archives. 
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Figure 6. The area of the German-British truce on 25 December 1014. Location of British Corps 
on the front line are marked. (Map by Dick Gilbreath.) 
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Before receiving this request, Brigadier General Gleichen, commander of the 15th 
Infantry Brigade, had already prepared a brief report about the truce, which stated that “an 
informal meeting took place yesterday between the lines of trenches of ourselves and the 
Germans, at which about 200 of our men assisted, and an even larger number of Germans.”272 
The account included the names of participating regiments and some minor intelligence 
details gleaned from the encounters with the enemy. Gleichen’s report, which further noted 
that the Germans said they would not fire between the 25 and 27 December, was fairly casual, 
as befitting a statement about an incident that did not appear to be of great importance but 
did yield some information about the enemy.273 However, after receiving the demand for 
further information and the names of the officers involved, Gleichen prepared a second report. 
This stated tersely that he had only heard of the truce after it was over, that he understood the 
armistice had been started by the Germans opposite the 4th Division, and that although “the 
moving out of a good many men and a few officers was not in accordance with the 
instructions” provided in the 4 December memo issued by Smith-Dorrien, he believed “that, 
had they not moved out, the Germans would certainly – though principally with amicable 
intentions – have come close up to our trenches and quite possibly have come into them in 
some cases.”274   
Gleichen also included reports from the 1st Norfolks and the 1st and 6th Cheshires that 
provided brief explanations for the Christmas cease-fire. The Norfolks’ account noted rather 
defensively that the first advances that come from the enemy, and that the only alternative to 
participating in the cease-fire was to shoot unarmed men.275 The 1st Cheshires’ report stated 
tactfully that the captain commanding “gave orders that his officers and men were not to go 
across, but before he quite realized the situation he is inclined to think that individuals did go 
over,” and further provided the names of the officers in charge.276 The 6th Cheshires’ account 
was even shorter, describing the armistice as “entirely spontaneous and unexpected” before 
claiming that the “officers of the 6th Btn. Cheshire Regiment stopped their men from going 
                                                          
272 5th Division. The first Gleichen report, it appears, was just a generally informative summary about the 
broad parameters of the truce, while the one written on 28 December appears to have been in direct 
response to Smith-Dorrien’s order. 
273 Gleichen also included a note in his report from the commander of the 6th Cheshires about the 
numbers of Germans in the trenches opposite them, as well as a description of their appearance, their 
units and insignia. 
274 5th Division. 
275 5th Division. 
276 5th Division. 
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forward until after some considerable time when they saw that the whole line was out in 
front.” Again, the names of the officers involved were given.277 
 These reports, prepared on the same day Smith-Dorrien’s directive was issued, were 
immediately forwarded back to II Corps headquarters. With this information, which 
acknowledged that at least three of the battalions in the 15th Brigade had participated in the 
truce, admitted that the officers of those battalions had either permitted or joined in the 
fraternization, and even provided the names of the officers involved, General Smith-Dorrien 
was now in a position to take the threatened “disciplinary action” against those officers and 
battalions. His response was issued two days later, on 30 December 1914, and is worth quoting 
in full: “The Corps Commander is quite satisfied with the explanation given, and the matter 
may be considered to be closed.”278 In other words, Smith-Dorrien only took two days to 
consider the reported fraternizations with the enemy, which had occurred in “direct 
contravention” of his earlier orders, and in the end decided to do absolutely nothing about it.  
The Christmas Truce documentary’s conclusion that Smith-Dorrien could take no 
punitive measures against the officers and soldiers involved because there were too many to 
prosecute, however, shows little understanding of the military mind. Soldiers were often 
court-martialed to provide an example to others who might have committed or were 
contemplating the same offenses: a court-martial was often as important for promoting 
military discipline amongst the ranks as it was for punishing a specific offender.  Even if the 
general had not wanted to lose an experienced officer from the front-lines, he could surely 
have found an inept one to stand in for the others who had also allowed truces.  In fact, the 
famous Smith-Dorrien order asking for the names of officers that joined in the cease-fire 
which is referenced by so many who wish to prove that all truce participants faced, as the 
Christmas Truce documentary alleges, severe punishment for defiance of orders on 25 
December 1914, was addressed to II Corps and therefore only applied to seven out of the fifty-
four battalions that had participated in truces. Further, Smith-Dorrien’s directive did not 
relate solely to the Christmas truce, but was in fact a much longer critique about the general 
state of the trenches and the army after the debilitating conditions of the winter campaign.279  
The III Corps leadership, which saw 60 percent of its front line troops in the 4th and 6th 
Divisions participating in the truce, had even less interest in punishing those involved. The 4th 
                                                          
277 5th Division. 
278 5th Division. 
279 In the same order, for example, under the heading “Comfort in the trenches,” Smith-Dorrien spent as 
much time bemoaning the lack of boards for soldiers to stand upon to keep them clear of the mud as he 
did chastising officers for involvement in the truce – hardly the attitude of someone who was 
determined to punish the men under his command for participation in “a friendly gathering” in No-
Man’s-Land. (* for the full text of Smith-Dorrien order, see appendix 1) 
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Division diary reported the cease-fire without any apparent censure, describing the episode as 
“a sort of truce” which it admitted was “absolutely unauthorized” but clearly took no action 
against.280 The diary further noted that many reports of a quiet day and night had been 
received, and that a “certain amount of information” had been acquired through contact with 
the enemy, but did not report that any brigades or divisions had been ordered to cease truce 
activities. The 6th Division records noted only that, on 25 December, there was an “(u)nofficial 
truce” with no firing.281 The divisional diary entries for the rest of the week reported “no 
change” in this situation (probably a euphemism for an ongoing cease-fire) and recorded 
without comment on 1 January 1915 that the “Commander 2nd Army orders that informal 
understandings with the enemy are not to take place,” while acknowledging that general 
conditions remained “unchanged.”282   
 In spite of the superficiality of the information noted about the truce in the 6th 
Division diaries, however, its records contained further details received from III Corps 
Headquarters about the armistice. Summaries of information gathered on 25 December were 
provided by the 4th Division, including reports from the 10th and 12th Brigades, the 1st Royal 
Warwickshires, the 2nd Essex, and the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, which identified the German 
troops opposite them in line, as well as providing details about their attitudes. The presence of 
these reports, unaccompanied by any apparent censure of the activities, demonstrates that, 
although fraternization was eventually discouraged by III Corps, the armistices on Christmas 
Day appeared to be primarily viewed as intelligence-gathering opportunities by its leadership. 
The information gleaned on 25 December by the various battalions and brigades in that corps 
were then shared among the divisions without any effort to disguise the fact that these details 
were collected during, for example, the 2nd Seaforth Highlander’s “unofficial armistice” or a 
“sort of armistice” reported by the 10th Brigade.283 
 The leadership of IV Corps’ 7th Division was even more tolerant towards the truces in 
which its battalions engaged. 75 percent of its battalions participated in the truce, and the 
majority of those involved recorded the fact, some in great detail, in their battalion diaries. A 
review of the diary for the 7th Division, which encompassed the 20th, 21st and 22nd Brigades, 
explains why the brigades and battalions involved generally felt able to report their truces so 
openly. The divisional diary recorded quiet days on 23 and 24 December, and noted that 
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282 As per the reorganization of 26 December 1914, III Corps was now part of the 2nd Army, under Smith-
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Christmas Day “passed without any hostilities on either side.”284 In fact, “(b)y mutual consent 
an informal armistice appears to have existed from 9 a.m. till 4 p.m. and parties from both 
sides went out of the trenches and buried the dead.” The 7th Division also reported that, after a 
quiet night with no firing, another armistice occurred on 26 December “for the purpose of 
burying the dead,” after which “both sides went back to the trenches but very little sniping 
took place.”  
 In fact, the 7th Division leadership, although it had not directed its battalions to initiate 
any holiday cease-fire, quickly recognized the use which the truce could be put: as its diary 
noted, “(i)nstructions were issued that no further unauthorized communication with the 
enemy was to take place and that the men were to keep in the trenches: the troops however 
might refrain from firing unless the enemy fired upon them, in order to allow working 
parties…to continue their work undisturbed.” On 27 December, the divisional diary did 
observe that orders had been “received from Corps Head Quarters that nothing in the shape of 
an armistice was to be arranged without reference to the Corps and that Artillery fire would be 
continued tomorrow on selected targets, while sniping would be vigorously maintained.”  
However, these orders were “afterwards modified as regards the sniping, in order that the 
clearance of the drains in the immediate rear of the firing line might be completed.” In any 
case, as the 7th Division records make clear, the front lines remained quiet for the rest of the 
week, “probably owing to the attention of both sides being absorbed in drainage operations.” 
The divisional diary continued to record the “lack of aggression” on the part of the Germans, 
indicating that peaceful conditions persisted in their part of the line for a few weeks after 
Christmas; no doubt the “modification” of the orders from corps headquarters contributed to 
the continued cease-fires in the 7th Division’s area of the front.285 
 In spite of the disinclination of the 7th Division leadership to punish troops 
participating in the truce, its diary demonstrates that it was able to collect more useful 
information than the 5th Division was able to summon up in response to Smith-Dorrien’s 
ultimatums. A captain with the 2nd Gordon Highlanders provided a detailed report about the 
soldiers in the German regiment opposite their battalion, and the names of British officers 
whom they had recently taken prisoner, while a German-speaking soldier was able to record 
the views of the enemy troops in the 69th and 139th Regiment. The commander of the 21st 
Brigade provided a complete report of the cease-fire on his section of the front, including 
descriptions of the placement of the German trenches and how strongly they were held. A 
major with the 22nd Brigade was able to pass on information about recently arrived German 
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reinforcements, and the combined reports enabled the division to produce a map identifying 
all the German troops facing them in the line. (See figure 6) By allowing the armistices to 
continue, the 7th Division was able to collect more intelligence about the Germans, their 
positions in the line, and the defences opposite than those divisions, such as the 5th, that tried 
to shut their truces down rapidly. 
 The soldiers in the 8th Division of IV Corps were also enthusiastic truce participants 
and reporters, with nine of the eleven battalions that joined in the armistice recording the 
event in their diaries. The 8th Division diary registered the existence of agreements not to fire, 
arrangements that were clearly sanctioned by the divisional leadership: the entry for 25 
December noted that “(n)egotiations took place with Germans at some points along our front 
regarding burial of dead between the lines,” during which it “was mutually agreed to bury the 
dead and not to fire during the day except in case of necessity.”286  On 26 December, the 8th 
Division noted the “arrangement made between 7th Div. and Germans to bury dead to-day,” as 
a result of which “no firing took place along our front.”287 The 8th Division diary for the rest of 
week focused on the wet conditions in the line rather than any fighting. 
 The Indian Corps’ attitude to the truce, in which three of its battalions participated, 
was clearly more disapproving; as a result, only the 2/39th Garhwals admitted in their diary 
that during the afternoon, the enemy had advanced towards them and offered a truce. The 
Germans spoke “with officers and men, they gave our men tobacco cigarettes and newspapers, 
and for about an hour both sides walked about freely outside their trenches and in the open 
space between the two lines.”288 (See figure 7) The rest of the night passed quietly, but during 
the evening, orders were received “that such mutual armistices were not to take place in 
future.” The Garhwal Brigade and Meerut Division diaries also both acknowledged the truce, 
which the divisional diary referred to as “unauthorized,” although no punishments were 
recorded for those who took part.289 
There can be no doubt that the disapproval that General Smith-Dorrien, the 
commander of II Corps at the time of the truce, displayed towards any friendly contact 
between the Germans and the soldiers under his command was at least partially responsible 
for the relatively low participation of the II Corps battalions in the holiday armistice and the 
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approached their lines was “forwarded to 4th Corps.” 8th Division. 
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Figure 6. Map drawn by a 7th Division soldier showing the location and identity of German 
troops along British front lines at Christmas 1914. (Used by permission of the National 
Archives, London.) 
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reluctance of the few battalions that did join in the cease-fire to admit to it in their official 
records. Equally, the relaxed attitudes of the leadership of III and IV Corps towards the 
episode were reflected in the willingness of the battalions under their command to both 
engage in an armistice and acknowledge it in their official diaries. Although some battalion or 
brigade diaries eventually recorded orders forbidding further participation in the truce, most 
did not reference any orders issued to cease fraternization or commands to resume shelling or  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. British and German soldiers fighting on Christmas Eve 1914 and fraternizing on 
Christmas Day 1914. (Drawing by E.R.P. Berryman, 2/39th Garhwal Rifles. Used by permission 
of Tamsin Baccus.) 
 
 
84 
 
sniping.290 For example, the diaries of the 1st North Staffordshires and the 2nd Borders, whose 
cease-fires continued at least until New Year’s Day, never noted any injunctions to resume 
firing; this was also true for the majority of the battalions participating in the truce. Generally, 
the diaries of battalions in the line at this time reported that fraternization came to an end by 
the evening of Christmas or Boxing Day, cease-fires generally persisted for a few days 
afterwards, firing began to pick up again just before or on New Year’s Day, and that the war 
was restarted in earnest sometime during January 1915, but often did not record any orders 
that battalions were to resume fighting. 
In addition, the many reports, most of them voluntarily produced, provided by front-
line British officers demonstrate that they generally considered the truce an opportunity to 
increase their knowledge of the German numbers in the line and the layout of their trenches. 
The intelligence gained during the armistices, including the detailed information about the 
identity of the troops in the opposite trenches, must surely have been welcomed by the 
military leadership, even though the knowledge gained did benefit both sides. The fact that 
the divisions and brigades who were most relaxed about the truce were able to collect the best 
information about the Germans contradicts the current narrative of the truce, which argues 
that the officers in the front line would have been careful to keep the armistices which they 
had condoned a secret; instead, the diaries reveal that in fact those officers acknowledged the 
existence of the truces by providing their headquarters with military intelligence collected 
during fraternization. 
As demonstrated by the official records of the units involved, the attitudes of military 
leadership towards the truce defy the myths that have since been asserted about the event. Of 
the four army corps whose battalions were involved in the armistice, only General Smith-
Dorrien of II Corps threatened the officers of those battalions with any punishment for 
allowing the truce – and he backed down within forty-eight hours of receiving those officers’ 
reports.291 The commanders of the 7th and 8th Divisions, on the other hand, without necessarily 
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encouraging contact with the enemy, issued orders in response to reports of a general cease-
fire at the front that there was to be no firing from the British lines on Christmas Day as long 
as the Germans did not fire (and, by doing so, obviously turned a blind eye to the extensive 
fraternization in IV Corps battalions). The leadership of the 4th and 6th Divisions clearly had no 
serious objection to a temporary truce in the lines, and took no steps to censure the front-line 
officers involved. On the brigade level, there was no unified response to the armistice: some 
leaders, such as Brigadier-General Gleichen of the 15th Brigade, were apparently quite satisfied 
for the truce to go ahead, while the leadership of the 19th Brigade, which ignored the event 
altogether in their diary, were probably none too pleased to hear about it.   
In short, the Christmas truce as reported in the battalion, brigade and divisional 
diaries of the B.E.F. bears little resemblance to the episode described by the Days That Shook 
the World documentary as “mass treason.” The soldiers who took part in the impromptu 
armistices, and the officers who recorded their participation in their battalion’s official 
military records, clearly did not believe that they were violating military code, but rather 
celebrating Christmas with a brief armistice for the day, after which, as the 2nd Scots Guards’ 
diary noted, “hostilities would continue.”292 The acknowledgement by front-line officers of the 
truce in their battalion diaries constituted a form of notice to army authorities about an event 
that they were likely to hear about in any case, even without official reports.  
The official military reaction to the Christmas truce, therefore, was hardly the unified 
disapproval accompanied by threats of punishment so central to the conventional narrative of 
the armistice. Additionally, the more relaxed attitude of ‘acknowledgement without censure’ 
that most commanders took towards the truce later carried over into the official British 
military history of the First World War. The 1927 installment of this work, which dealt with 
the winter 1914-1915 campaign, was written by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds and 
Captain G. C. Wynne, and was surprisingly frank about the grim situation facing the B.E.F. 
early in the war.293 The authors admitted that the year following the battles in October and 
November 1914 “brought little but disillusionment and disappointment,” and that French had 
erred in concurring with Joffre’s plans for offensive action during the first months of 1915.294 In 
this authorized history, Edmonds and Wynne devoted an entire paragraph to the truce, noting 
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293 Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds and Captain G. C. Wynne, History of the Great War, Based 
on Official Documents, by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
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that “there was an informal suspension of arms during daylight on a few parts of the front, and 
a certain amount of fraternization.”295 They referred to the joint burials of the dead in No-
Man’s-Land, and added that “in some places there was an exchange of small gifts and a little 
talk, the Germans expressing themselves confident of early victory.”296   
Edmonds and Wynne further mentioned that “both parties sang Christmas carols and 
soldier songs,” and concluded with a reference to some minor truces that took place on 25 
December of the following year, which they described as “an attempt to repeat this custom of 
old time warfare on Christmas 1915.”297 More surprising, however, is what the official 
historians of the war did not report: there is no allusion to any disapproval of either the cease-
fire or fraternizations. While it can be argued that one paragraph in a twenty-nine volume 
work hardly constitutes excessive notice of an event, the fact that the truce, which cannot be 
said to have had any impact on the course of the war, received a place at all in the officially 
authorized history, and that no displeasure on the part of the military leadership was 
recorded, certainly puts paid to the idea that the holiday cease-fire was the object of 
censorship from the military leadership both during and after the war.  
This is further borne out by the First World War histories of the regiments that served 
in the conflict, many of which were written by either high-ranking officers or professional 
military historians. These works served two purposes: creating a cohesive record of the actions 
of a regiment during the war, and acting as a group memoir for those who had served in its 
ranks. While the diaries kept daily in the field were the official record of a unit’s activities, 
regimental histories functioned as a tribute to the regiment’s achievements, as well as a 
testimonial to those who had served in one of the regiment’s battalions and remembered their 
service with pride. These histories rarely sold in large quantities, but were instead intended for 
a select audience, mainly veterans of the regiments in question, whose memories would be 
reinforced by an account of the battles and campaigns in which the regiment had fought. 
For the authors of the chronicles of those regiments who had participated in the 
Christmas cease-fire, the truce posed a certain difficulty: featuring an event of which some 
military leaders had disapproved might be less than tactful, but ignoring it entirely would 
mean skipping over an episode which was no doubt remembered fondly by the soldiers 
involved. For the most part, however, the authors of these histories included the truce in their 
books, demonstrating that while a few senior military leaders were probably not delighted to 
be reminded of the event, the impromptu armistice was not the cause of censure and 
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repression that many have since alleged. The presence of the truce in these works also 
demonstrates that the soldiers of the regiments involved wanted their memories of the war to 
be complete, with no meaningful episodes expediently ignored. 
Information about the impromptu truce available through the regimental histories, 
however, is often incomplete or misleading, which possibly has contributed to a number of 
later misconceptions about the event. A number of these chronicles assert, for example, that 
the cease-fires lasted only a day or two when, in fact, as noted in battalion diaries, many 
persisted throughout the holiday week. Foreshadowing the later myth that the truce was 
brought to an abrupt halt by disapproving officers, these histories often claim that the truces 
were stopped by orders from military leadership, although this only appears to have occurred 
in a minority of cases. At the same time, football matches are rarely mentioned in regimental 
histories, but references to burial of the dead in No-Man’s-Land are much more common.298 In 
one sense, however, these histories present the truce accurately: it is credited, variously, to the 
regiments’ professionalism, historical precedent, the terrible weather, close contact with the 
enemy and the Christmas holidays, but, albeit not surprisingly, never to rebellion against 
military leadership. The regimental histories of the battalions involved in the cease-fire 
therefore simultaneously propagated and contradicted the conventional narrative of the truce, 
while demonstrating by inclusion of the event that it was part of the military’s overall 
narrative of the war. 
While the discrepancies between the various versions of the truce featured in these 
regimental histories pose a problem for cohesive military remembrance of the event, an 
examination of these sources does clarify one point: that the armistice remained a vital 
memory for the soldiers who had either participated in it or heard about it from their 
comrades. Thirty-one out of forty regimental histories which contained battalions that had 
joined in the Christmas truce mention the cease-fire, whether briefly or at length.299 In 
addition, a few divisional histories also reference the truce. These chronicles also featured a 
surprising level of detail about the miseries of the trenches, particularly during the first year of 
the war, and the tremendous losses suffered by those regiments during this period. The 
inclusion of these vital but horrific elements of the war, together with accounts of the truce, 
demonstrates that these books were designed as remembrances for the veterans of the 
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299 Not every regiment produced an official history after the war: some regiments were disbanded or 
consolidated after the conflict ended and as a result were less likely to commission a history of the unit, 
particularly those whose losses had been so high that few veterans remained to take an interest in any 
publication offered. 
88 
 
regiments rather than as glossy public relations exercises meant to please the army leadership. 
The presence of the truce, an episode that was not crucial to the progress of the war, in these 
works was therefore clearly on the basis of its interest to those who had participated in it. 
The History of the London Rifle Brigade 1859-1919, written by Maj.-Gen. Sir Frederick 
Maurice, provides vivid descriptions of the horrible conditions under which its soldiers served 
in the Flanders trenches, which “generally had two feet or more of icy cold water in them,” and 
posits a connection between those conditions and the truce.300 Noting that the time in the line 
at the end of the year was very quiet, because both sides were “worn out,” Maurice wrote that 
a truce was arranged with the Saxons opposite “in order that burying parties might carry out 
their necessary duties, and this led to meetings in No Man’s Land and an exchange of 
courtesies, which ignorance at that time of German methods and intentions in the matter of 
poison-gas and other horrors made possible.”301 There were even “rumours of a proposed 
football match, but the authorities frowned upon ideas of this sort and stopped them,” not 
because of disapproval of fraternization with the enemy, but “quite rightly, because it would 
have been most unwise to allow the Germans to know how weakly the British trenches were 
held.”302  
In Crown and Company, The Historical Records of the 2nd Batt. Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 
Colonel H.C. Wylly skirted around the subject of the armistice, noting only that there “was 
quiet in the front line during the last few days of the first year of the Great War, and the 
battalion diary under date of December 31st, 1914, contains two words only – ‘No Sniping!’”303 In 
The Border Regiment in the Great War, published the following year, however, Wylly not only 
discussed the event openly, but admitted it continued until well into 1915.304 On Christmas 
morning, he wrote, the Germans proposed an armistice, which was “arranged until 4 in the 
afternoon, for the purposes of burying the dead who had been lying between the trenches 
since the 18th October.”305 A cease-fire to bury fallen comrades was certainly within military 
tradition, so it would hardly have been surprising if Wylly had left the subject alone after that 
disclosure, but instead he returned to it later in the history, noting that “(t)he truce which had 
been mutually and unofficially established during Christmas between the British and the 
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Germans endured, so far as concerned any operations on the front of the 2nd Battalion The 
Border Regiment, until the end of the first week of the New Year.” He further observed that it 
was not until 8 January that “the troops fired volleys over the German trenches to indicate that 
fighting was about to recommence, while this somewhat broad hint was accompanied by a 
message to the same effect which was sent across.” The war, with its “usual sniping,” then 
started up again, “and both the Gordon Highlanders and the Border Regiment suffered some 
few casualties before the men could understand that it was no longer safe to walk about ‘on 
the top.’”306  
F. Loraine Peter, in The History of the Norfolk Regiment 1685-1918, discussed some of 
the mild controversy that had surrounded the truce for the 1st Norfolks, which were part of II 
Corps. “On Christmas Day occurred the famous meeting with the Germans in ‘No Man’s Land’ 
which drew down the wrath of G.H.Q. and a demand for the names of officers, who, it was 
held, should have prevented it,” Petre wrote, observing that in the end no punishments were 
imposed.307 “The matter was eventually dropped, and no harm was, as a matter of fact, done, 
seeing that our men managed to have a good look at the German defences, and took good care 
that the fraternization did not spread over to their own trenches.”308  
The History of the Rifle Brigade in the War of 1914-1918, by Reginald Berkeley (M.C.), 
made much of the holiday armistice. As the Rifles had three battalions in the line on 
Christmas Day, all of whom participated enthusiastically in the event, such notice was hardly 
surprising.309 Berkeley even excused the brevity of his 300-word account with the observation 
that, as “Christmas 1914 and the truce that it brought along the front, with its flavour of the 
medieval prohibition of fighting on Sunday, have formed the subject of many a writer,” there 
was not much “to add from the experiences of the Rifle Brigade.”310 After describing the Rifles’ 
truces, Berkeley further noted that one of the battalion’s diaries recorded that a German 
juggler entertained both sides in No-Man’s-Land on Christmas Day. “In the dumbfounding 
unexpectedness of the truce,” Berkeley observed, “it would not have surprised anyone very 
greatly if the German juggler had turned out to be a modern Pied Piper and had led away a 
                                                          
306 Wylly, The Border Regiment, pg. 30. 
307 F. Loraine Petre, The History of the Norfolk Regiment 1685-1918 (Norwich: Jarrold & Sons, Limited, 
The Empire Press, 1924), pg. 13. 
308 Petre, Norfolk Regiment, pg. 13. In fact, the truce did spread throughout the British trenches, which 
was already known by those most likely to read the history, but at least Petre acknowledged that 
participation in the truce went unpunished, in spite of the 1st Norfolks’ position in Smith-Dorrien’s II 
Corps. 
309 Reginald Berkeley, The History of the Rifle Brigade in the War of 1914-1918, Vol. 1, August 1914-
December 1916 (London:  The Rifle Brigade Club Ltd., 1927). 
310 Berkeley, Rifle Brigade, pg. 46. 
90 
 
hypnotized crowd of friends and enemies into the blue, determining the war for want of 
troops.”311  
Berkeley’s lively account of the truce demonstrates one of the main purposes of a 
regimental history: to reinforce the memories of those who served in it and who looked back 
on their service with pride and satisfaction. For the veterans of the Rifle Brigade, as this work 
establishes, the truce was obviously an important part of their remembrance of the war. In 
fact, several regiments that had no battalions participating in the truce, such as the Irish 
Guards and the Royal West Kents, even worked a reference to the armistice into their 
histories, proving that the event had long since passed into the collective military memory of 
the war and enjoyed a communal ownership that went far beyond the original members of the 
B.E.F. who had fraternized with the Germans at Christmas 1914.312   
As the constant references throughout these regimental histories to the “famous” or 
“well-known” truce illustrate, the story of the armistice was very much part of the 
recollections of the war for the soldiers who had been involved in it, and the military 
historians and officers who wrote these chronicles respected the memories of the veterans of 
these regiments by including this vital event in their works on the war. In fact, the lack of 
censure with which the event was reported in many regimental histories, together with the 
fact that it was even included in chronicles that did not participate in the truce, refutes many 
of the myths that were to later overtake the holiday armistice.  
As demonstrated by the diaries of the battalions, brigades and divisions involved, there 
were a few military leaders who opposed the truce, but there were also many who either 
shrugged it off or tacitly condoned it. What is clear, however, is that while some front-line 
officers may have had to produce reports explaining their battalions’ involvement in the truce, 
this was the most serious consequence they had to face for their actions: no punishments were 
handed out for participation in the cease-fire. Contrary to the conventional narrative, the war 
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diaries of the army units involved not only contain a wealth of detail about the event, but 
manage to convey some of the delight the soldiers involved experienced during their 
unexpected holiday in the trenches. This narrative carried over into their regimental histories, 
which produced surprisingly candid accounts of the event.  The military world, however, is a 
relatively small and enclosed one, even during a war. The attitudes of the front-line officers 
towards the truce, as recorded in their battalion diaries, constituted a form of notice to army 
authorities about an event that they were likely to hear about in any case, even without official 
reports. Although the information that was conveyed as part of internal army records proved 
to be, for a number of regiments and brigades, surprisingly forthright, the censorship 
prevailing in the British press would certainly influence the way the story of the Christmas 
truce was presented. An examination of major British newspapers in the weeks following the 
holiday cease-fire will reveal the way the truce was reported to the British public. 
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Chapter Five 
 “One day of peace at the front”: 
The Christmas Truce and the British Press 
 
 
NO CHRISTMAS TRUCE 
FIGHTING IN FRANCE AS FIERCE AS EVER 
A DETERMINED ADVANCE 
(PRESS ASSOCIATION WAR SPECIAL) 
 
At the front Christmas had to be postponed. The materials of good cheer were there in 
abundance, but the army was too engaged with the Germans to be able to enjoy them. 
-Manchester Guardian, 28 December 1914 
 
A CHRISTMAS TRUCE AT THE FRONT 
ENEMIES AT FOOTBALL 
GERMAN GETS A FRIENDLY HAIRCUT 
 
That there was an unofficial truce along sections, at least, of the trenches in France on 
Christmas Day, and that advantage was taken of it for some remarkable fraternizing among 
enemies, is shown in convincing detail in the following extracts from letters just arrived from 
the front. The first was received in Manchester yesterday from a British officer. 
-Manchester Guardian, 31 December 1914 
 
 
 
 In Death’s Men: Soldiers of the Great War, Denis Winter argues that during the First 
World War those on the home front “drew arrows on maps and talked of battles and 
campaigns, but what it felt like to be in the front line or in a base hospital they did not know. 
Civilians did not ask and soldiers did not write.”313 Winter credits this reticence to soldiers’ 
desire to protect their families, but additionally blames the “news media” for their failure to 
communicate the truth about the war.314  In fact, as he notes in his 1978 work on the conflict, 
“if newspapers of the first year are a guide, the war was as marginal to people’s lives as the 
Napoleonic wars had been to the generation of Jane Austen.”315 According to Winter, this lack 
of information, coupled with “rigorous censorship,” extended to news of the Christmas truce. 
Although hde claims that the weekly news magazine The Sphere “had broken the story of the 
first Christmas” truce in January 1915, Winter insists that “the censor had intervened” to 
prevent publication of information about the holiday cease-fire and the true facts about what 
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happened on the Western front on 25 December 1914 “only really came out when Captain 
Chudleigh in the Telegraph wrote after the war.”316 
 Winter’s contention that news of the Christmas truce was suppressed by the British 
press forms part of his larger argument that the voices of the individuals who fought the war 
were lost among the battles and campaigns generally featured in histories of the First World 
War, in which, he notes, the “soldiers’ war is at best relegated to a single chapter with 
colourful accounts of mud and vermin, bully beef and particular deaths in battle.”317 Winter 
sees the impromptu cease-fires that occurred in the line, whether at Christmas 1914 or other 
times, as the ultimate expression of the soldiers’ respect for their enemies, which “could 
sometimes turn into an even warmer feeling” resulting in occasional “fraternization, truces, 
[and] the cessation of violence by mutual consent.”318 By emphasizing the gap between men 
serving in the front line and civilians at home, the solidarity that soldiers felt with their 
enemies, and the refusal of the newspapers to tell the truth about the war, even to the extent 
of refusing to continue to publish soldiers’ letters after October 1914, Winter endorses the 
conventional narrative of the Christmas truce and maintains that news of the holiday cease-
fire was kept from the home-front.  
 Winter’s argument seems reasonable. After all, the mainstream British newspapers, 
which generally supported the war and were in the habit of printing whatever stories the 
government fed them, were likely to be reluctant to broadcast the news of the truce.  Although 
forthright accounts about life in the trenches may have been readily available to the public 
through publication of soldiers’ letters in newspapers (which practice, contrary to Winter’s 
claim, did not stop by November 1914), those reports came from soldiers who believed that 
fighting the war was necessary, even if they were willing to be candid about its horrors and 
discomforts. The holiday truce posed an altogether different issue for the British press, and 
one that presented them with an interesting quandary: would the news that soldiers had 
abandoned fighting, albeit temporarily, be subject to censorship? To what extent would 
newspapers admit to knowledge of the armistice? Would they acknowledge the cease-fire and 
try to define it as an outlying event, or would they situate it within the larger pro-war 
narrative? 
The approach taken towards the existence of the Christmas truce by the mainstream 
British press reveals a conflicted discourse that simultaneously supports and challenges the 
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conventional narratives of the war and the truce. While many accounts of the cease-fire did 
appear in the national newspapers, and were even featured prominently, news about the 
impromptu holiday truce was confined almost entirely to letters reprinted from soldiers. The 
1914 armistice, therefore, was dealt with by the press in the same way as it handled accurate 
information about the conditions at the front and the attitudes of the British front-line troops: 
these controversial truths could only be safely expressed by the soldiers themselves. Obviously 
ambivalent about how to treat an event that so clearly contradicted the contemporaneous 
narrative of the war and portrayed the Germans as human beings rather than a faceless 
enemy, British newspapers limited themselves to presenting the truce through their soldiers’ 
own words, and did not report on it in any conventional sense. However, the length of time 
the newspapers continued to print letters about the truce – three weeks, which in press terms 
is an eon – provides a strong indication of the reaction to the cease-fire. If the public response 
had not been positive, and interest in the cease-fire not overwhelming, the major British 
newspapers would surely not have continued to print letters describing the truce for such a 
long period.   
Although letters featuring the holiday armistice appeared almost daily in the British 
press from the end of December 1914 through the middle of January 1915, the only articles on 
the subject that could be characterized as conventional journalism consisted of stories about 
how the French and German military authorities responded to the truce. In a three-week 
period, from 31 December 1914 through 20 January 1915, the Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, 
Morning Post, Manchester Guardian and The Times combined published over sixty letters 
referencing the truce, but only a few articles about any official responses to the event – and 
those responses only concerned non-British reactions.319  Additionally, after numerous truce 
reports had appeared in their respective papers, the Daily Telegraph and the Manchester 
Guardian each offered editorials that attempted to situate the Christmas truce within the 
accepted discourse of the war. Aside from those two efforts to reconcile the unofficial 
armistice with the overarching narrative of the war, coverage of the truce otherwise remained 
under the jurisdiction of the “Letters from the Front” columns, and ceased altogether by the 
end of the third week of January 1915. It should be noted, however, that while the letters from 
the front discussing the truce contained ample contradictions to the usual war reporting, both 
through the details of life at the front they provided and the story of the truce itself, this had 
no effect on other war news published during this time. In fact, the standard journalistic 
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representations of the conflict continued unabated in British newspapers during the period 
that soldiers’ letters about the unofficial armistice were featured so prominently in the same 
publications. 
 The Christmas truce was not mentioned in the British press until nearly a week after it 
occurred. As there were no press representatives at the front in the early part of the war and 
no official communiques were ever offered on the subject, the newspapers probably did not 
even hear of the event until, at minimum, a few days after Christmas.320 In the meantime, the 
reporting of the conflict in the newspapers between Christmas and New Year’s Eve consisted 
of stories that fit comfortably into the contemporaneous narrative of the war. The Times, for 
example, published an article on 26 December entitled “A Carol Sung by Both Sides.” This 
account began with the observation that the correspondent had “always been struck, and 
never more so than during this Christmastide, with the large-hearted, tolerant attitude our 
men have unconsciously adopted towards the individual German solder.” As the unnamed 
journalist declared, “(m)alice finds no place at all in the British military equipment, and that is 
why a season consecrated to goodwill and fellowship finds the hand and heart of the British 
soldier in sympathy with the Christmas spirit.”  
To demonstrate the goodness of the generic British soldier’s heart, the article noted 
that carols were sung in the British trenches on Christmas Eve, and that in one case the 
Germans even sang along. Unfortunately, the harmonizing finished unhappily, as “no sooner 
had the carol ended than the cynical Teutonic touch was introduced by a shower of bullets 
from the enemy’s trenches.”321 Similarly, the Daily Mail’s post-Christmas reporting also started 
with an account of the stereotypical Hun at his fiendish worst: “Troops Feast While Belgians 
Fast,” read the headline of a 26 December article that discussed how the Germans celebrated 
Christmas by “bleeding” the Belgian peasantry of wine and cigars, noting that “the Belgian 
people were even asked to make Christmas cakes for the German soldiers.”322 To further 
demonize the enemy, the Daily Mail’s readers were informed that such selfish celebrations 
were “in obedience to the military order, for notices were issued several days ago that the 
troops must do their best to enjoy Yuletide.”  
 On 28 December the Daily Mail published an account of the war purporting to come 
from a correspondent in Flanders. “Christmas Day,” he wrote, “was a day of strife – in these 
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northern regions at least. The Germans came down upon the countryside east of Nieuport in a 
fury of hate. Their fiercest onslaught of the week they reserved for Christmas Day.” The public, 
however, was not to worry, as for “the whole of the afternoon the Allies were busy beating 
them off. The guns thumped, the machine guns tapped, and rifles cracked. That was the music 
of Christmas about Nieuport.”323 The Daily Telegraph had similar news on 26 December, 
noting that the official communiqué issued in Paris on 25 December reported fighting on the 
front, with headway made in the form of some slight advances against the enemy. “North of 
Roye at Lihu near Lihons,” the article claimed, “we also made some progress. These different 
attacks were carried out with much dash. Everywhere we retained the ground which we had 
won.”324 As these various accounts demonstrate, the official reports of the war showed the 
situation unchanged over the Christmas holiday, and there was no mention of any cease-fires 
in these articules, which were no doubt based upon official army briefings. 
Amidst the reports of fierce fighting and German atrocities, the news of the Christmas 
truce, when it began trickling through, must certainly have perplexed the editors of these 
papers. There was no communication about the episode from any official source, yet the 
letters being passed on to the papers from soldiers’ friends and families would have confirmed 
the existence of the impromptu armistice beyond any reasonable doubt. Whether by pre-
arrangement or coincidence, the newspapers all took the same approach towards the truce, 
which was to offer the soldiers’ accounts of it rather than report upon it. The first descriptions 
of the holiday cease-fire began to appear in the British press on 31 December 1914, when three 
newspapers simultaneously published letters referring to the event.  
A typical account in the Daily Telegraph, “Christmastide in the Trenches/Greeting the 
Enemy/Unaccepted Challenges,” was credited to a “rifleman in the Queen’s Westminsters, 
writing home on Boxing Day to friends in London,” who “describes how certain members of 
the regiment and the German troops spent a merry Christmas together.”325 The soldier 
recounted how his unit shelled the German trenches until it became dark on Christmas Eve, 
when the British began to sing carols, and the Germans joined in. The British carried on “a 
sort of ‘matey’ conversation with the enemy,” after which the two sides held “a concert and a 
dance,” followed by a meeting in No-Man’s-Land, with cigarettes exchanged. The rifleman 
pronounced the Germans “jolly good sports” and was disappointed when a proposed football 
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match on Christmas Day did not come off. He closed the letter by assuring the recipient of its 
veracity: “I expect you think this a bit of a yarn. In fact, the Regulars, who were in reserve here, 
would not believe it, and some of them came up to see for themselves.” 
 The Telegraph printed two other letters from soldiers in the Queen’s Westminster 
Rifles; one reported that it was the Germans who initiated the carol-singing and fire-lighting, 
but the British troops who shouted “‘(w)on’t you come half-way and meet us and shake 
hands?’” When the Germans agreed, “we downed all arms and I went over with ----- and met 
four of them (they weren’t taking any risks), and we had a chat, exchanged cigarettes for 
coffee and sweets, &c.”326 Another rifleman provided a similar description, with firing dying 
down on Christmas Eve, carols sung in both lines of trenches, and “compliments of the 
season” shouted across.327 On Christmas Day itself, he continued, the Germans walked about 
“‘on top,’ and some of our fellows went out to meet them, and there, between the two firing 
lines, the English were shaking hands with the Germans, changing smokes, buttons and hats.” 
As the British troops discovered, many of the Germans spoke English, and a “great number of 
them had come from London. One man said he had lived in London for ten years, and he was 
going back. If the Kaiser did not take him he was going back on his own.” The day was 
concluded by an arrangement with the Germans “that they would not fire until we did,” which 
held “until five o’clock, when we were relieved by Regulars.” 
 The first soldiers’ accounts in the Manchester Guardian, which appeared on 31 
December, followed a similar pattern. The newspaper quoted a letter from a British officer 
that told how “at 11 p.m. on 24 December there was absolute peace, bar a little sniping and a 
few rounds from a machine gun, and then no more. ‘The King’ was sung, then you heard ‘To-
morrow is Christmas; if you don’t fight, we won’t’; and the answer came back ‘All right!’”328 
This report contained an account of a football match “with a bully beef tin,” and, for a 
crowning touch of absurdity, “and one man went over and cut a German’s hair!” The Morning 
Post also published letters about the truce on 31 December, including one from a British army 
captain who noted that the British trenches “in some cases are so near those of the enemy that 
communication is quite easy,” and reported that “an informal compact was arranged – at least 
at one point of our line, where our people were faced by a Saxon regiment – to the effect that 
no sniping was to take place for a day.”329 After coming out of their trenches, the English and 
Germans began, rather domestically, “to hang out their washing and mend their wire 
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entanglements.” Unfortunately, the captain wrote, “this happy scene was suddenly upset by 
the bursting of a big shell, fired from a position many miles in the rear, and everyone scuttled 
back to his hole in double quick time.” The Captain reported singing on Christmas evening, 
courtesy of an “Irish captain with a turn for music,” and closed his account with the 
observation that it was “a pity the German Press vilify us so much, for here the British soldiers 
and their adversaries mutually respect each other. And our officers certainly admire the 
Germans for putting up such a great fight, and this is quite the common opinion.”  
As demonstrated by the initial accounts published in these three papers, aside from 
choosing the letters published, the sole input that the newspapers provided about the 
Christmas truce was headlines and very brief explanations prefacing the letters. Except for the 
short introductions, there was no analysis of the event and no official information provided. In 
addition, the extent to which these published letters echo the type of information already 
shown to have been sent privately by soldiers to their friends and family demonstrates that the 
letters printed were probably not censored in any way by the newspapers, beyond the 
selection of the specific letters from the many that must have been received. The unexpected 
overtures for a cease-fire, the mutual respect – aggravated by some suspicion – between the 
two lines, the attribution of enthusiasm for the war to the Prussian regiments and the pleasure 
in an unexpected holiday all echo the themes already noted in soldiers’ letters about the truce. 
 Although by the end of the year the news of the holiday cease-fire was obviously 
starting to reach the British public, it appears that the press as a whole was unwilling to 
extrapolate any conclusions from the truce and certainly had no intention, as yet, of 
committing itself to any approval or interpretation of the event by straight-forwardly 
reporting on it. In addition, the existence of the truce had no discernible impact on the 
normal newspaper reports about the war. This pattern continued with further letters about 
the truce that appearing in the next few days. On New Year’s Day, the British newspapers 
increased the column space they devoted to the Christmas truce, with The Times, the Daily 
Telegraph, the Manchester Guardian and the Daily Mail all publishing soldiers’ accounts of the 
event, while still refraining from commenting or reporting upon it.   
The Times printed multiple letters about the truce on that day, one of which came 
from a major in the Royal Field Artillery who reported how, on Christmas Eve, “things went 
positively dead; there was not a sound. Even our own pet sniper went off duty.” After a quiet 
evening around a fire, at “about 11 o’clock a very excited Infantry officer came along and told 
us that all fighting was off, and the men were fraternizing in between the trenches.” The major 
then walked up to the front and discovered that “(i)t had been agreed between the soldiers on 
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both sides that there should be no firing until midnight Christmas Day.” In fact, the two sides 
also arranged terms for the cease-fire, agreeing “that if by any mischance a single shot was 
fired it was not to be taken as an act of war, and an apology would be accepted; also that firing 
would not be opened without due warning on both sides.” The officer further reported that 
the German appetite for an armistice seemed greater than that of the British; the Germans, he 
claimed, “were all for the truce lasting for 48 hours, but we stuck out for midnight on 
Christmas.”330 
The Times then offered two more accounts of the truce as “interesting corroborative 
evidence of the letter printed above.” One of those letters, from a major in the Leicestershire 
Regiment, discussed the impact of the event on soldiers’ attitudes towards the war. “Even out 
here,” the officer wrote, “there is a time of peace and good will. I’ve just spent an hour talking 
to German officers and men, who have drawn a line half-way between our left trenches and 
theirs and have met all our men and officers there. We exchanged cigars, cigarettes, and 
papers.” The major noted that the German soldiers “are jolly, cheery fellows for the most part,” 
and concluded that, at least for that moment, it seemed “so silly under the circumstances to be 
fighting them.”331 Another account from a major in the Royal Army Medical Corps reported 
that a different regiment “actually had a football match with the Saxons, who beat them 3-2!!!”  
He then offered the less cheerful tale of another regiment who “went out of their trenches just 
as the others had done, but the enemy – now thought to be Prussians – told them to go back 
and fired on them before they regained their trenches.”332  
Additionally, the Times reprinted a letter from a member of the London Rifles, who 
wrote, with fine understatement, that his unit “had rather an interesting time in the trenches 
on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.” The British and Germans had handled the negotiations 
before coming out of their trenches, and agreed on Christmas Eve that “in our part of the 
firing line that there should be no firing and no thought of war on Christmas Day.” The two 
sides visited each other on Christmas Day, and exchanged gifts and addresses. Everyone, the 
writer claimed, “friend and foe, were real good pals….and on Christmas Day a football match 
was played between them and us in front of the trench.” The letter related how the opposing 
troops “even allowed us to bury all our dead lying in front, and some of them, with hats in 
hand, brought in one of our dead officers from behind their trench, so that we could bury him 
decently.” Because of this, the author confided, “I now have a very different opinion of the 
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Germans.” However, by the time the letter was written, “(b)oth sides have already started the 
firing, and are already enemies again. Strange it all seems, doesn’t it?”333 
As more soldiers’ accounts of the event appeared, the letters the newspapers published 
from truce participants recounting their experiences, as well as the themes expressed in those 
letters, continued to resemble those already presented as private correspondence. The 
proximity of the trenches, the individual arrangements for cease-fires, the meetings between 
trenches and exchange of gifts, the joint burial parties and even the occasional football match 
were all common truce elements which continued to be printed alongside the more customary 
reporting about the war. The Daily Mail, for example, published two letters about the 
Christmas Truce on 1 January 1915, but unwittingly demonstrated the dichotomy between the 
reports of the truce and the standard war narrative by choosing first to summarize, in an 
editorial entitled “The New Year,” the reasons that the British had gone to war. The editorial 
asserted Britain was fighting to maintain its liberty, restore Belgian sovereignty, preserve 
French independence, and prevent Germany from “plotting and preparing our destruction.” 
However, the Daily Mail declared, there was still more at stake: “(l)et Germany win, and the 
whole gospel of despotism, based on the anarchic doctrine that nothing counts in this world 
except the sheer mass of organized strength, receives a new and indefinite lease.” If the Allies 
prevailed, on the other hand, “liberty steps into the sun once more, and there will at length be 
a chance not only of striking off the burden of armaments but also of redrawing the map along 
the lasting lines of race, nationality and justice.” It was therefore, the editorial concluded, 
Britain’s “glorious privilege to-day, as it has been many times in the past, to turn the scale 
against a jack-booted Colossus seeking to stamp out the liberties of Europe.”334 
 After clearly stating Britain’s war aims and pointing out the differences between the 
two sides, the Daily Mail may have felt more at ease about printing its first soldiers’ accounts 
of the impromptu armistice. Under a banner headline, “One Day of Peace at the Front,” the 
Mail provided a version of the truce that focused mainly on a joint funeral service.335 The 
account began with the burial of a Scottish solider, at which troops from both sides began 
venturing out of their respective trenches. The British chaplain went forward to meet with the 
German commander when a rabbit suddenly appeared. The Germans and British both ran out 
into No Man’s Land, “and a marvelous thing happened. It was like a football match, the hare 
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being the football, and gray tunicked Germans the one side, and the kilted ‘Jocks’ the other. 
The game was won by the Germans, who captured the prize.”   
As a result of the chase, the officer wrote, “a sudden friendship had been struck up, the 
truce of God had been called, and for the rest of Christmas Day not a shot was fired along our 
section.” The two sides proceeded to remove the dead soldiers lying out in No Man’s Land, as 
“over the sixty yards separating the trenches were scores and scores of dead soldiers, and soon 
spades were flung up by comrades on guard in both trenches, and by instinct each side set to 
to dig graves for their dead.” The British padre reached an agreement with the German 
commander to have a truce for the day, with a joint burial service. The officer noted that the 
“whole German staff showed a fine spirit of respect during the service for the dead.” Prayers 
were said by both sides, first by the Chaplain in English, then translated by a German divinity 
student, and the officer observed that “(i)t was a memorable sight to see officers and men who 
had been fighting and as I write are fighting against one another as fiercely as ever, 
bareheaded, reverent, and keeping sacred truce as they did homage to the memory of the dead 
on Christmas Day, 1914.”336 
 Whether the Daily Mail felt that an editorial reminding its readers of the reasons that 
Britain was fighting the war nullified the surprising reports of the apparent lack of enmity on 
the Western front, or whether it saw relatively little harm in recounting events that all the 
other papers were featuring, the stories about the armistice certainly ran counter to its normal 
reports of the conflict. The Daily Telegraph and the Manchester Guardian also printed soldiers’ 
accounts of the truce on 1 January 1915, although the letters that ran in those papers did 
introduce some elements that were new to the public truce narrative. The Telegraph, for 
example, featured an account from a rifleman in the Queen’s Westminster Rifles who noted 
the possible risks of the cease-fire when he reported that, while his unit was fraternizing in 
No-Man’s-Land, “(t)wo of our men went too far, and went into their trenches, and haven’t 
since returned, so I suppose they are prisoners.”337 Another letter discussed a twenty-four hour 
truce arranged by an infantryman who went into the German trenches to negotiate it, the first 
time a British soldier was reported to have been invited into a German trench. The soldier 
noted that the cease-fires “happened along most of the British front except where the 
Prussians opposed them.” On the following day, however, “all was changed, and where they 
had been at peace they were again at war, with the guns roaring and the rifles firing.”338 The 
Telegraph’s coverage of the event clearly underlined the expectation that the truce was to be 
                                                          
336 Daily Mail, “One Day of Peace at the Front,” 1 January 1915.   
337 Daily Telegraph, “Christmas Truce/Mingling with the Enemy,” 1 January 1915. 
338 Daily Telegraph, “Exchanging Cigars,” 1 January 1915. 
102 
 
for a specific time only and not a precursor for any more enduring cease-fire. This last point 
was borne out by the headlines in the Telegraph on that same day reporting the ‘real’ news of 
the war: “German Atrocities in Belgium/Maltreatment of Wounded/Firing on the Red Cross.” 
The Manchester Guardian also continued to provide letters about the truce, including 
one from a Manchester soldier who wrote to his wife that the Germans had displayed lit 
Christmas trees on their parapets before beckoning the British out into No-Man’s-Land.  
Champagne was drunk by the officers, and they were then joined by the men. The Germans, 
“having occupied a brewery,” presented the British with two barrels of beer.339 The truce lasted 
only twenty-four hours, according to the soldier, after which “they are at it again this 
morning.” The soldier also reported that the Germans had told the British that “their officers 
fire on them if they don’t fire on us every time they see an English soldier.”340 Another letter, 
from Private Lydall of the London Rifle Brigade, noted that “some understanding was arrived 
at with the Germans and not a shot was fired,” after which the two sides met in No-Man’s-
Land, “exchanged souvenirs and chatted.” Looking back on the experience, the private 
remarked that the Germans “weren’t a half bad lot, really. You would never think we were 
flying at one another’s throats a few hours previously.” 
 During the week following New Year’s Day, the Christmas truce continued to be 
featured in the major British papers, although none of the newspapers printed letters about 
the event on a daily basis. As noted in relation to the soldiers’ letters received privately, these 
soldiers’ accounts continued not only to challenge the contemporaneous narrative of the war, 
but also provided details that contest the modern orthodoxies of the armistice. A letter 
published in the Daily Telegraph on 2 January, for example, demonstrated that higher-ranking 
officers did not always oppose the truce. A colonel of an infantry regiment, who went up the 
trenches on Christmas Day to wish his soldiers a happy Christmas, observed that as he was 
leaving “there was a sudden hurrah and rush, and our men and the Germans both started 
running to one another, and met half-way and shook hands.” The colonel expressed some 
reservations, ordering his men back, but “was told they wanted a truce for the day to bury 
their dead, so I agreed to that.”  
Leaving half the men in the trenches to “keep a smart look-out,” the colonel went 
forward and “joined the crowd.” An obliging Saxon interpreted for the officer while he spoke 
to the German soldiers. Catching the Christmas spirit, the colonel agreed that “if they would 
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have an armistice on New Year’s Day we would play them at football between our lines.” After 
noting the details of a joint burial service, the colonel observed, in closing, that the Germans 
seemed keen on the idea of playing the British at football, which, due to the burials, might 
actually be practicable, as “there won’t be any obstacles like dead Germans lying about unless 
they try another attack before then.”341 The Telegraph also printed a letter from a soldier in the 
3rd Rifles that discussed the truce, and closed with the rifleman reporting no expectation that 
the cease-fire would become more permanent; as he remarked resignedly, “I don’t expect we 
shall shake hands with the enemy again for a long time to come.”342 
 Demonstrating that the published accounts of the event encompassed the holiday 
armistice in all its diverse manifestations, the Morning Post produced an instance of official 
interference in the truce, printing a letter from an officer who noted that the British and 
German soldiers had arranged “to have a two hours’ interval on Boxing Day from 2 p.m. to 4 
p.m. for a football match. This, however, was prevented by our superiors at Headquarters.” 
The author accepted this restriction philosophically while reflecting that “(i)t is terrible to 
think that on one day we can be at such peace, with such good feeling, and on the others we 
must occupy our minds inventing diabolical methods of destroying one another.”343  Ironically, 
in light of this account, an editorial published in the Morning Post on the same day argued 
that “(w)ar in itself is a thing indifferent, being either good or bad, according to its use and 
services. In the present case,” the editorial continued, “peace for this country would have been 
a far greater evil than war, not only because it would have meant an evil day only deferred, but 
because it would have been enjoyed at the expense of a national moral surrender.”344 With its 
customary disregard of any dissonance engendered by the continued information on the truce 
and the stance that the newspaper was taking towards the war, coverage in the Morning Post 
epitomized the contradictions inherent in the simultaneous reports of the holiday cease-fire 
and the ongoing conflict.  
Continued first-hand accounts of the Christmas truce in the Times in early January 1915 
showed that the cease-fire took as many forms as the soldiers who participated in it. A letter 
from an officer in a Highland regiment, for example, demonstrated his increasing frustration 
with the German troops who refused to fight on Christmas. The officer described himself as 
initially “horrified at discovering that some of our men actually had gone out, imbued more 
with the idea of seeing the German trenches than anything else; they met half-way, and there 
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ensued the giving of cigarettes and receiving of cigars, and they arranged (the private soldiers 
of one army and the private soldiers of the other) a 48 hours’ armistice.” At this point, 
however, the officer recalled the lessons of history, and while noting that “(i)t was all most 
irregular,” consoled himself with the reflection that “the Peninsular and other wars will furnish 
many such examples; eventually both sides were induced to return to their respective 
trenches, but the enemy sang all night.” 
 The officer’s irritation recurred the next day, when once again “out came those 
Germans to wish us ‘A Happy Day’.” He told the Germans that “we were at war with them, and 
that really they must play the game and pretend to fight; they went back, but again attempted 
to come towards us.” Tiring of appeals to their enemies’ sporting instincts, the British troops 
“fired over their heads, they fired a shot back to show they understood, and the rest of the day 
passed quietly in this part of the line, but in others a great deal of fraternizing went on.” In 
spite of his impatience with the Germans’ refusal to fight on Christmas, the officer finished his 
account with the reflection that it was “a great hope for future peace when two great nations, 
hating each other as foes have seldom hated, one side vowing eternal hate and vengeance and 
setting their venom to music, should on Christmas Day, and for all that the word implies, lay 
down their arms, exchange smokes, and wish each other happiness!”345  It is clear from some 
of the letters published in the press that it was not just the editors of the newspapers who 
found the truce difficult to reconcile with their attitudes towards the war; evidently, some 
soldiers also were perplexed by the contradictions inherent in the event. 
 Another hesitant truce participant was an officer in a Rifle Brigade, who observed lit 
Christmas trees on the German parapets on Christmas Eve. The officer, who noted that “(n)o 
truce had been proclaimed,” was strongly against “allowing the blighters to enjoy themselves, 
especially as they had killed one of our men that afternoon.” His less experienced captain 
“(who hadn’t seen our wounded going mad and slowly dying outside the German trenches on 
the Aisne) wouldn’t let me shoot; however, I soon had an excuse, as one of the Germans fired 
at us, so I quickly lined up my platoon and had those Christmas-trees down and out.” The 
officer later heard that two officers from another trench met two German officers in No-
Man’s-Land, which the writer thought “an awfully stupid thing to do, as it might easily have 
had different results; but our captains are new and, not having seen the Germans in their true 
light yet, apparently won’t believe the stories of their treachery and brutality.”   
On Christmas, however, the two sides had a “sort of mutual truce; nothing on paper or 
even in words, but a sort of mutual understanding.” The officer reported that some of his 
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suspicions were allayed when he saw that the Germans opposite were Saxons, “because they’re 
good fellows on the whole and play the game as far as they know it.” The German dead in 
between the lines were buried, and the Germans told the British that they would not shoot at 
them for now, but warned them that, when their Eastern army returned on 1 January, “they 
were going to wipe us off the face of the earth.” In response, the officer wrote that the British 
“roared with laughter, but (the Germans) were quite serious about it and evidently believed it 
all.” In the evening, the officer “took good care to double my sentries, as I trust these fellows 
devil an inch,” but in spite of his caution, he still thought it possible that the “politicians will 
be wrong now, and that the war will come to an end because every one will get fed up and 
refuse to go on shooting.”346  
This officer’s letter demonstrates once again that the newspapers found horrific details 
about life at the front acceptable to print when they came directly from British soldiers: 
reports of wounded “going mad and slowly dying” were certainly not featured in any of the 
conventional newspaper reports on the war, and neither was speculation that soldiers could 
just quit fighting if they felt “fed up” with the war. The Times also printed a letter from a 
Belgian soldier describing a truce that appeared much tamer than those experienced by the 
British: he reported singing from both trenches, a brief meeting in No Man’s Land, and 
Christmas passing without hearing one shot fired the whole day.347 These letters in The Times, 
including the first report from a truce participant who was neither British nor German, added 
a level of complexity to the information previously provided about the truce, and the 
continued coverage of the holiday cease-fire demonstrated how popular the story was proving 
to be with British readers. 
During the first week of January 1915, the reprinted accounts of the truce expanded to 
reflect reports that demonstrated its intermittent nature, showing just how different soldiers’ 
experiences in the front line on Christmas Day could be. Two letters in the Guardian on 6 
January from different companies of the 2nd East Lancashires provide an example of this: in the 
first, from a private in B Company, the German troops requested a cease-fire for the British to 
collect and bury two bodies of British soldiers that were near the German trenches. “Not a 
shot was fired between us after that up to the time of our relief on Christmas night,” the 
soldier wrote. “The scene was very dramatic, and I don’t suppose will be witnessed again on a 
battlefield.”348 It certainly was not witnessed by the same battalion’s D Company, who, while 
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they heard the Germans singing, did not participate in any truce. “Oh, by the way, they have a 
novel way of wishing one a happy Christmas – namely, shouting out ‘A happy Christmas to 
you!’ and then firing a number of shots at us, only they couldn’t hit us, as we were out of sight 
of them,” a soldier in that company reported. “Of course we returned the salute with 
interest.”349 
The Guardian also published an account from a subaltern at the front who participated 
in a truce that was arranged with the Germans for the purposes of burying both the British 
and German dead “who had been lying out in the open since the fierce night-fighting a week 
earlier.” The subaltern, arriving at the site, found the bodies already laid out in rows, and he 
“went along those dreadful ranks and scanned the faces, fearing at every step to recognize one 
I knew. It was a ghastly sight. They lay stiffly in contorted attitudes, dirty with frozen mud and 
powdered with rime.” Two common graves were dug, but because the burials could not be 
completed on Christmas Day, the truce was extended to 26 December. As a result, the 
Germans “left us alone that night to enjoy a peaceful Christmas.” The next day, a service was 
read over the graves, and the subaltern confessed himself moved by the occasion, writing that 
it “was one of the most impressive things I have ever witnessed. Friend and foe stood side by 
side, bare-headed, watching the tall, grave figure of the padre outlined against the frosty 
landscape as he blessed the poor broken bodies at his feet,” the soldier reported. “Then, with 
more formal salutes, we turned and made our way back to our respective ruts.”350 In spite of 
the cheerful tone of most of the letters published about the holiday cease-fire, they still 
contained reminders of the horrors of war and the “poor broken bodies” of dead comrades. 
 As the first week of January 1915 drew to a close, the number of letters referencing the 
Christmas truce published in the newspapers began to dwindle.351 The papers also began to 
feature accounts by soldiers in the front line at times other than Christmas, or by soldiers who 
were in the front line at Christmas but did not participate in the truce, reminding their readers 
that the armistice was not a universal experience. The Daily Mail, for example, reprinted a 
letter from a gunner in the Royal Field Artillery who described going into the trenches on 
Christmas morning. “We got into action about eleven o’clock on Christmas morning by the 
side of a road,” he recounted, “and after we had got the guns into position and covered them 
with trees we had about half an hour’s football.” After this interlude, they “got the order ‘Eyes 
front’ (which means every man to his post), and then we started sending the ‘Germs’ over 
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Christmas boxes which went into their trenches, so I guess there are a few there who would 
not have any Christmas pudding.”352   
 While the quantity of letters about the truce tapered off, the newspapers began to 
report, in the form of short articles, on the responses of the French and German military 
authorities to the unofficial cease-fire. On 6 January, the Manchester Guardian featured an 
article headlined “A Sequel to the Truce/French and Germans Refuse to Fight Afterwards,” 
which was purported to be based on a conversation that the correspondent had with a French 
soldier in a Parisian hospital. The soldier related that “on the night of December 24 the French 
and Germans at a particular place came out of their respective trenches and met half-way 
between them.” The sequel to this event, the reporter wrote, “was more interesting than the 
event itself,” for the “French and German soldiers who had thus fraternized subsequently 
refused to fire on one another, and had to be removed from the trenches and replaced by 
other men.”353  The Guardian featured another article on 14 January, discussing truces between 
the French and Germans, which “alarmed” the French government, who had since “forbidden 
the French papers to publish them, and have even suppressed stories of fraternization 
between English and German soldiers in an English paper published in Paris.”354 The paper 
also reported reactions from the German government disapproving of the truce. The 
appearance of these articles could be credited to either public interest in the truce generally, 
or the desire to show the Germans had no taste for further fighting, which was certainly a 
moral that some British soldiers had deduced from the cease-fire.355 
The Times also featured a similar article, sent by a correspondent in Amsterdam, 
entitled “The Christmas Truce/Stringent German Army Order.” It noted that the German 
newspapers had “recently published numerous descriptions of attempted friendly overtures 
between the trenches of the Germans and the French.” The article quoted the German paper 
Tagliche Rundschau, which observed that “‘(e)very one will recognize that this fraternizing has 
its serious side, for war is no sport, and one must affirm with regret that those who made or 
countenanced these overtures evidently mistook the seriousness of the situation.’” As a result, 
the newspaper reported, an Army order had been issued on 29 December forbidding 
fraternization, and warning the troops that “every approach to the enemy…will be punished as 
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treason.”356 On 9 January, the Daily Mail also picked up this article for its own pages, 
illustrating the newspapers’ willingness to discuss official reaction to the holiday armistice, as 
long as it wasn’t British official reaction. 
The Illustrated London News, a weekly journal which turned the news of the day into 
simple stories accompanied by photographs and drawings, featured the Christmas Truce on 
the front page of its 9 January edition, under the headline “The Light of Peace in the Trenches 
on Christmas Eve: a German Soldier Opens the Spontaneous Truce by Approaching the British 
Lines with a Small Christmas Tree.”357 The journal clearly assumed its readers would be 
already familiar with the event, and the brief caption on the drawing contained the 
information that in some sections of the front the Germans, on Christmas Eve, “decorated 
their trenches with Christmas-trees and paper lanterns, and invited our troops to stop 
shooting and come over to smoke and have a palaver.” Both sides, the journal reported, 
continued the cessation of hostilities the next day, and “spent a happy Christmas.”  
 Charles Lowe, an Illustrated London News’ weekly columnist, poetically noted in the 
same edition that “Christmastide brought with it to our trenches in Flanders a sort of ‘truce of 
God’ by mutual consent, accompanied by such fraternizing between opposing foes as had 
never been seen, perhaps, since Peninsular days or the siege of Sebastopol.”358 Of course, he 
observed, “afterwards the fighting went on as briskly as ever – with results on the whole, as 
unfavourable to the ‘Boches’ in Belgium as it has been to them in South-West Africa, where we 
have re-occupied Walfinch Bay.” The rest of the journal contained further drawings 
representing different aspects of the truce, with titles such as “British and German Soldiers 
Arm-in-Arm and Exchanging Headgear,” and “Saxons and Anglo-Saxons Fraternizing on the 
Field of Battle.” The captions under these drawings described the truce as “informal and 
spontaneous,” and noted that there was “‘peace on earth and goodwill towards men’ among 
those who a few hours before had been seeking each other’s blood, and were bound to do so 
again after the truce was over.” The journal reminded its readers that the German troops 
participating in the truce were, of course, Saxons, while in other areas of the front, “where 
Prussian troops were said to be stationed, there was a certain amount of fighting.” The weekly 
paper described some fairly standard elements of the truce, including the exchange of 
cigarettes, and noted that “(s)ome of the British, it is said, visited the German trenches, and an 
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Anglo-German football match was even played.”359 The Christmas truce, it appears, was 
considered an acceptable subject for coverage by all manifestations of the British press, as long 
as it was made clear that the armistice was both spontaneous and temporary, and would 
shortly be followed by renewed combat. 
Up until this time, the British newspapers had refrained from either reporting or 
providing substantial comments upon the truce.360 More than two weeks after the event, and a 
week after coverage of it had begun to appear in the press, the Daily Telegraph apparently felt 
ready – or perhaps compelled - to tackle the subject. In an editorial published on 7 January, it 
acknowledged that “(p)robably no news since the war began has made a greater sensation, and 
certainly none has made better reading than the accounts which have come through from the 
trenches of the unofficial armistice established between certain sections of the German line 
and our own on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.”361 The newspaper noted that the stories of 
the truce seemed incredible “in view of the ferocity of the combatants during months past and 
of the authenticated tales of German atrocities and trickery”; in fact, the Telegraph feared, on 
the basis of the truce people might believe that the German soldier, once “outside the 
influence of the Prussian military machine,” was a “good-hearted peace loving individual.” 
 This interpretation of the event was inaccurate, the editorial asserted. Truces were 
traditional, had always occurred between troops facing one another in war, and arose “from a 
growing feeling of respect for your adversary” with whom soldiers shared “common hardships 
and common dangers.” In those circumstances, “the national feeling gives way before the 
fellow-feeling for the man opposite, who, after all, is not responsible for the war and is only 
obeying orders.” Having established that, as it had preached all along, the German leadership 
and not the unfortunately deluded common German soldier bore the blame for the war, the 
Daily Telegraph then tried to put the best face possible on the truce. Since it could not ignore 
the cease-fire, it instead enjoined its readers to remember that it was the Kaiser who had 
started the war and that, on Christmas Day, “the brave Bavarians and Saxons exchanged 
greetings and gifts and the dead whilst the author of all Europe’s miseries was publically 
announcing ‘that to the enemy I send bullets and bayonets.’” While the Telegraph editorial 
actually tried to place the truce in the context of the standard war narrative by reminding its 
readers that a day of goodwill on the part of the troops did not absolve the Kaiser of 
responsibility for starting the war, most of the other newspapers made no analogous effort, 
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confining themselves to further letters about the truce and articles on the effects of 
fraternization in the German and French armies. 
The Manchester Guardian, however, in a similar attempt to reconcile the 
inconsistencies between the Christmas truce and the continuing fighting on the Western 
Front, featured an editorial about the event in its 9 January edition. In its endeavor to situate 
the truce within the narrative of the war, the Guardian tried to characterize it as proof that, 
while battles destroyed the bodies of soldiers, their souls survived intact.362 The editorial noted 
that the message of the truce, which some wanted to explain as “a truce of God,” was in fact 
something altogether more complex. The Guardian presented the cease-fire as “the simple and 
unexamined impulse of human souls, drawn together in face of a common and desperate 
plight.” To the skeptics who observed that the soldiers involved went immediately back to the 
business of killing each other, the Guardian pointed out that the reasons for the war still 
existed – that Belgium still had to be liberated and the Germans “taught that Culture cannot 
be carried by the sword”, and that the soldiers, therefore, had good reasons to continue 
fighting. 
 The editorial argued that the real lesson to be gained from the truce was that the 
British soldier, while remaining capable, both physically and morally, of defeating the 
Germans (with their “insufficient insight into the better way”), would return from the war not 
brutalized or scarred by his experiences. The fact that the British troops were able to put aside 
their arms for one day, the Guardian theorized, proved that “the soul of man” was greater than 
the guns that the armies used and that the British soldier had been briefly granted a vision of 
an ideal “that things seen can have no power at all over the things which are not seen.” While 
this editorial contained some simplistic and contradictory elements, it was at least an attempt 
to reconcile the armistice with the continuation of the war by providing a reasoned argument 
(although skewed in favor of the superior moral character of the British) about the 
motivations of the soldiers involved, in contrast to the Daily Telegraph editorial that was 
satisfied with continuing to blame the Kaiser for the conflict.363  
 These two editorials, which appeared over two weeks after the truce took place, 
constituted the only contemporaneous journalistic attempts to explain the event and find a 
place for it within the contemporaneous narrative of the war. The approaches that were taken 
by the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian differed greatly: while the Daily Telegraph merely 
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maintained its pre-truce stance, the Guardian attempted to assign greater meaning to the 
event within the context of the eventual end of the war, and the emotional effects of the 
conflict on the men involved. After the publication of these two editorials, coverage of the 
truce tapered off dramatically, with most newspapers only printing the occasional letter on the 
subject until about the third week in January 1915, when accounts of the truce disappeared 
from British newspaper columns altogether.  
The Christmas truce, as presented in the pages of the British press, resembled in 
complexity the event as viewed by individual soldiers in their private letters, demonstrating 
that the newspapers did not make any effort to emphasize or ignore letters that presented any 
specific narrative of the truce. During the three weeks that the Christmas truce was featured 
prominently in the British newspapers, however, the ambivalence of the press towards the 
event was apparent. While it was clear that the story of the truce was tremendously popular – 
after all, twenty-one days would be far too long to feature an episode that bored the public – it 
was equally clear that British newspaper editors were unwilling to commit themselves to an 
opinion on the subject. By confining the reports of the truce to the “Letters from the Front” 
columns, the British press segregated the episode from the rest of its war coverage, allowing 
its normal representations of the conflict to remain unaltered by the news of the unofficial 
cease-fire. The only attempts at reporting on the truce covered French and German sanctions 
towards it, and British official reaction to the episode was not recorded in any newspaper.  
In addition, the rather feeble attempt on the part of the Daily Telegraph and the more 
robust opinion from the Manchester Guardian, both attempting to ‘explain’ the truce within 
the context of the overarching war narrative, shows how the temporary armistice and the 
soldiers’ attitudes towards the conflict and their enemies confounded the newspapers’ 
endeavors to present the First World War as a seamless narrative of triumphant good against 
easily vanquished evil. In spite of the ambivalence toward the event, however, the story of the 
truce in all its complexity was openly published, and the British public as a whole was 
therefore able to understand the event and the emotions of the soldiers involved through their 
own words, which the papers printed without apparent censorship. In addition, the popularity 
of the story shows that, whatever reservations the British press may have had about the truce, 
the British public were able to absorb and accept it without loss of faith in their soldiers or the 
cause for which the nation fought. In fact, it probably comforted many of them to know that 
their soldiers had, at least in part, enjoyed their Christmas in the trenches, if only for its 
novelty value. It now remains to be seen whether the knowledge of the Christmas truce would 
112 
 
sink without a trace during the remaining years of war, or whether, having received so much 
attention, it would continue to remain part of the collective memory of the conflict. 
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Chapter Six 
“That unique and weird Christmas”: 
The Christmas Truce during the War 
 
And then, to all intents, the story was forgotten. It disappeared under the gas clouds of Ypres 
and the colossal casualty lists of the Somme and Passchendaele.  
-Malcolm Brown 
“When Peace Broke Out” 
Manchester Guardian, 23 December 2001 
 
The fraternizing of the British and Germans at their first Christmas under arms, in 1914, will, 
perhaps, always be accounted as the most curious episode of the war. 
-Stephen Stapleton 
“The Relations between the Trenches” 
Contemporary Review, 1917 
 
 
“One of the strangest and most significant events of the war,” was how George Perris 
described the Christmas truce in The Campaign of 1914 in France and Belgium, his 1915 book 
about the initial months of fighting.364 In this work, which tried to present an even-handed 
view of the war and the events leading up the conflict, Perris, a journalist and political writer, 
predicted that, as the great wave of violence would only slow Europe’s progress towards the 
goal of a more civilized and morally advanced world, no nation could actually “win” the war.365 
At the same time, he envisaged the possibility of a hopeful ending to the conflict: if it resulted 
in a “real European partnership” then “the blood offering of the great war will not have been 
all in vain.”366 It was within this discourse that Perris situated the truce. He described the 
scene on Christmas Eve, with British troops opposite the Saxons, and observed that when 
carol singing came from the German trenches, the British snipers simply ceased shooting and 
thereafter fraternization began in earnest, including an agreement for the truce to continue 
until midnight on Christmas Day.367   
 Perris included joint burial services and a football match, as well as officers who came 
out “to see ‘the fun,’” in his account of the truce.368 From these scenes he drew a hopeful 
                                                          
364 George Herbert Perris, Campaign of 1914 in France and Belgium (London: Hodder and Stoughten, 
1915), pg. xxiii. 
365 Perris’ attempt at even-handedness was not always successful, as he could not resist crediting the war 
to standard German “frightfulness.” 
366 Perris, Campaign of 1914, pp. xx, xxiii. 
367 Perris, Campaign of 1914, pg. xxiii. 
368 Perris, Campaign of 1914, pg. 391. 
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lesson, namely that “(s)uch acts, such men, give us back our faith in the virtue of life and the 
common human heart.”369 As the temporary cease-fire had not been sanctioned by the 
countries’ leaders, nor suggested to the troops by any idealists, but rather came from the 
hearts of the men involved, it was a vision “of reconciliation” that would sustain the soldiers 
“when many a day of dear-bought but necessary victory has sunk into oblivion. The men who 
went back to their guns, if they survive, will recall it as the day when Christmas became real 
for them.”370 Perris took the 1914 armistice as a sign that there was still hope for a better world 
to rise from the ashes of the battlefield, seeing the episode as proof that “(o)ur sons’ ways will 
not be as ours. They will make a new Europe.”371 Perris believed that the truce reflected the 
possibility that the war could engender a better world than the one Europe had left behind on 
4 August 1914, and his attempts to shape the cease-fire into a myth that underlined the general 
themes of his work illustrates how little time it took for the holiday armistice to be pressed 
into the service of a more over-reaching discourse. 
The inclusion of the Christmas truce in Perris’ history also contradicts one the most 
persistent myths of the truce: the belief that, once it was over, the cease-fire sank immediately 
from sight. Malcolm Brown is one of the most fervent advocates of this theory; in Meetings in 
No-Man’s-Land, for example, he notes that long before 1916, subsequent events “had almost 
wiped the story from the collective memory. To all intents and purposes, it was forgotten.”372 
This is far from the only inaccurate idea that is now firmly embedded in the truce’s modern 
narrative, stubbornly resistant to the available evidence. As befitting an event that, even for 
those involved, had a slight air of unreality about it, the end of the Christmas truce proved to 
be only the beginning of the myths that would eventually to be constructed around it. A 
headline for the “Letters from the Front” column in the Daily Mail on 1 January 1915, “One Day 
of Peace at the Front,” illustrates one of the main beliefs about the truce: that the cease-fire 
lasted for only Christmas Day (after which, of course, it was ruthlessly suppressed by the 
authorities).373 Another subsequent truce myth, the theory that soldiers who participated in 
the holiday armistice later had to be transferred to other parts of the line because they then 
refused to fight the enemies whom they had befriended, which can be traced back to 
newspaper accounts published shortly after the truce, was further propagated by soldiers in 
the line. 
                                                          
369 Perris, Campaign of 1914, pg. 392. 
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371 Perris, Campaign of 1914, pg. 392. 
372 Ferro, et al., Meetings in No Man’s Land, pg. 76. This, of course, is a corollary to Brown’s insistence 
that many believe that the truce itself was a myth, a viewpoint he has contradicted on many occasions, 
even though the ranks of those that appear to doubt the cease-fires existence were always few. 
373 “One Day of Peace at the Front,” Daily Mail, 1 January 1915. 
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An additional misconception that remains part of the conventional narrative of the 
truce is that there were no further holiday cease-fires in any of the subsequent years of the 
war, a “fact” underlined in the 2004 Timewatch documentary which stated that, while on 
Christmas 1914 “half of the British army took part in the greatest act of spontaneous peace in 
any war,” the following year, on 25 December 1915, “there will be no repeat,” due to the 
continuing brutal war breaking the “common bond of soldiers,” as well as “threats to court-
martial fraternizers and shoot deserters.”374 Interestingly, another legend about the truce – 
which, while contradicting the idea that no further cease-fires occurred, appears to run 
concurrently with it - concerns Iain Colquhoun, a captain with the Scots Guards, who 
participated in a 1915 truce and according to numerous sources, was court-martialed and 
severely punished for disobeying orders.375  
Demonstrating that cease-fires (if not actual truces) continued on the Western front 
long past Christmas or even New Year’s Day, war diaries for a number of regiments continued 
to report peaceful spells in the line and a lack of aggression from both sides well into January 
1915. The diary for 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers for 2 through 5 January, for example, records “very 
quiet practically no sniping.”376 The 2nd Yorkshires noted on 3 January 1915 that the battalion 
“(g)ot on well with improvements to the trenches as there was no firing.”377 The 1st Rifle 
Brigade’s diary reflects diminished activity over the course of January 1915, beginning with the 
observation that on 1 January that the front remained “very quiet, very little sniping or shelling 
by either side.” Thereafter, the line remained “fairly quiet but began slowly to increase in 
activity as regards sniping,” and the battalion closed out January’s entries with the sly 
observation that “(t)his has been a very quiet month and we have got through a lot of work 
owing to the enemy’s disinclination to annoy us.”378 Other war diaries, including those of the 
2nd Borders and the 2nd Rile Brigade, also reported continuing cease-fires or extremely inactive 
fronts during this time.  
The 1st Somerset Light Infantry went even further in reporting a continued truce, albeit 
without fraternization, throughout the first week of January, and the implicit knowledge about 
this cease-fire by the military leadership. On 1 January, its diary recorded that “(p)eaceable 
                                                          
374 Days That Shook the World. 
375 The reason these two myths may co-exist peacefully is that people tend to believe that Colquhoun 
was court-martialed for participation in the 1914 truce. M. Leslie Walkinton, in a 1985 interview, stated 
that “I think I have read since that, you see, some people went on with it a bit after Christmas Day, and I 
think that one Scottish officer was court-martialed, but I don’t think he was punished or anything, but I 
don’t really know.” M. Leslie Walkinton, 1/16th Queen’s Westminster Rifles, Interview, 1985, Imperial 
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376 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers diary entry, WO/95/1507, 2-5 January 1915. 
377 2nd Yorkshires diary entry, WO 95/16593, January 1915. 
378 1st Rifle Brigade diary entries,  WO 95/1496, all from January 1915. 
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conditions still continue,” with good progress subsequently being made on all front-line 
construction. The battalion’s 2 January entry is even more unambiguous, noting that the 
“unofficial truce still continues,” with only a few shell exchanges on 3 January. The next day, 
the diary reported that conditions were, “(a)s usual, very quiet,” and that “the General” had 
come up to the lines to inspect the new construction. Similar entries continued for another six 
days, during which time various senior leaders, including “Lt. Colonel Prowse” and “Gen. 
Hunter Weston,” visited the lines and must have detected, without apparent censure, the lack 
of fighting on this part of the front. The 1st Somersets seem, throughout this month, to have 
been quite content not to disturb the equilibrium at the front, particularly in view of the 
persistent rain that constantly undermined their efforts to construct new breastworks. On 11 
January, however, their diary recorded that the “truce came to an abrupt end today and 
sniping started again in earnest.”379   
The willingness of leadership to condone continued inactivity in the front line, as 
evidenced by the lack of reserve with which some units reported prolonged periods of quiet 
during January 1915, stands in sharp contrast to the conventional narrative of the cease-fire, 
which suggests that army leaders ordered an immediate resumption of the war shortly after 
the (one-day) Christmas truce ended. Instead, the presence of senior officers in the 1st 
Somerset trenches in early January, during a time when a truce not only remained in effect but 
its existence was recorded openly in the battalion diary, indicates that front-line officers did 
not fear reprisals for reporting on-going armistices, and that under the right circumstances, 
such as horrific weather preventing any chance of successful aggression against the enemy, 
high-ranking leadership were certainly prepared to overlook continuing peaceful conditions in 
the trenches.   
Even after it ended, the holiday armistice continued to be featured in diary entries and 
letters written home from the Western front, demonstrating that the episode had certainly not 
been forgotten by the soldiers who taken part in it. Although after Christmas most truce 
participants quickly reverted to discussing the war in the same manner as they did before the 
cease-fire, as the memory of the armistice was presumably overridden by new events, a few 
continued to refer to the episode in their letters home, and even discussed the theory, which 
would later be accepted as fact, that troops would be moved to different places in the line in 
order to reinvigorate the war. On 27 December 1914, Harold Atkins told his father that his 
battalion hoped “to have another truce on New Years’ Day, and have fixed up a footer match.” 
Wondering how “this business will end,” Atkins speculated that “(p)erhaps they will change 
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the battalions.”380 Dillon wrote home on 17 January that this in fact had happened, noting that 
the Germany authorities were “very angry” about the Christmas fraternization, and as a result 
“changed the Saxon Regt. for a Prussian Jaeger Regt. and we fight them continuously.”381   
W.A.F. Foxx-Pitt, a junior officer with the 2nd Cheshires, which rotated into the 
trenches right after Christmas, wrote his mother at the end of December that his time in the 
line was very quiet, as “luckily we have got a very peaceful lot of Germans in front of us and we 
have come to a sort of agreement that if one side doesn’t shoot the other won’t so we walk 
about fairly safely, but you never know who will start shooting. You can see them walking 
about the top of their trenches.”382 These tales of continued quiet periods in the front lines 
even appeared in some newspapers, with the Manchester Guardian publishing a letter on 22 
January 1915 from a corporal who noted that his battalion was serving opposite some 
Bavarians, who since Christmas “have been turning friendly and speaking to the British from 
the trenches.”383 Another letter printed on the same day reported renewed firing “just before 
the New Year came in,” but when it stopped “one of the Germans started to sing over to our 
trenches, and when he’d finished his song he shouted, ‘Good night boys. We’re going to bed, 
and I wish you all a happy New Year.’”384  
Although these brief allusions to the Christmas armistice and further friendliness from 
the enemy were not as common as the initial reports of the truce itself, the fact that these 
anecdotes were published in the British press demonstrates that military censorship remained 
relaxed even after the cease-fire and did not prevent soldiers referencing the event in their 
letters. In fact, when writing home on 7 January 1915, Cuthbert Lawson, an officer with the 3rd 
Royal Horse Artillery, made light of the military leadership’s reaction to the truce. “I suppose 
you saw in the papers about the English and Germans fraternizing on Christmas day – most of 
it is quite true,” he told his mother, adding that “Sir John French has sent round an awful 
stinker saying how reprehensible it is, or words to that effect, and expressing his great surprise 
that such a thing should have happened! Rather amusing isn’t it?”385 French’s disapproval of 
                                                          
380 H. Atkins, 27 December 1914 letter. 
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the event, obviously, did not carry a great deal of weight with at least one soldier in the front 
lines. 
Although it is true that no truce on the same scale as the 1914 one took place in the 
following year, smaller armistices did occur in parts of the line on Christmas in 1915, and news 
of these cease-fires got around quickly. 2nd Lieutenant H. Ridsdale of the Royal Engineers 
recorded in his diary on 25 December 1915 that, although the Artillery did not participate in a 
truce, “the Scots and Coldstreams appear to have met the Germans halfway between the 
lines.”386 W. Tate, with the 2nd Coldstream Guards, pronounced his first Christmas in the lines 
“very good indeed,” as early on “Dec. 25th (Xmas Day) the German Infantry (14th Prussians) 
came out of their trenches and walked towards our line. We did not fire on them, as they had 
no equipment or arms of any sort; some of our fellows went over to meet them. They shook 
hands and exchanged greetings, they also exchanged money and cigarettes, etc.”387 Although 
specific orders against fraternization over the holiday period were issued in 1915 by British 
military leaders, they do not appear to have prevented at least a few small truces, and no 
doubt there were also some cases of cease-fires (without fraternization) in the lines on that 
day, although the troops involved probably made no efforts to publicize them. 
The most famous case of fraternization in 1915 took place on 25 December between the 
1st Scots Guards and the Germans stationed in the trenches opposite them. Captain Iain 
Colquhoun, a company commander, wrote extensively about the episode in his diary, in which 
he noted that on Christmas morning, at about 9 a.m., the Germans advanced into No-Man’s-
Land, and he went out to meet a German officer, who asked for a truce for Christmas. 
Colquhoun “replied that this was impossible. He then asked for ¾ hr. to bury his dead. I 
agreed.” The two sides took half hour to bury their respective dead, and spent the remaining 
fifteen minutes talking and exchanging cigars and cigarettes. “When the time was up, I blew a 
whistle, and both sides returned to their trenches,” Colquhoun wrote. “For the rest of the day 
the Germans walked about and sat on their parapets. Our men did much the same, but 
remained in their trenches. Not a shot was fired.” That night, the Germans lit up their 
trenches with lights, which, together with the full moon, caused Colquhoun to declare it was 
“the prettiest sight I have ever seen.” After that, the shelling resumed.388 
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 The next day, Colquhoun was called to “explain to (a) Court of Inquiry my conduct on 
Christmas Day.” He reported that the Brigadier “doesn’t mind a bit,” but that Major-General 
Cavan was “furious about it.” The 2nd Scots Guards and the Coldstream Guards “are also 
implicated.” On 30 December, Colquhoun wrote that “(t)he row about the Xmas truce is still 
going on” – as presumably the irate Major-General was not prepared to let the matter go - and 
that he “had to write my account of the thing about 8 times.” On 4 January 1915 Colquhoun 
“received note from the Colonel telling me that I was under close arrest for my share in the 
Xmas Day truce, also Miles Barne. The others implicated are not being prosecuted against.” 
His status was then changed to open arrest, and on 5 January he was “ordered to attend a 
‘Summary of Evidence’ at H.Q.” Evidence was given on that day against both Colquhoun and 
Barne, and they were both charged.”389   
On the same day as the Summary of Evidence, Colquhoun received word that his wife 
had gone into labour. Although under arrest, he was granted leave to go back to England for 
the birth of his child.390 He returned to France afterwards, and attended the court-martial 
which was held on 17 January, at which the two officers were represented by Raymond 
Asquith, a noted barrister and the son of the Prime Minister. Barne’s case went first; he was 
tried for “Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline for not giving definite 
enough orders for the procedure on Christmas day when in Command of the Batt.” Barne’s 
trial ended at 2:00 p.m., and a verdict of “not guilty” was given at 2:10, leaving him “exonerated 
from all blame,” a judgment Asquith had predicted in a 12 January letter to his wife.391   
Colquhoun’s trial, at which he was “accused of Conduct to the Prejudice of good order and 
military discipline in that on the 25th Dec. I (1) agreed to a truce with the enemy (2) permitted 
a cessation of hostilities,” then commenced. Colquhoun was questioned by Raymond Asquith 
“with the object of proving that when I went up to the trenches on Xmas morning, I found a 
very advanced situation which I did my best to regularize by having a definite agreement as to 
how long the situation was to last.” After others presented evidence, character witnesses for 
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Colquhoun, among them a brigadier general and a colonel, were called, and then speeches for 
both the prosecution and accused were given.392   
After five hours of deliberation, he court found Colquhoun guilty and “then closed to 
consider its sentence.”393  Three days later Colquhoun heard that the verdict, a reprimand, was 
“quashed by G.H.Q.” which really, Colquhoun wrote, “means that the whole thing is washed 
out.”394 Brown and Seaton report that, in fact, General Haig himself remitted the sentence 
because of Colquhoun’s “distinguished record in the field.”395 As Asquith observed, “there was 
no doubt that he committed a technical offense, but in reality he showed a good deal of 
decision and common sense, and his military character is so first rate that they ought to take a 
lenient view of the case,” which apparently is how Haig also viewed the matter.396 
  At first glance, these two courts-martial, which represented the only times officers 
were prosecuted during the First World War for allowing fraternization at Christmas, appear 
to fit the standard narrative of both the truce and the war. In fact, however, not only was one 
officer entirely exonerated – a sentence which took the court just ten minutes to reach – but 
the second officer charged, who was represented by the son of the Prime Minister, had his 
sentence quashed by General Haig within three days of the verdict. However, this episode 
involving Captain Colquhoun, which ended with the judicial equivalent of a whimper rather 
than a bang, is one that has been since blown out of all proportion.  In their work on the truce, 
Brown and Seaton, for example, call the reaction to the fraternization “a considerable fracas,” 
noting that it became “a minor scandal.”397 Weintraub characterizes Colquhoun’s court-
martial as the inevitable reaction of a callous leadership, insisting that “(f)rom the command 
standpoint, conspicuous examples had to be made” - however big a stretch it may be to call a 
quashed reprimand a “conspicuous example.”398 Colquhoun’s clan website even featured an 
interesting myth about the event, noting that the “late chief, Sir Iain Colquhoun 31st of 
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Luss…was condemned to death by a court martial but pardoned by King George V for 
fraternising on Christmas Day with the Germans in No Man's Land.”399 
In the end, however, this was really quite a simple affair. Two officers were charged 
with conduct prejudicial to good order; one was found not guilty and the other had his very 
mild sentence quashed. Had the military leadership wished to make an example of these two 
officers for daring to allow their troops to fraternize with the enemy, it would have ensured 
that they were punished, and punished severely, for their actions. Instead, the British Army’s 
Commander-in-Chief took the time and trouble to make sure the sentence was entirely 
dismissed, and as Colquhoun later wrote, the “whole Guards division and everyone who knows 
the facts of the case all say it was a monstrous thing that the Court martial even took place.”400 
In addition, it should be noted that Colquhoun, who remained in service throughout the war, 
eventually rose to the rank of Brigadier-General, demonstrating that the episode did nothing 
to impede his career.401 There is no report that any officers from other battalions were 
prosecuted for allowing holiday cease-fires, even though Tate’s diary entry verifies that the 2nd 
Coldstreams did participate in a truce, as did the 1st Scots Guards, and Ridsdale’s diary makes 
it clear that these armistices were well-known throughout the front lines.402 Once again, the 
evidence from Christmas 1915 confirms that, contrary to the conventional narrative of the 
truce, the military leadership really had no vested interest in punishing soldiers for brief cease-
fires in the front lines, and in spite of having caught some officers in the act of allowing their 
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men to fraternize after orders were implicitly issued to prevent it, were prepared to overlook 
the matter even after a court-martial and a guilty verdict. 
As illustrated by some references in battalion diaries to the lack of a Christmas truce 
on the Western front in subsequent years, the 1914 armistice remained part of the general 
military memory of the war.403 However, the lack of further information in the newspapers 
about the truce after January 1915 did not prevent the home front from remembering the 1914 
cease-fire even long after it had ended. It remained a vital presence in books written about the 
war and in the soldiers’ memoirs that began to appear between 1915 and 1919, illustrating how, 
aided by the memories of those who had participated in the event, the “wonderful Christmas 
outburst” had become part of the general narrative of the war.404 The truce was featured, for 
example, in a number of multi-volume accounts about the war that were written between 1915 
and 1919.  In these serials, such as The Times’ History of the War, published in a weekly journal 
format, and Nelson’s History of the War, which was written by John Buchan in twenty-four 
volumes over the course of the conflict, the war was parceled up and presented to the British 
home front as a coherent narrative, and the truce found its place as part of the general 
chronicle in these accounts. In addition, authors such as Arthur Conan Doyle and George 
Perris tried to write about the war more reflectively, endeavoring to examine its overall 
meaning rather than its day-to-day events; here, too, the Christmas cease-fire had a role in the 
overall discourse. During this period, the armistice was also featured in published collections 
of letters (generally from officers killed in battle) and memoirs written by soldiers invalided 
home, including the autobiographical account of Bruce Bairnsfather, the famous cartoonist of 
trench life, who provided one of the most memorable descriptions of the event. Additionally, 
the guns had barely stopped firing when Field Marshall French, who headed the B.E.F. in the 
first year of the war, rushed into print with the self-justifying volume 1914, in which he 
reconsidered his disapproval of the unofficial cease-fire. From 1915 through 1919, the truce 
remained an accepted part of the narrative of the war, kept alive in the public memory 
through works written about the conflict.  
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While Nelson’s History of the War was later criticized for not being nearly hard enough 
on the British military and political leadership, John Buchan’s serial was not strictly 
propaganda; he was forthright, for example, about such matters as the conditions under which 
the soldiers served.405  To write, at that time, about “the misery of standing for hours up to the 
waist in icy water, of having every pore of the skin impregnated with mud, of finding the walls 
of a trench dissolving  in slimy torrents, while rifles jammed, clothes rotted, and feet were 
frost-bitten,” may not, in light of information from soldiers already published in the British 
press, have been particularly novel, but certainly Buchan pulled no punches when it came to 
letting the public know what their troops had to endure.406 Buchan’s attitude towards the 
Christmas truce similarly refused to romanticize the episode, even if his view of the average 
Tommy was somewhat rose-coloured. Introducing the holiday cease-fire with the observation 
that the British soldier, “nothing if not a good sportsman” exhibited “none of that childish 
venom of hate which seems to have been officially regarded in Germany as the proper spirit in 
which to fight battles,” Buchan attributed the willingness of the British to participate in the 
truce to their professionalism, although of course he did not give the German soldiers similar 
credit.407 He also observed that the truce had historical precedents, as “(o)utposts have always 
fraternized to some extent, - they did it in the Peninsula and in the Crimea,” and further noted 
that propinquity also played a part in the armistice, noting that “the close contact of the lines 
led to the extraordinary truce of Christmas Day.”408 Additional confirmation of Buchan’s 
realistic attitude towards the cease-fire is demonstrated by his admission that the episode was 
probably “connived at by the commanders on both sides, for some of our trenches were nearly 
flooded out, and the Germans had much timbering to do.”409 In Buchan’s view, the truce was a 
very natural event: grounded in historical precedent and British good sportsmanship, abetted 
by bad weather and the need to relieve boredom, and providing an opportunity to carry out 
repairs to trenches, it appeared to him neither surprising nor a symptom of rebellion by fed-up 
troops. 
 Part 45 of the The London Times’ History of the War, published in the same year, took a 
rather more moralistic tone towards the truce, although it did generally get its facts right. In 
the 29 June 1915 edition of the series, entitled “The Winter Campaign in France,” the Times 
noted that Christmas Eve was “an appropriate time for the slackening of hostile activities,” but 
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admitted that “no one was prepared for the extraordinary outbursts of good-will and good 
feelings towards enemies which actually took place on this strange Christmas Day.” The Times 
credited the truce to  “the psychology exhibited by soldiers facing each other in combat on the 
field, and engaged for months past in constant fighting” who commenced fraternization “on 
this great anniversary simply on account of its Christian significance.” It then described the 
episode as “the most interesting, certainly the most moving, feature of this winter campaign,” 
and noted that although the British public approved of the event, the German leadership 
certainly did not,” demonstrating the tolerance of the British in contrast to the Prussian 
rigidity of their enemy.410 
 With some slight variations on these themes, the Times provided a fairly 
straightforward account of the events leading up and contributing to the truce, including the 
terrible conditions in Flanders, the exhaustion of the troops after the fall campaign and the 
familiarity of the soldiers on both sides of the line with each other, and further acknowledged 
that the home front had been fully aware of - and enjoyed - the news of the cease-fire. The 
report went on to remark upon the extent of the truce – “over a very considerable part of the 
line” - and observed, most surprisingly, “that it is worth remarking that in the British lines 
orders were received on Christmas morning not to shoot unless it was absolutely necessary.”411 
This, incidentally, was the first time that such orders had been acknowledged in print; 
Buchan’s belief that “commanders on both sides” had “connived” at the truce because it was 
convenient to have a breathing space in which to effect trench repairs was as far as anyone had 
gone previously in implicating senior leadership in the cease-fire’s continuance. The Times’ 
account went on to relate many already-familiar truce elements while acknowledging the 
approval of fraternization from ‘higher ups’, such as the report that “the Colonel of a British 
Infantry regiment met enemy officers (again apparently Saxons) and told them that if they 
would have an armistice on New Year’s Day the British would play them at football.”412 The 
Times also observed that there were “traces of suspicion” on each side, wrote about a burial 
service for some German dead and noted requests from Germans who had lived in London to 
forward letters and photos to friends in England.413  
 So far, so relatively realistic, but the Times now decided to impose a narrative upon the 
holiday cease-fire. Noting that the truce was “a text from which many morals may be 
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preached,” the Times could not resist pointing out their favorite one. The account observed 
that “from the German side, this exhibition of goodwill consorted badly with the enemy’s 
avowed policy of ‘frightfulness,’” and therefore received, “as may easily be imagined, no 
support from the German Higher Command,” which in fact issued orders prohibiting further 
fraternization.414 The Times then went on to remind its readers that fraternization had taken 
place during the Peninsular Wars, and that such impromptu truces were more likely to result 
from the proximity of two opposing sides rather than war-weariness – at least as far as the 
British were concerned. However, the truce might lead German soldiers, who “had been led to 
expect a short and glorious campaign” to believe that “the fury of the war had spent itself.” Of 
course, there was no fear expressed that British soldiers, who never had “any real hate of the 
Germans” and who could therefore forget enmity and respond to the “exhibition of German 
sentiment” during the Christmas season, would believe that the truce betokened the end of 
the war.415 For the Times, therefore, the truce proved that the Germans were in fact completely 
fed up with the war, while simultaneously demonstrating that the British soldier was a true 
sportsman who just wanted to celebrate Christmas. 
 The report, now turned editorial, incorrectly noted that all truces had taken place 
against Saxon troops, and reminded readers that the “frightful” Prussian behaviour that had 
caused the war also required its continuation, in spite of the generous feelings that the 
Christmas season and German “sentiment” aroused in the equable, sporting and always fair 
British soldier.416 The Times, apparently, had saved its polemic on the truce for a less transient 
medium than its daily newspaper, but had no trouble reaching the same conclusion as the 
Daily Telegraph had months earlier: truces may be traditional, and this one therefore 
understandable, particularly in light of the well-known British sense of fair play, but no matter 
what had happened on Christmas 1914, the frightful Prussian-influenced German state still had 
to be defeated. The only surprising part of the account was the admission that British soldiers 
had been instructed not to fire upon the Germans unless they fired first, but this fact was 
buried, without comment, in the long passage devoted to the truce. Although the Times got 
many of the details about the armistice correct, its decision to cast the episode in these 
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dramatic terms imposed a moral upon the narrative of the cease-fire that had not been drawn 
by those who had participated in it.  
Bruce Bairnsfather, the cartoonist who served with the 1st Royal Warwicks from 1914 to 
1915 before he was invalided home with hearing damage and shell shock, provided a less 
didactic take on the truce in his 1916 memoir of life in the trenches, Bullets and Billets.417 
Interspersed with many of the drawings for which he was famous, the memoir tried to give an 
accurate and sardonic account of life in the front lines. His war cartoons were well appreciated 
by other soldiers; as Cyril Falls, the military historian who also served in the trenches, said of 
Bairnsfather’s work, “(h)e did as much as most people to help us to endure what we had to 
endure.”418 Early in the memoir, Bairnsfather advised his audience to try a small experiment to 
gain an understanding of what life in the trenches was like: 
Select a flat ten-acre ploughed field, so sited that all the surface water of the 
surrounding country drains into it. Now cut a zig-zag slot about four feet deep 
and three feet wide diagonally across, dam off as much water as you can so as 
to leave about a hundred yards of squelchy mud; delve out a hole at one side of 
the slot, then endeavour to live there for a month on bully beef and damp 
biscuits, whilst a friend has instructions to fire at you with his Winchester 
every time you put your head above the surface. 
 
Bairnsfather wrote about his initial disappointment at finding his battalion assigned to 
the trenches on Christmas Day, but conceded that “looking back on it all, I wouldn’t have 
missed that unique and weird Christmas for anything.” He recalled how the Germans began 
singing on Christmas Eve, then called out to the British, who sent an emissary across No-
Man’s-Land in the form of a sergeant (at first suspicious and reluctant), who returned with a 
gift of German cigars. This episode, Bairnsfather noted, came as “a welcome relief to the daily 
monotony of antagonism,” although it “did not lessen our ardour or determination.” The next 
morning, German soldiers appeared in No-Man’s-Land and the British also started to show 
themselves, leading to a day of fraternization. In spite of the friendly relations, however, 
Bairnsfather claimed that he and his fellow soldiers could not forget that the Germans, “these 
sausage-eating wretches, who had elected to start this infernal European fracas, and in so 
doing had brought us all into the same muddy pickle as themselves,” were the enemy. He 
reported that the British soldiers, “superior, broadminded, more frank, and lovable beings,” 
regarded “these faded, unimaginative products of perverted kulture as a set of objectionable 
but amusing lunatics whose heads had got to be eventually smacked.”  
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Bairnsfather’s Christmas day ended peacefully with a photograph being taken of the 
two sides which, he imagined, would repose “on some Hun mantelpieces, showing clearly and 
unmistakably to admiring strafers how a group of perfidious English surrendered 
unconditionally on Christmas Day to the brave Deutschers.” (Figure 8) After the photo 
session, the two groups “began to disperse,” as a general “feeling that the authorities on both 
sides were not very enthusiastic about this fraternizing seemed to creep across the gathering,” 
although “there was a distinct and friendly understanding that Christmas Day would be left to 
finish in tranquillity.” Bairnsfather summed up the episode by noting that, although “(t)here 
was not an atom of hate on either side that day; and yet, on our side, not for a moment was 
the will to war and the will to beat them relaxed.” Absent the sermonizing that seemed to 
accompany other references to the Christmas cease-fire during this period, Bairnsfather’s 
retrospective view of the event mirrored that of truce participants who wrote about it more 
contemporaneously: he saw it as a welcome break from the monotony of life in the trenches in 
a war which had to be won. 
 
Figure 10. German and British soldiers fraternizing on Christmas Day 1914. (Cartoon by Bruce 
Bairnsfather.) 
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In the same year as Bairnsfather’s memoir, Arthur Conan Doyle also published the first 
instalment of his six volume series, The British Campaign in France and Flanders.419 In it, Doyle 
analysed the causes of the war, fixing the blame firmly on Germany. “Looking at the matter 
from the German point of view, there were some root-causes out of which this monstrous 
growth had come, and it is only fair that these should be acknowledged and recorded,” Doyle 
wrote. However his fairness stopped abruptly at the edge of the English Channel: “(t)hese 
causes can all be traced to the fact that Britain stood between Germany and that world-empire 
of which she dreamed.”420 Having placed the British firmly on the side of the angels, Doyle was 
prepared to look charitably upon the truce, when “Christmas brought about something like 
fraternization” between the two armies.”421 However, this “amazing spectacle” – and here 
Doyle arrived at the moral of his lesson – “must arouse bitter thoughts concerning those high-
born conspirators against the peace of the world, who in their mad ambition had hounded 
those men on to take each other by the throat rather than by the hand.”422 The truce, which 
remained “one human episode amid all the atrocities which have stained the memory of the 
war,” had to end, as the Germans, bent on world domination, resumed their aggression.423 For 
Doyle, therefore, the armistice proved to be merely a brief Christmas celebration and a respite 
from battle before the goal of beating the ‘frightful’ Germans was renewed. 
 The letters to his mother written from the Western front by Edward Hulse, an officer 
with the 2nd Scots Guards who participated in the 1914 truce, which were published privately in 
1916, include one of the most thorough contemporaneous accounts of the truce available.424 Sir 
Edward, who had enlisted well before the war, displayed many of the characteristics of the 
professional British officer class: he despised liberals, thought all Germans greatly inferior 
creatures, and appeared to swallow whole any propaganda he encountered.425 He spoke, in his 
letters home, about “bagging” Germans and hoped that “some strong unscrupulous fellow with 
an iron hand to run things” would take over in Britain, observing that everything would work 
much better “if we could put the whole country under martial law, Government included.”426 
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 Considering his views, it may seem surprising that Hulse was willing to participate in 
the truce, but his letter about the cease-fire shows that he had no trouble fitting the event into 
his general outlook on the war and the enemy. He reported that, on Christmas morning, four 
unarmed Germans came out of the trenches and advanced towards the British lines, while 
Hulse and another British soldier went out to meet them. Cigarettes and cigars were 
exchanged, and Hulse instructed the Germans not to come out past the half-way line between 
the trenches.  He then went to Headquarters to report the incident. When he returned to the 
front line, the British and German troops were out in No-Man’s-Land, happily fraternizing. 
Hulse called for the German officers and arranged with them that no soldiers should advance 
more than half-way between the trenches, that everyone should be unarmed, and that neither 
side would fire unless the other did.427 The fraternization continued, with souvenirs and 
addresses exchanged, and both sides sang boisterously.428  
At this point, Captain George Paynter, also of the 2nd Scots Guards, arrived at the front 
lines (presumably from headquarters), producing a large bottle of rum which was shared out 
with the Germans.429 Both sides then repaired to their respective trenches to eat their 
Christmas meal, but in the afternoon returned again to No-Man’s-Land for continued 
fraternization. Even after the armistice ended by mutual agreement at 4:30, the Germans 
continued to protest that they would not fire, and, as Hulse noted, Captain Paynter “had told 
us not to, unless they did, we prepared for a quiet night, but warned all sentries to be doubly 
on the alert.” The next day, the 2nd Scots Guards participated in a ceremony at which 29 British 
dead were buried, which Hulse referred to in a second letter as “the sadder side of Xmas Day,” 
while noting that “it was a great thing being able to collect them, and their relations, to whom 
of course they had been reported missing, will be put out of suspense and hoping that they are 
prisoners.”430  
The general cease-fire continued throughout Boxing Day, and the Scots Guards used 
the time to build up their defences; Hulse noted that the Germans “came out and sat on their 
parapet, and watched us doing it, although we had informed them that the truce was ended.” 
Hulse wrote, however, that he still “had instructions not to fire till the enemy did.”431 After the 
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2nd Scots Guards had returned to the trenches on New Year’s Eve, Hulse reiterated that “the 
158th German regiment have not yet fired a shot since Christmas,” which he believed proved 
that they “are genuinely sick of the whole thing.”432 Hulse, not surprisingly, saw the Christmas 
truce as confirmation of the enemy’s lack of enthusiasm for war on the Western front rather 
than a symptom of rebellion on the part of the British. In fact, rather than inspiring Hulse with 
good-will towards the enemy, the truce only confirmed his poor opinion of the Germans and 
provided his battalion with a good opportunity of shoring up their defences.433 
Hulse’s letter has, in the years since it was published, been featured in a number of 
accounts about the truce.  The BBC program, Days that Shook the World: The Christmas Truce, 
for example, based much of its dramatization of the holiday armistice on Hulse’s description 
of the experiences of the 2nd Scots Guards on 25 December 1914. However, the documentary 
consolidates Hulse’s two trips into No-Man’s-Land into one, leaving out the crucial fact that 
he reported the German offer of a truce back to Headquarters after the first meeting, and that 
he obviously received permission to continue the cease-fire. “Taking the most pragmatic 
course, Hulse decides that his men deserve a day off,” the documentary reports.  
He chooses to ignore the fact that they’re sharing it with the enemy – until his 
commanding officer arrives. Captain George Paynter is the last word in 
authority for Hulse and his men – and the last chance to call a halt before word 
reaches HQ.  But instead of stopping the party, he fuels it with Fortnum and 
Mason’s rum. 
 
Not only does the episode avoid revealing that Paynter was hardly the “last chance” to stop the 
truce before “word reaches HQ” – impossible because Hulse has already told Headquarters 
himself, and Paynter arrived from there bearing his bottle of rum – but it also omits any 
mention of Paynter’s orders not to fire upon the enemy. The Christmas Truce documentary is 
far from the only occasion that this account of the truce has been employed to emphasize a 
certain view of the war, but at the time it was published, Hulse’s report was merely considered 
an excellent description of what the introduction to the volume of his letters described as “the 
most extraordinary event of the war - the Christmas Truce of 1914.”434 
 Another view of the holiday armistice was provided by Brigadier-General Gleichen, 
who on 28 December 1914 had supplied one of the responses to Smith-Dorrien’s demand for 
reports on the truce. In 1917, Gleichen published an account of the “doings” of the Fifteenth 
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Infantry Brigade, based upon “a very scrappy diary” he had kept in France from 1914 through 
1915. The work contained the usual frank descriptions of life in the trenches, with Gleichen 
proving to be particularly effusive on the subject of Belgian mud. “O that mud!,” he wrote. 
“We have heard lots about Flanders mud, but the reality transcends imagination, especially in 
winter. Greasy, slippery, holding clay, over your toes in most places and over your ankles in all 
the rest--where it is not over your knees,--it is the most horrible ‘going’ I know anywhere.”435 
The book also included a reference to the truce, in which three out of five of the brigade’s 
battalions participated. Gleichen wrote that the Germans came out of their trenches unarmed, 
“with boxes of cigars and seasonable remarks.” In the face of these overtures, Gliechen asked 
rhetorically, what were the British to do? “Shoot? You could not shoot unarmed men. Let 
them come? You could not let them come into your trenches; so the only thing feasible at the 
moment was done--and some of our men met them halfway and began talking to them.” 
While noting that the brigade “got into trouble for doing it,” he justified the fraternization 
with the observation that it was “difficult to see what we could otherwise have done,” and 
besides, the officers involved got “excellent close views of the German trenches.” Although 
obviously annoyed, even two years later, by Smith-Dorrien’s orders regarding the incident, 
Gleichen still had no hesitation about discussing his brigade’s part in the truce in a memoir 
published during the war.436 
 In a 1917 Contemporary Review article, Stephen Stapleton, writing about “The Relations 
Between the Trenches,” examined the “common brotherhood of man” that existed between 
the opposing sides.437 While asserting that the British thought the Germans soldiers were 
“treacherous fighters,” he still admitted that the historical practice of fraternizing between 
even bitter enemies (Stapleton mentioned the customary armistices between the Greeks and 
Trojans, and French and British truces during the Napoleonic Wars) had been followed during 
the first year of fighting.438 He credited the truce to “a common feeling of inquisitiveness,” 
claiming that the two sides were just curious about their enemy.439 In spite of the exchange of 
souvenirs, however, Stapleton maintained that, once in No-Man’s-Land, “for the most part, 
British and Germans stood with arms folded across their breasts and stared at each other with 
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a kind of dread fascination.”440 He believed that the truce was never repeated not because the 
British high command gave orders preventing a recurrence, but rather because of the 
introduction into the conflict by the Germans “of the barbaric elements of ‘frightfulness,’ 
hitherto confined to savage tribes at war; their use of such devilish inventions as poison gas 
and liquid fire; (and) their belief only in brute strength.”441 The British troops, according to 
Stapleton, felt no personal rancor towards the Germans during the first part of the war; in fact, 
he argued that “British feeling is extraordinarily devoid of the vindictiveness that springs from 
revenge,” as proven by the generous way the British treated German prisoners.442 Once more, 
the Christmas truce, in which both sides participated equally, and which was generally 
initiated by the Germans, was used to prove the lack of vindictiveness on the part of the 
British, while Stapleton blamed the fact that it never re-occurred on the same scale on German 
‘frightfulness.’ 
Later in 1917, the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, who were apparently still nostalgic about 
the 1914 truce, noted in their war diary that “(i)t was Xmas Day, but there was no 
fraternizing.”443 As this was the last Christmas of the war, there would be no opportunity for 
another holiday armistice, but it is clear that at least some battalions continued to mourn its 
absence. Sir John French also reflected on the truce a few years after the event, writing in his 
1919 memoir of the first year of the war, 1914, that, upon hearing about the holiday cease-fire, 
he had issued “immediate orders to prevent any recurrence of such conduct,” adding that his 
response to the news was to call “the local commanders to strict account, which resulted in a 
good deal of trouble.”444 This single sentence from his memoir has been quoted in many 
descriptions of the Christmas truce, and provided as proof of the “severe” military reaction to 
it, but as already noted, there was neither much accounting nor any real trouble.  In fact, as 
demonstrated, the cease-fires continued happily and without interference in many parts of the 
line well beyond Christmas Day. Clearly, French believed (or at least pretended to believe) 
that his displeasure had prompted definitive action and that all truces had therefore been 
stopped immediately.   
In retrospect, however, French was “not sure that, had the question of the agreement 
upon an armistice for the day been submitted to me, I should have dissented from it.”445 After 
all, he had “always attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of that chivalry in war 
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which has almost invariably characterized every campaign of modern times in which this 
country has been engaged,” an attitude that was not held by the Germans, who had “glaringly 
and wantonly set all such sentiments at defiance by their ruthless conduct of the present war; 
even from its very commencement.”446 French then recalled a similar circumstance in the Boer 
War, when a cease-fire for the purposes of burying the dead had been proposed on Christmas, 
and he had sent a box of cigars and a bottle of whiskey to his counterpart in the South African 
army to seal the deal, after which the South African general obligingly freed two British 
prisoners.   
 “Soldiers should have no politics,” French declared in conclusion, “but should cultivate 
a free-masonry of their own and, emulating the knights of old, should honour a brave enemy 
only second to a comrade, and like them rejoice to split a friendly lance to-day and ride boot 
to boot in the charge to-morrow.”447 This change of heart on French’s part is, unsurprisingly, 
not included in the many accounts of the truce that prominently feature his “immediate 
orders” to prevent the fraternization. Murphy, in Truce, equates the displeasure expressed in 
French’s memoir, five years after the 1914 armistice, with Smith-Dorrien’s directive issued on 
26 December 1914, implying that both date from immediately after the truce and were direct 
orders. “Because Smith-Dorrien had also heard that some officers were actually encouraging 
the truce, he issued an ominous warning…The commander of all British troops, Field Marshall 
John French, was just as angry,” Murphy writes, before quoting from 1914 about French’s 
“immediate” orders.448  In fact, if French issued any written orders regarding the truce, they 
have never come to light, so it can be safely assumed that French in fact confined himself to 
reprimands of the senior leadership, which resulted in precisely one order not to fraternize, 
issued by Smith-Dorrien. 
Having thus proven that he was on the soldiers’ side all along, French spent most of 
the rest of his book criticizing the War Office for undermining his efforts by “failing to speed 
up the manufacture of munitions of war and…the derailment of troops and war material to the 
Dardanelles” which “was undoubtedly the chief cause” of the “lack of success of our 
endeavours.”449 By establishing that he could not be held responsible for the failure of the 
British army to defeat the Germans in the first winter of the war, and claiming that, had he 
been asked in advance, he might well have approved of the still very popular truce, French’s 
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memoir, which Brian Bond characterizes as “a belt of ammunition fired at French’s enemies in 
general,” presumably helped him to wash his hands of the entire 1914-1915 debacle.450 
 As illustrated by French’s retrospective approval of the event, the Christmas truce was 
firmly entrenched in the British collective memory by the end of the war, and frequent 
references to it from 1915 through 1919 demonstrate that it was an accepted part of the 
narrative of the conflict. The fact that it continued to be mentioned in soldiers’ letters and war 
diaries shows that the supposed censure of the event from the military leadership did little to 
prevent the soldiers who joined in from reporting their participation. In fact, the rather 
mocking tone taken by one soldier towards French’s orders bringing the truce to a halt, as well 
as the continued cease-fires in the lines in the beginning of January 1915 and the willingness to 
report them in the diaries of the battalions involved, reveal that soldiers certainly felt free to 
speak about the episodes. Although a brief truce the following year did attract some 
unwelcome attention from an unhappy Colonel, the results of the ensuing court-martial shows 
how little interest the leadership had in disciplining those involved. In addition, histories, 
memoirs and serial accounts of the war published throughout the conflict frequently featured 
the truce, and although some writers could not resist turning the event into a morality tale 
that highlighted their view of the war and the enemy, the basic facts of the cease-fire 
continued to be reported relatively realistically during this period.  
With the arrival of peace, however, views on the war would begin to undergo a 
metamorphosis, and the truce, now part of the general narrative of the conflict, would also 
experience a certain amount of revisionist treatment as the soldiers involved, and those 
writing about the war more generally, began to reconsider the conflict in light of the peace 
that followed it. 
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Chapter Seven 
“The Curious Christmas Truce”: 
The First World War and the Christmas Truce, 1920-1959 
 
 
The earliest fraternizations, at Christmas 1914, could also be seen as such a formless outcry, 
but they carried a very different message. Essentially, they were a way to stop thinking about 
the war, to humanize it for these few moments when enemies met each other as brothers.  
-Marc Ferro 
Meetings in No Man’s Land (2007) 
 
 
I did not leave the trench myself, feeling too sick at what had happened to Collins, and 
thinking some of us had better be ready in case of any other treacherous act. One short 
bearded German N.C.O. approached near to our wire, and upon being warned away, spat and 
snarled “English swine – wait until tonight.” 
-F.A. Brown 
2nd Monmouthshires, 1939 memoir 
 
 
On 31 March 1930 Parliament considered the issue of whether the Labour government 
should overturn a 1920 undertaking which prevented the years that conscientious objectors 
had remained in the civil service during the war being counted towards their pensions, and 
proscribed their promotion over war veterans.451 The question aroused strong feelings on both 
sides of the House, with the Conservatives bitterly opposing the action on the grounds that 
“the man who has served his country deserves more consideration than the man who has 
refused to do so.”452 The government, however, argued that since conscientious objectors were 
allowed by law to refuse service in the armed forces, even if conscripted, it could not “punish 
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people for doing something which the State has said they have a right to do.”453 The 
Parliamentary debate on this issue encompassed widely diverse views about the First World 
War, particularly from M.P.s who had served in the conflict. Kingsley Griffith, a Liberal, noted 
that he “was in the front-line trenches, in 1914” and “that we had a feeling of irritation against 
the conscientious objectors.”454 The Conservative Bertie Leighton admitted that he could 
“understand a man disliking war and I can understand men doing all that they can to prevent 
war, but I cannot understand men who, when the country is in danger, refuse to lift one finger 
to help it.”455 George Benson, a Labour M.P., announced that he spoke “as one who was a 
conscientious objector during the War, and I only hope that hon. Members opposite are as 
proud of their War record as I am of mine.”456   
In the midst of this controversy, one M.P. argued that dying in battle was the “greatest 
and most glorious service” a man could give to his country. Benson vehemently pointed out 
“that men were not sent into the Army for the definite purpose of dying, but to kill,” and that 
he “was not prepared to admit that killing another man was the highest form of service to 
one's country.”457 At this point, Major McKenzie Wood, a Liberal who had served with the 
Gordon Highlanders during the war, joined the debate, passionately asserting that when he 
had volunteered for service, he did so not to kill, but “to prevent killing,” and further stating 
that “(d)uring the whole time I was in the Army, or during the whole of the War, I can 
honestly say that I never had the slightest degree of animosity against anyone, even against 
those who were opposed to us in the War.”458 
To emphasize the nature of his convictions, Major Wood declared that “at Christmas, 
1914, I was in the front trenches, and took part in what was well known at the time as a truce,” 
when his unit “went over in front of the trenches, and shook hands with many of our German 
enemies.” He observed that a “great number of people think we did something that was 
degrading,” but that as a result of that experience, “I then came to the conclusion that I have 
held very firmly ever since, that if we had been left to ourselves there would never have been 
another shot fired.”459  Major Wood argued that “the fact that we were being controlled by 
others…made it necessary for us to start trying to shoot one another again,” and that it was 
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only because “we were all in the grip of a political system which was bad” that the war had 
continued.460 This view, he noted, had prompted his entry into politics, and certainly 
influenced his belief that “it required, in many cases at any rate, an extraordinary amount of 
moral courage to be a conscientious objector during the War, and, for my part, I think we 
ought to see that people who had that strong moral courage to do what they did ought not to 
be penalised further.”461 
Since in 1930 there were 148,000 First World War veterans in the Civil Service and only 
230 conscientious objectors, the fervor aroused by a subject that would affect so few men 
reveals that not only did the British still feel passionately about the war twelve years after it 
had ended, but also that their attitudes towards it continued to vary widely. There was 
certainly no political consensus on the war at this time: Benson, a conscientious objector, had 
been elected to Parliament, but so had Captain Austin Hudson, who declared in the same 
debate that if conscientious objectors “would not undertake the unpleasant part of their 
obligation of citizenship, they should not later on participate in the advantages which would 
accrue to them from being citizens.”462 While by 1930, according to the conventional narrative 
of the war, those who had refused to fight in it out of moral conviction should have received 
credit for their resistance to a senseless and futile war, this Parliamentary debate illustrates 
how that belief was just one view of the conflict, and that support for those who fought in 
what was still perceived by many as a worthy cause also held its own among public opinion.   
 For Major Woods, memories of the truce provided an inspiration that guided his post-
war behavior, and prompted him in 1930 to argue that the British soldiers had been in the grip 
of a “bad” political system which had involved them in a senseless war. In the same year, 
Charles Edmund Carrington, also a veteran of the conflict, strongly opposed the idea that 
veterans looked back on the war with abhorrence. “A legend has grown up, propagated not by 
soldiers but by journalists,” Carrington declared in his 1930 memoir A subaltern’s war, “that 
these men who went gaily to fight in the mood of Rupert Brooke and Julian Grenfell, lost their 
faith amid the horrors of the trenches and returned in a mood of anger and despair.”463 
According to Carrington, these attitudes did not reflect the feelings of the vast majority of the 
soldiers that fought in the war, who never became “‘disenchanted,’ for war had never offered 
them an enchanting prospect.” The average British soldier, he maintained, “had not wanted 
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war, but he had engaged in it; he liked it even less than he expected, but he proposed to see it 
through; and if, which God forbid, similar circumstances arose in 1929, he would do the same 
again.”464 
The current popular narrative of the First World War, which stresses the supposed 
bitterness of veterans of the conflict as well as the failure of the peace that followed it, 
emphasizes general disillusionment as the dominant outlook on the war during the 1920s and 
193os. As Ludovic Kennedy wrote in the introduction to Alan Lloyd’s The War in the Trenches,  
(f)or many of England’s young men the outbreak of the 1914 war seemed a romantic adventure, 
an opportunity for winning honour and glory – ‘as swimmers,’ Rupert Brooke saw them, ‘into 
cleaness leaping.’ Four years later, after millions of young Englishmen, Frenchmen and 
Germans had perished on the muddy battlefields of the Somme and the Aisne and 
Passchendaele, the war was recognized for what it was: one of the bloodiest and most futile 
conflicts in history.465  
Kennedy’s 1976 assumption that, in 1919, everyone thought the war had been 
completely pointless was far from accurate. During the interwar years, as journalists and 
historians picked over the carcass of the conflict, writers produced fictional accounts of the 
war, and soldiers began to write their memoirs, many views about the First World War 
competed for ascendancy in British public discourse. What various works produced from 1920 
through 1939 mainly demonstrate is the multiplicity of narratives presented during those two 
decades. Some minor unifying themes do emerge from these diverse works, among them the 
idealization of the soldiers who fought in the conflict and the surprisingly stark depiction of 
conditions on the Western front, but a consensus on the war itself was notably absent. 
Throughout the interwar period, the Christmas truce was not forgotten, but continued to be 
an accepted part of the history of the First World War even as it became increasingly utilized 
by writers in pursuit of a cohesive narrative to impose upon the conflict.  
In contrast to the soldier-poets who wrote of their embitterment long before the war 
ended and then later made it a central theme of their memoirs, there were many veterans, 
such as Carrington, who continued to view their service on the Western front and their part in 
helping to defeat the Central Powers as worthwhile. There were historians and journalists who 
reviewed the conflict and concluded that, on balance, the rationale upon which the war had 
been fought was valid, and that its results, including the peace treaty, may not have been 
ideal, but were overall as satisfactory as could be expected under difficult circumstances. 
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There were others who reached the opposite conclusion, and upon reconsidering the conflict 
saw nothing but waste and horror. This diversity of views produced a fragmented discourse of 
the war during the first two decades after it ended, and the Christmas truce remained part of 
that narrative battleground, credited with meanings as varied as the attitudes of those who 
wrote about it.  
Disillusionment with the war was well represented long before the famous memoirs of 
Graves, Sassoon, and Blundon appeared in the late 1920s. This theme was thoroughly explored 
by Philip Gibbs, a war correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, in his 1920 memoir Realities of 
War. Planting himself firmly on the futile-and-wasteful side of the argument, Gibbs used this 
work to vent his frustrations with four years of “official briefings” from the army.  Realities of 
War therefore served as a fierce polemic against the War Office, Kitchener, the generals and 
officers (“who had the brains of canaries”), the politicians, other journalists and British 
civilians – against everyone, in fact, except British soldiers serving in the front lines, whom 
Gibbs romanticized beyond all reality. Although protesting that, as he was “not a soldier nor a 
military expert,” he had no right to blame French for his actions, Gibbs’ mock-innocent 
assertion that “(o)ur High Command had to learn by mistakes, by ghastly mistakes, repeated 
often, until they became visible to the military mind, and were paid for again by the slaughter 
of British youth” demonstrated that his sympathies lay entirely with the “other ranks.”’466   
British soldiers, Gibbs claimed, were motivated to fight largely by an unspoken love of 
their country and not “because they hated the Germans, because, after a few turns in the 
trenches, they had a fellow-feeling for the poor devils over the way.”467 The Christmas truce, 
for Gibbs, was proof of this sense of camaraderie: British troops at the front “(b)ut for 
stringent regulations…would have fraternized with the enemy at the slightest excuse, and did 
so in the winter of 1914, to the great scandal of G.H.Q.”468  Although he blamed Germany for 
starting the war, Gibbs declared that the troops on both sides of the line had “‘no real quarrel 
with each other.”469 In Realities of War, he praised the good-will and simple hearts of the 
front-line soldiers, who in the post-war period were still “inspired by the humble belief that 
humanity may be cured of its cruelty and stupidity,” and claimed that the truce exemplified 
their sense of brotherhood with their enemies.470   
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C.E. Montague, who enlisted in the war in 1914 in spite of the fact that he was well over 
the age allowed, was similarly forthright about his attitude towards the conflict, as is clear 
from the title of his 1922 work. When the war broke out, he wrote in Disenchantment,  
(a)ll the air was ringing with rousing assurances.  France to be saved, Belgium 
righted, freedom and civilization re-won, a sour, soiled, crooked old world to 
be rid of bullies and crooks and reclaimed for straightness, decency, good-
nature, the ways of common men dealing with common men. What a 
chance!471  
 
Montague, like Gibbs, idealized British soldiers, who were “simply and happily friendly, 
trustful, and keen.”472 Unfortunately, Montague maintained, these men imagined that those 
who led them were of equal good will, and “(t)hat was the paradise that the bottom fell out 
of.”473 Montague contended that soldiers joined up for honourable reasons, but the war 
debased their souls, which were annihilated by it even when their bodies survived. The 
Christmas truce, he maintained, was proof that the soldiers had started the war with good 
principles. “Even on the dull earth it takes time and pains to get a clean-run boy or young man 
into a mean frame of mind,” Montague argued, providing as an example a “fine N.C.O. of the 
Grenadier Guards (who) was killed near Laventie – no one knows how – while going over to 
shake hands with the Germans on Christmas morning. ‘What! not shake hands on Christmas 
Day?’ He would have thought it poor, sulky fighting.”474   
Disenchantment features a ‘typical’ truce that began when two British officers 
approached the German trenches (lit with Christmas trees) on Christmas Eve, and proposed a 
cease-fire to the surprised inhabitants. As a result, “on Christmas Day the two sides exchanged 
cigarettes and played football together. The English intended the truce to end with the day, as 
agreed, but decided not to shoot next day till the enemy did.”475 Since the Germans remained 
peaceful, the British did as well, even sending a subaltern across to explain away a rifle shot off 
by accident while cleaning, which the enemy excused, although one German who was not so 
forgiving shot the unlucky messenger in the knee. The British, however, sportingly “took it 
that some German sentry had misunderstood our fluke shot. They did not impute 
dishonour.”476 This, Montague claimed, was because the soldiers at this point of the war still 
retained their “trustful” and “friendly” pre-war values. For Gibbs, the truce demonstrated the 
good-will and camaraderie that British soldiers felt towards their German counterparts, while 
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for Montague the cease-fire symbolized the principles in which British soldiers believed before 
they were betrayed by the callous actions of their politicians and generals. For both men, 
however, the 1914 armistice had become a symbol rather than an event, a moment of truth in a 
hated war and one that had little to do with the motivations of the men who had actually 
participated in it. 
 These books, written soon after the end of the war, foreshadowed the emergence in 
the late 1920s of the many fictional and autobiographical works that were to re-cast the 
narrative of the war for the next eighty-five years, including R.C. Sherriff’s Journey’s End, 
Blunden’s Undertones of War and the opening book of Sassoon’s Sherston Trilogy, Memoirs of 
a Fox-Hunting Gentleman. What the authors of all these works had in common was their 
service in the trenches on the Western front and their collective view of the war as futile and 
unnecessary.477 Following the 1929 publication of All Quiet on the Western Front, Hew 
Strachan observes, “there had been many interpretations of the war; thereafter one 
increasingly dominated over the others.”478 Also contributing to the shift of the war’s narrative 
was Lord Posonby’s Falsehood in Wartime, which was published during the same period. 
Posonby’s work, which purported to debunk anti-German propaganda, also promoted the 
belief that the war had been instigated by both sides equally.479 Lessening German 
responsibility for the war also removed its justification, and this, combined with endorsement 
of the idea that “the war had been an identical and equally disastrous experience for all 
soldiers and all armies,” contributed to the changing attitude towards the conflict that began 
to take effect at the end of this decade, one which shared the blame for the war among all the 
combatant countries.480 
Even within this narrative of disillusionment, however, the implicit view of the 
Christmas truce as the soldiers’ rebellion against a hated war received some surprising 
resistance. In Goodbye to All That, Robert Graves, who because of his opposition to the conflict 
might have been expected to take the line that the Christmas truce was an act of defiance on 
the part of the soldiers involved, demonstrated instead his loyalty to his regiment and 
admiration for their professionalism by describing the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers 1914 armistice 
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with the enemy as no “emotional hiatus” but rather “a commonplace of military tradition – an 
exchange of courtesies between officers of opposing armies.”481 As it clear from this example, 
even by the end of the 1920s the war’s discourse had not yet hardened into the set parameters 
that would define it much later in the century. 
In addition, while the school of disillusionment had many supporters, it was a simple 
task to find as many dissenters. 1928, the year that the quintessential anti-war novel All Quiet 
on the  Western Front was issued, also saw the publication of H.W. Wilson’s The War Guilt, 
which advanced the theory that the Allies had no choice but to form a coalition against the 
Central Powers, because when “a preponderant state arises and shows aggressive purposes by 
its armaments or its actions, other states will be forced to group themselves into ententes or 
alliances against it, as the alternative to surrendering their liberty and submitting to 
injustice.”482 In his 1927 work, Lions Led by Donkeys, P.A. Thompson attributed the cause of 
the conflict to Germany’s “fatal error,” which was “that they did not ‘play the game,’” and 
complained that “in forcing the actual outbreak of war, and in their conduct of the war itself, 
they transgressed every law of civilization and humanity.”483 Thompson believed that once 
Germany had conquered Europe, it would then turn its attention to England, who “must soon 
have dropped to second place.” He therefore criticized British military leadership not for their 
incompetence, as Alan Clark was later to do in a similarly titled history, but rather for their 
willingness to undertake offensives on the Western front in the early part of the war to please 
the French, when it would have been better for the British to wait until their numbers 
increased before commencing large battles.484  
In his work, Thompson described the horrors of the front line, where the men “lived in 
bitter, biting cold, soaked to the skin; with mud in their nails, their hair, their eyes – mud 
everywhere,” but noted that in spite of the terrible conditions of the war, British soldiers felt 
“no personal animosity for the fellows in the trench on the other side, fifty yards away.”485 This 
led him to the subject of the truce, “the only time during the War when both sides 
fraternized.”486  He wrote about the singing in the trenches on Christmas Eve and how the two 
sides met in No-Man’s-Land the next day, when the British were surprised to see “that ‘Jerry’ 
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was spic and span, well shaven, and possessing an abundance of cigars and champagne.”  
Thompson noted that the cease-fire “prevailed for some days afterwards,” with a spirit of 
cooperation between the two sides, exemplified by a British engineer who, while “putting up 
barbed wire borrowed a mallet from a neighbouring ‘Jerry’ who was similarly employed.”487 
For Thompson, however, the truce served as a distraction from his main theme: Germany’s 
sole responsibility for the war, and Britain’s delay in giving it the beating it deserved by 
allowing political motivations to influence battlefield strategies. 
In the introduction to their survey of the conflict, the authors of An Outline History of 
the Great War declared that understanding “what the war felt like is even more important 
than to know its events in outline.”488 To this end, G.V. Carey and H.S. Scott noted that “the 
false glamour which is apt to be shed on war, when viewed from a distance, finds no place in 
this narrative.”489 To assert in 1928 that a history of the First World War must avoid idealizing 
the conflict certainly contradicts current ideas about the war’s orthodox narrative, which 
suggests that by the end of the 1920s, the war was generally seen as an exercise in senseless 
destruction. In spite of their determination not to romanticize the war, however, Carey and 
Scott still venerated the British soldiers, particularly during the first winter of the war, when 
they opposed “the splendid bravery of the Germans” with “the patient and stubborn resistance 
of perfect fitness and great skill.”490 It is in this vein that Carey and Scott acknowledged the 
Christmas truce, but with a twist: it was because of their inability to “reach the Channel ports 
and Paris,” and their distractions in Poland, “that, when Christmas came, the German troops 
fraternized freely with their enemies wherever they could.”491 In this account, which 
emphasized the bravery of the B.E.F., the cease-fire was a sign that the Germans were 
disheartened by their lack of success in the war, while the British, referred to only as “their 
enemies,” were reduced to passive actors, relieved of their responsibility for the truce. 
It is impossible to review these varied pre-1930 books, treatises and histories and find 
any universal attitudes denoting an overarching view of the war. Some condemned it while 
others defended it, and few common themes were to be found, besides the emphasis on the 
patience, fortitude and good-will of the British soldier - whether those qualities had been, 
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alternatively, drawn upon to fight a war worth winning, or manipulated and betrayed in order 
to prevail in a senseless conflict. The following decade saw little change in this dichotomy of 
opinion, with disillusionment with the 1914-1918 conflict continuing to compete with the view 
that it had been a worthwhile war, and the truce still used to support both sides equally. In 
1930, the same year that Major Woods was declaring in Parliament that the holiday cease-fire 
would have signaled the end of fighting if the soldiers had been left to themselves, the 
historian Liddell Hart, who had also served in the trenches of Flanders, drew a rather different 
conclusion from the impromptu armistice.  
Liddell Hart’s survey of the war presented a more even-handed approach to the 
conflict than many written during the previous decade, and although he laid the largest 
responsibility for the war on the Kaiser, whose “bellicose utterances and attitude…filled 
Europe with gunpowder,” he also believed that, in the summer of 1914, the “rush to the abyss” 
had been “driven by the motor of ‘military necessity.’”492 In The Real War, Liddell Hart 
promoted the concept of inevitability, the idea that the war had happened because no one 
knew how to stop it, which later became an important element in the conflict’s orthodox 
narrative. He further observed that Europe welcomed the war with “an immeasurable sigh of 
relief,” as “a revolt of the spirit against the monotony and triviality of the everyday round.” 
This initial enthusiasm, Liddell Hart argued, was followed by passion, “the natural ferocity of 
war.” As the war continued past its first months, he identified a third phase, the “momentary 
growth of a spirit of tolerance, symbolized by the fraternization which took place on 
Christmas Day,” although “this in turn was to wane as the strain of the war became felt and 
the reality of the struggle for existence came home to the warring sides.”493  
For Liddell Hart, the truce was a stage in the front-line soldiers’ eventual acceptance of 
the lengthy deadlock on the Western front. Absent a quick victory, neither side could 
maintain their early enthusiasm for the war, nor sustain the passion that succeeded their 
initial emotions. The cease-fire, according to Liddell Hart, was a symptom of the process 
through which both sides accustomed themselves to the idea of trench warfare, an acceptance 
which was eventually replaced by the determined resignation that characterized soldiers’ 
attitudes for the rest of the war. The holiday armistice, in other words, was merely one step in 
the progression towards the attitude eventually adopted by the British army, which enabled it 
to win a war that neither side had known how to prevent. 
The contradictions inherent in the 1914 armistice being cited in the same year by one 
veterans of the conflict as proof of the soldiers’ rebellion against the war and by another as 
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evidence of the troops’ acceptance of the long and necessary battle ahead of them 
demonstrate how little consensus could be found, even twelve years after the First World War 
had ended, on either its meaning or that of the Christmas truce. Additionally, Major Wood 
and Liddell Hart were not the only veterans that used the cease-fire to illustrate their 
assumptions about the war during the 1930s. Like Carrington, Lieutenant-Colonel Graham 
Seton Hutchinson, who served with the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, obviously 
intended his memoir to counter the waste and futility narrative expressed in certain anti-war 
works. “The reader has been led to believe,” Hutchinson asserted in 1932’s Warrior, “unless 
indeed he knew the whole or half the truth before, that every attack was a costly failure, that 
assault followed assault until each man and every man died, his body hideously torn and 
mangled.”494 The war, Hutchinson claimed, was terrible, but it also “raised the qualities of 
honour, patriotism, and devotion to an ideal, to an eminence never previously attained in all 
the history of mankind.”495  
 Having staked out his position on the “purity of motive” with which the British had 
entered the war, Hutchinson then turned to the continuing cease-fire in his battalion’s part of 
the line in early January 1915.496 Admitting that “the fires of patriotism were soon damped by 
the unequal struggle with the elements,” he described the conditions that led to an on-going 
armistice, when the troops “were so preoccupied with the task of keeping the water at a 
sufficiently low level…that a rifle was seldom fired from our line.”497 Not only was fighting 
impossible under these circumstances, but the shared misery resulted in intermittent 
fraternizing that was part of “an unwritten armistice covering a front of some miles.”498  The 
two sides occasionally met while crossing No-Man’s-Land, exchanged the odd souvenir, and 
even shared working tools: as Hutchinson observed, “(h)ammers and mallets became mutual 
property.”499 
 Hutchinson then noted that plans were on for a joint football match when the “High 
Command” issued orders, “about which there could be no equivocation, that warlike measures 
against the enemy must be adopted forthwith.”500 The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 
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bowed to the inevitable, but first warned the Germans that the war would resume the next 
day. The enemy, however, continued to send out working parties, which placed the British in a 
quandary, as it “went wholly against tradition to open fire on apparently peaceful, and 
certainly unarmed German soldiers.” Eventually a small bomb was thrown which wounded a 
German in the leg, the enemy quickly retaliated (proving that their previous peaceful attitude 
had been merely a “ruse to test the British aggressive intentions”), and the two sides returned 
to “the warfare of sniping, bombing, patrols, and walking in a crouched position.”501   
 Hutchinson’s version of the cease-fire, which continued on certain parts of the front 
during early January, not only conforms to the diaries of various battalions, but was also an 
event that the self-proclaimed “warrior” had no problem fitting into his view of his fellow 
soldiers, which was that they were sportsmen who would lay down their arms to allow both 
sides to cope undisturbed with the terrible conditions at the front. His belief that his views on 
the war were shared by many veterans, however, was contradicted by Frank Richards’ memoir, 
Old Soldiers Never Die, which was published a year later.502 Richards, who served with the 2nd 
Royal Welch Fusiliers, reportedly received assistance from Robert Graves when writing his 
memoir, which is unsurprising: Richards was the sort of cheerful soldier, impervious to 
discipline and with a healthy scepticism about army leadership, whom Graves admired. On 
Christmas morning, Richards reported, both sides stuck up boards that said ‘Merry Christmas,’ 
and a few soldiers ventured out in No-Man’s-Land, where they were soon followed by the rest 
of the troops.503   
 A Welch Fusiliers officer, who according to Richards was already generally 
unpopular, tried to stop the exodus, “but he was too late: the whole of the Company was now 
out, and so were the Germans. He had to accept the situation, so soon he and the other 
company officers climbed out, too.”504 The two sides “mucked in all day with one another,” 
exchanged complaints about how “fed up” they all were with the war, and drank the beer the 
Germans offered.505 “The officers came to an understanding that the unofficial truce would 
end at midnight,” but the British soldiers, who returned to their trenches at dusk, decided not 
to start shooting before the Germans did, and the cease-fire lasted through Boxing Day.506 
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That evening, the Welch Fusiliers were “surprised” to find themselves relieved by another 
battalion, who told them that the truce had been general in the front line. Apart from 
Richards’ broad hint that the relief of the 2nd Welch Fusiliers was unexpected and therefore 
somehow related to the truce, an assertion not borne out by the battalion’s war diary, his 
account is fairly routine, giving a quick wink to the soldiers’ defiance of a particularly disliked 
officer whose orders to return to the trenches were ignored.507   
 On the other hand, Captain J.C. Dunn, also of the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers, 
believed that the truce displayed his regiment to advantage. In The War the Infantry Knew: 
1914-1919, Dunn obviously felt obliged to counter some of the anti-war literature so prevalent 
in the decade before 1938, the year this memoir was published.508 Explaining his divergence 
with the anti-war school of disillusionment, Dunn observed that most of the enormous 
number of books written about the war “have come from writers whose emotions have been 
quickened by the penitential mood that follows all great wars.”509 For Dunn, in spite of 
remembering the conflict as “a time of trench warfare with eruptions of great violence, of 
waning morale, of increasing vexation and heartache,” the memories of the war that remained 
with him were encapsulated in 
the gay self-sacrifice of junior officers and of non-commissioned officers; by the 
resource and cheerfulness in discomfort of the men of our Old Army, and their 
prompt answer to every call, confident in themselves and in each other: beside 
them the Territorial and New Army personnel had the native virtues common 
to all, good nature and endurance.510 
 
Although the reports of the Christmas truce that appear in The War the Infantry Knew were 
drawn from accounts provided by members of the battalion, making it unclear whether Dunn 
participated in the event, the selections chosen underline his themes of the professionalism 
and good humor of the B.E.F., although both versions minimized any fraternization between 
the two sides.   
 In the first account, a screen with “Merry Christmas” painted upon it is put up in the 
morning, and both sides walked about in the open behind their lines. Later, the Germans 
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came into No-Man’s-Land, but the British, who “were forbidden to leave” their trenches, threw 
them “tins of food with plenty of sympathy in the shape of, ‘Here you are, you poor hungry 
bastards,’ and other such-like endearments.”  A Welch Fusiliers’ captain went out to meet the 
Germans when they rolled over two barrels of beer, and the officers “agreed to recall all men 
to the trenches and have no more fraternizing.” A cease-fire was negotiated, and “the Germans 
were allowed to bury their dead.”511 The second account, written by the captain who met with 
the Germans, maintained that “(s)trict orders had been issued that there was to be no 
fraternizing on Christmas Day,” and reported that he told the German officers that they 
should get their men back behind the parapets, as it was dangerous for them to be “running 
about in the open like this,” in case someone fired. A mutual cease-fire was agreed, and the 
Germans, the officer recorded, “played the game, not a shot all night.” The truce ended when 
the two captains appeared on their respective parapets: “both bowed and saluted and got 
down into our respective trenches…and the War was on again.”512 For Dunn, as for Robert 
Graves of the same regiment, the truce demonstrated that the professionalism of the Royal 
Welch Fusiliers overrode the personal animosities of war, and that, as long as the Germans 
“played the game,” the regiment could be counted on to do the same. 
 Later during the same decade, the truce made another appearance in a history from 
one more veteran of the conflict, who was concerned not “with its causes remote or 
immediate, nor with the so-called settlement which followed,” but instead focused on the 
conduct of the war itself.513 In A History of the Great War, Charles Cruttwell advanced the 
theory, later embraced by A.J.P. Taylor, that the combat plans of the countries involved, which 
focused on the offensive, made mobilization the equivalent of war. As “any improvisation, 
except in detail” was rendered impossible by the complexity of those plans, the order to 
mobilize was the equivalent of a declaration of war.514 Cruttwell’s argument that “universal 
insecurity” made every country nervous and therefore more inclined to fight spread the blame 
for the conflict among all the “continental belligerents,” excepting Britain, who “entered the 
war in defense of her treaty obligations toward Belgium and not under the terms of any 
general alliance.”515 
 After arguing that, Britain’s hands were relatively clean in the general debacle,  
Cruttwell then examined the 1914 fighting closely. He pointed out that although trenches 
served to protect the men within them, they had their psychological pitfalls: “Stationary 
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warfare,” he observed, bred “a sense of isolation and of disproportionate risk between the 
troops in the line and the staff.”516 The French approach to trench fighting, which was to 
remain relatively inactive unless an attack was expected, enabled them to hold their front line 
with few men, while the “British were very thick on the ground, and the troops were enjoined 
to harass the enemy by every possible pinprick, such as fighting patrols, and burst of fire on 
his nightly working parties.”517 In spite of this, Cruttwell observed, “it was the British and not 
the French soldiers who were the actors in the curious ‘Christmas Truce’ of 1914, when 
fraternizing between the lines, even games of football and mutual trench visits were common, 
and in some sectors lasted for nearly a week.”518   
Towards the end of the 1930s, with Britain on the brink of another war against 
Germany, veterans throughout the country must have reflected upon their service in the last 
one.519 Frederick Brown, who fought with the 2nd Monmouthshires on the Western Front 
during the first year of the war, and later served in Mesopotamia, began his 1939 unpublished 
memoir reflecting that he never imagined “after the Great War of 1914-1918, that our country 
would be called upon to once again fight the battle ‘for civilization’ during my lifetime.”520 
However, as “the impossible” had happened, he wanted “to place on record as far as my 
memory will permit” an account of his experiences in the previous war.  
Brown, a corporal in the 2nd Monmouths at the start of the conflict, embarked for 
France on 5 November. The Monmouths were in the trenches for Christmas 1914, and Brown 
recalled the bitter cold of Christmas Eve and waking at dawn. He contrasted the thoughts of 
home with “our bleak surroundings,” looking at “where a German soldier had been buried, and 
his foot had actually been sticking out in our trench until we covered it up with earth.” Then, 
“a strange happening occurred, which is generally not accepted, but well known to those who 
were present in this part of the line.” A rumour began to spread that there would be an 
armistice for Christmas so the Germans could bury their dead. Brown then described how 
“German heads appeared” over the parapets of the trenches opposite, which were only 35 
yards apart, and a Monmouths sergeant looked over the top of the British trench, waving a box 
of cigarettes.  However, “a shot rang out, and the poor Sergt. staggered back into the trench, 
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shot through the chest. I can still hear his cries ‘Oh my God, they have shot me’, and he died 
immediately.”521 
 Of course, Brown wrote, the Monmouths got back in their trenches, “with very bitter 
feelings on our part.” Fraternization did occur later that afternoon, although Brown explained 
that the British soldiers went out “mostly to collect souvenirs in the shape of helmets etc.”  
The Germans apologized for the shooting of the sergeant, but Brown remained in his trench 
throughout the day, still angry about the killing of the unarmed soldier. “After this,” he noted, 
“all fraternizing was strictly forbidden.” Although he later received wounds in Mesopotamia 
which left him permanently disabled and forced him to relinquish his chosen career, Brown 
did not seem to feel either the anger towards the war that prompted many veterans to write 
memoirs condemning it, or the defensiveness that pervaded aggressively militaristic memoirs 
such as Hutchinson’s Warrior. Instead, he accepted the necessity of the war in which he had 
fought and been so severely wounded, just as he was resigned to the thought of the next one, 
which Brown also recognized as a battle “for civilization.” 
From Gibbs’ over-wrought Realities of War through Brown’s matter-of-fact account of 
the same conflict nearly twenty years later, the narrative of the First World War in the inter-
war years embraced a multiplicity of viewpoints. The two decades saw a great deal written 
about the truce from soldiers who had participated in it and writers who wished to use it to 
underline their view of the conflict, such as Montague’s disillusionment with the war or 
Liddell Hart’s theories about attitudes of the combatant countries during the early stages of 
the conflict. Based upon an overview of books written about the war during the 1920s and 
1930s, it can certainly be argued that Carey and Scott were correct in their assertion that it 
would be “foolish to pretend that the war had no redeeming features.”522 While some veterans 
could not, even years after it ended, forget the horrors of the war, for many the victory they 
had won in the field and “the recollection of a comfortable billet, a cheerful mess, the smoke-
laden atmosphere of an estaminet, the unexpected encounter of a friend,” or the Christmas 
Day they fraternized with the Germans, remained as strong a reality as the “months of 
stagnation and sordid horror.”523   
In addition, it is worth noting that the most famous anti-war work of the inter-war 
years, All Quiet on the Western Front, ignored the truce entirely, and that some disillusioned 
veterans, such as Graves, who characterized the conflict as “wicked nonsense,” did not cite the 
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1914 cease-fire in support of their views.524 During this time, the truce, whether recalled fondly 
in a memoir or used as a moral in an anti-war treatise, remained both a well-remembered 
event and an accepted feature within the narrative of the war. Competing strands of the war’s 
narrative, including vivid descriptions of the horrors of the fr0nt line and the remembrance of 
the camaraderie found in the trenches, were characteristic of the diverse views of the conflict 
held during this period. The attitudes expressed in various works written during the first two 
decades after the war’s end demonstrated that no all-encompassing view of the conflict 
dominated either its discourse, or that of the Christmas truce. However, after memories of the 
old world war were, at least temporarily, subsumed during the new global conflict, the post-
Second World War narrative of the First World War would begin to undergo a decided shift in 
perspective - and drag the truce along behind it. 
Two works about the First World War, published between 1939 and 1945, exemplified 
the continued varied discourse of the conflict that struggled to take into account the new and 
even larger war that had overtaken the world. The titles of these histories, E. Lipson’s Europe 
1914-1939 and A Sketch-Map History of the Great War and After, 1914-1935, by I. Richards, J.B. 
Goodson and J.A. Morris, illustrated an increasing awareness that the inter-war years formed 
as much a part of the narrative as the war itself.525 Defending the Treaty of Versailles, for 
example, against charges that it had caused the German sense of grievance that prompted the 
rise of Nazism and the onset of the Second World War, Lipson maintained that, while it had 
become fashionable to condemn it “as a bad treaty,” and assert that if the Allies had been more 
lenient, Germany would have “reconciled herself more readily,” this could not be certain.526 “It 
is at least doubtful whether the military caste, shorn of its prestige and smarting under the 
stigma of defeat,” Lipson argued, “would not have repudiated even a lenient treaty, and 
endeavoured sooner or later to recover for Germany the dominant position she had formerly 
enjoyed in Europe.”527 Characterizing Germany, in 1944, as “the country which alone could 
have averted the conflagration,” Lipson assigned to it the major responsibility for the war.528 
Richards, Goodson and Morris similarly contended that German attitudes and actions, 
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particularly its demand for “‘a place in the sun’” and its rivalry with France, Russia and Britain, 
had been the main impetus for the First World War, demonstrating that, even in the 1940s, 
many historians continued to support this view of the conflict.529 
 Aylmer Haldane, the general in charge of the 3rd Division in 1914, also concurred with 
this analysis. In his autobiography, A Soldier’s Saga, published in 1948, he argued that 
Germany, by doing nothing “to prevent what must inevitably lead to a general conflagration in 
Europe,” and instead encouraging the conflict for its own ends, bore responsibility for the 
war.530  In his chronicle of the war, Haldane included his orders to the 3rd Division forbidding a 
truce at Christmas 1914, and noted that, while his division did not participate in an armistice, 
in other commands, “(a)dvances made by the Germans were not repelled, and in consequence 
certain commanders got into hot water with higher authority.”531 Haldane also repeated a 
quite astonishing and uncredited tale about how in one section  
the enemy tried to repeat a truce – unauthorized, of course – which had taken 
place earlier and was warned what would happen.  One of the German officers 
then came forward and asked that the gun-fire might be opened on his men 
between the lines, on which they sat down close to our parapets and some time 
elapsed before they could be made to return to their own defences.532  
 
It seems incredible to believe that a German officer would have asked the British to fire upon 
his own men to get them to stop fraternizing, but Haldane apparently found this story 
sufficiently plausible to include in his work as further evidence that officers on both sides 
imposed harsh punishments on soldiers who participated in the truce. 
 Haldane’s endorsement of the myth that retribution followed the 1914 truce was part of 
the continuing alteration that the narrative of the armistice underwent in the post-war period. 
Whereas previously the idea that soldiers involved suffered retribution from their 
commanders for their participation in the armistice had been a minority view, at this time it 
began to creep into the dominant discourse of the truce. Mary Renault’s 1953 novel, The 
Charioteer, also featured a new interpretation of the cease-fire.533 In the book, which was set 
during the Second World War, Laurie O’Dell, the main character, discusses the moral 
implications of the war with a conscientious objector who is performing alternative service at 
the home where O’Dell is convalescing. The C.O. explains that, while he believes that there 
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may be times when it was right to kill, he is not prepared to be commanded to do so, as he 
could not surrender “my moral choice to men I’d never met, about whose moral standards I 
knew nothing whatever.”534 O’Dell responds that there was no way to defeat Nazi Germany, 
except by fighting them:  
‘in Napoleon’s day if you wanted to cross the Channel in the middle of the war 
and talk sensibly to the enemy there was almost nothing to stop you.  Even in 
1914 they had the Christmas Truce and it very nearly worked. Nowadays we’re 
all sealed off in airtight cans and there’s nothing between war and surrender.  
You can’t convert a propaganda machine.’535  
 
In the view presented in Renault’s novel, therefore, the truce had been transformed from an 
unexpected holiday for the soldiers involved into something that had “very nearly worked,” 
that is, had almost ended the war. The accounts of the truce, one factual and one fictional, put 
forward by Haldane and Renault during the 1950s, are two sides of the same coin, underlining 
the myth that the armistice was frowned upon by the authorities, who saw it as a threat to the 
fighting spirit of the troops, but was initiated by front-line soldiers out of a desire to stop a 
senseless war. 
 In Fox under my Cloak, a semi-autobiographical account of his war-time experiences in 
the “London Highlanders,” Henry Williamson, the author of the well-known children’s book 
Tarka the Otter, also discussed the holiday armistice.536 For Williamson, who joined the 1/5th 
London Rifles in January 1914, and was with the battalion on the Western front on the first 
Christmas of the war, “the fraternisation on Christmas Eve 1914 made a deep and lasting 
impression upon his life, in which he saw that war was created by greed, misplaced zeal and 
bigotry.”537 These attitudes are reflected in his account of the truce, which was published forty 
years after the event had taken place. In Williamson’s version, Phillip Maddison, his alter-ego, 
takes advantage of the peaceful conditions on 25 December 1914 to visit his cousin Willie in 
the London Rifles. Arriving at their trenches, Maddison locates his relative, who was “full of 
the strangeness of Christmas Day” and excitedly tells Phillip that  
‘(i)t’s most extraordinary, but the Germans think exactly about the war as we 
do! They can’t lose, they say, because God is on their side. And they say they 
are fighting for civilization, just as we are! Surely, if all the Germans and all the 
English knew this, at home, then this ghastly war would end. If we started to 
walk back, and they did, too, it would be over!’538   
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The only reason the war continued, Willie argues, is that “‘the people at home do not know 
the whole truth,’” and that, if the British public realized that the Germans were “‘just the 
same’” and “‘fighting with identical ideas to drive them on,’” they would see that the whole 
conflict was pointless, and it would end immediately.539 In the novel, the truce lasts until New 
Year’s Eve, when the Saxons send over a note stating “that a staff-inspection was taking place 
at midnight along the Corps front; the ‘automatic pistolen’ would be fired in accordance with 
orders; but they would be fired high.”540 The Germans keep their word, and the truce only 
ends, according to Williamson, when the “Saxon Corps left; Prussians took over the front,” and 
sniping and shelling resumes.541 
 In Williamson’s account, the truce ended by German instigation, when Prussians were 
put in the line and the enemy was ordered to fire, rather than by orders from the British 
generals, but otherwise this version of events presaged the story of the truce that would later 
dominate the anti-war narrative in the 1960s and afterwards. Oddly, Williamson, who in the 
1930s became a passionate fascist who believed that “Hitler was essentially a good man who 
wanted only to build a new and better Germany,” and in 1969 described the Second World 
War as “a war of the moneylenders’ revenge,” has been accepted as reliable on the subject of 
the Christmas truce and the senselessness of the war, and his version of events has been 
assumed, in the years since Fox under my Cloak was published, to embody a representative 
view.542   
 The truce described in Arthur Cook’s A Soldier’s War, which appeared two years after 
the Williamson account, is one that would be much more recognizable to the men involved.543 
Cook, who served with the 1st Somerset Light Infantry, kept a diary of his time as an N.C.O. 
during the war, which was published shortly after his death.544 While Cook’s unit appeared to 
have been out of the line on Christmas Day itself, his entry for 28 December indicated that, 
when relieving another company at the front on that day, they discovered that “during the last 
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few days our men and the enemy have been fraternizing and exchanging souvenirs,” and that 
socializing with the Germans continued to occur.545 The Somersets, Cook wrote, were “making 
the most of this fantastic situation while it lasts, for it enables us to bring in our dead who 
have been lying about since December 19 and give them a proper burial.”546 As Cook made 
very clear in his diary, the truce was never expected to be anything but temporary, as 
demonstrated by the way the Somersets were “making the most” of the armistice while it 
lasted. 
 Echoing Cook’s general attitudes towards the conflict, two histories of the First World 
War, also published during the 1950s, revealed that for many historians the interpretations of 
the inter-war years still persisted. Arthur Booth, in The True Book about the First World War, 
placed the blame for the war firmly on the Germans, particularly the Kaiser, whom he 
characterized as a cowardly bully.547 Booth believed that the Germans had hoped the French 
would reject their pre-war conditions, as “France’s abject compliance with the demand would 
have been the last thing the German generals wanted; what they really wanted was war,” and 
defended the British decision to go to war over the violation of Belgian neutrality.548 A year 
later, in The Great War, Cyril Falls scornfully dismissed the German theory “that their superior 
skill, endurance, and bravery” had only been overcome by the superior equipment and arms of 
the Allied Forces, “as if there were something unfair, even treacherous and contemptible, in 
waging a war of materiel.”549 In fact, he maintained, it was the “easy armistice terms” that had 
largely contributed to the myth that the German army was never defeated.550 The war, Falls 
claimed, while “looked on with particular abhorrence by many people because it seems to 
them to have been waged with unexampled clumsiness and to stand for a picture of slaughter 
and misery,” was, in his opinion, the inspiration for “an enthusiasm for ideals, of 
determination and bravery in face of death and suffering, of generosity of spirit.”551 
 As these examples demonstrate, even in the late 1950s, when fictional representations 
of the truce underscored an altered narrative of the war, some historians still argued that the 
First World War had been justified and defended the generals who had led the fight and the 
treaty that had ended it. However, this narrative tide was about to turn: whereas previously, 
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the argument that the war had been futile and senseless had been left mainly to novelists, 
poets, journalists and polemicists, it was now about to be taken up wholesale by historians.  
An examination of memoirs, fiction, histories and polemics published between 1920 and 1959 
demonstrate that no single view dominated the narrative of the First World War.  Veterans 
and non-veterans alike maintained diverse opinions on the conflict, and works published 
during this four-decade period are mainly notable for the way they contributed to the 
fragmentation of the public discourse of the war. The 1960s, however, would soon put an end 
to this diversity, and establish a narrative of the war that would drive out the dissenting voices 
that had contributed to and enriched the debate from the end of the conflict through its 
fiftieth anniversary. 
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Chapter Eight 
“The famous Christmas truce”: 
The Christmas Truce from 1960-1969 
 
 
And after that the story went underground for many years. The play and film Oh! What A 
Lovely War revived it - to some disbelief - in the 60s.  
Malcolm Brown 
“When Peace Broke Out” 
The Guardian, 23 December 2001 
 
 
The whole world knew that on Christmas Day, 1914, there was some fraternizing at one part of 
the line, and even an attempt at a game of football. 
George Coppard 
With a machine gun to Cambrai: the tale of a young  
Tommy in Kitchener’s army 1914-1918 (1969) 
 
 
 
 
 “Prisoners of national pride, shackled together by treaty obligations,” was how the 
warring powers were described in 1964’s The Great War, a 26-part documentary created by the 
BBC to mark the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the First World War.552 
Described by Emma Hanna, author of The Great War on the Small Screen, as “a televised 
monument to the dead of 1914-18,” the program reinforced many now-familiar elements of the 
conflict’s discourse: the “accidental” war, the mud, the horror, the shell-shocked soldiers and 
the ignorant home front.553 The producers of the series were not above manipulating images – 
and the audience – in an attempt to increase the impact of their interpretation of the conflict: 
the photograph of a war-weary soldier, sitting among a pile of corpses the audience assumes 
he will soon join, which was used during the opening credits to every episode, was in fact a 
composite of two photographs, one of the soldier and another of dead bodies in a trench.554 
The series argued that in 1914 the nations of Europe, while all fearful of war, were also 
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suffering from the tensions of various internal and external conflicts, including class war at 
home, mistrust between nations, competition for colonies and resentment over previous wars. 
The assassinations at Sarajevo were the spark that ignited this volatile mix, and with the 
deaths of Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the “peace of Europe died with them.”555 
The title of the second episode, “for such a stupid reason, too,” sums up the series’ 
approach towards the entire war.556 The documentary seized upon the theme of the conflict’s 
inevitability, an increasingly prevalent historiographical theory, noting that France, as well as 
Germany and Russia, had been trapped into war by their respective mobilization plans. By 
establishing that all the combatant nations could now be considered victims of the strategies 
of their own hide-bound military leadership, the series furthered the idea that Europe 
inadvertently became entangled in a conflict that none of those involved had wanted. The 
third episode, for example, asserted that the “invasion of Belgium was demanded by the 
Schlieffen plan,” but failed to observe that the strategy had been endorsed and set into motion 
by German leaders who had chosen to follow it, instead presenting the offensive against 
Belgium as a course of action which the passive (and presumably unwilling) Germans had no 
choice but to follow.557 The fifth instalment in the series, entitled “this business may last a long 
time,” which dealt with the winter of 1914 and the stalemate on the Western front, featured 
the Christmas armistice at the end of the episode. The truce participant selected to discuss the 
event was Henry Williamson, whose 1955 novel Fox Under my Cloak had contained such a long 
and detailed description of the cease-fire.558 
The 1964 interview with Williamson, from which documentary footage was chosen, 
repeated many of the elements that he earlier featured in his fictional work, but on this 
occasion it was Williamson himself, rather than his fictitious cousin Willie, who made the 
supposedly momentous discovery that the Germans also believed that their cause was sacred. 
When the dead soldiers between the lines were buried on Christmas Day, Williamson 
professed to be astonished that the Germans wrote the words “for Vaderland and Vriehied, for 
fatherland and freedom” on the crosses marking the graves of their comrades. “I said to a 
German,” Williamson recalled, “excuse me, but how can you be fighting for freedom, you 
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started the war, and we are fighting for freedom. And he said, excuse me, English comrade, but 
we are fighting for freedom, for our country.” Williamson claimed that he followed this 
exchange with the question of how the German could write “Here rest in God,” on the grave of 
a dead soldier, and the German replied, “Oh, yes, God is on our side,” which Williamson stated 
he countered with the assertion that “he is on our side.” Williamson maintained that the 
declaration made by the German “was a tremendous shock, to think that these chaps, who 
were like ourselves, whom we liked and who felt about the war as we did,” actually believed, as 
did the British, that God supported their cause, and further claimed that, following this 
exchange, the German genially said “well, English comrade, do not let us quarrel on Christmas 
Day,” providing a final footnote of absurdity to a frankly incredible account of the truce. 
The 1964 documentary featured Williamson as the only veteran discussing the 
Christmas cease-fire and thereby tacitly endorsed his account of it, but in fact Williamson’s 
version of the event was contradicted by a letter he wrote home to his mother on 26 December 
1914, which was re-printed in the Daily Express shortly afterwards.559 In it, he briefly described 
the truce, noting that it took place in a limited area, “only for about a mile or two on either 
side of us (so far as we know),” demonstrating that the event Williamson would later claim 
exposed the universal feelings of both sides was perceived the time to be quite constricted. 
Williamson had also recorded the reluctance of both sides to venture forth into No-Man’s-
Land, noting that, despite the Germans and British soldiers calling to each other to come out, 
everyone stayed put “for some time, neither fully trusting the other, until, after much 
promising to ‘play the game’ a bold Tommy crept out & stood between the trenches, & 
immediately a Saxon came to meet him.” Fraternization then ensued, and cigars and cigarettes 
were exchanged and smoked. Williamson then wrote that there was a joint burial service, 
“over the dead Germans who perished in the ‘last attack that was repulsed’ against us. The 
Germans put ‘For Fatherland & Freedom’ on the cross. They obviously think their cause is a 
just one.”560  
Williamson’s contemporaneous account illustrates that he was making an assumption 
about the enemy troops’ motives rather than reporting their statements, and makes it unlikely 
that Williamson engaged in the conversation with a German soldier that he would describe 
fifty years later at such length in Fox Under My Cloak and the interview for The Great War.  In 
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fact, G. Selby Grigg, from the same battalion as Williamson, also reported in a letter home the 
burial of a German solder on 25 December 1914 in No-Man’s-Land, but without Williamson’s 
embellishments, instead noting that a German officer read a short prayer service over the 
unknown soldier’s gave before the Germans “stuck a bit of wood over the grave – no name on 
it only ‘Fur Vaterland and Freheit’ (for Fatherland and Freedom).”561 Grigg’s version of events 
makes it seem even unlikelier that Williamson would have, under those solemn 
circumstances, started an argument with a German soldier about their respective motivations 
for fighting the war. It seems likely, therefore, that Williamson invented these details long 
after the fact to underscore his contention that the Christmas truce had been a turning point 
in his attitude towards the First World War. As his daughter-in-law Anne dutifully observed 
years later in A Patriot’s Progress: Henry Williamson and the First World War, the 
“fraternization over Christmas 1914 made a deep and lasting impression” on Williamson, who 
“could never forget what he learned that day - that the German soldiers thought as deeply and 
sincerely as the English that they were fighting for God and their country.”562  
However, even if Williamson had indeed had the epiphany on 25 December 1914 that 
he later described, even without the benefit of a conversation with a sympathetic German 
soldier, it had no immediate impact on his view of the war. On 10 January 1915, for example, he 
wrote to his father that while it would take a long time to “drive (the Germans) across 
Belgium,” he hoped that “when the floods and ooze had subsided somewhat, we can, by 
superior numbers, drive their flanks right back and so force their whole line to withdraw.”563  
However, Williamson added more optimistically, while the British line was temporarily stale-
mated, “the French are doing splendidly in Alsace” - hardly the views of someone who, two 
weeks earlier, had suddenly seen the war as a farce and exercise in futility.  
This attitude was not confined to the immediate post-truce period. On 19 May 1917, 
Williamson, now a transport officer and safely out of the front line, wrote his mother that 
“(t)hey say our dead out there are being stripped by him (the enemy), he wants the clothes for 
making paper!!! Still when we do finally get in those trenches – we will call it even!!”564 In fact, 
the only reference he made in later correspondence to the eye-opening events of 25 December 
was in a 9 January 1915 letter, again to his mother, when he noted that “my letter of Xmas Day 
has appeared in the Daily Express” and suggesting that another letter about the war that he 
was sending, of “general” rather than “personal” interest, be instead submitted to the Daily 
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Mail, which Williamson thought “a better paper.”565 Additionally, although Williamson 
credited the fraternization itself with enabling the two sides to understand that the soldiers 
opposite them were men like themselves, with the same feelings for their country and as little 
enjoyment of mud, cold, rats and trenches as they had, this opinion ran counter to the 
attitudes of many of the other soldiers involved in the truce, who cited this realization as a 
reason for fraternization rather than a result of it.  
A letter written by Williamson later in the decade to a fellow veteran reveals his 
attitude towards the truce in an even more troubling context. “I was also in the Xmas Day 
truce,” Williams observed, “and spoke to many Germans, marveling (I was only a little older 
than you) that they believed in the righteousness of their cause, that God was on their side, 
and they could not lose the war.”566 In fact, Williamson added that he had always found the 
Germans to be “chivalrous opponents,” who helped the British wounded on the Somme and at 
Passchendaele, “while the lying papers and Home Front Fireside Lancers kept up the hatred” 
even through to “the wicked Treaty of Versailles, and War 2.” Apparently, in Williamson’s 
view, the Second World War could also be credited to anti-German propaganda, whereas the 
truce revealed the true feelings of the soldiers on both sides.567  
Williamson’s memories, being strongly informed by both his fascist ideology and his 
later opposition to the conflict, made the inclusion of his solitary and unchallenged version of 
the truce troubling in the context of a series purporting to be the definitive word on the First 
World War. At the same time, as illustrated by his later letter to a fellow soldier, Williamson 
made no secret of his support for fascism and the impact this had on his opinion of the war. 
The producers of The Great War should have been aware of this and, at minimum, balanced 
his account of the truce with that of a veteran who had no particular axe to grind, but 
Williamson’s version of the armistice doubtless proved too useful at underlining the series’ 
main theme, that of the pointlessness of the war. The final episode in the series, “and we were 
young,” ended with images of young, happy soldiers marching off to war and crowds cheering 
them on, ironically contrasted with photographs of piles of dead bodies and blighted 
landscapes.568 The Great War helped establish, as Todman later notes, “the myth that it had 
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been a uniquely horrific experience for those who had fought it,” underlined by Henry 
Williamson’s embellished version of the truce, which sought to demonstrate that the soldiers 
from both sides had the same motivations and had been trapped into a conflict by their 
uncaring governments.  
It was through such distortions, errors and inventions – many of them well-meaning, 
as there is no doubt that Williamson later developed a hatred of the war which informed his 
views retrospectively, but others, such as the juxtaposed photograph, which deliberately 
encouraged false conclusions – that the series promoted a certain narrative of the First World 
War. The Great War, however, did not invent this view of the conflict, which until the 
approach of the fiftieth anniversary of 1914 had been just one strand in a diverse discourse 
encompassing a spectrum of opinions about the war, from disillusionment through full-
throated patriotic support. The five years before the documentary aired had seen a dramatic 
shift in the discourse of the First World War, with the imposition of a single narrative that 
exaggerated contemporaneous disenchantment with the conflict, and even more damningly, 
blamed it for causing the Second World War.  
With the trauma of the later war still fresh in the mind of the British public – 
rationing, for example, only ended in 1954, and damaged and destroyed buildings remained in 
many large cities, serving as a reminder of the extensive German bombing campaigns – the 
First World War was now, in retrospect, available to serve as a handy scapegoat. During the 
1960s, the diminishing numbers of First World War veterans helped contribute to an altered 
narrative; as Todman observes, as the conflict “receded into history and personal contact with 
it has been lost, it has become increasingly easy to judge the war as futile.”569 The impact of 
this phenomenon would be exacerbated by the fact that the least likely survivors, fifty years 
on, would be those who were already serving in the army at the time that war was declared, 
the professional soldiers who were the vast majority of the fighting force in Flanders during 
1914 through 1915, and who fought in the war because it was their job to do so. These troops 
had, as Janet Watson would later describe, “(an) attitude of work, rather than service,” which 
made their outlook on the war very different from those who volunteered after war was 
declared, and their proportionately larger loss from the body of veterans who were now 
solicited for their views on the war surely helped contribute to this more monolithic 
narrative.570 
 In the early 1960s, however, this altered discourse was driven primarily by historians 
re-evaluating the First World War. James Cameron, whose work 1914 appeared in 1959, 
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anticipated the very different view of the conflict that was to prevail in the 1960s.571 Enlarging 
upon Liddell Hart’s notion of inevitability, Cameron discussed the “machine” of war, which 
“seemed to be grinding irresistibly on,” and which “(n)othing could stop.”572 Cameron further 
explored many of the themes that were to later dominate the conflict’s discourse, including 
the censorship that made truths about the war “contraband,” and the gulf between the home-
front and the war-weary soldier.573 Most soldiers, he claimed, endured trench warfare mutely, 
with only a few able to express “their personal trauma…in writing and verse, endeavouring to 
exercise something of the horror by expressing it horribly, defining with irony the pain of fear 
and despair.”574 
 Cameron ended his history with the story of the Christmas truce, the better to 
emphasize its role as a counterpoint to the senseless slaughter that had not only preceded it, 
but also was to follow it for four long years afterwards. He described the “curious 
phenomenon” of lit Christmas trees on the German trenches, and the sound of the Germans 
singing hymns. Cameron accurately noted that French as well as British soldiers “saw the 
Germans climb one by one from their trenches, singing and signalling as they sang,” and then 
also “climbed out, leaving their rifles behind them.” The enemies, comprising “many hundreds 
of men, many thousands of men,” met in No-Man’s-Land, “exchanging gifts and sharing 
cigarettes.” This, Cameron proclaimed, “was the Christmas truce that the Commands had 
refused; it was the subject of many disciplinary measures and was never to happen again.”575 
Although he placed the main fraternization on Christmas Eve, Cameron’s version of the truce 
was mainly accurate, and even included French soldiers, which was a rare acknowledgement 
at the time. However, the context in which he situated the cease-fire, as an ironic challenge to 
the war itself, and his report of the “many disciplinary measures” that followed it, established 
the narrative elements that were soon to overtake the story of the truce and become 
increasingly accepted as hard facts. 
 Alan Clark, who, according to his biographer Ion Trewin, worried that Cameron’s 1914 
would narrow the market for his own work, need not have been concerned: The Donkeys, his 
famous 1961 critique of the blundering British First World War generals who destroyed “the 
old professional army of the United Kingdom that always won the last battle,” saw an 
unparalleled success that enshrined the belief in the British military leadership’s general 
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incompetence, previously only hinted at in histories by Liddell Hart and Cruttwell, in the 
public’s mind. In this work, Alan Clark paid tribute to the members of the original B.E.F., who, 
he claimed, “have no memorial” in print.576 Because of the ineptitude of their military 
leadership, he claimed, these soldiers were repeatedly “called upon to do the impossible, and 
in the end they were all killed. It was as simple as that.”577 It was certainly not as simple as 
that: while the British army was asked to undertake battle campaigns in 1914 and 1915 that 
turned out very badly indeed, the histories, memoirs and fiction written by ex-soldiers such as 
Montague, Sassoon, Liddell Hart, Cruttwell, Wylly, Sassoon and Henriques demonstrate that 
numerous veterans of the first year of the war survived the conflict, and what is more, 
published many memorials to their fallen comrades. Clark, however, was never one to let facts 
stand in the way of a good story, and his account of the 1915 campaigns suffered from a 
number of easily disproven and rather dubious assertions, all in pursuit of a pre-determined 
moral.578   
While Clark’s discussion of the Christmas truce provided a fairly correct summary of 
the armistice itself, his assertions about its aftermath echoed those presented by Cameron. He 
first noted that, on 25 December, “there had been no firing, and in many sectors the troops 
had climbed out of their trenches and, meeting in No-Man’s-Land, had talked and exchanged 
gifts,” but then stated categorically that the cease-fire “met with the strongest disapproval at 
G.H.Q. and the officers responsible were punished.” As a result, the truce “did not happen 
again.”579 Clark’s account, which was sourced to French’s memoir 1914, interpreted the B.E.F. 
leader’s claim that, after hearing about the truce, he “called the local commanders to strict 
account, which resulted in a great deal of trouble,” to mean that those who participated in the 
truce were disciplined and therefore suffered for their actions. This supposition, advanced by 
Clark as fact, underlined his contention that the “lion” soldiers, the “flower of the richest, most 
powerful, nation on earth,” who brought to the trenches “decency, regularity, a Christian 
upbringing, a concept of chivalry; over-riding faith in the inevitably triumph of right over 
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wrong,” were betrayed by their idiotic leadership, who punished them for displaying civility 
towards their enemies.580 
 Although the complementary opinions of Cameron and Clark on both the war and the 
1914 cease-fire echo some of the judgments offered about both events during the previous four 
decades, the difference in their influence on the prevailing narrative can be attributed, at least 
in part, to the lack of prominent opposing viewpoints. During the inter-war years, the 
characterization of the conflict as senseless and futile, an interpretation promoted by Graves, 
Sassoon, Gibbs and Montague, was offset by the histories written by Carey and Scott, Liddell 
Hart and Cruttwell, all of whom, while they had specific criticisms of the way it had been 
fought, believed that the war had been a necessary evil. In the 1960s, however, Clark’s 
interpretation of the war, as exemplified by his main theme, that of the idiotic leadership 
sacrificing its brave soldiers in a useless cause, went largely unchallenged. As a result, in the 
aftermath of the more worthwhile Second World War, the First World War became, in 
retrospect, the “bad” war, a chronicle of stupidity, horror and waste, fought for no good 
reason, prosecuted incompetently, and only worthy of remembrance as a lesson in how the 
old-fashioned British values of patriotism and loyalty had betrayed an entire generation, who 
had been slaughtered in service to beliefs that were now exposed as naive.   
 Within the new growing consensus, the First World War, now blamed for causing the 
Second World War, became retrospectively established as a futile and senseless conflict – an 
interpretation that was widely assumed to date back to 1918 and the end of the war. As a result 
of this narrative shift, the truce was pressed into the service of the new view of the war, and 
suddenly became transformed from its previous characterization as a minor curiosity in the 
history of the war, evidence of the lack of rancor on the part of British troops towards their 
enemies, and a cherished memory for the soldiers involved. The new “Christmas Truce,” 
repurposed to serve as proof that on 25 December 1914, the troops who fought in the First 
World War had rebelled not only against the politicians and generals who were sacrificing 
their lives for nothing, but also against the war itself, would have been largely unrecognizable 
to the soldiers who had participated in it, but voices of the few soldiers left who had actually 
joined in the holiday armistice were either drowned out in the clamor of the truce’s 
reimagined story, or were swayed by the new analysis of the war, leaving their memories 
vulnerable to a view that had great narrative appeal. 
The power of the new discourse of the war to drive out previous interpretations can be 
demonstrated by Cameron’s contention that the armistice “was the subject of many 
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disciplinary measures” and Clark’s insistence that the officers who allowed their men to 
participate in the Christmas truce suffered for it. In spite of the statement made by French in 
his memoir (which never, it should be noted, specified that the officers involved were 
disciplined), the myth that soldiers who joined in the truce were punished for their actions 
was noticeably absent from the majority of works written between 1920 and 1960 that 
discussed the impromptu armistice. Although there were a few exceptions to this rule, 
including Haldane’s 1948 autobiography, the histories, memoirs and regimental histories 
published during the First World War and in the first four decades after it ended did not 
mention any penalties imposed after the truce. In the 1960s, however, the idea that strict and 
immediate disciplinary action was taken against those who joined in the armistice became a 
now-standard feature of the Christmas truce, asserted without proof and accepted without 
question. Similarly, the myth that the First World War had been an exercise in futility, as 
presented in the new popular histories by Clark, A.J.P Taylor and Barbara Tuchman, was 
reinforced through the media of television and film, which offered similar conclusions about 
the war. As a result, historians who advanced what were previously more mainstream 
positions on the conflict, such as John Terraine or Llewellyn Woodward, found their works 
sidelined in the rush to pass judgment on the now ironically titled “lovely war” of Joan 
Littlewood and Richard Attenborough. 
The main myth-maker of the First World War was the acclaimed historian A.J.P. 
Taylor, described by his biographer Chris Wrigley as “respected by much of the academic 
history profession as well as appealing to a wide readership beyond the bounds of higher 
education.”581 His works on both the First and Second World Wars gained an especially large 
readership in Britain and beyond, and his influence on the public discourse of the war cannot 
be over-estimated. His 1961 publication, The Origins of the Second World War, pronounced a 
fatal judgment upon the earlier conflict, noting that “(t)he first war explains the second and, in 
fact, caused it, in so far as one event causes another.”582 The Germans, Taylor went on to 
explain, “fought specifically in the second World war to reverse the verdict of the first and 
destroy the settlement which followed it,” but the subtleties of this argument were lost in the 
easier-to-grasp concept that the First World War and, more specifically, the war-guilt clause 
and reparations imposed upon Germany through the Treaty of Versailles were to blame for the 
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Second World War.583  This was a charge from which the reputation of the 1914-1918 war was 
never to recover, and the following year, Barbara Tuchman’s equally successful The Guns of 
August underlined these ideas by wildly inflating the human cost of the conflict. “Sucking up 
lives at a rate of 5,000 and sometimes 50,000 a day,” Tuchman wrote, “absorbing munitions, 
energy, money, brains, and trained men, the Western Front ate up Allied war resources and 
predetermined the failure of back-door efforts like that of the Dardanelles which might 
otherwise have shortened the war.”584 It is the horrifying figure of 5,000 to 50,000 killed each 
day (which, even at the minimal rate, would have meant 8,250,000 killed on the Western front 
alone between 1914 and 1918 – and Tuchman’s figures just apply to Allied casualties) that is 
remembered, rather than her point that the focus on that front doomed other efforts that 
might have ended the conflict earlier.585 
  The timing of these histories underlines another influence that contributed to the 
formation of the narrative of the First World War during the early 1960s, which was the post-
1945 development of a state of hostility and a permanent warlike footing that dominated 
relations between the Soviet bloc and the West. As Gary Sheffield notes, A.J.P. Taylor’s history 
of the First World War was “coloured by contemporary concerns about the Cold War,” and the 
popularity of such anti-nuclear weapons organizations as the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND), of which Taylor was one of the most famous members, was part of the 
impetus behind the shift in attitude towards the 1914-1918 conflict, which was seen by many as 
emblematic of the way minor tensions between countries could easily escalate and result in 
horrendous unintentional consequences.586 If it was now difficult to justify involvement in the 
First World War, or even understand why it had started, what guarantee was there that 
another, and even deadlier, war could be prevented? In the frigid depths of the Cold War, with 
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis underlining the ease with which the world could slip into a third 
global war, it became harder for those defending involvement in the First World War to be 
heard above the voices appealing for an end to all wars before those wars could doom 
humanity to extinction. 
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Taylor’s History of the First World War, published the year after the standoff between 
Soviet Russia and the United States, and described by Niall Ferguson as “the most successful of 
all books on the subject,” presented a narrative of both the war and the armistice that was 
clearly informed by Taylor’s political beliefs.587 In this history, Taylor enlarged upon his earlier 
work, advancing his famous theory that the war had begun because no one knew how to stop 
it. “Nowhere,” he declared, “was there conscious determination to provoke a war.”588 The 
European powers, all of whom were committed to a belief in attack as “the only effective 
means of modern war,” had enormous armies which, once set in motion, could not be 
stopped.589 “The plans for mobilizing these millions rested on railways; and railway timetables 
cannot be improvised,” Taylor argued. “Once started, the wagons and carriages must roll 
remorselessly and inevitably forward to their predestined goal.”590 As a result, the First World 
War was “imposed on the statesmen of Europe by railway timetables.”591 This argument, so 
appealing in its simplicity, must be read carefully in line with Taylor’s political beliefs and 
ideas that, as expressed in his book on the origins of the Second World War, “(h)uman 
blunders…usually do more to shape history than human wickedness.”592 His fears that “human 
blunders” might lead to the destruction of the world in the 1960s through the inadvertent 
triggering of nuclear war surely influenced his attempt to recast the First World War as an 
accident of history. 
Taylor, in an effort to underline the futility of the conflict, also emphasized the lack of 
articulated aims of First World War combatants, contending that “(n)o one asked what the 
war was about. The Germans had started the war in order to win; the Allies fought so as not to 
lose.”593 As discussed in countless histories, the Germans had a definite aim in promulgating 
war: their goal was to dominate central and western Europe, both economically and militarily. 
Although Taylor may have dismissed it in 1963 as an unworthy motivation, the Allies’ fight 
“not to lose” was a valid war aim, since against German aggression, it was either fight or 
capitulate, leaving Belgium, northern France and parts of central and eastern Europe under 
German control, with the victors no doubt eyeing Britain hungrily across the Channel.     
As a result of his attitude towards the war, Taylor’s take on the truce opted for full-out 
irony, claiming that on Christmas Day 1914, while those at home in Britain and Germany were 
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beseeching the Almighty to destroy their respective enemies, those “enemies” were at the 
same time cheerfully “exchanging cigarettes” and displaying a complete lack of rancor towards 
each other in No-Man’s-Land.594 A similar view of both the war and the truce was promoted 
by the Theatre Workshop’s Oh What a Lovely War, which premiered in Stratford in 1963. The 
drama enlarged upon many of the themes already introduced by Cameron, Taylor and Clark, 
singling out for particular censure the ignorant home front and the shockingly inept 
generals.595 Although the play’s script and direction are credited to the Theatre Workshop as a 
whole, Joan Littlewood is generally recognized as the guiding spirit behind its production. 
Littlewood saw the theatre as a vehicle for social awareness, with a focus on class struggle.596  
This outlook is very apparent in the play, where the uncaring, upper-class commanders 
of the British military are presented as being more concerned with their own standing in 
society and their personal reputations than the safety and security of their men.”597 Oh What a 
Lovely War portrays the common soldiers as working-class puppets (“pierrots”) enticed 
unknowingly into the “War Game” and therefore at the mercy of the insensitive monsters who 
send them off to be “senselessly killed.”598 The new narrative of the Christmas truce fit 
seamlessly into this version of the war, and its “pathos,” according to the plot notes, “comes 
through the way in which the two sides of the conflict are depicted as vulnerable human 
beings. Despite the carnage around them, the German and British soldiers are able to share 
their cultural differences and basic similarities through the singing of their songs and the 
exchange of gifts.”599 Unfortunately, the relevant scene, in keeping with the Theatre 
Workshop’s emphasis on improvisation, contained little information that would promote this 
idea of the truce, and consisted mostly of “Tommies” and “Jerries” shouting inanities across at 
each other in working-class dialect: “Right, Jerry, ‘ere’s your Christmas box,” being a 
representative sample of dialogue.600   
Although the public was very taken with the Theatre Workshop’s view of the war, as 
demonstrated by the play receiving a premiere in London’s West End later in 1963, the Times’ 
theatre critic was somewhat less impressed, dismissing its “familiar view of the 1914-18 War as 
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a criminally wasteful adventure in which the stoic courage of the common soldiers was 
equaled only by the sanctimonious incompetence of their commanders and the blind jingoism 
of the civilians.”601 The impact of the works of Clark, Taylor and Tuchman can be deduced 
from this offhand criticism, which assumed that the British public was not only well-
acquainted with this view of the war, but by 1963 found it hardly earth-shattering. The review, 
however, did praise the production for its “presentation of the men at the front,” noting that it 
took “an unusually well-developed sense of truth to stage a scene like the Christmas night 
fraternization in no-man’s-land without becoming mawkish.”602 This quite casual mention of 
the holiday armistice, tossed in at the end of the review, demonstrates just how well known 
the event was to the British public in 1963: the Times’ theatre reviewer, without even using the 
word “truce,” assumed that the newspapers’ readers needed no explanation to understand this 
reference. The myth propagated by Brown and Seaton that the Christmas truce was “brought 
to general notice” by its inclusion in Oh What a Lovely War is contradicted by this review, 
which appeared the day after the play premiered in Stratford and certainly assumed the Times’ 
readers general familiarity with the event.603 
Fifty years after it had begun, the battle-lines of the First World War narrative were 
clearly drawn: either historians must now try to defend a conflict increasingly seen as 
senseless and futile, or line up on the side of Clark, Taylor and Tuchman, opponents of a war 
that had served no purpose except to create another one, while at the same time becoming a 
byword for unparalleled horror and misery. The reinforcement of this monolithic discourse 
through such popular works as The Great War or Oh What a Lovely War gave the impression 
that no other interpretation of the conflict was permissible, or even possible. In this 
atmosphere, a sensible history such as Llewellyn Woodward’s 1967 work, Great Britain and the 
War of 1914-1918, was unlikely to garner much attention. Woodward himself explained why, 
noting the recent popularity of what he called “‘donkey’ studies,” which reduced the war to a 
few simplified facts: that “the armies were badly led; the officers were unsuited to their tasks; 
(and) they ordered the maiming and killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent soldiers in 
unnecessary military combat.”604  
Woodward, in fact, agreed that many “commanders just did not know how to set about 
their task of winning the war,” for which he blamed the British, “who had allowed this 
dangerous state of affairs” and therefore “could not complain of the consequences when they 
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had left the fate of a generation in the hands of a custom-bound clique.”605 At the same time, 
he took exception to many of the elements of the recent war narrative, noting that it was 
erroneous to state that “the war broke out accidentally, and that given more time and greater 
skill in negotiation it would have been avoided,” as the Germans, “if they had been willing to 
do so, could have called off the war before it was too late.”606 Similarly, John Terraine’s 1964 
defense of Haig’s leadership in The Western Front: 1914-1918, and his complementary argument 
that there had been no alternative to the terrible losses on the Western front made no dent on 
the now overriding narrative of the war, which had overtaken the words of those who still 
disagreed with this viewpoint.607 
Surprisingly, a very different take on both the First World War and the holiday 
armistice was presented by a man famous for his disillusionment with the 1914-1918 conflict. In 
Robert Graves’ work of fiction “Christmas Truce,” which was published in 1962, a soldier’s 
grandson tries to persuade his grandfather to join him in a protest march against nuclear 
weapons, citing the 1914 armistice, in which the veteran had participated, as proof that it was 
possible for enemies to see reason and get along with each other. “‘And you didn’t hate the 
Germans even when you were fighting them – in spite of the newspapers,’” the grandson 
argues. “‘What about the Christmas Truce?’”608 According to his grandfather, however, the 
younger man had “drawn the wrong conclusions and didn’t want to be put straight.”609 To 
correct his misconceptions, the grandfather again tells the story of the truce, with all its 
standard details, including a football match where the Germans “beat us 3-2” and follows it up 
with the tale of the second (albeit very muted) armistice in 1915.610   
Graves added some surprising touches to his story, including a complimentary word 
for French, who “commanded the B.E.F. at the time – decent old stick. Said afterwards that if 
he’d been consulted about the truce, he’d have agreed for chivalrous reasons.”611 Graves, more 
predictably, also had the fictitious colonel who allows his troops to participate in the 1915 
cease-fire punished for his actions, as Colquhoun was, except that Graves imposed a more 
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severe penalty on the unfortunate officer. Haig, Graves wrote, ordered a court martial on 
Colonel Pomeroy, who “wasn’t shot” for permitting fraternization, “but got a severe reprimand 
and lost five years’ seniority.”612 The lesson to be learned from the two separate cease-fires, the 
veteran argued, was that if another Christmas truce could not have happened “‘in the days 
when ‘mankind’, as you call ‘em, was still a little bit civilized, tell me, what can you hope for 
now?’”613 The soldier concluded that the threat of nuclear attack was the only thing that 
prevented a third world war, and therefore refused to march against “the bomb.”  
While Clark saw the truce as a rebellion by the brave front-line soldiers against the 
uncaring and inept military leadership, the character in Graves’ story viewed it as proof that 
pessimism about the future of mankind was justified. However, to complicate this conclusion, 
another veteran of the holiday armistice who is present during the conversation tells the 
soldier’s grandson that “‘(t)here wasn’t any feeling of hate between the individuals composing 
the opposite armies. The hate was all whipped up by the newspapers.’”614 After the grandfather 
presents his opinion on the significance of the truce, the second soldier advises the grandson 
that he shouldn’t “be talked out of your beliefs” and should make up his own mind on the 
subject.615 This double narration, which provided conflicting views of the cease-fire, enabled 
Graves to avoid providing an unambiguous moral to the story of the Christmas truce, which 
was consistent with his refusal, in his autobiography, to credit the event to rebellion against 
the war he despised.  
In the year after this story appeared, Peter Jackson, another veteran of the fighting, 
recorded a version of the truce that, like Graves’ fiction, avoided the simplifications of Clark 
and Taylor, but also included certain inaccuracies. Jackson described seeing heads emerge 
from the German trenches on 24 December, which “was a very dangerous thing to do,” but as 
the British were aware there were Bavarians opposite, they held their fire.616 An officer came 
forward, and Jackson ventured out to meet him. Jackson had instructed his men not to fire, 
but if the Germans started, then they should respond “with everything you’ve got.” The two 
officers arranged to bury the “one hundred and fifty bodies of our men who had died in an 
abortive attack about ten days previously,” and Jackson was able to collect their identity disks. 
                                                          
612 Graves, “Christmas Truce,” pg. 114. Graves further noted that the punishment was irrelevant because 
the colonel was killed in action the following year.  
613 Graves, “Christmas Truce,” pg. 115. 
614 Graves, “Christmas Truce,” pg. 109. 
615 Graves, “Christmas Truce,” pg. 115. 
616 Peter Jackson, Interview, 1963, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 4138. Jackson’s regiment is not 
given, but his description of events from November 1914 implies that his battalion was part of the 21st 
Brigade (7th Division, IV Corps), whose leadership took a very relaxed attitude towards the Christmas 
truce. 
173 
 
One of the British soldiers got in an argument with a German, and Jackson had to order him 
back to the trench to prevent him starting “another private war.” The two sides began 
fraternizing enthusiastically, but “things were getting a bit out of hand,” and Jackson was 
beginning to feel “a bit sorry that I had ever started this fraternization business,” when he 
suggested a football match as a distraction. The two sides played what Jackson described as “a 
melee” rather than a proper match, which only ended only when the football was impaled on 
barbed wire. 
The truce continued the next day, with more fraternization, and Jackson conversed 
with a German officer, who told him that they expected to be in London in two months.  
Jackson’s reply to this was the mild statement that “if you get past this bit of trench that’s as 
far as you are going to get.” After two days’ of truce c0nditions, the Bavarian battalion was 
replaced during the night by a Prussian one, and the war started again with “very heavy fire” 
from the German trenches. That, according to Jackson, “concluded the unofficial armistice 
which was frowned upon by all the brass-hats afterwards, they said of course it should never 
have happened but it did happen.” Jackson’s truce, although recalled 49 years after the event, 
displayed many of the elements of more contemporaneous accounts: an obvious ambivalence 
towards the enemy, the idea that the “brass-hats” did not approve of the armistice, although 
no record of any punishments, a football kick-about that actually seems to have happened, 
and the inaccurate but contemporaneously expressed theory that troops were shuffled in the 
front line in order to restart the war. However, Jackson did not credit any of the soldiers 
involved with a desire to end the war, noting, in fact that tensions existed between the two 
sides even in the midst of fraternization, and that, in this case, a football match between the 
Germans and British was seen not as a shared pastime, but as a way to distract from an 
argument between two enemy soldiers. 
The diaries of Brigadier General James Jack, edited by John Terraine, which were 
published in the same year that the BBC series The Great War was aired, also demonstrate 
how opinions that contradicted the now predominant narrative of the war and truce were 
sidelined.617 Jack, whose battalion, the 1st Cameronians, did not participate in the armistice, 
only heard of it afterwards. Remarking on the “extraordinary” stories being told about the 
“unofficial Christmas truce,” including a football match between the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders and the Saxons, Jack noted on 13 January 1915 that these incidents seemed to 
suggest that, “except in the temper of battle or some great grievance, educated men have no 
desire to kill one another; and that were it not for aggressive National Policies, or the fear of 
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them by others, war between civilized peoples would seldom take place.”618 Jack’s level-headed 
view of the war, which men were fighting because of a “great grievance” rather than because 
they had demonized the other side, stood in direct contrast to Williamson’s disingenuousness, 
but in the end it was Williamson’s interpretation of the truce that was granted a national 
audience, while Jack’s diary was no doubt perceived as just another war memoir.619 
George Coppard, whose memoir With a Machine Gun to Cambrai was edited and 
printed by the Imperial War Museum in 1969, also swam against the tide of the emerging First 
World War and Christmas truce discourse.620 Coppard, who joined the 6th Queen’s Royal West 
Surrey at the start of the war, did not leave for France until May 1915, when “Kitchener’s Army” 
arrived at the Western Front. 23 December 1915 found Coppard’s battalion in trenches at 
Festubert, and the wet conditions and continuous rifle fire took their toll on the soldiers, who 
were immediately “reduced to a state of exasperating misery and discomfort.”621 Although the 
troops they relieved told the new battalion that “they could hear the Germans talking,” 
Coppard did not feel any sense of fellowship with the enemy whose trenches were so close, 
and who were suffering under the same terrible conditions.622  
On being reminded of orders that “there was not to be any fraternizing with the enemy 
on Christmas Day,” Coppard scotched all notions that the British were in the mood for 
another truce. “Speaking for my companions and myself,” he observed, “I can categorically 
state that we were in no mood for any joviality with Jerry. In fact, after what we had been 
through since Loos, we hated his bloody guts. We were bent on his destruction at each and 
every opportunity for all the miseries and privations which were our lot.”623 In spite of the 
collective memories of the Christmas 1914 truce, which he acknowledged was widely known, 
and the speculation among front line troops in 1915 as to “whether a repeat performance would 
develop,” Coppard’s anger at the enemy would not have permitted any recurrence of 
fraternization or even friendly conversation across No-Man’s-Land.624  In fact, on noticing that 
the Germans were being careless about exposing themselves on Christmas night, Coppard and 
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his mates reckoned that “if we were careful we could bag a good many of them,” and opened 
fire on an enemy wiring party.625   
The bitterness of the continued war, which Coppard believed made the “age-old 
sentiment of ‘goodwill to all men’” untenable, had destroyed the desire for further truces on 
the part of at least one soldier.626 In the same year, J. Davey, a former sapper with the Royal 
Engineers who was in the front line in late December 1914, reported a relatively happy memory 
of the truce.627 Observing that the Imperial War Museum might “care for” information on the 
“1914 Christmas ‘truce,’” Davey recalled the “fancy lights” on the enemy’s trenches, the 
Germans “constantly calling out to this effect – ‘Don’t fire, its Christmas; if you don’t, we 
won’t; come over and talk,’” and the subsequent fraternization in No-Man’s-Land. Davey 
received a field post card with a Christmas greeting from a German soldier, which he had kept 
ever since, recalled that the truce “went on for 2 ½ days,” and mentioned a hare chased by the 
two sides. “In all, this was a most interesting experience,” Davey concluded mildly, “and quite 
true in spite of many times such happenings have been discredited.” 
The transformation during the 1960s of the narrative of both the war and the truce 
culminated in the film production, Oh! What a Lovely War, directed by Richard 
Attenborough.628 While the film was neither an unqualified critical or commercial success – it 
won some BAFTAs and a Golden Globe for “Best English-Language Foreign Film,” but few 
other accolades – Oh! What a Lovely War did present a cinematic vision that echoed the anti-
war narrative of the earlier stage production and similarly resonated with the public.629 In it, 
the Christmas truce received a more thorough treatment than it had in the 1963 play. In fact, 
the film’s dramatization of the event, which lasted for over six minutes of screen time, drew 
heavily upon Hulse’s letter about the cease-fire, but, quite predictably, it did not include any 
instructions from headquarters not to fire upon German soldiers.   
Considering that Richard Attenborough’s directorial style has always leaned towards 
the heavy-handedly explicit, the Christmas truce scene in Oh! What a Lovely War is 
surprisingly understated. Although one German soldier asks, rather discretely, whether the 
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British are “sick of the war,” the majority of the dialogue between the enemy troops remains 
superficial. The two sides joke mildly with each other, as when a British soldier, saying 
goodbye to his German counterpart after a shared drink of schnapps, offhandedly tells him 
“thanks very much mate, and give my love to the Kaiser.” The movie is famous for its final 
scenes, which feature a soldier who was killed just before 11 a.m. on November 11, 1918 walking 
through a room where the leaders of the belligerent nations are drawing up the peace treaty; 
they all look up as the soldier walks by, but he remains invisible to them.  The soldier then 
goes out into a field, where he lays down with other victims of the war while his mother, wife 
and daughter picnic nearby.  At the end, the daughter asks the soldier’s wife what her father 
did in the war, while the camera pulls back to show 16,000 white crosses planted evenly in a 
field and in the background a male chorus sings “And when they ask us, and they’re certainly 
going to ask us/The reason why we didn’t win the Croix de Guerre/Oh, we’ll never tell them, 
oh, we’ll never tell them/There was a front, but damned if we knew where.”   
After a period in the 1940s and early 1950s when both the First World War and the 
Christmas truce were mostly ignored in favor of the all-encompassing Second World War, the 
earlier conflict returned to the public’s attention with the approach of the fiftieth anniversary 
of August 1914. The renewed notice that the First World War received could not avoid taking 
into account the knowledge of the second war, making it clear that the Great War had not, in 
fact, achieved its stated purpose as “the war to end all wars.”630 Not only had the 1914-1918 
conflict conspicuously failed to bring an end to all disputes between nations, it now, in the 
light of the destruction and misery caused by the Second World War, became blamed for the 
new war that had engulfed the world, caused an estimated fifty-five million or more deaths, 
and spawned the seemingly endless Cold War, with its threat of nuclear annihilation. The last 
major campaign on the Western Front, The Great War maintained, “resulted finally in the 
collapse of German resistance and deep humiliation for them in the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles: a humiliation which festered in the German psyche until a man called Adolf Hitler 
promised an end…,” closely tying the two conflicts and blaming the first for the second.631 
Burdened with this now deadly reputation, it was difficult for the First World War to 
maintain the pre-Second World War image that many held of it as a conflict that had 
occurred, quite rationally, in response to German aggression and that had been fought by 
leaders trying their best under miserable conditions. Additionally, the pre-1939 beliefs that the 
soldiers who had served in the 1914-1918 war had understood the reasons for their service and 
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the terrible sacrifices they had been asked to make were also held to be myths. With the 
ascent in the early 1960s of the waste and futility narrative of the war, which drew on elements 
that had previously been a part, but not a whole, of the inter-war discourse, other views of the 
war were driven to the sidelines and largely negated.   
With this shift, the Christmas truce, which previously had been noted by historians as 
an interesting but insignificant event, started to move to the forefront of the narrative, and 
became increasingly used as proof of the anti-war feelings of the soldiers who had participated 
in the armistice.  This use of the armistice was most blatant in the works of Clark and Taylor, 
and further emphasized in the stage and screen versions of Oh What a Lovely War. In a sense, 
the truce, which had formerly been part of the general narrative of the First World War, now 
became a crucial element in the chronicle of resistance to that same war. At the same time, 
while histories of the war that subscribed to the senseless and futile view of the conflict began 
to feature the truce more prominently, those historians, such as Woodward and Terraine, who 
took a more ‘old-fashioned’ attitude towards the war, a view in which the truce had never 
been more than a minor curiosity, ignored the event altogether. 
The focus on such flawed versions of the armistice as Williamson’s account, or the 
insistence by Clark and Cameron that truce participants were punished for joining in the 
event, ensured that the myths of the truce, propagated by those who promoted an altered view 
of the war, became enshrined as fact during this decade. While the evidence from the 1960s 
demonstrates that many of the legends about the 1914 armistice, such as the falsehood that the 
public was largely unaware of it before The Great War and Oh What a Lovely War brought it 
into national prominence, were untrue, the sources from that period, such as Taylor’s work on 
the First World War, also illustrate how those myths became the new reality of the truce. As 
the decade that saw the great transformation of the British public’s view of the conflict ended, 
the Christmas truce was steadily moving from its old place in the war narrative to its new 
position as a crucial part of the anti-war narrative.   
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Chapter Nine 
“The Legendary Christmas Truce”: 
The First World War, the Christmas Truce and Social History, 1970-1989 
 
 
Against that background, the Christmas Truce of 1914 stands out with particular poignancy. 
While there had been truces for religious and secular holidays since classical times, the events 
that occurred 90 years ago this week were a spontaneous, unled cry for sanity before the 
advent of industrialized war.  
-David Brown 
“Remembering a Victory for Human Kindness: WWI’s Puzzling, Poignant Christmas Truce” 
Washington Post, 25 December 2004 
 
 
I don’t think we discussed the war itself all that much, and I am quite sure that we didn’t say 
that this is silly, let’s chuck it altogether, neither side talked like that at all, we all remained 
absolutely loyal to our side, and it was perfectly clear to both sides that at the end of the day 
we would go back and we would start killing each other again. 
-M.L. Walkinton 
Queen’s Westminster Rifles 
1985 Interview 
 
 
The Christmas truce, as described by Malcolm Brown in the documentary Peace in No 
Man’s Land, “is an event still vivid in the minds of those who took part in it.”632 The program, 
which aired on Christmas Eve, 1981, was the first work that focused on the holiday armistice as 
a separate event rather than just one episode in the larger story of the war. The thirty-five 
minute broadcast consisted almost entirely of excerpts taken from interviews with three 
veterans who had participated in the 1914 cease-fire. By featuring these soldiers so prominently 
in his presentation of the truce, Brown’s documentary followed the trend begun in the 1960s 
and pursued more thoroughly in the two following decades, in which accounts of the war, 
particularly histories and documentaries, were re-fashioned as part of a rejection of “top-down 
history.” That approach to studying the past, where politicians and generals were perceived as 
the guiding forces behind events and therefore the only figures worth examining in depth, was 
largely swept aside by the innovative focus of social history. This new historiography 
emphasized a broader understanding of the past through the study of social groups and the 
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expansion of historical enquiry to “cultures and mentalities,” or as E.P. Thompson labelled it, 
“history from below.”633  
This method of examining the past, however, was not entirely novel, particularly 
within the context of a contemporaneous understanding of the First World War. As early as 
1914, the British press, by featuring letters written home from those on active service (and the 
closer to the front line the better) as a vital component of the conflict’s narrative, had 
conditioned the public to believe that the words of ordinary soldiers provided the ‘truth’ about 
the war. The spate of memoirs in the late 1920s and early 1930s written by literate and 
articulate junior officers who made the horrors of life in the trenches of the Western front 
vivid and accessible to interested readers not only contributed to the diversity of the inter-war 
discourse, but also favored front-line experience over political or military analysis as a way of 
understanding the 1914-1918 conflict. In other words, while historians could argue over the 
causes of the war, or condemn the way it was fought, only a soldier who had served in the 
front lines could say what it was like to actually fight in that war. The emphasis on eye-witness 
accounts undoubtedly influenced the interpretation of the First World War in the 1960s and 
beyond, when the narrative of the conflict was increasingly constructed based on what the 
common soldier felt and remembered. 
Peace in No Man’s Land used the words of three ‘average’ Tommies, H.G.R. Williams, 
an N.C.O. with the 1/5th London Rifles at Christmas 1914, Albert Moren, a private serving with 
the 2nd Queen’s Royal West Surreys, and Leslie Walkinton of the 1st Queen’s Westminster 
Rifles, to offer a version of the truce that underlined the futility of the First World War. Brown 
chose carefully from the recollections of these three soldiers to present a Christmas truce that 
tallied with the version that had become standard by the end of the 1960s, featuring a belief 
that if the cease-fire had continued the conflict would have come to a halt, enraged generals 
threatening courts-martial, battalions pulled out of the front line as punishment for 
fraternizing and the troops’ humanity eventually becoming “lost in bigger battles.” In their 
interviews, which are available in their entirety in the Imperial War Museum archives, the 
veterans who appeared in the documentary recalled the carol singing on Christmas Eve and 
fraternization the next day, when the two sides exchanged chocolate and cigars. However, 
Peace in No Man’s Land disregarded certain other aspects of the armistice that the men 
discussed when questioned about the event, demonstrating how an account purportedly based 
upon the direct recollections of participating soldiers – those in a position to speak the truth 
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about the Christmas truce – could, with careful editing, instead support a narrative that 
contradicted many of their recollections. 
Williams, who served in the 1/5th London Rifles, Henry Williamson’s battalion, noted 
in his interview that the truce may have been frowned upon in other areas, but that “in our 
sector, anyway as far as brigade was concerned, it was encouraged because it enabled us to 
work on the trenches and also on various fortifications which were being built in Plugstreet 
Wood without the nuisance of continual machine gun fire.”634 That subversive statement 
however, did not make it to the final broadcast. Moren’s contention that the armistice “could 
have finished the war” was, predictably, highlighted in the first few minutes of the 
documentary, while Williams’ claim that the cease-fire had not changed his attitude towards 
the enemy – that “while the truce was on it was quite all right to be friendly with them, but 
directly it ended, we just went back to normal, I say, being shot at or shooting at the other 
people was one of the jobs we were out there to do and we sort of took it as a matter of course” 
- was left out.635 In fact, as Williams noted casually, “even on the next day after the truce if 
there had been an attack or anything we should quite cheerfully have shot them and they 
would have quite cheerfully shot us I am sure of that”- yet another statement that failed to 
make the final cut.636 Walkinton was even willing to consider the truce from the point of view 
of the leadership as well as the front-line soldiers, observing that the troops’ fraternizing was 
“very unpopular with the staff of course, but it would have been a bit awkward for the generals 
if the Germans had decided to attack.”637 This sort of even-handedness was, however, also not 
deemed suitable for inclusion in Brown’s “twentieth-century story of temporary peace.” 
As demonstrated by the interview he conducted with Moren, in addition to choosing 
the statements that most apt to prove his overall point about the truce and the war, Brown 
also was at times determined to guide the veterans in the direction he wanted the armistice’s 
interpretation to flow. The following exchange between the two illustrates the attempts Brown 
made to shape Moren’s version of the truce: 
Moren: Only one German could speak English.  He had wife and two children, 
he was thinking of them, he was definitely against it. 
 
Brown: and he said it was a silly war, didn’t he. 
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Moren: Yes, he was definitely against it. 
 
Brown: I’d like you to go on if you would, and you said to me, I’d like you to say 
this, that if it had gone on much longer – if you could tell us – 
 
Moren: Well, there was a mention of that, they said it was a silly war, and I felt 
in the way he spoke that it could have gone on, it could have stopped all 
fighting. You know, the feeling of the troops that day, felt on both sides. Could 
have gone into, sort of, you know, we don’t want to fight any more. Who 
knows? 
 
Brown: If it had been left to the troops- 
 
Moren: I think so, yes, because the conditions were appalling, water, mud, poor 
rations and no laundry, no cleaning up or anything.   
 
Brown: And none of you really wanted to fight? 
 
Moren: I don’t think so, no.638 
 
Such pointed questioning and later selectivity in editing the veterans’ memories for the 
broadcast resulted in a documentary that appeared to be based on recollections of the soldiers 
involved, but in fact led to a deliberately-moulded narrative of the truce that ignored many of 
those memories. When the armistice was presented by a participant as an opportunity that 
could have ended the war, Brown included the statement in the broadcast, while the words of 
a soldier who enjoyed the fraternization but saw no special significance in it were not 
included.  
Brown’s views on the truce, as expressed in Peace in No Man’s Land, built upon his 1978 
history, Tommy Goes to War, in which he argues that “(t)he Tommy had no wish to be in 
trenches killing Germans and he realized that the German almost certainly had no wish to be 
in trenches killing Tommies.”639 What Brown describes as the “camaraderie of the victim” led 
to “the legendary Christmas truce of 1914,” the only time “when British and German soldiers 
saw each other face to face and did not fire.”640 Brown takes this approach towards the 
armistice even further in Christmas Truce, his 1984 collaboration with Shirley Seaton, a work 
which demonstrates how easily contradictory or dissenting memories can be used to shape a 
discourse. In that work, Brown and Seaton, drawing heavily upon contemporaneous letters 
and diary entries about the truce, as well as a number of interviews conducted between 1960 
and 1980, readily acknowledge that the vast majority of the misconceptions that have arisen in 
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connection with the holiday armistice – many of which were promoted by Brown to begin 
with - are untrue. They note, for example, that officers as well as privates and common 
soldiers took part, that uncensored letters about it were published in the newspapers, and that 
“(c)ontemporary histories of the war included it as a matter of course.”641 Brown and Seaton 
further concede that the “special circumstances” of the new type of warfare contributed to the 
atmosphere that allowed the truce to happen, that burial of the dead was an important part of 
many cease-fires, that there was no armistice in many parts of the line, and that many high-
ranking officers, while not “conniving at fraternization,” used the “lull to improve what all 
commanders knew were very inadequate lines of defence.”642 They disclose the fact that no 
battalions were taken out of line and that no punishments were handed down as a result of 
the truce, although they make as much hay out of Ian Colquhoun’s court martial as possible. 
Brown and Seaton even admit that the truce could not possibly have ended the fighting, 
acknowledging that “(t)here was no chance that this could have happened.”643   
Even while conceding that it was “a relatively obscure event,” however, the authors 
continue to insist upon the truce’s real and lasting importance.644 “But what gives it greater 
historical interest and significance,” Brown and Seaton argue forcibly, “is that it happened so 
soon after a violent explosion of nationalist hatred, the result – and the intention – of which 
was to inspire the peoples at war with a loathing and contempt for their opponents.”645 As a 
result, the Christmas truce - according to these two historians – negated the initial outbreak of 
blind antipathy that accompanied the start of the war, and therefore continues to serve as a 
source of inspiration. In fact, as Brown wrote in the preface to the 1999 edition of the book, 
the 1914 armistice “can genuinely be seen as a precursor, a portent indeed, of the spirit of 
reconciliation now powerfully abroad as one century ends and a new age begins.”646 As Brown 
and Seaton declare, “while it would be easy to dismiss the events of that far-off Christmas as 
little more than a candle in the darkness,” they in fact “offer a light where no light might have 
been, and are thus a source of encouragement and hope that should not be overlooked and 
forgotten, rather acknowledged and, indeed, celebrated.”647  
In spite of having access to, and citing as sources, the contemporaneous accounts of 
such truce participants as R.J. Armes, Edward Hulse, Wilbert Spencer, and Lt.-Col. Fisher-
Rowe, all of whom strongly contradicted the inferences offered at the end of their history, 
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Brown and Seaton resolutely refuse to view the holiday cease-fire as anything other than the 
“candle in the darkness” that illuminates the moral of their work.648 As with Brown’s 
documentary Peace in No Man’s Land, the interviews conducted for the book were carefully 
screened to avoid memories that contradicted this monolithic narrative of the truce. Brown, 
for example, spoke with another veteran for Christmas Truce, Ernie Williams of the 6th 
Cheshires, but got little from him in the way of the now-preferred story of the cease-fire. 
When asked to explain the truce, Williams, although stating that he thought the conflict was 
“crackers actually,” believed that “we had a sense of duty and loyalty to our country and they 
would have the same idea, and they were fighting for their own country, or thought they 
were.” As a result, he had no issue with the Germans themselves, but still thought it important 
to win the war.  For inclusion in their work on the truce, however, Brown and Seaton preferred 
to quote Williams on the subject of a football game, during which he noted that “(t)here was 
no sort of ill-will between us,” rather than his desire to support his country by fighting the war 
in which it had engaged.649 
Brown’s various attempts to force the discourse of the truce into the pattern of the 
now-standardized narrative of the First World War, in which the soldiers had become the 
war’s victims and fraternization a manifestation of their fellow feeling for the enemy troops, 
were at least ostensibly based upon the recollections of the veterans themselves, a 
historiographical methodology which was now considered essential to the authenticity of any 
history or documentary about the conflict. The interest, therefore, in interviewing and 
collecting memoirs from soldiers who had served in the First World War arose not only from 
the realization that it would be wise to get their recollections down on tape or in print while 
they were still alive, but also as part of the growing interest in social and cultural history, and 
the need to draw conclusions about the war from the views of the men who had taken part in 
it. As a result, the focus in works about the First World War written after the 1960s now 
shifted to those who had experienced the conflict first-hand, moving the spotlight from the 
politicians and generals who had directed the war to front-line soldiers or junior officers. Paul 
Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory exemplified the new approach, in which the 
words of those who had served in and written about the war were adopted not only as the 
“truth” about the war, but also as the only valid way to understand what had actually 
happened between 1914 and 1918. For Fussell, soldiers’ recollections of the conflict were the 
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sole point of view through which the war could be correctly perceived.  As Leonard Smith, in 
his critique of this work, points out, “‘(m)emory’ is a wonderfully unproblematic and self-
evident concept in Fussell’s book. Memory always seems a clear window on the nature of 
reality, one opened by the hand of the war writer.”650 Through an examination of the works, 
generally fictional, written by soldiers about their experiences in the First World War, and an 
accompanying assumption that they were the most accurate possible representation of that 
war, Fussell argues that memory is history, because only these soldiers could accurately 
convey what the First World War was like, and knowing what the war was like was the only 
possible way to understand it.  
This is a point of view that has informed the narrative of the First World War ever 
since Fussell first articulated it.  Although previously the memoirs and poetry of soldiers such 
as Graves, Owen, Sassoon and Blunden were considered an important part of the war’s 
discourse, they were never taken to be the literal truth about the war, and were always offset 
by histories and other writings that provided more of an overview of the conflict. Fussell, 
however, strikes no such balance. He is a professor of English rather than an historian, and as 
a result often relies upon sources that were not completely accurate and points of view that 
were far from universal. Fussell, for example, discusses the “prewar summer,” which “was the 
most idyllic for many years,” during which Sassoon played cricket, Graves walked in the Welch 
mountains, and urbanites enjoyed “splendid evening parties, as well as a superb season for 
concerts, theatre, and the Russian ballet,” without further noting that this was hardly the 
representative experience of ordinary soldiers, who far outnumbered these privileged few and 
whose experiences of both peace and war were often very different.651 Most importantly, 
Fussell, while acknowledging that the works he used to support his argument were 
fictionalized and generally written well after the war ended, does not appear to question their 
validity as genuine and reliable artifacts. In fact, the poems and novels from which Fussell so 
liberally quotes were mostly intended to convey general “truths” about the First World War, 
and more largely the experience of fighting in a war itself, but were not necessarily meant to 
be directly representational. 
 As a result of this selectivity in the use of primary sources, Fussell has no trouble 
making his case. Because the soldiers whose works he has examines saw only senseless 
massacre and horror in the war, he concludes that “the German and British are not enemies; 
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the enemy of both is the War.”652 Consequently, the Christmas truce, which according to 
Fussell “outraged” the military leadership, is taken as proof that the soldiers’ adversaries were 
not on the other side of No-Man’s-Land, but were instead their own leadership sitting behind 
the lines directing the troops’ movements with callous disregard for the lives they threw away. 
Fussell even stretches this moral to the following year, 1915, when repeating an anecdote 
related by Stephen Graham in the post-war polemic The Challenge of the Dead regarding a 6th 
Black Watch sergeant, who was shot “when he went forward in violation of orders to fraternize 
with the enemy on Christmas Day,” although this anecdote is fiction rather than fact, as the 6th 
Black Watch were not in line on 25 December 1915, and in addition sustained no casualties 
during that entire month.653  
As Fussell notes in the preface to his work, by focusing on “places and situations where 
literary tradition and real life notably transect,” he tries to understand “the simultaneous and 
reciprocal process by which life feeds materials to literature while literature returns the favor 
by conferring forms upon life.”654 Taking the anti-war literature written by an articulate and 
disaffected group of junior officers and extrapolating those attitudes to all involved in the 
conflict, as well as using that literature to define soldiers’ experiences in the First World War 
in general, Fussell permanently shaped the narrative of that conflict, underlining the belief 
that it was, as Graves put it, “wicked nonsense.” The Christmas truce, with its murderous 
leaders and rebellious and victimized soldiers, provides Fussell with further proof that the war 
could be comprehended through the ideas and actions of the men involved rather than the 
views of their leadership. 
 The problem with this approach to the analysis of the First World War is that memory, 
while it can convey some of the emotions felt at the time, is far from “wonderfully 
unproblematic and self-evident.” In fact, at the same time that veterans were being lionized as 
the best source of truth about the war and probed for every last detail of the conflict, their 
recollections often refused to fall into line with the First World War’s prevailing narrative, or 
were so influenced by the modern discourse that they too imposed new meanings upon the 
truce and the war. Interviews with soldiers who had been in the front lines in Flanders in 1914 
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demonstrate how problematic memories could be in trying to determine what happened 
during Christmas of that year.655 For example, R.G. Garrod, a soldier with the 20th Hussars 
during the First World War, wrote sceptically about the truce in the early 1970s, observing 
that “(a)lthough it was said that on Christmas Day there was an unofficial armistice, I myself 
have never met a man who took part in it.”656  
However, Garrod’s assertion that he had never known anyone who participated in a 
truce actually demonstrates how the previous decade had informed not only the narrative of 
the First World War, but also that of the armistice itself, as he then went on to describe his 
experiences in the front lines of Flanders on 25 December 1914, when “some Germans exposed 
themselves and a few of our chaps did the same, each side called out “Happy Christmas” to 
each other and although no order was given, no firing took place.” Nevertheless, since on that 
day “certainly no one went across to actually meet the enemy,” Garrod did not understand 
that he had indeed taken part in the Christmas truce, the event that had now become so 
famous. While Gilbert Smith, who served with the 1st Queen’s Royal West Surreys, did recall 
participating in the truce, during which British soldiers who had died during the 18 December 
attack were buried, he observed very little fraternization on that day, except when “some men 
did go over to the German wire but they kept on their side and received cigarettes from our 
fellows.”657  
A. Self, who served with the 2nd West Yorks, also discussed the truce in his privately 
printed memoir A Gunner at a Ring Side Seat.658 Self’s armistice consisted mainly of a cease-
fire to bury the bodies in No-Man’s-Land. “You have read all sorts of stories, ciggarettes, 
football etc; on what has been termed the ‘Armistice’,” Self wrote, but “here are the facts in my 
sector, this was at Bois Grenier, South of Armentiers.” He described the burial of an “L/Sgt. 
Friend,” who had been killed during the German counter-attack on 19 December, “in a grave 
about four yards behind our front line.” The burial took place “in full view of the German front 
line – no mourners – no chaplain – just myself, a shallow grave, and a small wooden cross.” 
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656 R.G. Garrod, 20th Hussars, Private Papers of R.G. Garrod, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 6677. 
The memoir is undated, but internal evidence indicates that it was probably written during the 1970s. 
657 Gilbert H. Smith, 1st Queen’s Royal West Surrey, Private Papers of G.H. Smith, Imperial War Museum 
Collection No. 11396. 
658 A. Self, 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment, Private Papers of A. Self, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 
7753. 
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Once Self had finished burying his friend, he “jumped down into our trench thankful that Fritz 
had kept faith to the truce.” For the rest of Christmas, the two sides faced “each other in the 
muddy trenches” in the “uncanny” quiet of the cease-fire. Philip Neame, who served in the 
Royal Engineers, described a similarly low-key event when he was interviewed in 1974 about 
his memories of the conflict. 659 Prompted by the interviewer, who referred to the armistice as 
“one of the most publicized events of the winter,” Neame recalled that, on the front to which 
he was posted, “there was a complete cease-fire, and I would remember walking along our own 
front line, but there was no fraternizing, both our own infantry stood up and strolled about 
and the Germans did too, but they never got together and talked to each other at all.”  
These four veterans, all of whom were recalling their war experiences more than fifty 
years after the conflict had ended, referred to their respective armistices very off-handedly, 
clearly believing that the cease-fires and mutually agreed burials in which they participated on 
Christmas Day 1914 did not in fact constitute a ‘real’ truce, as the event had been described in 
so many histories and documentaries, and therefore weren’t worth dwelling upon. Only a 
decade after the narrative of futility had generally overtaken the discourse of the First World 
War, and the armistice had become a prime example of the soldiers’ rebellion against that 
hated war, the belief that participation in the holiday truce meant fraternization with the 
enemy, a game of football, and threats from authorities to resume the war, as well as a cynical 
attitude towards the conflict, had become so ingrained that even veterans who had been in the 
front lines at Christmas 1914 could not recognize their individual armistices as part of the 
legendary ‘Christmas Truce’ about which they had heard so much. 
Veterans of the conflict were also often confronted with the prejudices of their 
interviewers, which in turn complicated their struggles to provide unbiased memories of the 
war and the truce. In 1975, Colin Wilson, a former Grenadier Guard, was interviewed about the 
armistice by someone who made no bones about being an impartial questioner.660 The 
interviewer began the session with the statement that “what interests me very much is that 
episode of the First World War where you had that wonderful thing on Christmas Day, it’s the 
most wonderful thing of the war, and I’ve never had the privilege of meeting anybody who was 
actually there.” Thus encouraged to claim a part in “the most wonderful thing of the war,” 
Wilson related a truce in which he had participated that took place on 31 rather than 25 
December, when the Germans sang in their trenches and the two sides called back and forth 
to each other, and then met and fraternized in No-Man’s-Land. Wilson recalled how other 
                                                          
659 Philip Neame, 15th Field Company Royal Engineers, Interview, 1974, Imperial War Museum Collection 
No. 48. 
660 Colin Wilson, 1st Grenadier Guards, Interview, 1975, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 9083.    
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battalions in the 7th Division, particularly the Scots Guards and Gordon Highlanders, also 
socialized with the enemy, and that the “truce was then spreading, by then the general 
headquarters behind the line had found out that there was a truce on, and that didn’t go down 
very well, so they issued an order that fraternization was to cease forthwith and any German 
soldiers that were seen to leave their trenches for the purpose of fraternizing was to be fired 
on” - in spite of the fact that the Grenadier Guards were part of the 7th Division of IV Corps, 
whose leadership was so tolerant of the truce.661 Wilson was also ready to fall in with the by-
now expected moral of the armistice: when the interviewer concluded that the “episode of that 
unofficial truce was to me the most wonderful thing that occurred in the whole war and I wish 
it could have stopped the whole war,” Wilson most cooperatively responded that “(i)f it had 
been left to the soldiers it probably would.”  
In the same year that Wilson’s memories of the truce were recorded, J. H. Acton, who 
was with the 1st Devons on the Western fr0nt from 1914 through 1918, described a much more 
conventional truce in his interview.662 Acton noted that the armistice lasted seven days, during 
which time there was no shooting, and that it had begun on Christmas Eve, when “during the 
night Jerry came out and shouted, it’s Christmas, if you no shoot we no shoot.” One of the 
Devons’ soldiers went over to the German trenches, exchanged cigarettes with the Germans, 
and agreed to a cease-fire for the rest of the night.  “Well, the next day at daylight on our right 
and on our left everyone was out in no-man’s-land,” Acton continued, describing the burial of 
two British soldiers who had been killed the night before when the Devons rotated into the 
trenches, and how “a German officer read the burial service.” When questioned about the 
repercussions of the truce, however, Acton obviously did not react as the interviewer expected. 
“I believe the higher authorities frowned upon it afterwards, didn’t they?” the interviewer 
asked. Acton shrugged off the question. “Ours didn’t,” he said. “I believe it went right along 
the line after, right along the line.”663   
As revealed by the recollections of these six veterans, whose written and oral memoirs 
were produced before 1976, the influence of the 1960s on the discourse of both the truce and 
the war itself is plain: four former soldiers more or less disavowed their cease-fires, as they did 
                                                          
661 Chronologically speaking, Wilson’s memories of the armistice are fairly dubious: although it is true 
that the 1st Grenadier Guards rotated back into the trenches on 27 December, and that the cease-fire in 
their area lasted until the beginning of January, there are no records from any battalion or soldier of 
fraternization after Boxing Day. He could not possibly have seen the 2nd Scots Guards or 2nd Gordon 
Highlanders fraternizing with the enemy, as neither battalion did so beyond 26 December. 
662 J.H. Acton, 1st Devonshires, Interview, 1975, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 24881. 
663 Although the 1st Devons were part of the 5th Division, and therefore under the direction of Smith-
Dorrien, it appears that Acton did not have any memories of displeasure on the part of the leadership to 
spoil the recollection of his truce. 
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not fit into the pattern of the now-familiar narrative of Germans and British meeting in No-
Man’s-Land, and one soldier spoke about observing fraternization that he heard about rather 
than saw, while only one veteran discussed a truce that echoed the more contemporaneous 
versions of the event, with a leadership that did not seem too bothered by the impromptu 
armistice. This pattern of inconsistencies in soldiers’ recollections of the event was to continue 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s as the memories of First World War veterans were probed for 
the details of their service in the conflict. 
Major Leslie Walkinton, who served with the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, was another 
soldier that, like Acton, did not buy into the general shift in the truce’s narrative, as illustrated 
in his 1979 interview about his experiences in the war (featured in the Brown documentary), 
which was followed by the 1980 publication of his autobiography, Twice in a Lifetime.664 In 
that memoir, Walkinton noted that although officers had previously warned the soldiers 
“against fraternization with the enemy,” Christmas was viewed by the troops as “a time of 
friendship and goodwill towards men.” In any case, the veteran observed, the British soldiers 
had “nothing against” the enemy: “He shot at us and we shot at him – but that’s what we were 
there for after all.”665 He discussed previous cases of friendly behavior, such as the two sides 
singing to each other from their respective trenches, and remarks shouted across No-Man’s-
Land “generally with less venom in them than a couple of London cabbies after a mild 
collision.”666 Walkinton even speculated that, during the war’s first winter, the two sides 
might have been able to settle things between them:  
How furious the politicians and generals would have been if the John Citizens 
of both sides had got together and said ‘This is too damn silly, and it’s very cold 
and uncomfortable. Let’s chuck it and go home.’ But no! I must admit that it is 
an impossible dream. If the plain man had tried to start a pow-wow some well-
meaning lance-corporal, anxious for a second stripe, would have opened fire 
and spoilt everything. Also, another admission (this is my disillusioned post-
war self writing this), in 1914, as one of the keenest and most patriotic (what 
pitfalls there are for the world in patriotism!) of very young soldiers, I would 
have spoilt it myself.667 
                                                          
664 Walkinton, Interview, 1979, and M. L. Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime (London: Samson Books, 1980). 
The foreword of Walkinton’s memoir, written by Field-Marshall Lord Harding of Petherton, who 
served, like Walkinton, in a London Territorial Infantry Brigade, unapologetically placed the First and 
Second World Wars on the same footing. “I often wonder if the younger generations of today realise 
how different, how difficult, how restricted and how tedious our lives would be,” Lord Harding wrote, 
“if the author and his comrades and mine had not been prepared to face all the fearfulness of war rather 
than submit to the Kaiser and his Prussians or Hitler and the Nazis.” (Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, 
pg. 7) 
665 As Walkinton noted, “(e)very fighting soldier also discovered, if he stayed long enough to get the 
front line mentality well into him, that the further from the line the greater the hatred of the enemy.  At 
the real front he was called Fritz or Brother Boche.” (Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pg. 43). 
666 Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pg. 43. 
667 Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pp. 43-44. 
190 
 
 
Walkinton then described how the British and Germans gradually eased into a truce in 
the evening of 24 December, with a cease-fire arranged for a twenty-four hour period, singing 
on Christmas Eve, and fraternization on Christmas Day, with the exchange of food and drink.  
Walkint0n recalled speaking with a German who “seemed a very pleasant sort of lad.”  The two 
soldiers “tried talking war, but I found he was full of newspaper propaganda, as I suppose I 
was, and we couldn’t make any sense of it.”668 The Queen’s Westminster Rifles’ truce ended, as 
Walkinton noted, when they were relieved by the 1st Royal Fusiliers, but he retained the same 
attitude towards the Germans throughout the war and even afterwards, noting that it was 
important “to realize that much of the devotion and bravery of the common soldiers was 
definitely the result of love of friends rather than hatred of the enemy’s soldiers.”669 
Walkinton’s recognition that his views on the enemy had changed since the early part of the 
war was more than most veterans would admit to, although he did not necessarily 
acknowledge that many of those changes owed much to the post-war narrative. 
John Wedderburn-Maxwell, whose contemporaneous account of the truce had been 
published in the Daily Telegraph in January 1915, was also interviewed in 1985 about his 
memories of the war.670 Although at the time he had written that the truce was “the most 
extraordinary show” and “(i)f we don’t take care there will be a permanent peace without 
generals or COs having any say in the matter,” his attitude seventy years later proved quite 
resistant to the modern narrative. “How did you feel about firing at these people to whom you 
had been talking to?” the interviewer asked him, to which the veteran responded fairly 
casually: “Oh, that was our job.” Wedderburn-Maxwell also maintained that the truce had no 
“psychological effect on us, no, I think it was just an event” and that he did not believe that 
anyone was punished for fraternizing with the enemy. In fact, the only negative thing 
Wedderburn-Maxwell could recall about the Christmas armistice was that he got “an awful 
dressing down” for the publication of his letter in the newspaper, as his superior officer was 
able to figure out who wrote it from the details involved, and was most annoyed with 
Wedderburn-Maxwell “for daring to write to the press.” 
Major Walkinton, not yet squeezed dry on the subject of the truce, was interviewed 
again in 1985, but this time was even more adamant about not falling in with the now-
                                                          
668 Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pg. 45. 
669 Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pg. 179.  Walkinton further added that “(o)f course we didn’t delude 
ourselves that we had never hated each other’s guts when our best friends were killed or maimed or our 
living conditions became unbearable, but we wanted to forgive and forget and do what little we could to 
avoid a repetition.” (Walkinton, Twice in a Lifetime, pg. 179). 
670 John Wedderburn-Maxwell, 45th Brigade R.F.A., Interview, 1985, Imperial War Museum Collection 
No. 9146. 
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prevalent view of the event. While acknowledging that the two sides, during fraternization, 
“couldn’t have been friendlier,” he scotched all notions that the cease-fire could have led to 
the conflict’s end.671 In response to a question regarding any disciplinary action taken after the 
truce, Walkinton again punctured this myth, noting that there was “(n)one whatever in my 
battalion, nothing at all, we were just told, look, you – don’t do this again, we said we 
wouldn’t.”672 He summed up the entire experience as a “damn good joke,” that is, a “way of 
laughing at one’s superiors,” as they could do nothing to prevent the truce, but in any case 
they did not even try: “they had the sense to keep away.”  
George Ashurst, who was interviewed in 1987, the same year that his memoir My Bit: A 
Lancashire Fusilier at War 1914-1918 was published, discussed the truce in both accounts.673 
Ashurst complained, in his book and the interview, about the “comfortably housed and well 
fed ‘Heads’ in the rear” who ordered the British artillery to fire, thus ending the armistice, and 
how “a few days afterwards when we got our letters and papers from home we read of the 
British public’s horror at their troops actually fraternizing with the horrible German troops.”674 
He was particularly bitter about the “parsons” who “condemned us for such un-British 
conduct.”675 Of course, there is no way to tell what was in any letters Ashurst may have 
received after the event, and possibly a friend or relative may have written this, but as noted 
earlier, no major newspapers condemned the truce, and in addition, no other soldier 
contemporaneously reported receiving communications from home denouncing the 
fraternization.  
Similarly, C.A.F Drummond, who served as an artillery officer on the Western Front in 
1914, wrote in a 1976 memoir that the cease-fire in his area had gone on for a week, “(b)ut of 
                                                          
671 Walkinton, Interview, 1985. 
672 Walkinton did recall hearing that “one Scottish officer was court-martialed, but I don’t think he was 
punished or anything, but I don’t really know,” although clearly he is mixing up the 1915 truce with the 
one in which he participated. 
673 Ashurst, Interview, and George Ashurst, My Bit: A Lancashire Fusilier at War 1914-1918 (Wiltshire: 
The Crowood Press, 1987). 
674 Ashurst, My Bit, pg. 42. Although Ashurst does not say exactly when his memoir was written – it 
seems unlikely that he had waited until the mid-1980s to record his memories of the war – he seemed 
very angry still at the time of writing it at “the men who did their fighting in big chateaux and their 
marching in motor cars” and the home front whom he believed had condemned the truce.  He defended 
the armistice against those critics, arguing that the soldiers had done nothing wrong: “We had dared to 
stop the bloody game of war a few hours longer than the ‘official’ period. Men who were half starved, 
dirty, lousy, suffering unbelievable mental and physical tortures, for a purpose that not one in a 
hundred of them could definitely state – can one imagine the feelings of these men at this ingratitude 
from their own country? No wonder that the common and general wish of these men was that those 
well fed and comfortable critics were in the trenches opposite, in the place of a more friendly enemy.” 
Ashurst, My Bit, pg. 42. 
675 At the same time, Ashurst was also, somewhat surprisingly, convinced that the truce had been 
authorized in advance by “somebody in authority” – he believed it was the Germans - who had 
decided that “we mustn’t fight” for a few hours. Ashurst, interview. 
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course the war was becoming a farce and the high-ups decided that this truce must stop.”676 A 
bombardier with the Royal Field Artillery, Colonel Harold Lewis, when interviewed in 1986, 
had a completely different take on the truce: he doubted “whether anything of the nature or 
magnitude that had been claimed for it took place at all.”677 In fact, he thought that, because 
of the discipline prevailing in the British and German armies, “the whole thing borders on the 
fairy tale and may be classed with the Russian with snow on their boots and the angel of 
Mons.” 
As Todman aptly notes, “(j)ust because a veteran has said it does not mean that it is 
true.”678  The interviews and memoirs that were recorded or written during the 1970s and 
1980s by now-elderly survivors of the First World War demonstrate that some of the soldiers 
involved were just as susceptible to the shifting elements of the narrative of the conflict and 
the Christmas truce as historians and the general public. There were veterans who believed 
that those involved in the armistice had been punished and soldiers who maintained that 
British civilians had condemned the truce, while others insisted that the event had never 
happened. The focus on the recollections of soldiers during this time illustrates the pitfalls of 
histories that emphasize personal narratives and rely upon the recollections of individuals 
about events long past. The memories of the war recorded by veterans in these decades 
reinforced many myths about the conflict, not least through the pre-conceptions of those who 
were interviewing the veterans or selecting the topics on which they spoke. At the same time, 
although many of the soldiers’ recollections about their service in the Great War diverged 
sharply from the now-conventional narrative, these deviations were glossed over and largely 
ignored in the rush to endorse a homogeneous discourse, as the many histories produced 
during these decades demonstrated. 
John Ellis’ Eye Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War I, like Fussell’s work, focuses 
on the war as experienced by the soldier in the trenches on the Western Front.679 Not content 
with noting that, “(i)n their letters home, soldiers were usually reticent about describing 
conditions as they really were,” Ellis goes on to conclude that this voluntary behaviour led to 
an antipathy on the part of the front-line troops to civilians.680 “As the war progressed,” he 
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677 Harold Essex Lewis, 240th Royal Field Artillery, Interview, 1986, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 
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678 Todman, Great War, pg. 207. 
679 In spite of the global emphasis of such documentaries as The Great War, the First World War was, 
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observes, “this reticence began to express itself as a positive dislike of the home front as a 
whole.”681 Ellis contrasts this with the “definite sense of comradeship that united the whole 
army,” which was “doing a task that people at home could not even understand.”682 This 
feeling of “common identity” was, however, confined “to the select brotherhood of the 
damned who had to suffer all the miseries of trench warfare.” In the ‘us v. them’ camaraderie 
of the front lines, “both sides were quite prepared to adopt a policy of live and let live” when 
lack of pressure from “higher commands permitted.”683  
 Ellis, in Eye-Deep in Hell, notes that the “most famous example of fraternization” came 
about at Christmas 1914, when “up and down the whole line, Frenchmen, Germans and 
Englishmen spontaneously emerged from their trenches and met in no man’s land where they 
exchanged cigarettes, drink, food, photographs and addresses,” and the Lancashire Fusiliers 
even played the Saxons at football.684 Ellis’ account of the armistice quotes an officer of the 
London Rifles, who volunteered that he now had “‘a very different opinion of the Germans,’” 
and includes the paragraph from Hulse’s letter where he discussed the inherent unlikelihood 
of the event, but omits the orders Hulse received from headquarters telling him not to fire 
upon the Germans. “But when news of these meetings reached the High Command,” Ellis 
continues, “they were utterly appalled at the seeming disintegration of the ‘fighting spirit’.”685 
He also quotes the information from Field Marshal French’s memoir noting how upset he was 
when he first heard of the truce, his immediate issuance of orders to prevent its recurrence, 
and the “trouble” that resulted for those commanders whose troops had participated in the 
event.686 Ellis, however, does not mention the accompanying passage from 1914 which 
expressed French’s regret that he had not endorsed the armistice at the time, thereby 
supporting the conventional view of the cease-fire through selective use of participants’ words 
to create the impression that the “‘absolutely astonishing’” truce, which changed the mind of 
one officer towards the enemy, was suppressed by the army’s leaders.   
Alan Lloyd’s The War in the Trenches went even further, observing that any temporary 
cease-fires in the trenches were feared by the military leadership, who believed that “lack of 
aggression in the proximity of the enemy - a live and let live attitude among the troops – once 
condoned might become habitual.”687 As proof of this, Lloyd maintains that the “fraternization 
at Christmas had quickly been condemned by British generals, and a number of the 
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participants court-martialed.”688 As these examples demonstrate, the parts of the armistice’s 
history that were inconsistent with the new narrative of the war were gradually being swept 
aside in favour of a new discourse that emphasized the punishments meted out to participants 
while ignoring the contemporaneous evidence that no such disciplinary measures were 
implemented. At the same time, therefore, that historians were so heavily focused on using 
soldiers’ contemporaneous documents and memories to present their histories as authentic, 
they were busy editing out the parts that did not fit their theories, creating a monolithic 
discourse that apparently captured the public imagination and drove out all dissenting views. 
Tony Ashworth, in Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System, also 
examined the war through the eyes of the front-line soldiers. In this work, Ashworth advanced 
the theory that it was the lack of hatred for the other side that enabled men to survive in the 
terrible conditions of the trenches. The live and let live system, “a process of reciprocal 
exchange among antagonists, where each diminished the other’s risk of death, discomfort and 
injury by a deliberate restriction of aggressive activity, but only on condition that the other 
requited the restraint,” was, according to Ashworth, “the antithesis of the official kill or be 
killed.” He compares the Christmas truce, which he maintains was neither the first nor the last 
unofficial armistice on the Western front, “to the sudden surfacing of an iceberg, visible to all 
including non-combatants, which for most of the war remained largely submerged, invisible 
to all save the participants.”689 However, for the validity of Ashworth’s argument, which is that 
the soldiers in the front lines had worked out their own method of survival in defiance of the 
leadership, any visible manifestations of insubordination had to be ruthlessly punished. The 
truce, with its lack of subsequent penalties, does not support Ashworth’s theories as well as he 
would like, so although he does maintain that the “reaction of high command to these truces 
was immediate and negative,” he is at the same time forced to admit that “on the whole (it) 
appears to have taken the form of admonishment and warning.”690  
The abbreviated 1915 truce is much better suited to Ashworth’s hypothesis, as orders 
had been issued in advance preventing it, and “(t)wo officers of the Scots Guards were court 
                                                          
688 Lloyd, War in the Trenches, pp. 37-38. Lloyd also describes the second truce that occurred at 
Christmas 1915, observing that on that date “the trench soldier’s inclination to make the most of 
seasonable lulls was demonstrated by a further outbreak of fraternization in No Man’s Land, despite the 
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martialed; one was acquitted, and the other convicted and reprimanded.”691 Ashworth, 
however, does not mention the quashing of Colquhoun’s reprimand, or the fact that at least 
three battalions participated in the 1915 truce, out of which only two junior officers from one 
of those battalions were brought up on charges.692 The 1914 and 1915 Christmas truces, which 
were ostensibly well suited to Ashworth’s theory that the soldiers in the trenches on both sides 
were keen to defy their commanders by “thwarting” their instructions to fight, did not in fact 
lead to the kind of punishments in which he believed such “unofficial and illegal” actions were 
supposed to result, requiring more than a bit of manipulation to make these two events fit his 
premise.693  
Another important work on the First World War that emerged during this period that 
used the truce to prove its point, Modris Eksteins’ Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth 
of the Modern Age approached the conflict from an entirely different angle.694 Although his 
view that the war heralded the birth of modernism was not unprecedented, having already 
been advanced by Fussell and others, Eksteins further theorized that Germany was, “on the 
eve of the war, the foremost representative of innovation and renewal,” while “Britain was in 
fact the major conservative power of the fin-de-siecle world.”695 Britain, as a result, was fighting 
not only to maintain her “pre-eminence in the world” but also her “entire way of life.”696 Under 
this scenario, Britain’s involvement in the war turned it “from a continental power struggle 
into a veritable war of cultures.”697 For Eksteins, therefore, the First World War was not a fight 
for more colonies or a greater place in the sun, but rather a battle for the soul of the world, a 
struggle that Germany dominated until the end of 1945.   
In Rites of Spring, the Christmas truce therefore represents not the communal feelings 
that the British had for their opponents across No-Man’s-Land nor a manifestation of their 
hatred of war, but was a stand-in for the conservative British principles for which they were 
fighting: “stability and responsibility,” in fact, civilization itself, which “was possible only if one 
                                                          
691 Ashworth, Trench Warfare, pp. 32-33. Ashworth also alleges, based upon Wilfred Ewart’s 
posthumously published diary, that “all leave in the battalion was stopped” for the 2nd Scots Guards 
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played the game according to rules laid down by the time, history, precedent, all of which 
amounted to the law.”698 Since for the British the war represented “a struggle to preserve social 
values, precisely those values and ideals which the prewar avant-garde had so bitterly 
attacked: notions of justice, dignity, civility, restraint, and ‘progress’ governed by a respect for 
the law,” participation in the truce embodied those ideals of ‘fair play,’ those “time-honoured 
courtesies” whereby “one saluted one’s opponent and paid one’s respects.”699 Eksteins also 
credits the armistice to the British “sporting spirit,” which had guided their decision to enter 
the war and in which “most of the British participants joined in the Christmas truce. The war 
was a game, deadly earnest, to be sure, but a game nevertheless.”700  
But what of the Germans, who joined equally in the truce and in most cases appeared 
to have initiated it? Eksteins attributes their participation to the fact that “(s)ome of the 
Germans who had spent time in England – and there were a surprising number of them – 
clearly had acquired the British passion” for sport, without noting that, however many 
Teutonic waiters London hotels had employed, there could never have been sufficient 
numbers to sway the attitudes of the entire army.701 Eksteins also tosses in the influence of 
their Bavarian and Saxon heritage on the German peoples as a whole, for whom “history was 
not subservient to a vision of the future, as it was for so many Prussians…The German quest 
for modernity was led by Prussia. The Christmas truce of 1914 was, by contrast, a celebration of 
history and tradition.”702 For Eksteins, the holiday armistice represents the traditional values 
of the British, Bavarians and Saxons, which took some time to be broken down by the modern 
conflict: “That such massive fraternization was never to recur during the war suggests,” 
Eksteins maintains, “that it was not the ‘guns of August’ but subsequent events that shattered 
an old world.”703 
 Eksteins discusses the sequel to the impromptu truces, with the event being 
extensively reported in the British press and less so in the German newspapers, while the 
French “muzzled all mention of fraternization.”704 Afterwards, “(s)trict orders went out to 
troops in all armies that a recurrence of such incidents would have drastic repercussions; and 
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since headquarters in each army pursued the matter for a time, seeking names and all 
available information, soldiers did become wary of further contacts with the enemy.”705 Even 
though the “live and let live system” continued to allow mutual accommodation between the 
opposing forces, truces later became rare, as the “enemy became increasingly an abstraction,” 
with whom no relationship, sporting or otherwise, was possible.706 
 For Eksteins, as for Montague sixty years earlier, the war had transformed European 
society, destroying its previously shared social and ethical standards. For both, the Christmas 
truce, “with its tales of camaraderie and warmth between supposedly bitter enemies in the 
crater-scarred territory of no man’s land,” represented the last gasp of the old values before 
they were shattered in the dehumanizing trenches that ushered in the new world of anti-
traditionalism and total war.707 Modernism, Eksteins argues, was imposed upon the world by 
the First World War; Fussell similarly maintains that the “essentially ironic” mode of “modern 
understanding” had originated “largely in the application of mind and memory to the events 
of the Great War.”708 These two influential writers saw in the First World War the origin of a 
world-view that perceived events through a lens of irony, one that contrasted expectations 
with disillusioning reality. The application of this modernist outlook to the “memory” of the 
First World War has since informed the narrative of the conflict in a way that renders such 
interwar works as Hutchinson’s Warrior and Thompson’s Lions Led by Donkeys not only 
obsolete but almost unreadable: praise for the army’s “courageous and sympathetic 
leadership” and complaints that the Germans “did not play the game” support modern 
criticisms of the conflict by demonstrating the naïveté of early twentieth century views. In 
fact, after the narrative shift during the 1960s and the hardening into established fact of the 
futile discourse of the war in the decades thereafter, the conventional way to view the First 
World War as the 1980s drew to a close was with despair at its waste and stupidity, 
accompanied by a large dose of sardonic wit to wash the bitterness down, attitudes 
exemplified in popular culture by the famous BBC television series Blackadder Goes Forth.709   
 In that comedy series, the quintessential modernist and cynic Captain Edmund 
Blackadder, stuck in the endless stalemate of the Western front, fights a rearguard action, 
armed with only his wits and his ability to see through the idiocy and futility of the war, 
against the moronic leadership (Colonel Melchett), the mindless upper-class officers 
(Lieutenant the Honourable George Colthurst St. Barleigh) and the gullible common soldiers 
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(Private Baldrick). Noting that an order to advance means that “Field Marshal Haig is about to 
make yet another gargantuan effort to move his drinks cabinet six inches closer to Berlin,” and 
remarking that the whole conflict “would be a damn sight simpler if we just stayed in England 
and shot fifty thousand of our men a week,” Blackadder was perceived as speaking the ‘truth’ 
of the war to an audience that, based upon the popular narrative of the conflict as it had been 
presented for the previous thirty years, was well primed to receive it.710 The series’ 
representation of the Christmas truce has Lieutenant St. Barleigh reminiscing lyrically about 
the “wonderful” armistice, with the sounds of Silent Night “drifting across the still, clear air of 
No-Man’s-Land,” and the meeting of German and British troops in No-Man’s-Land, and 
Blackadder quickly deflating him by observing that more ground was gained “during one 
Christmas piss-up than they managed in the next two-and-a-half years of war.” The show, 
therefore, managed to present both a romantic and cynical interpretation of the truce while 
reinforcing what had become the mainstream view of the futile fight on the Western front. 
 By the end of the 1980s, the narrative of senseless waste that had overtaken the 
previously varied discourse of the First World War had almost completely driven out opposing 
opinions. Histories, memoirs, interviews with veterans, documentaries, and various 
manifestations of popular culture all reinforced a mainstream view of the war and the truce 
that was increasingly homogeneous, in which Malcolm Brown’s perceived “camaraderie of the 
victim” led bitter enemies to cross No-Man’s-Land and shake hands with those they had been 
trying to kill for the first five months of the war, and only threatened punishment from army 
leadership was able to force the men to fight each other again. While Eksteins argues that the 
1914 holiday cease-fire was, in fact, the dying breath of the nineteenth century values that were 
later destroyed by the war, the sophistication of his theories was no match for the breath-
taking simplicity of the iconic last scene of Blackadder Goes Forth, when the do0med soldiers, 
invited by “General Insanity Melchett” to participate in “a mass slaughter,” go over the top to 
face certain death. With such images, the new orthodoxy of the war captured the public 
imagination and led to reliance upon a narrative of the conflict that left little room for 
disagreement. 
 Although the new approach towards history during the 1970s and 1980s emphasized 
the importance of views of the common soldier in understanding the war, the voices of the 
soldiers themselves either became increasingly lost in the drive to establish a more monolithic 
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discourse of the war, or were reliant on the new discourse of the war as a touchstone for their 
own memories. The well-intentioned efforts to let the words of the veterans themselves drive 
the narrative of the war and produce genuine “history from below,” that would allow their 
voices to be heard above the rhetoric of politicians and the analysis of the generals’ tactics, 
failed to take into account the fallibility of soldiers’ memories, and the possibility that they 
could also re-write the past to suit a pre-determined narrative or please a ready audience for 
their war stories.   
As a result of the new emphasis of historiography, the now generally-accepted 
elements of the First World War’s conventions – stupid and callous generals sending the 
helpless front-line victims to be slaughtered in a war that had no purpose and made no sense – 
were apparently reinforced by the survivors of the conflict. The influence of the 1960s on the 
narrative of the war, together with the new emphasis on the role of the truce as a soldiers’ 
rebellion against the conflict, came to inform not only popular culture, but also the memories 
of those who fought in the war itself. Many veterans of the war, when recalling the cease-fires 
in which their battalions had participated, succumbed to the discourse that had grown around 
the armistice, and because they had not fraternized with the enemy in ways that echoed the 
myth, did not perceive that they had nonetheless been a part of the famous Christmas truce. 
By 1990, the image of British and Germans meeting each other in No-Man’s-Land had become 
so ingrained in the public consciousness that it now defined the ‘official’ holiday truce, with 
few mainstream variations on this theme available to counter popular attitudes. Although 
some surviving soldiers still insisted on the armistice they remembered, with no punishments 
handed out and no desire to end the war, it was Albert Moren’s belief that the truce “could 
have finished the war, if it was left to the men” that was broadcast on Christmas Eve 1981. The 
selectivity in the use of earlier sources utilized by those now writing about the war, and 
equally selective reliance on the memories of those who had experienced it sixty or seventy 
years earlier, meant that during the 1970s and 1980s the Christmas truce had become 
increasing mythologized in support of a greater narrative that consistently reinforced the idea 
of the First World War as a senseless conflict.  
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Chapter Ten 
“Memories of Christmas 1914 persist”: 
Orthodoxy, Revisionism and the Christmas Truce, 1990 - 2013 
 
 
Some of the British officers took a dim view of such sport, and when the game came to its 
exhausted end, the men were encouraged back to their trenches for a carol service and 
supper….Boxing Day passed without a game. The officers were alarmed at what had happened 
on Christmas Day. If such friendly relations continued, how could they get the men to fight 
again? How could the war continue? 
-Michael Foreman  
War Game: Village Green to No-Man’s-Land (1993) 
 
The Christmas Truce of 1914, however, was unique. While some senior officers went out of 
their way to ‘look the other way,’ most officers worked hard to put an end to it. The fact that 
the men under them defied these orders is extremely unusual. In addition, this truce lasted 
much longer and involved many more soldiers than any other previous truce. 
-Jim Murphy 
Truce: the Day the Soldiers Stopped Fighting (2009)  
 
 
 On the quiet Western front in early 1915, Lyn Macdonald writes in her 1993 book 1915: 
The Death of Innocence, the state of affairs between the opposing sides was so peaceful that 
“(s)uch belligerence as there was at present was largely directed by officers towards their own 
troops.”711 The hostility which Macdonald believes was shown by army leadership towards its 
soldiers was the result of the 1914 truce, during which “(a)uthority on both sides of the line 
had strongly disapproved of the Christmas spirit of goodwill that had brought the front-line 
soldiers of both sides out of their trenches to swap greetings and gifts,” resulting in “rebukes 
that had passed down the chain of command through discomfited Brigadiers, Colonels and 
Majors to the rank and file.”  
Although the holiday armistice took place just before the chronological beginning of 
her history of the second year of the war, Macdonald’s work opens with the aftermath of that 
truce on the Western front in early 1915. In fact, as Macdonald claims, the junior officers in the 
front lines  
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who had cast a benevolent eye on the friendly gatherings in No Man’s Land and been glad of 
the chance to bury the dead in places where there had been an attack, spent the days after 
Christmas miserably composing the written explanations for these lapses of discipline which 
had enraged higher authority and for which higher authority was holding them personally 
responsible.712   
The officers in the 5th Division, in fact, produced their very brief descriptions of the 
armistice within a day after receiving Smith-Dorrien’s order to do so, and the officers in the 
other divisions faced no such requirement, but Macdonald, who writes about those soldiers 
“that might otherwise have gone unheard, the voices of a traumatized generation,” is intent on 
proving that truce participants were punished.713 Disregarding the lack of consequences for 
those who joined in the wide-spread fraternization, the fact that Smith-Dorrein’s order only 
applied to a very small percentage of truce participants, and the extensive reporting of the 
truce in regimental diaries, Macdonald uses the 1914 armistice to prove her point: that the 
“enraged” and callous authorities, condemning what they perceived as anti-war sentiment, 
had punished the officers who had allowed the truce to happen.714 
 Macdonald’s work, driven by the dominant narrative of the war as senseless and futile, 
emphasizes the enthusiasm for the conflict among the willfully ignorant civilian populations 
of Britain and Germany, and characterizes the British military establishment as hide-bound, 
inflexible and short-sighted. She closes 1915: Death of Innnocence with the horror with which 
the army leadership, who had issued orders “which forbade any contact with the enemy,” 
greeted the 1915 truces by three Guards battalions.715 As a result of the generals’ anger over 
these mini-truces, Macdonald claims, “(t)he junior officer who condoned the meeting in No 
Man’s Land was sent home in disgrace,” while “First Army Headquarters thundered its 
determination to get to the bottom of the sorry episode and threatened dire retribution.”716 
Macdonald then references the urgent memo from Headquarters asking for a report on the 
fraternization by the 1st Grenadier Guards and 1st and 2nd Scots Guards, and follows this with 
the statement that the Guards’ fraternization was “hushed up,” as the British public would 
have not appreciated the story.717 “The comical Germans of the year before,” Macdonald wrote, 
                                                          
712 Macdonald, 1915, pg. 5. 
713 Macdonald, 1915, foreword, pg. vii. The explanations written in response to Smith-Dorrien’s 27 
December request by the 5th Division officers involved in the truce were all dated 28 December 1914. 
714 Macdonald, 1915, pp. 3-4. 
715 Macdonald, 1915, pg. 599. 
716 Macdonald, 1915, pp. 599-600. 
717 Information about Colquhoun’s court martial was not published in the British press, but this may 
have been for a number of reasons, only one of which is censorship by the leadership. Alternative 
202 
 
“were now the hated Boche, progenitors of all the horrors and misery that had dashed the 
hopes and expectations of a long and harrowing year.”718  
 The omissions in Macdonald’s account of the 1915 truce are easily refuted. Colquhoun 
was certainly not sent home in disgrace, but rather received permission to return to Britain 
while his wife gave birth to their child. The threatened “dire retribution” for the 1915 truces 
was never implemented.719 No mention is made of the fact that the verdict returned in the 
Colquhoun court-martial was only a reprimand (or of Haig’s quashing of that mild 
punishment), or that a second officer was also court-martialed and immediately found not 
guilty. Macdonald also does not acknowledge the fact that, while two other Guards battalions 
participated in truces, no officers from those units were punished. Moreover, the 1914 truce 
had not been condoned by the British public because they found the Germans “comical,” but 
was instead readily accepted by the home front as an unusual Christmas celebration by its 
troops. Macdonald’s view of the war, however, presumes overreaction on the part of the 
British military leadership to any peaceable behavior from the soldiers they commanded, and 
as a result, Colquhoun had to be banished to England by a furious leadership and severely 
punished for his actions while the news of the 1915 truce – but not the one a year earlier - was 
covered up by the government. 
A completely different view of both the war and the truce, however, was presented by 
Gary Sheffield less than a decade after Macdonald’s work. Sheffield, who argues in Forgotten 
Victory that “the Great War was seen by the vast majority of British people as a just and 
worthwhile war – while it was still going on,” believes that it was the failure of the conflict to 
bring prosperity and security to Europe that contributed to its reputation of futility.720 So 
prevalent is this myth, he remarks, that “the First World War is often used as shorthand for 
stupidity, blind obedience, failures of leadership, appalling physical conditions and 
deadlock.”721 According to Sheffield, the soldiers in the front lines tried to make their lives 
more bearable “by informal truces and tacit agreements that developed between opposing 
sides,” with the Christmas truce being the “most famous” of these temporary cease-fires.722  
After 1990, in spite of the presence of dissenting voices such as Sheffield’s, there was 
little room in popular culture for variation in the narrative of the truce, or indeed of the First 
World War as a whole. The soldiers who fought the war were now generally perceived to be 
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203 
 
the traumatized victims of the callous and stupid British generals, and the 1914 armistice 
became, as a result, an unorganized but powerful rebellion against the war, which, in turn, 
had to be suppressed by the callous military leadership. This interpretation of the conflict, 
based in part on the attitude of the famous anti-war poets and in part on the selective use of 
the views of the soldiers who had participated in it, was during the same period scrutinized by 
some revisionist historians, who looked at contemporaneous sources and drew different 
conclusions about the First World War. In response to this opposition, the supporters of the 
now-conventional views dug in their heels and insisted even more firmly that their 
interpretation of the conflict was accurate. The 1990s and 2000s became, in a sense, a new 
battleground for the war, with the orthodox narrative of the conflict, while under attack from 
revisionist forces, so firmly entrenched in the public consciousness that no new offensive 
could easily uproot it. 
The conventional view of the war, in fact, continued to be promoted by a number of 
historians who subscribed to that interpretation of the conflict. Martin Gilbert, in The First 
World War: A Complete History, believes that the war started because “the European 
sovereigns lacked the will to try to halt” it.723 He then describes the “moment of peaceable 
behavior” in the front lines at Christmas 1914, when “a spontaneous outburst of pacific feeling 
took place in the war zones.”724 Gilbert also quotes various truce participants before turning to 
French’s statement, taken from his memoir 1914, that he had issued orders to prevent further 
fraternization, and “‘called the local commanders to strict account,’” without noting French’s 
admission that he regretted doing so, or the lack of punishments handed out following the 
holiday armistice.725   
 In The Great War, Jay Winter and Blaine Baggett also emphasize the war’s inexorable 
progress, as the countries involved felt obliged to honor their obligations under various 
treaties: “As soon as armies mobilized, war was unavoidable.”726 They include the story of the 
“unofficial truce,” which some saw “for what it was: a reassertion of decency by men who, as 
1915 dawned, persisted in the belief that, while their enemies were misguided and dangerous, 
they were still men like themselves.”727 The British generals, however, “were appalled at the 
news of the Christmas truce. Explicit orders threatened serious punishment should any similar 
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incident ever happen again.”728 Gerald de Groot, who argues that the “German invasion of 
Belgium was a godsend to the British government” as it enabled them to “sell” the war to the 
British people and transform a “war of hegemony” into a “war of morality,” sees the conflict as 
unavoidable, with mobilization leading quickly to declarations of war.729 “No one wanted to 
miss the train,” de Groot declares, enlarging upon A.J.P. Taylor’s theories. “Once war became 
inevitable, the European nations obeyed the dictates of the stationmaster’s whistle.”730 In spite 
of the dehumanization of the conflict through the use of technology, “(s)hared sufferings 
encouraged a common humanity” across No-Man’s-Land, and “civility occasionally sprouted 
like a flower in the desert.”731 As an example of the common soldiers’ resistance to the 
mechanized “business of killing,” de Groot offers the “famous Christmas truce of 1914” which 
“inspired a football match between Germans and British, much to the dismay of the 
commanding officers who deemed it bad for morale.”732 
 While all these accounts provide details that could be found in certain 1914 holiday 
truces, they tend to treat the armistices as more consistent and homogenized than they 
actually were. The Christmas truce was certainly a moment of “peaceable behavior,” as noted 
by Gilbert, but participation was motivated more by the holiday season than a desire to lay 
down arms. Certainly the cease-fire was partly inspired by the idea that the enemies opposite 
were men like themselves, but few soldiers participating in the truce would have believed that, 
by fighting a war that they perceived as necessary, they were not behaving decently the 
remainder of the time they spent in the trenches. The football match that de Groot claimed 
was inspired by the atmosphere of the truce did occur, but it was the exception rather the rule.  
Additionally, French’s memoir is referenced in a number of works which all note that he was 
against the truce at the time, but fail to report either the lack of punishment handed out after 
the 1914 truce or French’s retrospective change of heart towards the cease-fire. 
 The “Horrible Histories” books, known for their popularity among British 
schoolchildren who doubtless remember their ‘facts’ after what was taught in classrooms is 
long forgotten, describe the First World War as “a story of what happens when machines go to 
war and human beings get in the way.”733 Terry Dreary and Martin Brown, the authors of The 
Frightful First World War, compare the European combatants to “two big gangs” who “started 
collecting weapons, making threats and swapping insults, the way gangs do. All it needed was 
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for one gang member to throw the first stone and a huge punch-up would follow.”734 While 
observing that the assassination of the Austrian Arch-Duke in Sarajevo was the “first stone” 
thrown, Dreary and Brown, astonishingly, focus on the France’s responsibility for the war, 
contending that “Germany smashed France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and it was 
just a matter of time before France tried to take its revenge.”735 They remark upon the famous 
truce that occurred on 25 December 1914, when “(e)nemies stop fighting for a day or two and 
even play friendly football matches,” a state of affairs which “can’t last, and it won’t be 
repeated,” before concluding that the “real tragedy” of the war was that it “didn’t solve any 
problems and it didn’t bring peace. It led to the Second World War and far, far more misery, 
death and destruction.”736  
Peter Simkins, in Chronicles of the Great War, agrees that technology promoted a 
depersonalized conflict, which made fraternization between enemy troops impossible after the 
first year of the war.737 “At Christmas 1914, he writes, there was a spontaneous unofficial truce 
in Flanders, when British and German troops fraternized openly between the front lines, 
exchanging souvenirs and taking photographs,” he observes.  However, “(a)s the war became 
ever more impersonal and insatiable in its demands for men and material, there would be no 
more such incidents on this scale, although a ‘live and let live’ attitude existed on both sides in 
many ‘quiet’ sectors throughout the conflict.”738 John Simpson, as befits a journalist, sees the 
armistice in terms of the government’s infamous censorship, which, surprisingly, “did not 
prevent British newspapers printing full accounts of the Christmas truce of 1914, even though 
GHQ disapproved of soldiers fraternizing with the enemy.”739 After Christmas, “all the main 
newspapers published letters from front-line soldiers to their families at home, describing the 
truce. The censors failed to stop them.”740 Simpson, however, does not question whether the 
censors in fact did try to intervene and prevent these reports from reaching the British public, 
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apparently believing that if the army leadership had disapproved of the truce, then the 
government as a matter of course would have wanted to repress the news of it.  
 All of these histories written between 1990 and 2010 reference a narrative of the war 
that appeared to be literally unquestionable, as if a single interpretation of the conflict had 
been in place since the moment the guns stopped firing at 11:00 a.m. on November 11, 1918, and 
no doubts about its validity had ever existed. The Christmas truce, in this monolithic 
discourse, was understood variously as a “reassertion of dignity,” a rebellion against 
mechanized warfare, an outburst of pacifism, or a revolt against the army leadership. During 
this time, however, some historians began to push back against the homogenized narrative of 
the First World War, providing not only a revisionist view of the causes of the war, a re-
appraisal of the tactics of the generals, and a defense of the post-war settlement, but also 
explanations for the development of the various myths about the conflict. These authors, 
however, while challenging the standard discourse of the war, correspondingly discount the 
story of the truce, which appears to have no place in their less conventional interpretations of 
the conflict.  
Niall Ferguson’s c0ntroversial history, The Pity of War, argues that the image of a “bad, 
futile war,” gained “academic respectability” through A.J.P. Taylor’s The First World War, and 
was thereafter constantly reinforced by media representations such as Blackadder Goes Forth, 
which added “to the folk memory of donkey-like leadership.”741 As a result of this general 
preoccupation with “the notion of the wickedness of the Great War,” Ferguson contends that 
“(d)isproportionate attention has been paid to the famous Christmas truce of 1914, when 
British and German soldiers ‘fraternized’ with one another in no man’s land, and even more to 
the so-called ‘live and let live’ system which developed in certain sectors of the Western Front 
in 1914 and 1915.”742 Michael Neiberg, on the other hand, maintains that the “aggression of the 
Kaiser’s foreign policy in causing the war and the crimes of the German army in conquered 
territory conveniently became submerged” in the 1920s and with it an understanding of the 
conflict’s origins.743 For Neiberg, the “continued fascination with the relatively minor and 
inconsequential Christmas truce of 1914 reflects the idea that the war was an aberration in an 
essentially fraternal Europe,” a theory that reinforces the view of “the soldiers as victims who 
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would have preferred to commiserate and celebrate with the ‘enemy’ but were instead forced 
to fight by vainglorious generals.”744   
John Morrow considers the First World War the result of centuries of imperialism, 
which, by allowing Europeans to massacre natives without remorse, had prepared the 
continent for the slaughter of the 1914-1918 conflict. “European youth set off to war in 1914 with 
romantic images of glory and honor in their heads,” Morrow states, as “(t)heir intellectuals 
and authors had spent a generation romanticizing their slaughter of other peoples; they 
presumed to continue this tradition in August 1914.”745 Describing a typical truce, including 
shared “rations, liquor, and addresses, playing rugby and soccer,” Morrow also notes that, in 
order to end the armistice, “(c)ommanders reminded their men that the other side was a 
perfidious enemy with whom fraternization should not recur.”746 It was this dehumanization 
of the opposing side, Morrow contends, that imperialism had encouraged among Europeans, 
and which now not only brought an abrupt end to the truce, but enabled them to not only 
engage, without compunction, in more than four years of carnage. 
In An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare, 
Joanna Burke finds a place for the truce in her central hypothesis on modern combat.747 While 
arguing that the “characteristic act of men at war is not dying, it is killing,” Bourke maintains 
that “(w)hile ‘love’ might be too strong a word, many combatants were surprised to find 
themselves feeling intensely affectionate towards their foe.”748 As a result, soldiers “at the 
frontlines frequently expressed respect for their opponents – even to the extent of fraternizing 
with them. Fraternization between German, British, and French soldiers during that first 
Christmas 1914 became such an important war myth that practically every soldier claimed to 
have defied High Command to participate.”749 While the soldiers who participated in the truce 
might have been surprised to hear their feelings for the enemy described as “intensely 
affectionate,” Bourke is certainly correct that, as established by the regimental histories of 
battalions that fought in the First World War, many more claimed a part in the truce than had 
originally joined in the holiday cease-fires.   
 Janet Watson further argues that the focus “away from the cooperative and diverse 
effort presented from 1914 to 1918 and primarily toward the view of useless sacrifice on the part 
of soldiers in the trenches” has greatly influenced the way the public has come to view the 
                                                          
744 Nieberg, “Revisiting the Myths,” pg. 506. 
745 Morrow, The Great War: An Imperial History, pg. 8. 
746 Morrow, The Great War: An Imperial History, pg. 69. 
747 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare 
(Great Britain: Granta Books, 1999). 
748 Bourke, Intimate History of Killing, pp. 5, 134. 
749 Bourke, Intimate History of Killing, pp. 5, 136. 
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war.750 Trench warfare, the most common experience of war for British soldiers serving in the 
First World War, was “what most civilians heard about, whether from members of their own 
families, friends and neighbors, or the press.”751 In Fighting Different Wars: Experience, 
Memory, and the First World War in Britain, Watson maintains that this emphasis on the 
experiences of soldiers in the trenches has obscured many truths about the conflict, among 
them the different attitudes and beliefs that those fighting the war brought to their service.752  
Watson also delineates the “different wars” fought by many soldiers, including those who were 
already serving in the army at the time the war broke out. The professional attitudes of these 
men, Watson contends, “may go far to explain the famous Christmas Truce.” Since the 
“volunteers who were fighting the war for a cause rather than because it was their job were 
still in the training camps at home” in December 1914, “the professional soldiers, both British 
and German, exchanged common courtesies and mutual respect.”753 Watson further 
characterizes the General Staff’s orders against future fraternization as “unnecessary. The 
conditions had changed, the soldiers had changed, the war had advanced, and there was little 
interest in befriending the enemy among the more service-oriented junior officers controlling 
the front lines.”754  
For historians with a less conventional view of the conflict, as demonstrated by these 
examples, the Christmas truce is a minor and easily explained event. Ferguson and Nieberg 
believe the emphasis First World War historians place upon the armistice is a manifestation of 
the orthodox narrative of the war and the complementary idea that soldiers rebelled against it 
by fraternizing with the enemy at Christmas 1914. Sheffield argues that the truce was nothing 
more than an attempt by the troops to make front-line service more bearable and Morrow 
contends the armistice ended because of colonial-influenced attitudes, whereas Bourke and 
Watson both press the cease-fire into the service of their theories about killing and 
professionalism. In all of these works, the truce is removed from the center-stage it occupies in 
more orthodox histories of the war, while the meanings ascribed to it in these revisionist 
histories are more reminiscent of the diversity of discourse found in writings about the 
armistice during the 1920s and 1930s. On the other hand, those earlier memoirs, polemics and 
histories all noted the importance of the truce to the men who had participated in it. In these 
                                                          
750 Watson, Fighting Different Wars, pg. 9. 
751 Watson, Fighting Different Wars, pg. 9. 
752 In addition, Watson argues that, by defining “the war” as the conflict that took place on the Western 
front, those who served on other fronts or in other non-fighting functions, such as women who built 
munitions in British factories, are denied their place in the history of the conflict. 
753 Watson, Fighting Different Wars, pp. 25-26. 
754 Watson, Fighting Different Wars, pp. 25-26. 
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later attempts to challenge the conventional notions of the war, the Christmas armistice is 
pushed off to the side, devoid of significance and barely worth a mention. 
 With the exception of Ferguson, whose work has been widely read (although few of his 
theories have been generally adopted), these revisionist historians, while often disputing the 
image of the war as wasteful and senseless, have had little impact upon the conflict’s orthodox 
discourse, which continues to be reinforced by popular culture, in the form of books, films, 
documentaries, songs and websites. As Hanna observes, novels such as Sebastian Faulks’ 
Birdsong and Pat Barker’s Regeneration trilogy, which promote the idea that the war was 
misguided and tragic, “have enjoyed great commercial success because they resonate with 
what the readership expects to read: mud, blood, poetry and utter futility.”755 In addition, by 
this time there were few veterans left to challenge the conventional narrative: the last 
available Imperial War Museum interview with a soldier who had participated in the 
Christmas truce took place in March 1990. Stanley Archibald, who served with the 1st East 
Kents (the Buffs) on the Western front, recalled that on 25 December, after building up their 
parapets, “all of us just walked together and we met in No-Man’s-Land.”756 He spoke with a 
German who told him, in a very familiar accent, “oh, blimey, mate, I was in a London ‘otel 
when the war broke out,” and the two sides exchanged tins of “bully beef for cigars.” 
According to Archibald, his battalion’s truce ended the next day, when a recently-
commissioned officer shot a German soldier who was still out in the open.   
 Although Archibald’s truce ended in a fashion designed to endear it to the hearts of 
those who support the orthodox discourse of the war, with a callous officer shooting an 
unarmed German, his overall view of the conflict is not so easily categorized. He felt, for 
example, that long before 1914 the army was aware that they would eventually have to fight 
Germany: “that is why we were so well trained,” Archibald maintained. He believed that the 
British “had no choice” but to declare war, and that the “majority had to accept” that fact. 
After the 1990s, however, the statements of veterans such as Archibald, who saw the First 
World War as a necessary evil, were no longer part of the living narrative. This lack of 
personal testimony allowed others to continue to impose an interpretation upon the conflict 
that would be unrecognizable to many who had fought in it.  
 After Blackadder aired in 1989, dramatizations of both the war and the truce followed a 
set narrative. The play A Christmas Truce, written by William Douglas Home and first 
performed in the same year that Stanley Archibald was interviewed, offers one such 
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756 Stanley Archibald, 1st East Kents (The Buffs), Interview, 1990, Imperial War Museum Collection No. 
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interpretation.757 In Home’s play, a British junior officer advances the theory that if everyone 
refused to fight, as the soldiers were doing on Christmas Day, “the war would have to end 
because there is nothing anyone could do about it.” Another British officer agrees “(t)hat’s 
what ought to happen,” but unfortunately “we all get taken in by bloody politicians telling us 
that this war is the one to end all bloody wars and that we’ve got to win it, whereas it’s quite 
obvious that, if we win the bloody thing – or if you win it – never mind which, all it will 
achieve, apart from all us poor sods getting killed – will be to sow the seeds of the next bloody 
war.”758  
Home’s dramatization contains all the now-standard elements of a typical Christmas 
truce: the German offer of an armistice, the burial of the dead and soldiers discussing the 
foolishness of the war, as well as featuring both a football match and a German soldier who 
used to be a waiter in London. In the play, the truce concludes on Christmas afternoon when a 
colonel comes down from headquarters to “make sure the whole escapade ends double-quick 
and without any trouble.” The soldiers who fraternized, the colonel states, should count 
themselves “damned lucky” because the brigadier in charge, “unlike lots of other Brigadiers 
…(is) not planning to have anyone court-martialed. Just so long as this truce ends at 
midnight.” A junior officer asks if those that get court-martialed will be shot. “Hung, drawn 
and quartered, I’d say,” the colonel responds grimly.759 This representation of the truce, so at 
odds with the contemporaneous accounts of it, completely encompasses the popular view of 
the event. 
The other major dramatic representation of the truce from this era, Joyeux Noel, as 
already discussed in Chapter 1, also situates the Christmas truce firmly within the orthodox 
narrative of the war: a rebellion by the soldiers against the futility of the conflict, punished by 
commanders who must ruthlessly stamp out any defiance. As this film asserts, the Christmas 
truce was so shocking, so offensive and so threatening to the status quo that even the British 
king and the German crown prince felt obliged to interfere to help punish the men involved. 
The film, like Home’s A Christmas Truce, further promotes two myths about the cease-fire 
that have increasingly become accepted as fact: that those soldiers who were involved in the 
event were penalized for their participation, and that the news of the cease-fire was 
                                                          
757 William Douglas Home, A Christmas Truce (London: Samuel French, 1990). 
758 Home, A Christmas Truce, pg. 48. 
759 Home, A Christmas Truce, pg. 53. The colonel does acknowledge they will probably “get away with 
it…because the top brass and the Government know damned well that the public at home wouldn’t 
stand for it, if people were court-martialed over Christmas – sentimental buggers that they are! I’d say 
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suppressed, kept from a public who would be horrified to hear that their soldiers had willingly 
fraternized with the enemy.760   
The companion book to that film, Meetings in No Man’s Land: Christmas 1914 and 
Fraternization in the Great War, jointly written by Marc Ferro, Malcolm Brown, Remy Cazals 
and Olaf Mueller, promises to reveal “a story of the Great War that has long been forgotten or 
lost in censored official reports or officer journals.”761  Admittedly, the French press, as noted 
by Eksteins, prevented contemporaneous mention of the truce in their newspapers, but 
German and British papers printed many details of it, and, as already demonstrated, the story 
of the truce remained public knowledge after the war ended. “(A)t last the story could be 
told,” according to Brown’s introduction, of the event that “has slipped across the divide 
between myth and reality, seizing the imagination of many people in the process.”762 Not only 
could the tale finally be disclosed, “it could be revealed to a new generation in a new Europe as 
evidence of a step forward in terms of international understanding and reconciliation.”763 
Brown praises Joyeux Noel as “a worthy, honourable and brave” film, “(d)espite its bold 
inaccuracies and certain other liberties that had been taken with the story” – as if there were 
something particularly courageous about making a twenty-first century anti-war film that was 
based on a well-known interpretation of a very familiar story. He also reassures readers once 
again that “the curious story of the festive season at the front in 1914 might sound bizarre, or 
crazy, or incredible, but it’s not another Christmas Carol or a historical leg-pull, it really did 
take place. There will always be incredulity: there can no longer be doubt.”764  
Although the inclusion of the French as fellow-fraternizers is certainly welcome, their 
participation was well-known long before Joyeux Noel or the publication of Meetings in No 
Man’s Land.765 Moreover, Brown’s continued crusade to have the Christmas truce accepted as 
fact rather than fiction seems increasingly odd: the reality of armistice, which remained in 
                                                          
760 An opera, Silent Night, based upon the narrative of Joyeux Noel, won the 2012 Pulitzer Prize for 
Music. Opera Philadelphia, which staged a production of this work in February 2013, promised that 
“(o)n World War I’s western front, weapons are laid down when Scottish, French and German officers 
defy their superiors and negotiate a Christmas Eve truce. Enemies become brothers as they come 
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761 Ferro, et al., Meetings in No Man’s Land. The quote comes from the jacket copy. 
762 Ferro et al, Meetings in No Man’s Land, pg. 1. 
763 Ferro et al, Meetings in No Man’s Land, pg. 2. 
764 Ferro et al, Meetings in No Man’s Land, pg. 5. 
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public sight from 1915 onwards, and has been perpetually described as “famous” or “legendary” 
since its occurrence, may have been doubted by a few skeptics but has never been seriously 
questioned at any point since 1914. Brown also advances some of his favorite First World War 
tropes: that, under the grim circumstances of the trenches, “it is almost natural that enemies 
cease to be enemies; rather they become fellow human beings soaked by the same rain, frozen 
by the same frost, whitened by the same snow,” who evolve into “companions in adversity, 
allies fighting the same grim conditions, and therefore, at a basic human level, almost 
friends.”766 While admitting that the war diaries of the battalions involved did, in fact, 
reference the truce, he also reports Smith-Dorrien’s call for the names of officers involved, and 
calls it “curious” that “no one was court-martialed” after the fraternization. Brown even 
reproduces a story about a Saxon battalion that, following fraternization with British troops, 
refused to fire upon the men “with whom over the past two days they had become instant 
close friends,” an action that he describes as “a virtual mutiny.”767 Brown’s account of the truce 
in Meetings in No Man’s Land, therefore, merely expands upon his earlier theories about the 
event, while adding little in the way of new material, aside from the information about the 
purported German mutiny.768 
 The increasingly simplified narrative of both the truce and the war also made these 
subjects particularly suitable for children’s literature. Michael Foreman’s War Game: Village 
Green to No-Man’s-Land, published in 1993, concerns a group of “Suffolk lads” who, pressured 
by the local vicar and squire, join the Kings Royal Rifles at the beginning of the war.769 The 
new soldiers are immediately sent to France and the front, from which they are “ordered to 
attack across No Man’s Land, even though many lives were always lost and little or nothing 
was achieved.” However, the proximity of the two lines of trenches meant that “each army 
could hear the other’s voices and could sometimes even smell their breakfasts. They all knew 
that they were sharing the same terrible conditions.” On Christmas morning, the British 
soldiers wake up to a world white with frost and quiet, where the “clock of death had stopped 
                                                          
766 Ferro et al, Meetings in No Man’s Land, pp. 16, 17 
767 Ferro et al, Meetings in No Man’s Land, pg. 54.  As will be noted later in this chapter, this episode was 
taken from Weintraub’s Silent Night, and is of dubious provenance. 
768 The sections on the French, German and Russian armistices will be more novel to English-speaking 
readers in their details, but provide little new in the way of war or Christmas truce narratives. 
769 Michael Foreman, War Game: Village Green to No-Man’s-Land (1993, repr. London: Pavilion 
Children’s Books, 2006). The book is unpaginated. Although Foreman dedicates his work to the 
memory of his uncles, “William James Foreman, killed aged 18; Frederick Benjamin Foreman, killed 
aged 20; William Henry Goddard, killed aged 20; Lacy Christmas Goddard, died of wounds Christmas 
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sent to the front almost immediately after enlisting, which rarely happened, the Kings Royal Rifles 
Corps, although at the front in December 1914, did not participate in the truce. 
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ticking.”  The Germans offer a cease-fire, the British accept, and fraternization ensues. The 
four Suffolk volunteers, who were all eager footballers before the war, join in a match where 
the goalposts are marked by caps. “Apart from that, it was wonderfully disorganized,” 
Foreman writes, “part football, part ice-skating, with unknown numbers on each team. No 
referee, no account of the score.” Of course, those in charge disapproved, and soldiers were 
instructed not to leave their trenches again, although Foreman adds that “(t)here were a few 
secret meetings here and there along the Front, and gifts and souvenirs were exchanged.” 
 The “friendly Germans from Saxony” opposite having been replaced by “fresh troops 
from Prussia,” the war starts again with a “full-scale attack” at dawn. When the British are 
ordered to counter-attack, one of the Suffolk villagers kicks a football into No-Man’s-Land, 
and the soldiers are mown down by machine gun fire, an appropriate end to an account so 
thoroughly informed by the conventional narrative. Fictional works such as A Christmas 
Truce, Joyeux Noel, and War Game encapsulate the contradictions of the now-orthodox 
discourse of the Christmas truce. Fraternization was a sign that those in the trenches hated 
the war and didn’t want to fight it – in spite of the fact that they then went back, apparently 
quite willingly, to fighting it for four more years. The truce was proof that soldiers were eager 
to defy the orders of their officers - even though, when ordered not to fraternize, troops 
mostly obeyed those orders, and those who did not were careful to keep their cease-fires very 
low-key rather than advertise them as acts of open defiance. The armistice still acts a beacon 
of hope for the world – that has, since it occurred, engaged in many wars, large and small, with 
no Christmas truces to leaven the violence. This conventional narrative emphasizes the 
punishments handed out to those that participated, even though no penalties followed the 
1914 cease-fires, and generally suggests the suppression of the news of the truce, in spite of its 
prominence in British newspaper columns. Within the parameters of the accepted discourse of 
the conflict, the tale of the truce was being taken as clear proof that the futile First World War 
had been despised by the soldiers fighting it, and was rarely now presented any other way. 
 Stanley Weintraub’s history of the cease-fire, Silent Night: The Story of the World War I 
Christmas Truce, follows the predictable story of “that remarkable moment” without deviation 
and, in an attempt to present a seamless anti-war discourse, mixes fact and fiction while 
presenting both as equally valid. Henry Williamson’s Fox Under My Cloak is extensively 
quoted, the truce scene in Bairnsfather’s Bullets and Billets segues neatly into the one in Oh! 
What a Lovely War and even Blackadder’s irritation at a German referee’s “decision that placed 
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him off-side” gets featured among the letters and diaries written by truce participants.770 “The 
Christmas Truce of 1914 has lingered strikingly in the memory even when its details have 
disappeared into myth,” Weintraub argues, while making no attempt to distinguish between 
the reality of the truce and the falsehoods that have grown up around it, even including 
Graves’ short story about the truce and Foreman’s War Game among the “accounts” of the 
event.771 Weintraub’s work also features John McCutcheon’s 1984 ballad, “Christmas in the 
Trenches.”772 Although the song details the experiences of a fictional soldier, John Tolliver, 
who participated in a truce on Christmas Day 1914, Weintraub claims that it in fact relates the 
story of Sir Iain Colquhoun, whom the song alleges joined in the 1914 truce and was court-
martialed and sentenced to death for that participation.773 The only problem with this version 
of events, Weintraub concedes, is that it is “inaccurate on almost every count.”774 In spite of 
this admission, Weintraub concludes that, however “erroneous the song’s specifics were, the 
conclusions were not,” demonstrating that he intends to support the myths of the truce in the 
face of any and all contrary evidence.”775  
Illustrating his bias in favor of the conventional narrative of the truce, Weintraub 
reproduces a story about the XIX Saxon Corps, in which he claims “there was almost a mutiny 
in one regiment when it received orders to begin shooting again.” For this regiment, 
the difficulty began on the 26th, when the order to fire was given, for the men 
struck. Herr Lange says that in the accumulated years he had never heard such 
language as the officers indulged in, while they stormed up and down, and got, 
                                                          
770 Somewhat defensively, Weintraub notes that “(t)he Commonwealth War Graves Commission lists six 
dead surnamed Blackadder,” as if this will magically transform the television show into demonstrable 
reality, and to underline the point, then refers to the football game in the Home play A Christmas 
Truce. The Germans won that fictional match 3-1 in equally fictional extra time. Weintraub, Silent Night, 
pp. 109-111. 
771 Weintraub, Silent Night, pg. 173. 
772 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJi41RWaTCs. The final three verses of the song are:  “Then one 
by one on either side walked into no-mans-land/with neither gun nor bayonet we met there hand to 
hand/We shared some secret brandy and wished each other well/and in a flare-lit soccer game we gave 
'em hell/We traded chocolates, cigarettes and photographs from home/these sons and fathers far away 
from families of their own/Young Sanders played his squeeze box and they had a violin/this curious and 
unlikely band of men/Soon daylight stole upon us and France was France once more/With sad farewells 
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bitter hung/The frozen fields of France were warmed as songs of peace were sung/For the walls they'd 
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Francis Tolliver. In Liverpool I dwell/Each Christmas come since World War One I've learned its lessons 
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we're the same.” 
773 Weintraub, Silent Night, pp. 171-172. Weintraub seems to have reached the conclusion that the ballad 
is about Colquhoun’s court-martial and subsequent execution based upon stories McCutcheon tells 
when he sings the song live, rather than any connection drawn in the lyrics. 
774 Weintraub, Silent Night, pg. 171. 
775 Weintraub, Silent Night, pg. 172. 
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as the only result, the answer, ‘We can’t – they are good fellows, and we can’t.’  
Finally, the officers turned on the men with, ‘Fire, or we do – and not at the 
enemy!’ Not a shot had come from the other side, but at last they fired, and an 
answering fire came back, but not a man fell.  ‘We spent that day and the next,’ 
said Herr Lange, ‘wasting ammunition in trying to shoot the stars down from 
the sky.’776  
 
This anecdote, the only documentation produced by anyone at any time that alleges that 
participation in the truce was followed by an outright refusal among soldiers to obey orders 
and fire upon the enemy, is sourced to a second-hand account of very dubious provenance, yet 
Weintraub reports it faithfully as gospel truth, including it as such alongside the fictional 
works of Williamson and McCutcheon.777 For Weintraub, “Christmas 1914 evokes the stubborn 
humanity within us, and suggests an unrealized potential to burst its seams and rewrite a 
century,” and, as a result, he is willing to rely on fiction and highly questionable “facts” to 
support the truce myths in which he believes.778  
The uncorroborated story of the German soldiers’ rebellion, which was also cited by 
Brown in Meetings in No Man’s Land, where he used it as proof that the Germans in the front 
lines on 25 December 1914 were, in the words of one participant, “’certainly sportsmen if they 
are nothing else’,” was taken to another level in the aforementioned Days that Shook the 
World series.779  The Christmas Truce documentary shows a Saxon regiment that “takes the 
truce further than anyone dares – to the very edge of mutiny. Sergeant Lange recalls that his 
men went on strike. There is no record of what sparked the revolt, except perhaps for these 
conscripts, the great patriotic cause had become nothing to the bond they felt with fellow 
soldiers just thirty yards away.”780 The documentary further embellishes Weinstein’s version of 
this event by showing the German officer cocking his revolver and pointing it at the head of a 
soldier while barking out an order in German. “The men realize that their protest can be 
nothing more,” the narrator relates while the soldiers begin reluctantly shooting. “The strike is 
                                                          
776 Weintraub, Silent Night, pp. 140-141. Weintraub’s lack of footnotes makes the source of this 
contention particularly hard to trace: the reference to the book from which this account comes only 
appears in endnotes to a passage cited 125 pages earlier. 
777 The anecdote was repeated by a German soldier in late 1915 to an Australian woman, Ethel Cooper, 
who lived in Germany and remained there throughout the war. Internal evidence in the Cooper letters, 
which are collected in a volume entitled Behind the Lines: One Woman’s War 1914-18, The Letters of 
Caroline Ethel Cooper, however, demonstrates that the supposed mutiny was not witnessed by the 
soldier in question, and is therefore undoubtedly based on nothing more than rumors and a desire to 
impress a foreigner with his distaste for the war. Decie Denholm, Ed., Behind the Lines: One Woman’s 
War 1914-18, The Letters of Caroline Ethel Cooper (Sydney:  William Collins Pty. Ltd., 1982). 
778 Weintraub, Silent Night, pg. 174. 
779 Nic Young, Days that Shook the World: The Christmas Truce. 
780 Weintraub’s account of the Saxon mutiny does not identify the soldiers involved as under Lange’s 
command (“his men”). As Lange was a member of the commissariat, he could not possibly have been in 
charge of front-line soldiers. 
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over.” Of course, the reason that there is “no record of what sparked the revolt,” is that there is 
no record of any such revolt at all, beyond a thirdhand belated version told to an Australian 
living in Germany during the war. The willingness of the Christmas Truce documentary to 
ignore readily-available facts and accept poorly sourced accounts of the armistice in order to 
prove a point about the war – that the truce was a demonstration of the soldiers’ hatred of a 
futile and destructive conflict – was echoed eight years later in an ITV documentary that also 
focused on the Christmas armistice. Find My Past, which promised to “reveal how three people 
are related to someone from a significant historical event by searching the records on 
findmypast.co.uk,” and “follow their journey as they discover who their ancestor is and the 
part they played in history,” features three survivors of truce participants, in an episode that 
simultaneously promotes both the genealogy service that sponsored the series and a very 
conventional view of the First World War.781 
   A number of military historians were enlisted to provide the survivors with graphic 
accounts of what their ancestors endured between 1914 and 1918. George Ashurst’s descendent, 
for example, is told that “(i)n the entire time your great-uncle was at war, he was in two feet of 
water in the trench.” Another historian states that the Saxons “were prepared to have a truce, 
where the Prussians, who were from the north of Germany, much more militant, were really 
prepared not to play.” The documentary notes that the armistice, when “(m)en put aside their 
weapons and they just go back to being men,” was in contravention of the orders Smith-
Dorrien had issued on 3 December 1914, and, through a confusing lapse in the episode’s time-
line, implies that Smith-Dorrien learned about the truce from the reports printed in the 
British papers on Boxing Day.  
Carol Smith-Dorrien, granddaughter of the famous general (who, the narrator 
inaccurately claims, was in charge of half of the B.E.F. at Christmas 1914), tries to place his 26 
December 1914 orders in the best possible light, observing that “he was in overall charge of the 
troops and had to make the very difficult decision when the Christmas truce broke out, to say 
no more fraternizing.”782 She further contends that the fact that Smith-Dorrien did not punish 
anyone for participation in a truce “shows that he understood that there was a desire to 
fraternize obviously, and even to admire each other, but this was not going to win the war,” 
and believes that it must have been “horrendous” for him to have to order the truce to cease. 
The documentary also describes the truce as a day of “spontaneous peace,” and reports, based 
                                                          
781 Find My Past, (ITV, 2012). http://www.findmypast.co.uk/.  
782 Smith-Dorrien’s command was extended on 26 December to II Corps of the re-organized B.E.F., but 
at the time of the truce he commanded one of the B.E.F.’s five corps. The series’ granting him an earlier 
promotion was presumably to emphasize his power to order an end to the truce. 
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solely upon George Ashurst’s later account, how furious the soldiers were to have the cease-
fire broken up by the military leadership. It further maintains that in some places in the line, 
the truce lasted until March. What the Find My Past episode does not do, however, is admit 
that most of the soldiers in Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps did not fraternize with the enemy, or that 
the commanders of the III and IV Corps, whose battalions much more frequently entered into 
truces, did not find it necessary to issue orders threatening punishment, as the cease-fires 
ended on their own. 
By 2012, the orthodox narrative of the First World War was so firmly established in 
popular culture that a military historian could, without fear of contradiction, tell the 
descendant of a soldier that his great-uncle had spent his “entire” war in two feet of water, 
although Ashurst’s memoir (referenced in the episode) talks freely about time spent in the 
reserve lines, intervals out of line in France, and periods spent in England, including the last 
three months of the war. Similarly, the conflict’s conventional discourse enables the 
granddaughter of a famous general to transform her ancestor into a victim of a war that 
required him to make distressing decisions.783 These views, however erroneous, are reinforced 
by numerous Internet sites about the truce, including its Wikipedia page, which notes that the 
holiday cease-fire is “often seen as a symbolic moment of peace and humanity amidst one of 
the most violent events of human history” and further describes it as “the most dramatic 
example of non-cooperation with the war spirit that included refusal to fight, unofficial truces, 
mutinies, strikes and peace protests.”784 This version of the Christmas truce, which few of its 
participants would recognize, is now being widely disseminated via the internet, which 
circulates many of the armistice’s myths while rarely providing alternative views about either 
the truce or the war itself.  The Christmas truce of 1914, the History Channel website claims, 
“was never repeated—future attempts at holiday ceasefires were quashed by officers' threats of 
disciplinary action—but it served as heartening proof, however brief, that beneath the brutal 
clash of weapons, the soldiers' essential humanity endured.”785 “The Soldier’s Truce: A Hidden 
                                                          
783 As demonstrated by Smith-Dorrien’s directive of 4 December 1914, which noted that “(t)he “rushing 
of a hostile trench at night and the scuppering of its occupants, thought it will doubtless be attended 
with loss on our side, and though there may be no intention of holding the trench permanently, has 
incalculable results of a moral nature both on our own troops and on those of the enemy. Similarly, 
constant sniping on the enemy’s trenches will have just as annoying effect on the enemy as their sniping 
has on us, and, and this is the important point, the enemy, owing to reduced numbers and the difficulty 
of providing reinforcements, will stand to lose far more on the balance than we shall.”   
784 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas_truce.  
785 www.history.com/topics/christmas-truce-of-1914.  
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History from the First World War” assures the reader that the story of the truce, while “once 
largely unknown, has become widely circulated on the internet.”786   
From 1990 through 2012, the truce made further gains in a narrative of the 1914-1918 
war that contended, however weak the evidence or contradictory the evidence, that it ‘proved’ 
that the soldiers involved in the conflict nearly a century earlier would have preferred to make 
peace with each other rather than to fight. Even if the facts did not, in fact, demonstrate this, 
as illustrated by Colquhoun’s failure to be shot for allowing a truce, then a fictionalized truce 
always trumped reality, as the moral drawn from it was infinitely more interesting. As a result, 
the lack of punishments handed out after both the 1914 and 1915 truces are truly an 
inconvenient truth, and one that will never be read in a work promoting the conventional 
narrative of the war. As Todman argues in The Great War: Myth and Memory, mainstream 
ideas about the conflict “have achieved the status of modern mythology and as such are 
knitted into the social fabric,” making it nearly impossible to challenge the modern discourse 
of the First World War.787 As the famous Sainsbury’s December 2014 Christmas advertisement 
demonstrates, the story of the armistice has become knitted firmly into the fabric of the 
conflict, and with the centenary of the Christmas truce upon us, the orthodox narrative of the 
1914 armistice, however it may deviate from the experiences and attitudes of the soldiers 
involved, has become the version incorporated into the British public’s memory of the war, 
generally accepted without contradiction or contention, and cited in support of the First 
World War’s discourse of waste and futility. 
 
  
                                                          
786 http://www.newdemocracyworld.org/revolution/christmas_truce_thoughts.html. The author of this 
website, Dave Stratman, also informs his readers that “(t)he real goal of political leaders in provoking 
World War I was to destroy the international working class movement of the time, which threatened to 
overwhelm the governments of Western Europe and Russia” – which at least presents a different take 
on the subject.  He reverts to a more conventi0nal narrative when discussing the truce, however, noting 
that “(m)any of the officers on each side attempted to prevent the event from occurring but the soldiers 
ignored the risk of a court-martial or of being shot,” in spite of offering no proof of these claims. 
787 Todman, The Great War, pg. xii. “Sainsbury’s Official Christmas 2014 Ad,” 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWF2JBb1bvM.  As of May 2015, the famous advertisement had garnered 
over 17 million viewings on YouTube. 
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Chapter Eleven 
“It was peace that won”: 
The Christmas Truce and the Narrative of the First World War 
 
Most higher-ups had looked the other way when scattered fraternization occurred earlier.  A 
Christmas truce, however, was another matter.  Any slackening in the action during Christmas 
week might undermine whatever sacrificial spirit there was among troops who lacked 
ideological fervor. 
-Stanley Weintraub 
Silent Night 
 
By the way I don’t know whether I told you there has been a Peace with the people opposite 
our section since Xmas Eve and it is still going on though the Germans sent in this morning to 
say they would begin sniping at 11.30 am, but they haven’t done it yet.  2 pm, I don’t think they 
want to start more than we do as it only means a few of each side being hit and does not affect 
the end of the War.   
-Lieutenant-Colonel Fisher-Rowe, Commander, 1st Grenadier Guards 
28 December 1914 letter 
 
 
In 1983, Paul McCartney applied his famous optimism to the subject of the Christmas 
truce. “In love our problems disappear,” the former Beatle sang in “Pipes of Peace,” which was 
accompanied by a video depicting the famous armistice, complete with a spontaneous football 
match.788 The video casts McCartney as both a German and British soldier – emphasizing the 
point that “the people here are like you and me” - who exchange family photographs, while the 
lyrics remind us that we should raise our children well by “help(ing) them to see” and teaching 
them “how to play the pipes of peace.” In the video, the truce ends when the soldiers 
fraternizing in No-Man’s-Land are shelled, presumably by orders of the cold-hearted but 
absent generals, and must run back to “safety” of the trenches. Once behind cover, the 
doppelgangers look longingly at the photographs of each other’s children, thus underlining 
the implicit moral that the soldiers of the two sides had the same feelings and sensibilities, 
and therefore had no reason to wage war upon each other. The McCartney song pulls exactly 
the emotional levers it intends to: a comment on the video posted to youtube.com notes that 
the song “shows you that they didn’t want to fight each other, but politics dictated that they 
had to.” 
                                                          
788 Paul McCartney, “Pipes of Peace,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7ErrZ-ipoE.  
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This 1980s variation on “All You Need is Love” demonstrates how an appealing and 
uncomplicated story can promote a clichéd view of the truce while simultaneously reinforcing 
certain myths about the First World War. As Alan Clark similarly maintained in his 
introduction to The Donkeys, the story of the 1914-1918 conflict really “was as simple as that.” 
He was wrong. The war was never that uncomplicated, and the problems of trench warfare 
were never that amenable to an effortless solution, but Clark’s superficial portrayal of the 
conflict was easy to grasp, which is how many of the myths about the First World War took 
root in the 1960s: by presenting a narrative that was straightforward, had obvious heroes and 
villains, and a clear moral. Having captured British cultural memory, that view of the conflict 
has become so ingrained that any attempts to dispute it arouse scorn and revulsion, as 
Michael Gove, the Conservative Secretary for Education, found out in early 2014 during the 
course of a very public spat over the narrative of the First World War. 
Gove’s clumsy and misguided attempts to reframe the First World War in heroic 
terms, as a victory for Britain and therefore a cause for public celebration, inspired headlines 
and censure in roughly equal quantities.789 His assertion that “(o)ur understanding of the war 
has been overlaid by misunderstandings, and misrepresentations which reflect an, at best, 
ambiguous attitude to this country  and, at worst, an unhappy compulsion on the part of some 
to denigrate virtues such as patriotism, honour and courage” characterized the orthodox 
narrative of the war as a creation of “left-wing academics” whose purpose is “to belittle Britain 
and its leaders.” In addition, he criticized the use of Blackadder Goes Forth as a teaching tool 
in school curricula relating to the war, condemning the popular television series as leftist 
propaganda. Although Gove’s initial intention was to assert that “the conflict was a ‘just war’ 
to combat aggression by a German elite bent on domination,” his comments were seen as a 
deliberately inflammatory attack on both the conventional discourse of the war and the 
historians who support that interpretation. 
Following this opening salvo in the dehate about the First World War’s narrative, 
Gove’s detractors – and occasional supporters - quickly leapt into the fray. The Observer 
featured a rebuttal from Tristram Hunt, Labour’s Shadow Education Secretary, who called 
Gove’s arguments “crass” and “politically motivated.”790 In the Mail Online, Sir Tony Robinson, 
who played Private Baldrick in Blackadder Goes Forth, labelled Gove’s comments “very silly,” 
                                                          
789 Tim Shipman, “Michael Gove blasts ‘Blackadder myths’ about the First World War spread by 
television sit-coms and left-wing academics,” Daily Mail, 2 January 2014.  
790 Toby Helm, Vanessa Thorpe and Philip Oltermann, “Labour condemns Michael Gove’s ‘crass’ 
comments on first world war,” Guardian, 4 January 2014.  
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while strongly refuting the idea that the series supported any party line.791 Richard Evans, 
Professor of History at the University of Cambridge, who had already crossed swords with 
Gove in 2013 over recommended changes to the British schools’ history curricula, pointed out 
in the Guardian that Niall Ferguson, Alan Clark and Max Hastings, the historians who were 
most famous for promoting a critical attitude towards the war and the failed military tactics of 
its generals, were all noted conservatives.792 Boris Johnson, Conservative Mayor of London, 
then took up arms on Gove’s behalf via an editorial in the Telegraph, provocatively titled 
“Germany started the Great War, but the Left can’t bear to say so.”793 In this piece, Johnson 
argued that “(i)t is a sad but undeniable fact that the First World War – in all its murderous 
horror – was overwhelmingly the result of German expansionism and aggression,” but 
contended that the modern Labour Party, out of misplaced political correctness, found it 
impolite to mention this inconvenient truth.   
Shortly after Johnson’s contribution to the debate, Mark Steel, a commentator and 
stand-up comedian, weighed in on the controversy in the Independent, asserting sarcastically 
that Gove’s assertions about the conflict should prevail over the “poncey academic types who 
criticised the war, like Wilfred Owen and those poets. Just because they spent a few years 
being gassed and shot at, they thought that gave them a right to criticise it. Well, if they’d 
joined the real world, like Michael Gove, they might not be so full of airy-fairy pacifist 
nonsense.”794 Brian Reade, a commentator on sports and current affairs for the Mirror, also 
added his two cents to the debate. “Michael Gove's attempt at rewriting Great War history 
would make my KKK-supporting Uncle Bud proud,” was the title of Reade’s piece, in which he 
declared that “(a)nyone with half a brain knows no single country was totally to blame. It was 
more about Europe’s ruling classes callously sacrificing 16 million lives in their dispute over 
who should have the biggest empires.”795  
The Christmas truce, the event that so many assume proves that the soldiers fighting 
the war found it futile and wished to bring it to a halt, plays a large part in the general myth-
making about the war. Margaret MacMillan, in an article entitled “The 1914 Christmas 
                                                          
791 Tony Robinson, “Baldrick hits back at ‘silly’ Gove in Great War rumpus: Sir Tony Robinson says 
Education Secretary made a mistake in row over showing Blackadder in lessons,” Daily Mail, 5 January 
2014. Robinson argued that it was perfectly appropriate for school-teachers to use Blackadder Goes Forth 
as “simply another teaching tool,” in conjunction with visits to Flanders and the poems of Wilfred 
Owen.  
792 Richard J. Evans, “Michael Gove shows his ignorance of history – again,” Guardian, 6 January 2014. 
793 Boris Johnson, “Germany started the Great War, but the Left can’t bear to say so,” Telegraph, 6 
January 2014. 
794 Mark Steel, “By jingo, Gove’s right – those leftie academics have hijacked the Great War.  
Remembrance Sunday has nothing on ‘Blackadder,’” Independent, 9 January 2014.  
795 Brian Reade, “Michael Gove's attempt at rewriting Great War history would make my KKK-
supporting Uncle Bud proud,” Mirror, 11 January 2014.   
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armistice: a triumph for common humanity,” featured in the Financial Times on December 20, 
2013, highlights that widely-accepted view of the truce.796 Her account, which traces the 
development of the First World War’s narrative of “the horrors of the trenches, the senseless 
waste of lives, and the meaninglessness of a war that apparently settled nothing,” discusses 
how that interpretation of the conflict came to prevail over all others. While endorsing a 
conventional view of the war, MacMillan nevertheless reminds the reader that “(a)t the time 
people on all sides thought they had a just cause. It is condescending and wrong to think they 
were hoodwinked.” Yet in spite of admitting that the war’s now-conventional narrative was 
not endorsed by many of the soldiers who fought in it or the populations of the countries 
involved, MacMillan still represents the truce in conventional terms, noting that it is 
remembered now as “a moment when ordinary soldiers reacted against their leaders and the 
monstrous folly of the first world war.” As a result,  while she calls for “a new international 
approach to the war,” MacMillan does not challenge the 1914 cease-fire’s orthodox narrative, 
leaving the impression that, just as she wishes that “the first world war cemeteries where the 
soldiers still remain separated into friend and foe will gradually crumble away,” she also 
subscribes to the now-standard view of the Christmas truce, the event that provides such a 
useful lesson about a war that was neither “glorious or noble,” but rather a conflict “where 
men were killed from a distance by an enemy they rarely saw,” making the moment when they 
fraternized in No-Man’s-Land all the more striking. 
 While MacMillan’s article admits that the orthodox discourse of the war is not entirely 
representative of contemporaneous beliefs, she still maintains that the Christmas truce 
represents “a small reminder of a common humanity.” Jeremy Rifkin, in his 2010 work The 
Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis, argues that on 25 
December 1914, the British and German soldiers who fraternized in No-Man’s-Land made a 
conscious decision when leaving their trenches: they “chose to be human.”797 However, as 
their letters and diaries demonstrate, the soldiers who took part in the truce were, and 
remained, human from the day they entered the trenches to the day they left them. What 
drew the men out of the trenches on that Christmas was not, as Rifkin contends, “empathy for 
one another,” but rather a combination of curiosity, sentimentality, boredom and 
homesickness. Although there was a sense of shared suffering between the opposing armies on 
the front, this did not prompt the actions of the soldiers who participated in the armistice, as 
                                                          
796 Margaret MacMillan “The 1914 Christmas armistice: a triumph for common humanity,” Financial 
Times, 20 December 2013. 
797 Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis, (New 
York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2010), pg. 8. 
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the joint miseries of the trenches would hardly become less apparent during the remaining 
four years of the war, while inciting no further large-scale episodes of fraternization. Nor was 
the truce inspired by resentment of the army leadership, who in most cases condoned it for 
the sake of both morale and necessary repairs to the trenches.  
The website www.firstworldwar.com goes even further in its support for the 
conventional narrative of the truce, acknowledging the truth about the cease-fire while 
asserting that, in fact, these troublesome particulars are irrelevant.798 The site maintains that 
the “most important legacy” of the Christmas truce is not the actual armistice – with the 
readily available details about the “many high-ranking officers who took a surprisingly relaxed 
view of the situation,” the way the truce was “wildly [sic] reported in Britain and to a lesser 
extent in Germany,” and the willingness of the soldiers involved to resume the war and fire 
upon the troops with whom they had fraternized – but rather the ideas that have overtaken its 
reality.799 The website’s authors readily admit that the truce has been romanticized, but argue 
that the myths about it are so much more “comforting to believe” than the more prosaic truth 
asserted by pragmatists, which is that the event was “a temporary lull induced by the season of 
goodwill, but willingly exploited by both sides to better their defences and eye out one 
another's positions.” The orthodox narrative the senseless and futile conflict that was the First 
World War is firmly reinforced by the idea that participation in the Christmas armistice, “an 
effort by normal men to bring about an end to the slaughter,” was a sign of mutiny by 
rebellious soldiers. The desire to believe in this myth overrides all evidence to the contrary, 
even for those, such as the authors of the First World War website www.firstworldwar.com, 
who admit to the truce’s troublesome realities. 
The Christmas truce, shorn of its mythology, is impossible to categorize simply, yet 
even those, like MacMillan, who challenge the conventional narrative of the war can’t seem to 
resist the conventional narrative of the truce. The myth of the 1914 armistice is based upon the 
belief that the soldiers who took part in it shared our modern sensibilities, hated war as we 
hate war, and rebelled against that futile conflict as we are certain we would have rebelled 
against it. The truce resonates with us today because we have long since decided where our 
sympathies lie, which is with the poets who represented the soldiers in the trenches and who 
captured their plight in such vivid language. As a result, the story of what really happened 
during the two weeks that started on Christmas Eve 1914 and finally ended about 10 January 
1915 rarely cites the letters and diaries of the men involved, but relies instead on post-war 
memories that largely reinforce what we already believe. Christmas was celebrated in the 
                                                          
798 “The Christmas Truce,” http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/christmastruce.html. 
799 It seems likely that the website’s authors meant that the truce was “widely,” not “wildly,” reported. 
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trenches on 25 December 1914 as a sentimental rather than a religious holiday, and the wide-
spread but not universal cease-fires and fraternizations were entered into in that spirit by a 
largely professional army composed of men who supported the war that they were fighting. To 
comprehend that viewpoint, it is necessary to reject much of what we now believe about the 
First World War, but to continue to impose a narrative upon the truce that is unsupported by 
the contemporaneous views of those who took part in it does a disservice to the very soldiers 
we now view as victimized. They did not see themselves in that way, and imputing to them a 
consciousness that so thoroughly misrepresents their perception of the conflict does not help 
us to understand either the war or the truce. 
 Nearly a hundred years after the 1914 cease-fires on the Western Front ended, the 
varied elements of the Christmas truce have coalesced in public memory into one idealized 
armistice. This event rarely includes the burial of the dead, suspicion of the enemy, or a refusal 
to participate, although all were features of the 1914 cease-fires. In the now-standard 
composite truce, soldiers meet in No-Man’s-Land, share cigarettes, food and drink and find 
time for a football match before being ordered back to their trenches by the callous generals. 
By consorting with their opponents, they make a mockery of the unwanted and purposeless 
conflict, and create an example that will eventually inspire many with admiration for their 
defiance of a war they hated and the shared humanity they displayed with their enemies. 
 The insistence upon a standardized view of the war and the 1914 truce, as well as the 
proliferation of misinformation about both, ensures that many of these myths about the 
Christmas armistice not only remain unchallenged, but are constantly being reinforced. As 
demonstrated by the evidence, however, in the form of contemporaneous letters and diary 
entries written about the truce, the armistice was hardly the monolithic event now portrayed 
in the various media that feature it. The letters written home by soldiers, even before the 
truce, illustrate the now-surprising frankness with which they wrote about their lives in the 
trenches, providing their correspondents with vivid details about mud and death, destruction 
and the plight of the Belgians, while also including stories about mutual jokes with the enemy 
in the lines opposite.  These particulars, freely shared with the home front, presaged both the 
candor they would display when writing about the truce and the way the civilians back in 
Britain were prepared to accept the truth about the events of Christmas 1914. 
 An examination of the accounts of the truce written by the British soldiers who had 
participated in the event shows that, while many found the unexpected holiday from gunfire 
and danger welcome, and enjoyed meeting their German counterparts in No-Man’s-Land, very 
few expected, or even desired, that any lasting peace would occur as a result of the unofficial 
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armistice. At the same time, they saw no need to hide from those at home their willingness to 
join in the occasion, clearly expecting their friends and family to enjoy the story of their 
impromptu Christmas truce as much as they did. Sparing few details, they wrote home about 
the cease-fires, fraternizations, the burial of the dead, the sharing of gifts and the German 
misinformation about the course of the war, as well as the occasional football match, and their 
letters were neither subject to censorship nor did they record any actions taken against those 
who had joined in the meetings with the enemy. 
 The evidence of the official war diaries for those battalions that had participated in the 
truce further demonstrates the general lack of inhibitions front-line officers felt about 
admitting to participation in the event. While battalions that were part of the B.E.F.’s 5th 
Division (II Corps) did tend to be cagier about the details of the truce – with most recording 
only “very quiet” times in the line over Christmas – the diaries of the battalions comprising the 
4th, 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions (III and IV Corps) demonstrated a willingness on the part of front-
line officers to feature the incident, often at great length, in the documents that constituted 
the official record of their activities during the war. While it is true that some officers in the 
14th and 15th Brigades (II Corps) were required by their leadership, a few days after Christmas, 
to write up a brief account of their truces, no further action was taken either against any of 
these officers or against the soldiers whom they had allowed to participate in any truce 
activities, including actual fraternization with Germans in No-Man’s-Land. In fact, an 
examination of a number of the diaries from battalions in the front line in Flanders during 
December 1914 and January 1915 reveals that on-going cease-fires were reported by some for 
two or more weeks after Christmas without disciplinary action being taken against the troops 
involved. 
 An examination of British newspapers reveals that accounts of the Christmas truce 
were reported openly in late December 1914 and early January 1915. Although the British press 
drew the line at writing articles discussing the event – no doubt finding it too difficult to 
reconcile with their overall war reporting – the many descriptions of the unofficial armistice 
that appeared in newspapers such as the Times, Daily Telegraph, and Manchester Guardian 
make it clear that the truce became well known in Britain shortly after it occurred. Further, an 
examination of the headlines and leaders that accompanied the soldiers’ letters about the 
Christmas armistice shows that it was accepted by the British without censure: “Christmas 
Truce/Mingling with the Enemy,” “A Christmas Truce at the Front/Enemies at Football,” and 
“British and Germans Fraternize,” to give a few examples, illustrate the non-condemnatory 
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nature of the press coverage of the event.800 The numerous accounts published in the British 
newspapers until mid-January 1915 demonstrate the level of public interest in the truce, while 
the refusal to condemn those who participated in the episode illuminates the fact that the 
newspaper editors that published these accounts, as well as the civilians who read about the 
event, probably understood the reasons for the truce, and did not disapprove of the idea of 
their soldiers enjoying a temporary holiday armistice. 
 As the war ground on for four more long and painful years, the Christmas truce not 
only remained an important memory for those who had participated in it, but additionally was 
often used as proof of the professionalism of the British army, who were assumed to be 
fighting not out of hatred of the Germans, but rather a belief in the righteousness of their 
cause. While it is true that many of those who served on the Western front and other theatres 
of the war eventually found themselves disillusioned about the purpose and prosecution of the 
conflict, the majority of the soldiers involved believed in the reasons Britain had gone to war, 
and the importance of winning that war. This is reflected not only in the contemporaneous 
histories of the war written between 1914 and 1918, but also in the letters and memoirs of the 
soldiers still serving on, or invalided home from, the Western front.   
A mild repetition of the 1914 cease-fires by three battalions in 1915 demonstrated that, 
in spite of official warnings, the army’s appetite for punishing overt fraternization with the 
enemy proved very feeble indeed. References to the truce continued throughout the interwar 
years, as the histories of many of the battalions and divisions who had participated in the 
Christmas truce appeared, and included accounts of the event that varied widely. Some 
regimental histories celebrated it at great length, while a few ignored the armistice altogether 
or passed over it briefly. For many, however, the truce was featured prominently, clearly 
retaining its meaning for participants as an event fondly remembered and a memory shared 
with fellow soldiers. 
With the end of the Great War, a flood of memoirs, histories and polemics that 
alternatively supported or condemned the war appeared, with no consensus either on the 
significance or result of the conflict being reached. The Christmas truce, instead of being 
consigned to oblivion by all but those who had participated in it, remained a vital part of the 
inter-war narrative and became increasingly utilized by those who took a firm stance on the 
war’s meaning.  Many still credited the truce to the professionalism of the soldiers involved, or 
took it as proof that Britain had not entered the war out of hatred against the enemy, but 
rather for the justice of the cause. Some who condemned the recent war, such as Philip Gibbs 
                                                          
800 Daily Telegraph, 1 January 1915; Manchester Guardian, 31 December 1914 and Morning Post, 31 
December 1914. 
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or C.E. Montague, believed that the armistice demonstrated a fellow-feeling for the enemy 
soldiers, or a manifestation of pre-war values. Surprisingly, the anti-war novels and memoirs 
that began to appear during the latter part of the 1920s – All Quiet on the Western Fr0nt, 
Goodbye to All That and Memoirs of a Fox-Hunting Man, which now constitute the trinity of 
the anti-war canon – either ignored the truce entirely or, as was the case with Graves, touted it 
as a tribute to his regiment’s traditions. As demonstrated by a survey of books written about 
the Great War before 1940, including the official British history of the conflict, the narrative of 
the Christmas truce in the first two decades after the end of the war continued to lack 
coherence, much like the varied views on the conflict itself.  
 With the advent of the Second World War and its aftermath, the discourse of both the 
Great War – now rechristened as the First World War, to denote its place as the precursor to 
the deadlier conflict – and the truce began to undergo major revisions.  The view of the earlier 
conflict as wasteful and futile, which during the interwar years had been merely one strand of 
its narrative, began to overshadow all other views of that war. The late 1950s and early 1960s 
works of historians such as Cameron, Clark, Taylor and Tuchman, who all strongly endorsed 
this interpretation, came to both shape and encapsulate the public understanding of the 
conflict, in which the incompetent “donkeys” of the British army leadership sacrificed the lives 
of the brave “lion” soldiers in a senseless and foolish war. The further connection drawn 
between the First and Second World Wars – with A.J.P. Taylor in particular blaming the 
second conflict on both the inept prosecution of the first war and mismanagement of the 
peace that followed it – hammered home the point that the First World War had not only 
killed and maimed millions of men for nothing, but had brought upon the world the second, 
and even deadlier, war.  With its reputation now firmly fixed, the First World War could never 
be viewed again as necessary or worthwhile, let alone successful in its achievements. As the 
anti-war narrative of the 1960s dominated all other views of the conflict, the Christmas truce 
became ripe for rediscovery as proof that, as early as 1914, the soldiers in the trenches had 
rebelled against their callous leadership and sought to make common cause with the equally 
abused soldiers opposite. 
 This view was reinforced in Britain during the 1960s through multiple media, including 
the works of the historians mentioned above, the 1964 BBC documentary The Great War, and 
the theatre and film versions of Oh What a Lovely War. In the 1970s, these sources of 
information were augmented by many interviews with surviving veterans whose memories 
were prodded by those already persuaded by the now-conventional narrative. “Did you tell 
them the truth?” George Ashurst was asked in 1985 about letters he wrote home during the 
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war. “Oh, yes, yes,” he replied, obviously bemused by the question, but far too polite to ask 
what the interviewer thought he would have written instead. With the insistence, from the 
1960s onwards, on one interpretation of the First World War, reinforced by the emphasis on 
the experiences of the men involved as well as the works of the soldier-writers who wrote of 
their disillusionment with the conflict, the British view of the truce coalesced around a 
narrative that supported the anti-war message of the second half of the twentieth century. 
 Over the past forty years, revisionist historians have tried without success to counter 
this view of the First World War, but it appears to be too firmly fixed in the British 
consciousness to be easily dislodged, as is the now-orthodox narrative of the Christmas truce. 
An evaluation of sources written between 1914 and 2013 that reference the armistice 
demonstrates that the conventional narrative of the truce, like that of the war itself, took 
many decades to develop. Once the myth of the Christmas truce, the widespread rebellion by 
traumatized soldiers against the war they hated, took root, however, the reality of the holiday 
armistice became obscured. By misrepresenting the words and feelings of the soldiers who had 
participated in the event, and ignoring the freely published accounts of it in regimental diaries 
and the British press, or the lack of disciplinary action taken against those involved, many 
have created a truce that bears little resemblance to the one which numerous soldiers joined 
in Flanders on Christmas Day 1914. “In the end, however,” Murphy declares in his children’s 
book about the armistice, “it was peace that won the day as hundreds of thousands of soldiers 
simply decided, despite direct orders to the contrary, that they weren’t going to fight.”801 This 
is, of course, not at all what the men involved in the Christmas truce decided. Those soldiers, 
in fact, wanted a day off, a holiday celebration, a temporary respite from fear and a break from 
the monotony of the trenches. They achieved all this, but only at the cost of having their 
actions and motivations misunderstood for the next century – in spite of the very clear record 
they left to the contrary. 
Since even some men who shared in the Christmas truce eventually came to believe in 
the myths about it, it is hardly surprising that those who wish to press the temporary cease-
fire into the service of the orthodox narrative of the war would also be inclined to distort both 
the reality and significance of the episode. As demonstrated, however, by the 
contemporaneous accounts of the soldiers involved, many of which appeared in the British 
press, it is apparent that the truce was widely publicized, and received by the public in the 
same spirit in which it was undertaken by those who participated in it: “We went out and met 
them,” E.G. Morley wrote matter-0f-factly to a friend, describing the “the curious pleasure of 
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chatting with men who had been doing their best to kill us, and we them.”802 The “most weird 
Christmas of my life,” as another soldier portrayed it, was just that: odd and unusual, a 
memory to cherish and a tale to relate in the letters written home, and a story to tell to 
grandchildren or reminisce about when meeting another veteran of the trenches, but not a 
reason to end a war.803  
In his 1967 work on the conflict, Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918, Llewellyn 
Woodward wrote that  
in the last years of the war, the futility, inevitable, outrageous in its necessity, 
overshadowed everything.  I use the words ‘inevitable’ and ‘necessary’ because I 
still thought that a German victory would fasten on Europe chains from which 
there would be no hope of release except after even greater misery. If I did not 
expect a much better world to come out of it, at least, though at far too heavy a 
cost, our victory would have removed the threat of a mindless European 
tyranny.804  
 
Wars are, by their very nature, senseless and idiotic: no one has ever started a sensible or 
justified one. If one nation, or an alliance of nations, is determined to begin a war, however, 
the countries attacked have few choices: either fight or give in. The First World War was 
indeed, as Llewellyn maintains, “outrageous in its necessity.” The true outrage of the war arose 
from the facts that fighting it was essential for Britain and that so many men had to die to win 
it.   
The 1914 cease-fire, the day of peace that has been romanticized by so many who 
subscribe to the orthodox narrative of the war, was instigated by men who believed in the 
cause for which they fought, and, in most cases, went on believing in that cause long after the 
temporary armistice and even the war itself ended. The truce may encapsulate our modern 
view of a hated war, but the First World War, and the 1914 armistice in particular, was 
perceived very differently by those who participated in it. Bruce Bairnsfather, whose account 
of the Christmas truce is renowned, characterized the episode as being “just like the interval 
between the rounds in a friendly boxing match.”805 The boxing match that was the First World 
War was in fact a deadly and tragic conflict, yet the spirit in which the Christmas truce was 
undertaken did generally reflect the attitudes of the soldiers who took part in it: determined 
to win the war, but at the same time very glad to take a break from the battle. 
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